"TRAFEED" Articles (289)

The BIS and OFAC 50% Rules: Exactly 50%, Aggregation, and Chains of Subsidiaries

Does exactly 50% ownership trigger the BIS and OFAC 50% rules? Are several owners' stakes added together? How are grandchild and great-grandchild companies counted? This guide works through the text of the rule and OFAC's numbered FAQ examples, and covers where the BIS rule's stay stands (it ends 9 November 2026) and how to check a counterparty's ownership.

2026-10-20Ryuta Hamamoto

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US EAR and China's Export Controls Reach Past Their Borders: A Guide for Japanese Exporters

US EAR and Chinese export controls can reach products shipped from Japan to a third country. But "one US-made part makes it subject" is a myth. This guide walks through the four ways the EAR attaches, the de minimis calculation (10% and 25%), foreign direct product rules, the 0.1% rule for Chinese rare earths and where it stands today, and a way to check your own exposure, all based on the regulations and notices themselves.

2026-10-20Ryuta Hamamoto

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Cyberattacks Are an Export Control Problem Too: Tech Leaks and Fake IT Workers

When drawings and technical documents are stolen in a cyberattack, it is not only an IT problem. Working from primary sources in Japan, including METI's guidance documents, government alerts on North Korean IT workers and the design policy for the new SCS supply chain security ratings, this article maps four routes technology leaves a company, ten checks to run in-house, and how to prepare when a customer asks for TICS or an SCS 4-star rating.

2026-10-04Ryuta Hamamoto

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UNGA 2026 General Debate: What World Leaders Said on Security

At the 81st UN General Assembly general debate (September 22-28, 2026), Japan's Prime Minister Takaichi, President Trump, China's Vice President Han Zheng and Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov set out their security positions. I sorted the original texts by topic, from Ukraine and Hormuz to the South China Sea, AI and sanctions, and note what it means for companies.

2026-10-04Ryuta Hamamoto

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China's Revised Defense Mobilization Law Takes Effect: What Applies to Companies in Peacetime

China's revised National Defense Mobilization Law (14 chapters, 82 articles) took effect on October 1, 2026. Most coverage has focused on the requisition of civilian resources, but several articles bind companies before any mobilization is declared, including a duty to supply data for mobilization-potential surveys. I walk through the text by article number and list what export control and subsidiary management teams should check.

2026-10-03Ryuta Hamamoto

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The Asahi Kasei Arrest: Which Law Was Broken, and Where Export Controls Fit

On September 17, 2026, Aichi police arrested a former Asahi Kasei employee on suspicion of disclosing trade secrets on a latent curing agent used in semiconductor packaging to a Chinese company. Working from Asahi Kasei's own statement and Japanese press reports, this article lays out the timeline, explains which part of Japan's Unfair Competition Prevention Act the arrest rests on, why the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act and the Economic Security Promotion Act do not appear, and what to check in your own company today.

2026-09-18Ryuta Hamamoto

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Takaichi's Cabinet Reshuffle and Economic Security | Who Stayed, Who Joined, What Changes

Japan's second Takaichi cabinet was reshuffled on September 17, 2026. Reading the official roster, the cabinet's basic policy, and the ministers' first press conferences, this article explains why the economic security, defense, foreign, and industry ministers all stayed, how the economic security portfolio was narrowed, who the ten new and returning ministers are, and what export control practitioners should watch over the next three to six months.

2026-09-18Ryuta Hamamoto

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Why Japan's Shipbuilding Revival Is a Defense Issue | The Numbers and the Policy

In September 2026 Japan's ruling LDP framed shipbuilding as a pillar of economic security and restated the goal of doubling output by 2035. Japan once built half the world's ships; its order share fell to 8 percent. This article reads the primary documents behind the designation of hulls as a critical good, the 311 billion yen in subsidies approved for eight shipbuilding groups, Japan's 99.5 percent reliance on sea transport, the Mogami-class export to Australia, and Japan-US shipbuilding cooperation, and explains why shipbuilding capacity is defense capacity.

2026-09-14Ryuta Hamamoto

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Building a Japan That Can Surge Drone and Ammunition Production

On 11 September 2026, Japan's Ministry of Defense was reported to be planning capital investment subsidies and a revision of the Defence Production Base Strengthening Act so that drones and ammunition can be surged in a contingency. This piece checks what is actually on the table in the FY2027 budget request and the Basic Policy 2026, looks at how Ukraine's four-million-drones-a-year war changed the nature of fighting, the dependence on Chinese-made drones that hold more than 70 percent of the world market, a Japan-China defence spending comparison using SIPRI and National People's Congress figures (roughly five to one), and the components and export control work that domestic surge capacity will require.

2026-09-12Ryuta Hamamoto

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What Waseda's Export Control Poster Gets Right: It Is More Than Shipping Goods

On 9 September 2026, Waseda University published an awareness poster on security export control. Its headline, "More Than Just Shipping Goods!", points at five everyday campus scenes: accepting international students and researchers, joint research, carrying data and samples abroad, hosting visitors, and closed lectures. This piece explains why export control is so often mistaken for a shipping formality, how Japan's "deemed export" rules and the 2022 specific-types approach work, what intake management looks like now that Japan hosts 408,000 international students, and the research security procedure manual that takes effect in fiscal 2026.

2026-09-12Ryuta Hamamoto

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What the CIA Director's Moscow Trip Actually Signals

On 25 August 2026 the CIA director flew to Moscow unannounced. The reported purpose was a warning not to attack NATO. But what US intelligence is said to be worried about is not conventional war, and that distinction changes what companies should do about it.

2026-08-27Ryuta Hamamoto

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512 Days of Hormuz Transit Data | What a 91.6% Drop Looks Like

I aggregated 512 days of daily transit counts for the Strait of Hormuz. Before the closure, 84.8 vessels a day; after, 7.1. The collapse took three days. And the partial recovery that appeared in June had disappeared again by August.

2026-08-27Ryuta Hamamoto