Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL. If you are looking into JC-STAR and Chinese products, I suspect you want an answer to one question. Will Chinese-made storage batteries and IoT devices be shut out of the Japanese market by this scheme?
Here is what can be said as of the end of October 2026. The scheme itself has no nationality requirement. At the same time, the register of labeled products that the IPA (Information-technology Promotion Agency) updated on October 26 contains no entries under the names of Huawei, Sungrow, BYD, or CATL. From April 2027, new solar and battery installations connecting to the grid will need Star 1 labels on equipment such as PCS and EMS, and subsidies made Star 1 a precondition even earlier. Chinese manufacturers have been reported as calling this "de facto exclusion," while the Japanese government says it makes a "comprehensive judgment." Deciding who is right is not the job of this article. I will lay out facts and claims separately, then get to what companies should prepare.
A lot has moved since I first published this piece on July 6. Last time I leaned on press reports for the certification numbers. This time I downloaded the IPA's register as an Excel file and counted it myself.
| Question | Answer as of October 29, 2026 |
|---|---|
| Is there a rule that turns applicants away by nationality? | No. But the application asks for the head-office location of parent companies and manufacturers, and the IPA can consult METI |
| Do the four major Chinese firms hold labels? | Not under their own names on the register updated October 26 |
| Are there zero Chinese-affiliated registrations? | No. The Japanese subsidiary of a China-born solar maker holds a Star 1 label |
| What is required, and from when? | Star 1 for PCS, BMS, EMS, and similar equipment in grid-connection contract applications from April 2027 (October 2027 for low voltage). Subsidies already require it |
| Will installed Chinese equipment have to come out? | No retroactive effect. Replacements from April 2027 generally need Star 1 products |
What JC-STAR is: the four tiers and how nationality is handled
JC-STAR is formally the "Labeling Scheme based on Japan Cyber-Security Technical Assessment Requirements." It checks the security of internet-connected IoT products against a common yardstick and gives conforming products a label with a QR code. The IPA runs it under METI's oversight1. Routers and network cameras are in scope, and so are the PCS (power conditioning system, which converts between DC and AC), the BMS (battery management system), and the EMS (energy management system) used with solar and storage.
There are four tiers. Star 1 and Star 2 work by self-declaration: the vendor evaluates its own product against the published criteria and procedures, and the IPA issues the label based on the resulting checklist. The IPA checks the checklist's format but does not ask for the underlying evidence. In exchange, the vendor must keep that evidence for the life of the label, and the IPA can inspect after the fact and revoke the label if questions arise2. Star 3 and Star 4 are meant for government agencies and critical infrastructure, and the IPA certifies them based on an independent third-party evaluation. The IPA says it plans to open Star 3 and Star 4 applications "from 2026 onward," and it published Star 3 requirements for communication equipment and network cameras in February and June 20261. There are still no Star 2-or-higher criteria for batteries or PCS, and every one of the 355 entries on the October 1 register is Star 13.
The timeline matters for the debate. METI began its study group in November 2022, ran a public comment period in March and April 2024, and published the scheme's design policy on August 23, 20244. Star 1 applications opened on March 25, 20255. The criteria were written to align with Europe's ETSI EN 303 645 and the U.S. NISTIR 84251, and Japan signed memoranda toward mutual recognition with the UK's PSTI regime in November 2025 and with Singapore's labeling scheme in March 20266. Whatever you think of the outcome, the record shows a scheme that was being built in step with other countries long before the battery story broke.
So how is nationality handled? I could not find any provision in the published rules that excludes companies from a particular country. The application form does, however, ask for the name and head-office location of the parent companies of the applicant, the actual manufacturer, and the company that develops and maintains the firmware7. The IPA's guidance says it may consult METI, where necessary, on whether an application complies with "domestic laws and standards related to cybersecurity," and act on the response7. Its internal procedures also describe consulting METI's Cybersecurity Division, where necessary, on the contents of an application and receiving a reply in the division director's name8. And the IPA's top page states plainly that an application is not guaranteed to be accepted and can be rejected, for example for failing to meet requirements1.
One point is easy to mix up, so let me be clear about it. Having or not having a label describes registration status. It is not a judgment on a product's safety, let alone on a company's merits. The IPA itself says a label marks a minimum baseline and does not guarantee complete security2. By the same logic, a missing label does not mean "a risky product." From the outside, you cannot tell whether a company never applied, is still in process, or was not accepted.
Before looking at labels, check where your sourcing is concentrated: We offer a fill-in version of the 44-item checklist attached to METI's Economic Security Management Guidelines (1st edition). It walks you through items such as dependence on a single source and qualifying alternative suppliers in advance. The guidelines themselves state that they are not written with transactions involving any particular country, company, or person in mind, which is one reason I chose them for this article. → Download the 44-item self-check worksheet
Can Chinese products get the label? Checking the IPA register (updated October 26, 2026)
The IPA publishes every labeled product in a downloadable Excel list. The October 26 version has 378 entries from 158 companies3. Of those, 168 entries from 85 companies fall under "energy-related equipment" or "battery systems." My previous update of this article, which counted the October 1 version, gave 155 entries and 79 companies, so the figures are up by 13 entries and 6 companies. If you split the same list by label date, there were 32 such companies as of March 19, 2026, the day the Nikkei reported that some thirty-odd companies from various countries had been certified and none from China, and 61 by July 6, when this article first ran. The number has risen about two and a half times in under seven months.
The list is international. Germany's SMA Solar Technology registered in September 2025, South Korea's Samsung SDI in October 2025, and Spain's Power Electronics in March 2026. Tesla Japan registered products in October 2025 and June 2026. From April 2026 onward, Taiwanese companies kept arriving: SEETEL, HD Renewable Energy, Chang Gung International Energy, MetaEnergy Technology, ETICA Battery, and Delta Electronics. Korea's LS ELECTRIC and H2 joined over the summer. October brought more, including a Taiwanese battery management system (October 5), an SMA storage system (October 7), and an Itochu storage system (October 17). Among Japanese companies, PowerX registered in September 2025, and Nichicon and Kyocera in March 20263.
What about the four major Chinese firms? I searched the register using their names in English, Chinese characters, and Japanese katakana and found no entries under Huawei, Sungrow, BYD, or CATL3. That has not changed since July, and it is the same on the October 26 version.
Still, "zero Chinese-affiliated companies" would be wrong. Suntech Power Japan, the Japanese subsidiary of Suntech, a solar maker that started in China, obtained Star 1 on August 14, 2026 for a power measurement and control unit used with PCS3. GoodWe, a PCS maker headquartered in China, took a different route through its Japanese subsidiary on September 24. It limits PCS communication to RS485 (Modbus RTU) so the PCS does not connect directly to external networks, and pairs it with an EMS or data logger that already holds Star 19. The PCS itself has no label, but the approach follows the rule that equipment without IP communication is outside JC-STAR's scope.
The register has limits, and they matter. It shows only labels that have been issued. Pending, withdrawn, or rejected applications do not appear, and nothing public tells us whether the four companies ever applied. The accurate reading is narrow: as of October 26, there are no entries under those four names.
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Where the label is required: grid connection, subsidies, and public procurement
JC-STAR is voluntary. Companies are rushing anyway because more and more rules point to it, and the grid is where it bites hardest.
At its grid code study meeting in December 2025, Japan's Agency for Natural Resources and Energy decided that IP-connected equipment in new solar and battery installations must use JC-STAR Star 1 products10. The rule applies to projects whose connection contract application is accepted by the transmission and distribution utility on or after the effective date of April 1, 2027. The trigger is the contract application, not the interconnection date. For low voltage (under 50 kW), the start was pushed back six months to October 2027 to allow for inventory already in distribution. Wind follows in April 2027 (initially limited to gateway firewalls), and fuel cells in April 202810. The agency's page, last updated October 16, says it will consider transitional measures for fuel cells if needed11. Covered equipment includes output control devices such as PCS, BMS, and EMS, as well as remote monitoring devices and gateways. If a device has IP communication capability, it is covered even if that function is not normally used. Fully self-consuming sites that never sell power are covered too, as long as they are connected to the grid10.
For existing sites, the new rule does not apply retroactively if the contract application was accepted by the end of March 2027. From April 2027, though, replacing covered equipment, even with the identical model, no longer counts as a "minor change." You will need to file a connection study application, and the replacement should, as a rule, be a Star 1 product11. Only where that would impose an excessive burden, for example because compatibility issues would force a much wider replacement, can a site keep using an unlabeled equivalent for the time being. That requires a plan stating why replacement is difficult, the year by which everything will be replaced, and the security measures in place until then11.
Why go this far for the power grid? The agency points to two things. Small solar installations under 50 kW have no cybersecurity-specific technical standard under the Electricity Business Act. And in May 2024, about 800 remote monitoring devices at solar plants were compromised and used as stepping stones for fraudulent online banking transfers10. I wrote about how home and office IoT devices get turned into relays in why blocking overseas traffic falls short.
Subsidies moved first. The FY2025 supplementary subsidy for grid-scale battery storage, open for applications from September 4 to November 4, 2026, requires Star 1 labels for the main control-system components of the battery system, including BMS, PCS, and EMS12. The same guidelines require that the BMS maker has not breached internationally accepted standards and that its development and supply are otherwise appropriate, and they award extra points when the cells come from a maker whose supply assurance plan was certified under the Economic Security Promotion Act12. The residential battery subsidy has a similar Star 1 requirement13. The third Long-Term Decarbonization Power Source Auction set out the same Star 1 policy for battery BMS, PCS, and EMS, and the agency's cybersecurity guidelines for energy resource aggregation (Ver. 3.0, May 2025) require Star 1 or higher for IoT products that aggregators newly deploy14.
On the procurement side, Japan's National Cybersecurity Office revised its guidelines for government agencies in September 2025 so that JC-STAR registration status becomes part of the selection criteria for IoT devices: Star 1 products for low-importance systems, and Star 1 or higher plus stronger functions for medium- and high-importance systems6. For local governments, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications added JC-STAR checks to its guidelines in March 2025, and similar steps for critical infrastructure operators are being coordinated6. The local-government procurement changes reported in April 2026 are covered in Japan's local government IT procurement shift.
"De facto exclusion"? The Chinese manufacturers' claim and the Japanese government's explanation
The same facts look different depending on where you stand, so here is who is saying what.
Start with the manufacturers. According to the Nikkei (March 19, 2026) and the Hankyoreh (July 2026), which cited it, some Chinese battery makers pushed back, saying that "only companies from a specific country are having their applications rejected; this is de facto exclusion"1516. The coverage described the four companies as global market leaders and framed it as a problem that firms with large global share cannot get through in Japan. From a trade-rules perspective, the argument that a standard can work as a barrier to entry is a legitimate one to raise. I should add that, as far as I could find by October 29, neither China's Ministry of Commerce nor its Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued an official statement naming JC-STAR. The claim, as reported, comes from companies.
Now the Japanese government. According to the same reports, METI says it decides by making a comprehensive judgment based on information submitted by companies and information held by the Japanese government1516. The absence of a nationality requirement, alignment with European and U.S. standards, and mutual recognition work with the UK and Singapore are facts that support the government's account16. Protecting power infrastructure is also an aim that stands on its own, regardless of nationality.
Between the two sits the question of what the review actually looks at. A June 30, 2026 analysis by the law firm Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu says that, during review, government bodies are asked whether "the IoT product vendor is affected by a foreign legal environment," and that clearing this is a practical hurdle for Chinese companies17. Press reports have described a similar check. I could not find that wording in the IPA documents I read, though. What the public documents confirm is what I described above: applicants disclose the head-office locations of parent companies and manufacturers, and the IPA can consult METI78. Conceptually, I see it as close to Japan's critical infrastructure pre-screening regime under the Economic Security Promotion Act, which requires operators to report where their equipment suppliers are based and whether those suppliers deal with foreign governments.
The Hankyoreh reported that Chinese companies suspect the Japanese government is concerned about China's National Intelligence Law16. The law passed on June 27, 2017 and took effect the next day. Article 7 provides that all organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence work in accordance with the law18. On the other side, a spokesperson for China's National People's Congress said at a March 4, 2019 press conference that China has never asked, and will never ask, Chinese companies to act against local laws and regulations overseas19. You cannot draw conclusions about any specific product from the existence of a law, and this article does not pick between the two readings.
The word "rejected" also needs care. Under the IPA's rules, applications can indeed be turned down18. But no public record shows that any particular company's application was rejected, and nothing public says whether the four companies applied. "Applied and was rejected" and "has no registration under its own name" are different statements.
One view of my own. I understand why the grounds for individual decisions cannot all be disclosed. Still, when the criteria cannot be seen from outside, the people relying on the scheme carry that burden too. A check that appears in press reports but not in the published documents is not a good place for anyone to be, whichever side they are on. That is as far as I will go on evaluation.
What changed between July and October 2026
Here are the main differences between the first version of this article and today.
| Item | First version (July 6, 2026) | Now (October 29, 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Energy-related labels | "Thirty-odd companies," per press reports | 85 companies and 168 entries on the IPA register (updated October 26) |
| Four major Chinese firms | "Zero certifications," per press reports | Still no entries under their names (October 26 update) |
| Chinese-affiliated companies | Not covered | Japanese subsidiary of a China-born maker labeled (August 14); PCS configuration that cuts external communication (September 24) |
| Grid-connection rule | "Under deliberation," texts not yet issued | Agency published timing, replacement rules, and the exception plan (July). The utilities' technical requirements are due to be revised within FY2026 |
| Subsidies | Not covered | Star 1 required for BMS, PCS, and EMS in grid-scale (applications September 4 to November 4) and residential programs |
| What the review checks | METI's "comprehensive judgment" | IPA guidance confirms METI consultation and disclosure of head-office locations. A law firm analysis mentions a foreign-legal-environment check |
| Star 2 and above | Only Star 1 in operation | Register still Star 1 only. Star 3 requirements published for communication equipment and network cameras |
The biggest change is that "from when, and for what" is now concrete. In July I could only describe the grid rule as a framework under discussion. Now the agency's own page explains it from the start dates down to how replacements at existing sites work11. The utilities' technical requirements are still described as being revised "within FY2026," but companies have enough to plan against.
The other change is speed on the supply side. Energy-related registrants went from 32 in March to 85 in October, with Taiwanese and Korean companies arriving in quick succession. On July 31, the IPA posted a notice that applications had surged and reviews were taking longer than usual1. Chinese-affiliated companies have started to move as well, either by obtaining labels through Japanese subsidiaries or by redesigning systems to cut external communication. The one thing that has not changed since July is the absence of entries under the four major firms' names.
What companies handling batteries and IoT devices should do now
However you judge the scheme, April 2027 is now less than six months away. Let me set positions aside and talk about practice.
Start with an inventory. For each model of PCS, BMS, EMS, remote monitoring device, and gateway, check whether it has IP communication capability, then look it up on the IPA register. Equipment without IP communication is out of scope, but equipment that has the capability and simply does not use it is in scope10. If you get the registration number and validity period from suppliers in writing, you can reuse them for both subsidy applications and grid-connection paperwork.
Next, work backward from the contract application date. Projects whose applications the utility accepts by the end of March 2027 stay under the old rules. Slip into April (October for low voltage) and you need Star 110. With the IPA's queue as long as it is, I would not build a schedule around a supplier's expected certification date.
If you own operating plants or storage sites, write your replacement plan now. From April 2027, swapping out even one failed PCS means a Star 1 replacement and a connection study application. The exception plan requires supporting evidence and a deadline for full replacement, so it is worth organizing your extended-warranty contracts and spare-parts inventory while there is time11.
Diversifying suppliers is another step worth taking regardless of how you view the scheme. If supply is concentrated in one country or one company, a gap in certification status or a geopolitical shift can stall your project through no fault of your own. The subsidy scoring that rewards cells from makers certified under the Economic Security Promotion Act reflects the same concern12. Storage batteries were designated as a "specified critical material" under that Act on December 20, 2022, alongside semiconductors and other items20. For the broader map, see Japan's Economic Security Promotion Act and what it means for companies.
This kind of inventory has a lot in common with export classification work: making your equipment, technology, specifications, and suppliers visible, then sorting out which rule in which regime applies to them. Companies that have turned this into a routine tend to cope calmly when new requirements arrive. If you want to see where your export compliance program stands, try our three-minute export compliance check. Our AI agent TRAFEED drafts Japan export classifications and screens counterparties against restricted party lists from multiple jurisdictions, with the evidence on file. Your export control officer makes the final call. It does not handle JC-STAR on your behalf, but as a way to keep economic-security risk visible in ordinary times, I see it as a neighboring field.
To restate where this article stands: I have not concluded that JC-STAR is either "a tool for excluding China" or "a purely technical scheme." What the facts support is narrower. A certification scheme aligned with international standards is being built into Japan's power-grid and subsidy rules, and as of October 26 there are no entries under the names of the four major Chinese firms. Whether that adds up to "exclusion" is a matter of judgment, and the answer depends on where you stand. The rules will keep moving. What a company can do is hold its judgment and check its own equipment and sourcing. If you would like to treat export control and economic security as one continuous problem, get in touch. An overview is in the TRAFEED product catalog (PDF).
References
Footnotes
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Labeling Scheme based on Japan Cyber-Security Technical Assessment Requirements (JC-STAR) — IPA (Japanese) — latest notice dated July 31, 2026 (accessed October 29, 2026) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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Detailed information on the JC-STAR labeling scheme — IPA (Japanese) (accessed October 3, 2026) ↩ ↩2
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List of products with conformance labels (Excel updated October 26, 2026) — IPA (Japanese) (downloaded October 29, 2026 and counted by TIMEWELL) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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JC-STAR utilization guide for IoT products in sector-specific systems (version 1.0) — METI Cybersecurity Division (Japanese) — November 2024 ↩
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Operation of the JC-STAR security labeling scheme for IoT products has begun — METI (Japanese) — March 25, 2025 ↩
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Initiatives for using JC-STAR — IPA (Japanese) — last updated July 9, 2026 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Guide to security requirement conformity assessment, certification, and label applications (JSM-02-A) — IPA (Japanese) — March 2025 ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Procedures for conformity assessment, certification, and label issuance (JSM-01-A) — IPA (Japanese) — March 2026 ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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GoodWe rolls out JC-STAR Star 1-ready configurations for PCS at solar plants — GoodWe Japan (PR TIMES, Japanese) — September 24, 2026 ↩
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Cybersecurity measures for distributed energy resources — Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Electricity Infrastructure Division (Japanese) — July 2026 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
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Cybersecurity in the electricity sector (bringing JC-STAR into the grid code) — Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (Japanese) — last updated October 16, 2026 (accessed October 29, 2026) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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FY2025 supplementary grid-scale battery storage subsidy: application guidelines — Sustainable open Innovation Initiative (SII) (Japanese) — September 2026 ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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FY2025 supplementary residential battery storage subsidy: application guidelines (version 1.1) — SII (Japanese) — March 26, 2026 ↩
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Cybersecurity risks and countermeasures for grid-scale battery businesses (Stationary Storage Study Group, FY2025 1st meeting, Document 5-1) — METI (prepared by Mitsubishi Research Institute) (Japanese) — July 22, 2025 ↩
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Chinese storage batteries still at zero in Japan's cyber certification; firms push back, calling it "de facto exclusion" — Nikkei (Japanese) — March 19, 2026 (paywalled portion not used) ↩ ↩2
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Many Chinese battery companies fall short in Japan's cyber certification: "Clashing over economic security" — Hankyoreh (reprinted on Yahoo! News Japan, Japanese) — July 2026 ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Government exclusion of Chinese IT products? Cybersecurity at local governments and critical infrastructure operators, and JC-STAR and ISMAP certification — Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (Japanese) — June 30, 2026 ↩
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[China] Enactment of the National Intelligence Law (Foreign Legislation, August 2017) — National Diet Library, Research and Legislative Reference Bureau (Japanese) — August 2017 ↩
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Zhang Yesui: China has always encouraged companies to strictly observe local laws and regulations when operating overseas — Xinhuanet (Chinese) — March 4, 2019 ↩
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Press conference by the Minister of State for Economic Security — Cabinet Office (Japanese) — December 20, 2022 ↩






