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UNGA 2026 General Debate: What World Leaders Said on Security

Published2026-10-04Ryuta Hamamoto

At the 81st UN General Assembly general debate (September 22-28, 2026), Japan's Prime Minister Takaichi, President Trump, China's Vice President Han Zheng and Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov set out their security positions. I sorted the original texts by topic, from Ukraine and Hormuz to the South China Sea, AI and sanctions, and note what it means for companies.

UNGA 2026 General Debate: What World Leaders Said on Security
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Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.

From September 22 to 28, 2026, world leaders gathered at UN Headquarters in New York for the general debate of the 81st General Assembly. Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took the podium on the first day.

Reading the speeches one after another, I noticed an odd overlap. Japan warned about "arbitrary export restrictions." Germany said no country should accept "raw materials being used to force obedience." India described "a weaponization of everything." China criticized "building walls" and "cutting supply chains." Similar words, pointed in different directions. For anyone who works in export control or procurement, that is not just diplomatic theater.

For this piece I went back to the original texts published by each government and regrouped the security-related remarks by topic. I am not going to judge whose position is right. The aim is to set out who said what, and then think through what it means for Japanese and international companies that export, source and run sites abroad. If you want a quick read on your own program first, try the 3-minute export compliance check.

Summary: The main security topics at the 81st UN General Assembly general debate (September 22-28, 2026) were Ukraine, the Strait of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear program, the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, AI and autonomous weapons, and Security Council reform. Prime Minister Takaichi raised concerns about arbitrary export restrictions, called for a stronger NPT regime, and urged expansion of both categories of Security Council membership and deletion of the "enemy State" clauses; China and North Korea used their right of reply to oppose deletion. The United States said it would never allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon and rejected any global scheme to control AI, while Russia said the objectives of its "special military operation" would be achieved. Germany and India voiced concern about raw materials and supply chains being used as pressure. The split over Iran sanctions bears directly on how companies screen counterparties.

The 81st general debate: dates and key speakers

The general debate is the opening segment of each autumn session of the UN General Assembly, when heads of state, heads of government and ministers take turns at the podium to set out their country's positions. Nothing is adopted. Still, it is one of the few moments when governments summarize a year of foreign policy in their own words, which makes it the quickest way I know to map the year's security agenda.

The 81st general debate ran from September 22 to 28, 20261. The theme was "Restoring trust, managing transformation: a United Nations that delivers for all," and the session was presided over by Khalilur Rahman of Bangladesh. After Secretary-General António Guterres opened the debate, Brazil and then the United States spoke first, as is customary. Guterres leaves office at the end of 2026, so this was his last general debate.

Prime Minister Takaichi spoke on September 222. It was her first general debate as prime minister, and she arrived in New York only days after reshuffling her cabinet on September 17. I covered the new lineup in my piece on the second Takaichi cabinet and economic security.

Here are the main speakers. Some countries sent their leader; others sent a foreign minister or another senior official. China was represented by Vice President Han Zheng. That same week, President Xi Jinping was in Washington on a state visit, with an arrival ceremony at the White House on September 243.

Country / body Speaker Date (New York time)
United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres Sep 22
Japan Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi Sep 22
United States President Donald Trump Sep 22
France President Emmanuel Macron Sep 22
United Kingdom Prime Minister Andy Burnham Sep 22
Republic of Korea President Lee Jae Myung Sep 22
Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy Sep 23
Iran President Masoud Pezeshkian Sep 23
European Union European Council President António Costa Sep 24
China Vice President Han Zheng Sep 26
Russia Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Sep 26
Germany Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul Sep 26
India External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar Sep 26
Philippines Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro Sep 26
DPRK (North Korea) Vice Foreign Minister Kim Son Gyong Sep 28

The other thing worth watching is the right of reply, which lets a country that has been named or criticized respond at the end of a meeting. Japan used it three times this year: once on September 26 in response to Russia, and twice on September 28 in response to North Korea and China4.

One piece of background: the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held every five years to review how the treaty is working, met from April 27 to May 22, 2026 and closed without agreeing on a final document5. In the general debate, Japan, the Philippines and the EU, among others, called for maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime.

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Topic-by-country table: who said what

The table below groups the main security remarks by topic. The "Original text" column quotes briefly from the speech texts published by each government or submitted to the UN. Chinese, Russian, French and Korean quotes appear in the original language, with my English rendering in the summary column. For Japan I quote the government's provisional English translation of the Japanese original. North Korea's quote comes from the English text its delegation submitted, and Ukraine's from the English version published by the President's Office, which I checked against the Ukrainian version.

Topic Country / speaker (date) Summary Original text (short quote)
Export restrictions and supply chains Japan, PM Takaichi (9/22) Concern about arbitrary export restrictions is spreading; proposes critical-mineral supply chain measures "concerns about arbitrary export restrictions are growing throughout the international community"
Export restrictions and supply chains Germany, FM Wadephul (9/26) No country should accept raw materials or supply chains being used as instruments of pressure "No country should have to accept raw materials being used to force obedience."
Export restrictions and supply chains India, EAM Jaishankar (9/26) Pressure now runs through finance, market access, supply chains and technology "a weaponization of everything"
Export restrictions and supply chains China, VP Han Zheng (9/26) "Protectionism produces no winners"; decoupling disrupts supply chains and harms all 「保护主义没有赢家」
Ukraine Russia, FM Lavrov (9/26) "The objectives of the special military operation will be achieved" «цели специальной военной операции будут достигнуты»
Ukraine Ukraine, President Zelenskyy (9/23) Asks governments to limit trade with Russia and keep sanctions in place "When someone gives Russia more money through trade, they give this war more time."
Ukraine China, VP Han Zheng (9/26) Will play a constructive role toward a political settlement "in its own way," guided by Xi's "four points" 「以自己的方式」
Ukraine France, President Macron (9/22) Supports "a double moratorium" on energy and civilian infrastructure and on the Black Sea «un double moratoire»
Middle East and shipping Japan, PM Takaichi (9/22) All vessels should pass through the Strait of Hormuz freely and safely, without new costs "without additional costs, as has been the case"
Middle East and Iran's nuclear program United States, President Trump (9/22) Iran will not be allowed a nuclear weapon "I will never allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon."
Middle East and shipping France, President Macron (9/22) Has set up a multinational coalition "to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz" «restaurer la liberté de navigation dans le détroit d'Ormuz»
Middle East and shipping EU, President Costa (9/24) Unconditional freedom of navigation in Hormuz; Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon "unconditionally and without hindrance"
Korean Peninsula ROK, President Lee (9/22) Stages: halt advances in North Korea's capabilities, reduce them in the medium term, reach a nuclear-free peninsula in the long term 「중단시키고, 중기적으로 축소를 거쳐」
Korean Peninsula DPRK, Vice FM Kim (9/28) Its status as a nuclear weapons state is irreversible "can never be reversed in any circumstances or by any means"
Korean Peninsula Japan, PM Takaichi (9/22) Full implementation of Security Council resolutions and resolution of the abductions issue "under the principle of the complete denuclearization of North Korea"
South China Sea Philippines, FS Lazaro (9/26) The 2016 arbitral award is final and binding "final and legally binding"
South China Sea China, Amb. Sun Lei, Permanent Mission (right of reply, 9/28) "The UN is not the appropriate forum to discuss the South China Sea issue"; does not accept the award 「联合国不是讨论南海问题的合适场所」
Taiwan Strait Tuvalu, PM Teo (9/25) Concerned that military activities around Taiwan threaten stability and trade "threaten stability across the Taiwan Strait"
AI and autonomous weapons UN, Secretary-General Guterres (9/22) Life-and-death decisions must never be handed to machines "Killer robots must have no place in our future."
AI United States, President Trump (9/22) Rejects any global framework for controlling AI "totally rejects any attempt to construct a globalist scheme of control"
AI Germany, FM Wadephul (9/26) Common safety requirements for the most capable models, including pre-release testing and incident reporting "test these models before release"
AI, space and cyber France, President Macron (9/22) New rules needed for AI "in space, in defense, in cybersecurity" «dans le spatial, dans la défense, dans la cybersécurité»
Information and cyber UK, PM Burnham (9/22) Has tasked security chiefs to begin work on a new body against hostile state information attacks "National Centre for Information Defence"
Security Council reform Japan, PM Takaichi (9/22) Expand both permanent and non-permanent seats; delete the "enemy State" clauses "these clauses must be deleted"
Security Council reform Russia, FM Lavrov (9/26) No additional seats for the West, "especially Germany and Japan"; supports Brazil and India «тем более Германии и Японии»
"Enemy State" clauses China, Amb. Sun Lei (right of reply, 9/28) The clauses "remain of great practical relevance today"; opposes deletion 「时至今日仍具有重要现实意义」
Defense and alliances UK, PM Burnham (9/22) Meet NATO commitments and keep building deterrence "relentless in building up our hard power and deterrence"
Defense and alliances Australia, PM Albanese (9/24) Works with both its ally and its main trading partner "our principal ally the United States and our major trading partner in China"

Building the table taught me two things. First, among the major powers whose texts I checked, almost nobody mentioned the Taiwan Strait directly; it was Taiwan's diplomatic partners who did. Second, concern about export restrictions and supply chains came from governments on different sides, in strikingly similar language. I come back to both points below.

What the major speakers said

Here I take the main speeches one at a time. How a government spends its limited minutes at the podium is a statement of priorities in itself. I go in this order: Japan, the United States and China, Russia and Ukraine, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific, focusing on security and economic security. Translations from non-English originals are mine unless noted.

Japan: three pillars and a push for UN reform

Prime Minister Takaichi described an international order under strain, then organized her speech around three pillars drawn from the "Updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" she announced in May2. The first was resilient supply chains for energy and critical materials. Here she said that "concerns about arbitrary export restrictions are growing throughout the international community," and proposed not only developing alternative sources but also building countries' ability to respond when supply is cut off. Her concrete examples were the "Resilient and Inclusive Supply-chain Enhancement (RISE) Partnership," which helps producer countries take on a bigger role in mining, refining and processing critical minerals, and a 20 million US dollar contribution to "RISE+," set up under the World Bank Group. She did not name any country.

The second pillar was cooperation for peace and stability: the NPT regime, North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and its malicious cyber activities including cryptocurrency theft, and the abductions issue. Pointing to concerns about nuclear and missile technology spreading through Russia-North Korea military cooperation, she said, "The security of the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic is inseparable." The third pillar was a free and open order based on the rule of law. Using Russia's aggression against Ukraine as the example, she said that when a permanent member vetoes resolutions on its own actions, "it must be said that the Security Council is not functioning for international peace." On the Strait of Hormuz, she stressed that all vessels must be able to pass freely and safely "without additional costs, as has been the case."

The second half turned to UN reform. She called for expanding both permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council and for deleting the so-called "enemy State" clauses from the UN Charter. On AI, she pointed to the Hiroshima AI Process and said Japan intends to host an AI Summit at the earliest opportunity. She closed by saying that Japan has contributed as a peace-loving nation under its exclusively defense-oriented policy for 70 years and that "this policy will remain unchanged in the future." At her press conference the next day, she added that she and President Trump had agreed to deepen economic security cooperation, including on AI, semiconductors and critical minerals6.

The United States and China: President Trump and Vice President Han Zheng

President Trump devoted much of his speech to Iran. According to excerpts released by the White House, he said, "I will never allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon"7. The UN's meetings coverage reports that he urged countries to keep up economic pressure on Iran while predicting that a deal would be reached8. On Ukraine, he said he was working closely with the leaders of both Russia and Ukraine and expected a settlement sooner than people think. On AI, he said, "The United States totally rejects any attempt to construct a globalist scheme of control for the Artificial Intelligence," adding that AI would officially be called "Super Intelligence." He also referred to an agreement with Denmark and Greenland.

Vice President Han Zheng built his speech around the four global initiatives proposed by President Xi Jinping on development, security, civilization and governance, and offered four proposals9. On security, he rejected Cold War thinking and bloc confrontation and said China opposes 「违反联合国宪章、绕开联合国安理会授权的单边军事行动」 ("unilateral military actions that violate the UN Charter and bypass Security Council authorization"). On Ukraine, he cited Xi's "four points" as China's fundamental guidance and said China would play a constructive role toward a political settlement 「以自己的方式」 ("in its own way").

His economic remarks matter for anyone in export control. He said 「保护主义没有赢家」 ("protectionism produces no winners") and argued that 「筑墙设垒」 and 「脱钩断链」 ("building walls and barriers" and "decoupling and severing supply chains") disrupt the stability of global industrial and supply chains and harm everyone's interests. He also called for better governance rules for cyberspace, outer space and the polar regions. Later in the speech, he marked 55 years since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2758 in 1971.

Russia and Ukraine: Foreign Minister Lavrov and President Zelenskyy

Quoting President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov argued that countries of the Global South and East are asserting themselves as sovereign centers of development while a "Western minority" tries to hold on to its privileges10. On Ukraine, he said, «цели специальной военной операции будут достигнуты» ("the objectives of the special military operation will be achieved"). On the Middle East, he argued that US-Israeli strikes reaching Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards had damaged the non-proliferation system.

On Security Council reform, he rejected any additional seats for Western countries, "especially Germany and Japan," and backed permanent seats for Brazil and India along with meeting Africa's interests. He criticized NATO for extending its reach into Southeast and Northeast Asia, and announced that Russia, Belarus and like-minded partners had begun work on a "Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century." On cyber, he welcomed the UN Convention against Cybercrime, drafted at Russia's initiative and opened for signature in Hanoi the previous October.

President Zelenskyy cited Ukraine's own count that the Russian army lost 248,964 people, killed and badly wounded, between January and August of this year, and argued that ending the war means cutting off Russia's ability to pay for it11. In the English version published by his office, he said, "When someone gives Russia more money through trade, they give this war more time," and asked governments to keep sanctions in place and limit trade with Russia. He also noted that North Korean troops were fighting on Russia's side and that Pyongyang's ballistic missile and drone capabilities had improved.

He spent a good part of the speech on defense industry. He described scaling up interceptor drones, the FREYJA anti-ballistic missile program now involving ten countries including Ukraine, and "Drone Deals" that share Ukraine's counter-drone systems with partners, noting that he had signed a Drone Deal with Finland and a security agreement with Australia that same day. On AI, he warned that as early as next year there is a real possibility that AI, not only people, will begin to decide what happens on the battlefield.

Europe: the United Kingdom, France and Germany

In his first general debate as prime minister, Andy Burnham made national security his starting point12. He said Britain would keep investing in defense and meet its NATO commitments, and that "we will be relentless in building up our hard power and deterrence," while refusing to "play Russia's game of trading escalatory rhetoric." To counter Russian information operations, he said he was tasking security chiefs to begin work on a "National Centre for Information Defence" to detect, attribute and disrupt hostile state information attacks. On AI, he announced a new AI defense partnership with the United States to protect critical national infrastructure and said AI would be at the heart of the UK's G20 presidency in 2027. He also referred to the Graham Bill, which he said President Trump had signed the previous week, as part of the effort to raise the cost for Russia of continuing the war.

President Macron built his speech around five principles under the refrain of not giving in13. On the Middle East, he said France had set up «une coalition indépendante et multinationale pour restaurer la liberté de navigation dans le détroit d'Ormuz» ("an independent, multinational coalition to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz"). On Ukraine, he supported a "double moratorium," covering strikes on energy and civilian infrastructure and the Black Sea. On Security Council reform, he backed opening the Council to new members, starting with Africa, and the French-Mexican initiative to restrain the veto in cases of mass atrocities, which he said 128 member states now support. On AI, he argued against a world where only the United States and China decide, and proposed that independent-minded countries jointly build an open-source frontier model. He also mentioned G7 work to prevent a few countries from accumulating critical minerals and rare earths.

German Foreign Minister Wadephul spent most of his speech on AI14. He opened by asking the hall to imagine nuclear weapons developed by private companies, with launch codes in a CEO's safe, and noted that companies holding most of the world's AI patents are concentrated in just two countries. He then called on member states to work toward common safety requirements for the most capable AI models, under which providers would have to test models before release and report serious safety failures. On the economy, he said, "No country should have to accept raw materials being used to force obedience," and rejected supply chains becoming instruments of pressure. He described Germany as Ukraine's largest supporter and urged Russia to come to the negotiating table.

Asia-Pacific: South Korea, North Korea, India, the Philippines and Australia

President Lee Jae Myung presented three blueprints for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and described denuclearization in stages15. In the Korean original, he said 「우선 북측의 핵·미사일 능력 고도화를 중단시키고, 중기적으로 축소를 거쳐 장기적으로 핵 없는 한반도를 향해 나아갈 수 있을 것」, which translates as: first halt further advances in the North's nuclear and missile capabilities, then reduce them in the medium term, and move toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula in the long term. He hoped US-North Korea dialogue would resume soon. Citing repeated blockades of sea routes in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, he proposed a 「건설적 기여국 연대」 ("Partnership of Constructive Contributors") of countries willing and able to support energy supply chains.

North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Son Gyong spoke on the final day, September 28, and criticized US-Japan-ROK security cooperation as a military bloc aimed at his country16. He argued that Japan was moving to rearm, citing constitutional revision and counterstrike capabilities, and the English text submitted by the delegation says these moves are "casting war clouds over the entire region." On nuclear weapons, he said North Korea's status as a nuclear weapons state "can never be reversed in any circumstances or by any means."

India's External Affairs Minister Jaishankar said the targeting of commercial shipping and seafarers in the Gulf was unacceptable and noted that Indian seafarers had lost their lives17. He then said, "what we are actually seeing, is a weaponization of everything," describing pressure that extends "from the world of finance, to constricting market access, disrupting supply chains and withholding technology." On AI, he stressed each nation's right to develop its own models and deploy them in line with its own priorities.

Philippine Foreign Secretary Lazaro noted that Filipino seafarers had died in an incident in the Strait of Hormuz and said that maritime security is human security18. On the South China Sea, she marked ten years since the 2016 arbitral award, calling it "an award that is final and legally binding." She proposed exploring a framework anchored in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to protect critical maritime infrastructure such as undersea cables, and also called for preventing an arms race in outer space and restoring trust in the NPT.

Australian Prime Minister Albanese said Australia would deepen ties with Japan, India, South Korea and Europe while continuing to work closely with "our principal ally the United States and our major trading partner in China"19. Keeping the alliance and the trade relationship in separate sentences is a framing many Japanese companies will recognize from their own position between Washington and Beijing.

Where governments differ, topic by topic

Read country by country, the same topic often looks different depending on who is talking. In this section I regroup the remarks into seven topics. I do not judge which position is right; the point is to show where governments overlap and where they diverge.

Ukraine: different ideas about how the war ends

The remarks on Ukraine fell into roughly three camps. Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov said the objectives of the special military operation would be achieved, argued that the West was arming Ukraine, and said Europe was obstructing peace talks. Ukraine and European governments formed a second camp. President Zelenskyy called for sanctions and trade limits to cut off Russia's revenue, and Prime Minister Burnham said Britain would stand with Ukraine "for as long as it takes." Germany's Wadephul urged Russia to negotiate, and France's Macron proposed the double moratorium on energy infrastructure and the Black Sea.

The third camp put negotiation or mediation front and center. According to the UN's meetings coverage, President Trump said he was working closely with both leaders and expected a deal sooner than people understand8. China's Han Zheng said China would play a constructive role in its own way. India's Jaishankar said, "As Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated, endless war must give way now, to an end to war," and called for urgent attention to seafarers' safety and food and energy supplies17. Japan's Takaichi named Russia's aggression in her speech, and said afterward that she had told President Zelenskyy Japan would continue its support for Ukraine and its sanctions on Russia6.

From a compliance point of view, the sanctions debate shows no sign of winding down. Prime Minister Burnham pointed to the US Graham Bill as part of raising the cost for Russia, and President Zelenskyy asked for trade limits in so many words. Even companies with no direct Russian business should keep checking end users so that sales through Central Asia or the Caucasus do not look like diversion.

Middle East: the Strait of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear program

Among the speeches I read, the place name that came up most often was the Strait of Hormuz. Japan, France, South Korea, the Philippines, the EU, Australia, Türkiye, Italy, Canada, Brazil and Pakistan, among others, all referred to freedom or safety of navigation there20. India, too, called the targeting of shipping and seafarers in the Gulf unacceptable. EU President Costa put it this way: "Freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz must be preserved, unconditionally and without hindrance"21. Japan's insistence on passage "without additional costs" reads to me as a concern not only about passage itself but also about new charges being imposed on it. For how long the closure may last and what reopening would require, see how long the Strait of Hormuz closure will last: October 2026 status and conditions for reopening.

On Iran's nuclear program, positions split clearly. President Trump, EU President Costa and Canada's Foreign Minister Anand all said Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon, and Canada pointed to targeted sanctions announced that same week22. Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu defended the strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities as a matter of national survival23. Iran's President Pezeshkian, according to the UN meetings coverage, said peaceful nuclear technology is part of Iran's development and that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons, and said his country had been attacked while at the negotiating table and remained under sanctions24. Russia's Lavrov said strikes on IAEA-safeguarded facilities had harmed the non-proliferation regime.

The dispute did not stay in the general debate. On September 17, China and Russia vetoed a Security Council draft resolution that would have extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring implementation of UN sanctions on Iran, and the General Assembly held a debate on those vetoes on October 125. The United States argued that the "snapback" procedure under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) had brought the earlier UN sanctions back into force. China argued that the snapback was legally and procedurally flawed and that resolution 2231 had already expired. In other words, permanent members of the Council disagree on whether UN sanctions on Iran are in effect at all. For the shipping side of the story, see our count of vessel traffic in 512 days of Strait of Hormuz transits.

The Korean Peninsula and non-proliferation after a failed NPT review

Japan and South Korea both spoke of denuclearization, but in different terms. Prime Minister Takaichi called for full implementation of Security Council resolutions "under the principle of the complete denuclearization of North Korea," for resolving the abductions issue quickly, and said she was ready for dialogue in line with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. President Lee laid out stages, from halting advances to medium-term reductions to a nuclear-free peninsula in the long term, and proposed resuming US-North Korea talks and dialogue among the parties toward ending the Korean War and moving to a peace regime.

North Korea said its nuclear status was irreversible and criticized trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan and South Korea. President Zelenskyy said North Korean troops were fighting for Russia and gaining missile and drone capabilities, and Prime Minister Takaichi voiced concern about technology spreading through Russia-North Korea military cooperation. Canada's Foreign Minister Anand said Canada would continue to implement Security Council sanctions against North Korea22.

On non-proliferation more broadly, Japan, the Philippines and the EU called for maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime against the backdrop of the May review conference that ended without a final document. Secretary-General Guterres also urged governments to advance non-proliferation and disarmament without delay26. For companies, the point is that North Korea-related sanctions reach beyond goods. Takaichi named cryptocurrency theft and other malicious cyber activity as funding sources for the North's weapons programs, which is a reminder that due diligence now needs to cover hiring of remote IT workers and payment flows, not just shipments.

The Indo-Pacific: the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait

The South China Sea produced an exchange between the Philippines and China. Foreign Secretary Lazaro called the 2016 arbitral award final and legally binding in her speech on September 26. In a right of reply on September 28, Ambassador Sun Lei of China's Permanent Mission said 「联合国不是讨论南海问题的合适场所」 ("the UN is not the appropriate forum to discuss the South China Sea issue") and stated that China neither accepts nor recognizes the award27. The Philippines replied again that the award is final and binding. China added that it settles territorial and maritime delimitation disputes through negotiation with the countries directly concerned and will work with ASEAN countries to keep the South China Sea peaceful and stable.

Across the wider region, Prime Minister Takaichi said attempts to change the status quo unilaterally by force or coercion must never be tolerated anywhere in the world, while Foreign Minister Lavrov criticized NATO for extending its reach into Southeast and Northeast Asia. Looking at the same region, governments point their concern in different directions.

On the Taiwan Strait, I found no direct reference in the texts I checked from Japan, China, Russia, the UK, France, Germany, South Korea and India, nor in the White House excerpts and UN meetings coverage of President Trump's speech. China's Han Zheng, as noted, marked 55 years since resolution 2758. Taiwan's diplomatic partners did raise the subject. Tuvalu's Prime Minister Teo said military activities around Taiwan "threaten stability across the Taiwan Strait, disrupt international transportation and trade," and called for arrangements enabling the meaningful participation of Taiwan's people in the UN and its specialized agencies28. Saint Kitts and Nevis said that "differences across the Taiwan Strait must be resolved peacefully." The Marshall Islands offered a reading of resolution 2758 that differs from China's. Taiwan is not a UN member and does not speak in the general debate.

AI and autonomous weapons, space and cyber

AI drew an unusually wide range of views this year. Secretary-General Guterres said, "life-and-death decisions must never be surrendered to machines. Killer robots must have no place in our future," and proposed a multilateral AI risk management framework26. Germany proposed common safety requirements for the most capable models, including pre-release testing and incident reporting. The UK said it would work through its 2027 G20 presidency toward a single set of global principles and standards. France called for new state-to-state rules on AI in space, defense and cybersecurity, and Japan pointed to the Hiroshima AI Process and its plan to host an AI Summit.

On the other side, President Trump said the United States totally rejects any global scheme to control AI. China's Han Zheng called for a people-centered approach that narrows the digital divide. Russia's Lavrov said rules for AI can only be written on an equal footing with all countries taking part, and voiced support for China's proposal for a World AI Cooperation Organization. India stressed each nation's right to build its own models. President Zelenskyy warned that AI could soon be deciding outcomes on the battlefield and argued that existing wars should end before that happens.

On space and cyber, the Philippines called for preventing an arms race in outer space, and China for better governance rules for cyberspace, outer space and the polar regions. The UK announced its information defense center, and Poland's President Nawrocki said "a large-scale hybrid war" involving sabotage and cyberattacks was being waged29. The Philippine proposal on undersea cables belongs here too. I have written separately about military AI and lethal autonomous weapons and about Japan's air force becoming an aerospace force.

Security Council reform and the "enemy State" clauses

Many of the speeches I read called for Security Council reform. What they meant by it varied a lot. Japan called for expanding both permanent and non-permanent seats and said a majority of member states support that. The Marshall Islands backed permanent membership for Japan and its G4 partners. Russia opposed new seats for the West, especially Germany and Japan, and backed Brazil and India. France called for opening seats to Africa and others and for veto restraint; South Korea for a Council that works in a more effective, democratic and accountable way; and Türkiye for an end to a system in which more than 190 countries depend on the will of five20. According to the UN meetings coverage, President Trump described budget cuts and other changes as "the most sweeping reform in UN history"8.

The sharpest exchange involving Japan was over the "enemy State" clauses. Articles 53, 77 and 107 of the UN Charter still contain provisions on the "enemy" states of the Second World War. General Assembly resolution 50/52 of 1995 recognized these clauses as obsolete, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome (resolution 60/1) recorded the resolve to delete references to "enemy States" from the Charter30. Amending the Charter, however, requires ratification by two thirds of member states, including all five permanent members. In her speech, Prime Minister Takaichi said that in accordance with the 2005 resolution, these clauses must be deleted.

In a right of reply on September 28, China's Ambassador Sun Lei described the clauses as an institutional arrangement to keep fascism and militarism from threatening international peace again, said they 「时至今日仍具有重要现实意义」 ("remain of great practical relevance today"), and opposed deleting them27. Citing Japan's rising defense spending, the relaxation of restrictions on exporting lethal weapons, and moves to deploy intermediate- and long-range missiles, he described Japan's course as 「再军事化」 ("remilitarization"); in a second reply he said the clauses 「不容删改」 ("must not be deleted or altered"). North Korea also used the right of reply to criticize Japan's defense buildup and oppose deletion.

Japan replied twice. According to the auto-generated transcript posted on the UN general debate site, which is not an official record, Japan's representative said that Japan keeps its defense capabilities to the minimum necessary for its security, adheres under its Constitution to an exclusively defense-oriented policy without becoming a military power that threatens other countries, and firmly maintains the three non-nuclear principles4. On the enemy State clauses, the representative cited the 1995 and 2005 General Assembly resolutions, noting that both were adopted with China's support or by consensus including China. On history, the representative said the current government upholds in their entirety the positions of previous cabinets, including the 2015 prime minister's statement on the 70th anniversary of the war's end. In the September 26 reply to Russia, Japan said it had consistently walked the path of a peace-loving nation since the war.

What an export control officer should take from this exchange is simple: Japan's defense equipment exports were raised as an issue by other governments on the floor of the UN. I explain how Japan's system actually works in my piece on the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer.

Defense, alliances, and the "weaponization" of the economy

On defense and alliances, European governments were explicit about strengthening deterrence. Britain said it would meet its NATO commitments and build up hard power, and Poland said it was strengthening alliances and modernizing its military to prevent war, not to wage it. In a release the day after the speech, the White House listed raising NATO members' defense spending to 5% of GDP among the administration's achievements31. Ukraine offered its defense industry as a security resource for others under the banner of "peace through protection." Japan's Takaichi said Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy would not change, while China and North Korea criticized Japan's defense buildup. I have tracked Japan's defense budget in my piece on Japan's 2026 Big-Boned Policy on defense.

On the economy, as I noted at the start, governments on different sides used similar language. Japan spoke of arbitrary export restrictions, Germany of raw materials and supply chains used as pressure, India of the weaponization of everything from finance to technology, and France of preventing a few countries from accumulating critical minerals and rare earths. China criticized protectionism and decoupling. Then, on October 1, 28 countries including China, Russia, North Korea and Iran delivered a joint statement in the General Assembly's Third Committee opposing unilateral coercive measures and arguing that 「次级制裁和过度遵守」 ("secondary sanctions and over-compliance") were deepening humanitarian and economic hardship32.

Most of these remarks did not name a target. The same words can point at someone else's export controls in one speech and at sanctions in another. Personally, I think this is the most practical takeaway of the whole debate for companies: export controls and sanctions now sit at the center of foreign policy for governments of every kind. Japan's own security strategy review has documented China's tightening of export controls toward Japan; see my piece on the economic security panel behind the revision.

What this means for export control, sanctions, supply chains and defense business

The general debate does not adopt binding decisions, so no rule changes the morning after a speech. What governments say there, in their own words, is still a useful guide to where sanctions and export controls are heading. I would put four items on the checklist.

First, manage sanctions by jurisdiction: which country's law, imposed by whom. On Iran, permanent members disagree over whether UN sanctions are even in force; the United States wants Iran economically isolated, and Canada has announced its own sanctions. On Russia, Britain spoke of tightening sanctions and Ukraine asked for trade limits. Meanwhile, 28 countries including China and Russia came out against unilateral sanctions and over-compliance. A Japanese company should anchor on measures under Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, and check US sanctions whenever US-origin items or dollar payments are involved. I lay out the main list families and how to screen against them in my guide to five sanctions list systems.

Second, plan sourcing of critical minerals and components on the assumption that export restrictions will be used. When Japan, Germany, India and France all bring up the "weaponization" of supply chains in the same week, it is because supply constraints are already showing up in their companies' daily work. China's recent export controls aimed at Japan are covered in my explainer on China's dual-use export restrictions toward Japan. My sense is that securing alternative sources and rethinking inventory buffers only after a restriction is announced usually comes too late.

Third, build shipping lanes and undersea cables into business continuity planning. The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Black Sea, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait all came up in this year's debate. Put numbers on what rerouting would do to lead times and insurance premiums, and on how much redundancy your communications have, while things are still calm.

Fourth, design export licensing and end-use checks into defense and dual-use technology partnerships from day one. International cooperation on defense technology is expanding, from Ukraine's Drone Deals and the FREYJA program to the UK-US AI defense partnership. At the same time, Japan's defense equipment exports were questioned by other governments at the UN. The further a partnership goes, the more your export classification and counterparty checks will be scrutinized.

Part of that work, screening counterparties against national sanctions and control lists and keeping a record of the basis for each decision, is what tools like TRAFEED are for. It screens against Japanese, US, EU, UK and UN lists, among others, in one pass and keeps the results on file. The final call always belongs to your export control officer; the tool's job is to put the evidence in front of them.

Key takeaways

  • The 81st UN General Assembly general debate ran from September 22 to 28, 2026. Prime Minister Takaichi spoke for Japan on September 22; China sent Vice President Han Zheng, and Russia Foreign Minister Lavrov.
  • Takaichi raised concerns about arbitrary export restrictions, called for a stronger NPT regime, complete denuclearization of North Korea and free and safe passage through Hormuz, and urged expansion of both categories of Council seats and deletion of the "enemy State" clauses.
  • China and North Korea used their right of reply to oppose deleting the clauses. Japan replied by citing its exclusively defense-oriented policy, the three non-nuclear principles, and the 1995 and 2005 General Assembly resolutions.
  • The United States and Europe on one side, and China, Russia and Iran on the other, disagree over Iran's nuclear program and whether UN sanctions are in force. The Philippines and China exchanged replies over the South China Sea arbitral award.
  • On AI, governments calling for international safety requirements stand opposite a United States that rejects any global control framework. The Secretary-General said life-and-death decisions must never be left to machines.
  • Governments on different sides used similar words about the "weaponization" of export controls and supply chains, a sign that sanctions and export controls now sit at the center of foreign policy.

Listened to casually, UN speeches all sound alike. Lay the original texts side by side, though, and you can see where each government will not budge and where it draws its lines. When I build this same table next September, I will be watching which rows have moved, and I plan to treat that as one cue for when counterparty lists need a fresh look. If you want to talk through preparing for sanctions list changes or setting up counterparty screening, you can reach us through a TRAFEED consultation.

Footnotes

  1. United Nations, General Debate of the 81st Session of the General Assembly (September 22-28, 2026), https://gadebate.un.org/en ↩

  2. Prime Minister's Office of Japan, "Address by Prime Minister Takaichi at the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly" (September 22, 2026), Japanese original https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/105/statement/2026/0922enzetsu.html ; provisional English translation https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/jp_en.pdf ↩ ↩2

  3. The White House, "First Lady Melania Trump Highlights Art, Culture, and the Next Generation During State Visit of President Xi Jinping and Madame Peng Liyuan" (September 25, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/09/first-lady-melania-trump-highlights-art-culture-and-the-next-generation-during-state-visit-of-president-xi-jinping-and-madame-peng-liyuan/ ↩

  4. United Nations, General Debate 81st Session, Japan (rights of reply on September 26 and twice on September 28; content checked against the auto-generated transcripts on the page, which are not official records), https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/japan ↩ ↩2

  5. United Nations, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (April 27-May 22, 2026; ended without a consensus outcome), https://www.un.org/en/conferences/npt2026 ↩

  6. Prime Minister's Office of Japan, press conference on attending the UN General Assembly (September 23, 2026, Japanese), https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/105/statement/2026/0923naigai.html ↩ ↩2

  7. The White House, "President Trump at the United Nations: 'While Others Have Talked, I Have Acted'" (September 22, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/09/president-trump-at-the-united-nations-while-others-have-talked-i-have-acted/ ↩

  8. United Nations, Meetings Coverage GA/12785 (September 22, 2026), https://press.un.org/en/2026/ga12785.doc.htm ; United Nations, General Debate 81st Session, United States of America, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Han Zheng's address to the general debate of the 81st session (September 26, 2026, Chinese), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202609/t20260927_12031833.shtml ↩

  10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, address by Sergey Lavrov at the general debate of the 81st session (September 26, 2026, No. 1562-26-09-2026, Russian), https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2149954/ ; PDF on the UN site https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/ru_ru.pdf ↩

  11. President of Ukraine, "Address by the President at the General Debate of the UN General Assembly in New York" (delivered September 23, 2026, New York time; published September 24, Kyiv time), English https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-zagalnih-debatah-generalnoyi-asambl-106573 ; Ukrainian https://www.president.gov.ua/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-zagalnih-debatah-generalnoyi-asambl-106573 ; PDF on the UN site https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/ua_en.pdf ↩

  12. GOV.UK, "PM speech at UNGA: 22 September 2026," https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-unga-22-september-2026 ↩

  13. Élysée, "Discours du Président de la République lors de la 81e Assemblée générale des Nations Unies" (September 22, 2026, French; PDF on the UN site), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/fr_fr.pdf ↩

  14. German Federal Foreign Office, speech by Foreign Minister Wadephul (September 26, 2026; PDF on the UN site), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/de_en.pdf ↩

  15. Office of the President of the Republic of Korea, address to the 81st UN General Assembly (September 22, 2026, Korean), https://www.president.go.kr/speeches/VWrWhWnq ; English https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/kr_en.pdf ↩

  16. Statement by H.E. Mr. Kim Son Gyong, Vice-Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (September 28, 2026; English text submitted by the delegation), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/kp_en.pdf ↩

  17. Ministry of External Affairs, India, "India's National Statement at the 81st session of the UN General Assembly" (September 26, 2026; PDF on the UN site), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/in_en.pdf ↩ ↩2

  18. National Statement by H.E. Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines (September 26, 2026; PDF on the UN site), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/ph_en.pdf ↩

  19. Prime Minister of Australia, "Australia's National Statement - United States, New York" (September 24, 2026), https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australias-national-statement-united-states-new-york ↩

  20. Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, President Erdoğan's address, English version (September 22, 2026; PDF on the UN site), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/tr_en.pdf ; Italy, Deputy Prime Minister Tajani (September 23), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/it_en.pdf ; Brazil, President Lula (September 22), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/br_en.pdf ; Pakistan, Prime Minister Sharif (September 25), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/pk_en.pdf ↩ ↩2

  21. European Council, "Speech by President António Costa at the 81st United Nations General Assembly" (September 24, 2026; PDF on the UN site), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/eu_en.pdf ↩

  22. Global Affairs Canada, "Remarks by the Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations General Assembly" (September 26, 2026; PDF on the UN site), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/ca_en.pdf ↩ ↩2

  23. United Nations, General Debate 81st Session, Israel (meetings coverage summary), https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/israel ↩

  24. United Nations, General Debate 81st Session, Iran (Islamic Republic of) (meetings coverage summary; no statement PDF posted), https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/iran-islamic-republic ↩

  25. United Nations, Meetings Coverage GA/12792 (October 1, 2026), https://press.un.org/en/2026/ga12792.doc.htm ; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, statement by Ambassador Sun Lei at the General Assembly debate on the use of the veto (October 1, 2026, Chinese), http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/hyyfy/202610/t20261002_12035210.htm ↩

  26. United Nations Secretary-General, address to the general debate of the 81st session (September 22, 2026; PDF on the UN site), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/unsg_en.pdf ↩ ↩2

  27. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, rights of reply by Ambassador Sun Lei in response to Japan and the Philippines (posted September 29, 2026, Chinese), http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/hyyfy/202609/t20260929_12032961.htm ↩ ↩2

  28. Statement by Prime Minister Feleti Teo of Tuvalu (September 25, 2026), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/tv_en.pdf ; Saint Kitts and Nevis (September 25, 2026), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/kn_en.pdf ; Marshall Islands (September 25, 2026), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/mh_en.pdf ↩

  29. Statement by President Karol Nawrocki of Poland (September 23, 2026; PDF on the UN site), https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/pl_en.pdf ↩

  30. Charter of the United Nations, Articles 53, 77, 107 and 108, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text ; General Assembly resolution 50/52 (1995), https://undocs.org/A/RES/50/52 ; General Assembly resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paragraph 177, https://undocs.org/A/RES/60/1 ↩

  31. The White House, "President Trump Delivers Powerful America First Message to the United Nations" (September 23, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/09/president-trump-delivers-powerful-america-first-message-to-the-united-nations/ ↩

  32. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, joint statement by Ambassador Fu Cong on behalf of like-minded countries on unilateral coercive measures in the Third Committee (October 1, 2026, Chinese), http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/hyyfy/202610/t20261002_12035148.htm ↩

This article was produced with the help of AI. A human verified the primary sources and edited the text before publication.

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