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HomeColumnsTRAFEEDKorea and Taiwan Both Passed Japan in Exports: Reading H1 2026 From the Primary Statistics
TRAFEED

Korea and Taiwan Both Passed Japan in Exports: Reading H1 2026 From the Primary Statistics

Published2026-08-08Updated2026-11-06Ryuta Hamamoto
Trade StatisticsEconomic SecuritySemiconductorsSupply ChainExport ControlTRAFEED

In the first half of 2026, Korea and Taiwan both passed Japan in export value for the first time: Korea USD 496.7bn, Taiwan USD 416.6bn, Japan JPY 60.66 trillion. Checked against primary statistics, with a November 6 follow-up on January to September showing the ranking unchanged and the gap wider.

Korea and Taiwan Both Passed Japan in Exports: Reading H1 2026 From the Primary Statistics
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Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.

A headline saying Japan has been overtaken is usually worth reading twice. Once for the fact. Once for how the fact was measured.

On 7 August 2026 it was reported that Korea and Taiwan had both passed Japan in export value for the first time. Taken alone the numbers are striking. But once you line up what each country's own statistical agency published, the story has at least two layers: how much of the AI boom each export structure can physically absorb, and which currency you happen to be measuring in.

Rather than repeating the headline figures, I went to the primary releases from Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources, Taiwan's Ministry of Finance, and Japan's Ministry of Finance. There is a practical angle too: more exports means more classification and screening. If you want to know whether your own setup can absorb that increase, the free export control and economic security self-check is a good starting point.

(Updated November 6, 2026) The first version used first-half statistics as of August 8. I have added the July to October releases in a follow-up section to check whether the ranking or the reading changed. In short, the ranking did not change and the gap widened. The full-year projection I made for Taiwan was also overtaken by the Ministry of Finance's own outlook.

First, the three numbers side by side

Here is what each agency published.

H1 2026 export values. Korea USD 496.7bn, up 48.4%. Taiwan USD 416.6bn, up 47.1%. Japan roughly USD 384.4bn, or JPY 60.6606 trillion, up 13.7% in yen terms. Japan's dollar figure is a press conversion

Korea's H1 2026 exports came to USD 496.7 billion, up 48.4% year on year1. Semiconductors alone accounted for USD 192.4 billion, up 162.6%, which in six months exceeded the previous full-year record. June alone reached USD 102.3 billion, the first month ever above USD 100 billion. Imports were USD 358.4 billion, up 16.6%, leaving a trade surplus of USD 138.3 billion.

Taiwan recorded USD 416.6 billion, up 47.1%2. That is a record for any first half, and the second-highest growth rate on record. The second quarter alone came to USD 220.9 billion, the first quarter ever above USD 200 billion. June was USD 74.8 billion, up 40.3%.

Japan's figure, from MOF Trade Statistics (preliminary), was JPY 60.6606 trillion, up 13.7%3. This is the part that matters: that is the highest for any comparable first half since 1979. Japanese exports did not fall. They set a record.

The ranking flipped anyway, partly because Korea and Taiwan grew close to 50%, and partly because the comparison is being run in dollars.

"Record high" and "third place" are both true

Take Japan's export figure on its own and look at it in two currencies.

The same H1 2026 Japanese export total in two currencies. In yen, JPY 60.6606 trillion, the highest for any comparable first half since 1979. In dollars, roughly USD 384.4 billion, behind Korea and Taiwan

Same six months, same exports. In yen it is the largest since 1979; in dollars it is third. The roughly USD 384.4 billion figure in circulation assumes about 158 yen to the dollar.

This is not a statistical trick. A weaker yen inflates the yen-denominated total while shrinking the dollar conversion. So "record high" and "overtaken" sit together without contradiction. Pull out either one on its own and you will misread the structure.

What concerns me is how easily that duality drops out of the conversation. Told that Japan lost to Korea in exports, most people picture volumes falling. What actually happened is that Japanese exports set a record while two neighbours grew faster still. That should change how the urgency is framed.

The numbers also show that a weak yen is not a cure-all. Japan's H1 2026 trade balance was a deficit of JPY 1.0144 trillion, the tenth consecutive period in deficit3. Record exports, and imports still growing faster. A weak yen inflates export receipts and import costs alike.

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The real gap is structural

So where does the growth differential come from? Industrial structure.

Share of total exports from semiconductors and electronic components in H1 2026. Taiwan 78.7% for ICT products plus electronic components, Korea 38.7% for semiconductors, Japan 6.8% for semiconductors and electronic parts

In Taiwan, information and communication products plus electronic components together made up 78.7% of all exports, and those two categories alone grew 63.5% year on year2. In Korea, semiconductors at USD 192.4 billion represent about 38.7% of total exports1. Japan's semiconductors and electronic parts came to JPY 4.1402 trillion, about 6.8% of the total3.

A quick caveat before anyone runs with those percentages. The published categories are not defined identically. Taiwan's "ICT products plus electronic components" is a broader bucket than Japan's "semiconductors and electronic parts," so the absolute shares cannot be read as a ranking. What they do show is real: how tightly each country's total exports track semiconductors and electronic components differs completely across the three.

Taiwan's exports rise as a whole when AI demand arrives, and that is exactly what happened. Nearly 40% of Korea's move with it too. Japan's tracks at around 7%, with the rest spread across autos, machinery, chemicals and materials. In a single-demand explosion like this one, concentration wins decisively. The flip side is that when demand recedes, concentration takes the harder hit.

Which is why I would not read this as a defeat for Japan's industrial structure. Diversification hurts in a boom and helps through a cycle. The honest verdict needs at least one full cycle.

For anyone exporting semiconductors or electronic components, the practical question in a rising market is whether "not on the control list" means "no licence needed." It does not always. Use and end user can bring a licence requirement even where the list does not apply, and I set out the line with a comparison table in list controls versus catch-all controls.

Where Japan still leads

One fact gets overlooked. Japan's semiconductor and electronic parts exports themselves set a record at JPY 4.1402 trillion, up 41.1%3. The small share of the total reflects how large the other categories are, not stagnation in semiconductors.

In equipment and materials, Japan is reported to have held a substantial position through this cycle, with the largest semiconductor manufacturing equipment exports of the three in H1 20264. Countries that build and sell AI chips and countries that sell the tools and materials to build them should look different in trade statistics. The former books the full value of a finished product; the latter books along the capex cycle.

That distinction matters for economic security, because equipment and materials sit upstream of downstream capacity, which is precisely why they attract export control attention. If you ship equipment or materials from Japan and want to know where Japanese and US rules each bite, my reading of the US-Japan semiconductor export control picture is a good place to start.

Follow-up: did the July to October figures change the ranking? (as of November 6, 2026)

After the first version, the July to October releases came out. To put everyone on the same footing, I lined up January to September (or the latest published period).

H1 (Jan-Jun) Jan-Sep Latest single month
Korea USD 496.7bn (+48.4%) Above USD 800bn (first time) Sept USD 120.9bn (+83.5%), Oct USD 115.3bn (+93.7%). Semiconductors Sept USD 60.3bn (+263%), Oct USD 56.4bn (+259%)
Taiwan USD 416.6bn (+47.1%) USD 661.55bn (+46.2%) Sept USD 87.22bn (+60.9%). Q3 USD 244.92bn (+44.6%)
Japan JPY 60.6606tn (+13.7%) About JPY 93.19tn (my sum; roughly USD 588bn) Sept JPY 10.9723tn (+16.7%, 13th consecutive increase). Semiconductors and electronic parts +49.4%

The Korean figures rest on reporting of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources' releases, and the Taiwanese on reporting of the Ministry of Finance's.56 I did not open the ministries' own release documents this time. For Japan, I added the Ministry of Finance monthly preliminary export figures (H1, July, August, September) and converted each at the customs-published monthly rate; that conversion is my own.37 They are preliminary figures, so confirmed data may move them.

Three things stand out. The ranking has not changed: in dollar terms for January to September it is still Korea, Taiwan, Japan. The gap has widened: Japan's yen exports rose 16.7% in September, the 13th straight monthly increase, but Korea grew 83.5% and Taiwan 60.9%, three to five times faster. And the weak yen continues to matter: the September rate was JPY 157.43 to the dollar, 6.7% weaker than a year earlier.7

In yen terms, Japan's exports for April to September (the fiscal first half) were JPY 63.457tn, up 18.4%, the 12th consecutive period of increase and the highest for any comparable period since 1979.7 The first version's point that "record high" and "third place" are both true still stands.

In the first version I projected Taiwan's full year mechanically at about USD 850 billion, assuming the second half held the Q2 pace. In fact January to September alone reached USD 661.55 billion, and the Ministry of Finance says that even on a conservative USD 80 billion a month, full-year exports are highly likely to exceed USD 900 billion.6 The projection missed to the upside. That also shows the assumption, that AI demand continues, held; if it breaks, the miss can go the other way.

Taiwan's own export control rules are moving too. If you do more business with or through Taiwan, the 18 items added to Taiwan's strategic high-tech commodity list in February 2026 are the place to start.

Also readSemiconductors and the US-Japan Standoff: What the MATCH Act Forces Japan to Decide

How to think about what comes next

I cannot forecast, but the published figures support some arithmetic. What follows is a mechanical projection with stated assumptions, not an official outlook.

At the time of the first version, Taiwan's H1 was USD 416.6 billion, with USD 220.9 billion in Q2 alone, and a second half that merely held the Q2 pace would have put the full year around USD 850 billion. As the follow-up above shows, January to September alone reached USD 661.55 billion, and the Ministry of Finance now says full-year exports are highly likely to exceed USD 900 billion.6 The Ministry had also indicated its trade surplus with the US may exceed USD 200 billion for the year.2 Korea crossed USD 100 billion in a single month for the first time in June, followed by USD 120.9 billion in September and USD 115.3 billion in October, and exports for January to October are reported to have passed USD 900 billion.5 Whether the year reaches USD 1 trillion depends on November and December, and I cannot say so now.

All of that assumes AI-driven demand continues at the current pace. Semiconductor demand has historically been cyclical. Projections built on peak growth rates miss badly in both directions. If you circulate these numbers internally, carry the assumption with them.

For Japan, even continued growth in yen terms can push the dollar ranking down further if the yen strengthens, and the reverse holds too. A ranking that moves with the exchange rate is not a measure of industrial competitiveness. Worth repeating.

What this means for export control work

To bring it back to our own field.

More export value means, directly, more classification and screening. And the growth is concentrated in semiconductors and electronic components, exactly the categories that catch on both list controls and catch-all controls. Japan's semiconductors and electronic parts growing 41.1% implies a proportionally wider base of items requiring determination.

There is a second effect. Surging exports from two neighbouring economies means Japanese companies gain more touchpoints as customers and resellers. Your product goes to a Taiwanese or Korean firm, is integrated there, and leaves for a third country. The thicker that path, the harder it becomes to trace who the ultimate end user is. Understanding a counterparty's ownership structure starts to matter more than it used to.

When you cannot tell who a reseller or end user really is, how far should you check? I walk through it step by step, including how to match against the Foreign End User List and the Entity List, in counterparty and end-user due diligence in practice.

TRAFEED is our export control AI agent built to absorb that repetitive work. Aligned with METI standards, it supports classification and counterparty screening in a single flow. We have run a joint proof of concept with Okayama University. The final determination stays with your export control officer; what gets lighter is everything leading up to it.

If you want to rebuild the mapping of supply chain and technology at management level, the Economic Security Management Guidelines METI published in January 2026 are a reasonable starting point.8 Their very first principle is mapping your own value chain accurately.

Wrapping up

The essentials:

  • H1 2026 exports: Korea USD 496.7bn (+48.4%), Taiwan USD 416.6bn (+47.1%), Japan JPY 60.6606tn (+13.7%). On a dollar basis, Korea and Taiwan both passed Japan for the first time
  • Follow-up (as of November 6): for January to September the ranking is unchanged. Taiwan USD 661.55bn (+46.2%), Korea above USD 800bn, Japan about JPY 93tn on my sum. The Ministry of Finance now expects Taiwan's full year above USD 900bn, overtaking the USD 850bn projection in the first version
  • Japanese exports did not fall. In yen they are the highest for any comparable first half since 1979. The ranking flipped from a combination of neighbouring growth and a weak yen shrinking the dollar conversion
  • The real gap is structural. Semiconductors and electronic components are 78.7% of Taiwan's exports, 38.7% of Korea's, and 6.8% of Japan's. The three track AI demand very differently
  • Japan's own semiconductor and electronic parts exports set a record, and Japan is reported to lead in semiconductor manufacturing equipment
  • Full-year projections assume AI demand holds its current pace. Semiconductor demand has been cyclical; keep the assumption attached to the number

The headline is about rankings, but what I took from these figures was a lesson about measurement. Yen or dollars. By category or in total. The same six months wears a different face depending on the cut. When you are trying to create urgency internally, say which cut you used.

For practitioners, though, the count matters more than the rank. More exports means more determinations. This is a good moment to check whether your current setup can absorb the increase. If you want to talk it through, reach out via TRAFEED's individual consultation.


References

The first version reflected published statistics as of 8 August 2026; the follow-up section reflects data as of 6 November 2026. National trade statistics are preliminary and subject to later revision. Full-year projections are mechanical calculations with stated assumptions, not official outlooks.

Footnotes

  1. Republic of Korea, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources, "Export and Import Trends for June and the First Half of 2026" (published 1 July 2026). H1 exports USD 496.7bn (+48.4%), semiconductors USD 192.4bn (+162.6%), June alone USD 102.3bn, imports USD 358.4bn (+16.6%), trade surplus USD 138.3bn. https://www.motie.go.kr ↩ ↩2

  2. Republic of China (Taiwan), Ministry of Finance, Department of Statistics, "Import and Export Trade Statistics" (published 9 July 2026). H1 exports USD 416.6bn (+47.1%, a record for the period), Q2 USD 220.9bn (+43.7%), June USD 74.8bn (+40.3%), ICT products plus electronic components 78.7% of total exports (+63.5% combined), H1 trade surplus with the US USD 104bn. https://www.mof.gov.tw ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  3. Japan, MOF Trade Statistics (preliminary), first half of 2026. Exports JPY 60.6606tn (+13.7%, highest for any comparable first half since 1979), semiconductors and electronic parts JPY 4.1402tn (+41.1%, a record), trade balance a deficit of JPY 1.0144tn (tenth consecutive period). https://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  4. Nikkei, "Korea and Taiwan both pass Japan in exports for the first time: H1 2026, AI boom drives the gap" (7 August 2026). Japan's dollar conversion (approximately USD 384.4bn) and the country comparison of semiconductor manufacturing equipment are from this reporting. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA050VT0V00C26A8000000/ ↩

  5. Reporting of the Republic of Korea Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources releases, carried by Yonhap and The Korea Times: "Korea's Sept. exports hit record $120.9 bil. on robust chip sales" (1 October 2026) and "Korea's monthly exports hit $115.3 bil. in Oct. on record chip sales" (1 November 2026). I did not open the ministry's own release. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/economy/20261001/koreas-sept-exports-hit-record-1209-bil-on-robust-chip-sales ↩ ↩2

  6. Reporting of the Taiwan Ministry of Finance release, Focus Taiwan (CNA), "Taiwan's September exports hit record" (8 October 2026). January to September exports USD 661.55bn (+46.2%), Q3 USD 244.92bn (+44.6%), September USD 87.22bn (+60.9%); the Ministry expects full-year exports to exceed USD 900bn. I did not open the ministry's own release. https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202610080020 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. Japan Ministry of Finance, preliminary trade statistics summaries for September 2026 (21 October), for the fiscal first half April to September 2026 (21 October), for August (16 September) and for July (20 August). September exports JPY 10.9723tn (+16.7%), April to September exports JPY 63.457tn (+18.4%, 12th consecutive increase), September rate JPY 157.43 per dollar. https://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/shinbun/happyou.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  8. METI Trade and Economic Security Bureau, "Economic Security Management Guidelines (1st Edition)" (23 January 2026) https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/economic_security/260123_guideline.pdf ↩

This article was produced with the help of AI. A human verified the primary sources and edited the text before publication.

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