How Long Will the Strait of Hormuz Closure Last? October 2026 Status and Conditions for Reopening

Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.

"How long will the Strait of Hormuz closure last?" That is the question most readers type before landing on this page, so here is the short answer first. As of October 29, 2026, the closure is not over. It began on February 28, the day the United States and Israel started striking Iran. Apart from a few days in June when ships moved again, the strait has been effectively closed for eight months. No government has named an end date.

No date, though, does not mean no visibility. We can check, from primary sources, what each side has said it needs before the strait reopens, what still has to happen after any deal before ships come back, and what the closure is doing to fuel prices, power bills, and procurement right now. When I last updated this piece on October 4, traffic was thin and the subsidy was 50.7 yen. In the three weeks since, the numbers have moved: transits stayed thin, Brent spiked in early October and then eased, and Japan's gasoline subsidy rose to 52.4 yen.

This article uses Japan as a worked example, because Japan still buys more than 90 percent of its crude from the Middle East and publishes detailed weekly data. The mechanics apply to any company that buys energy-priced inputs, ships through the Gulf, or clears dollars. If you want a quick read on whether your export-control setup can absorb this kind of multi-jurisdiction shock, the free export-control readiness check takes a few minutes.

Summary (as of October 29, 2026): The de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz began on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel struck Iran, and it is still in place. Transits visible in IMF PortWatch AIS data averaged 3.5 a day from October 1 to 25 (3.7 in September), under 5 percent of the roughly 85 a day before the war. A U.S. official says about 60 ships crossed on September 23, including vessels sailing with AIS off, but that figure has not been independently verified. On September 25 Iran proposed reopening the strait within seven days if the U.S. unfroze Iranian funds, lifted oil sanctions, and ended its blockade of Iranian ports; President Trump said on September 26 the plan was not acceptable. On October 4, Iran's chief negotiator said the strait would stay closed until seven conditions under the memorandum are met. No government has set a reopening date, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration's October 6 outlook assumes Middle East crude flows stay constrained through the end of the fourth quarter of 2026. In Japan, regular gasoline averaged 170.1 yen per liter on October 26 with a 52.4-yen subsidy from October 29; without it, the price would be about 212.9 yen.

When Did the Strait of Hormuz Closure Start? February 28 to Late October

The start date is clear. On February 28, 2026 (local time), Israel's defense minister announced strikes on Iran, and the U.S. president announced the start of military action against Iran. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a travel alert the same day¹. Shipping through the strait collapsed almost immediately. In the daily data from PortWatch, a platform run by the IMF and the University of Oxford that counts transits from AIS (Automatic Identification System) signals, transits fell from 57 on February 28 to 20 on March 1, 4 on March 2, and zero on March 4². Before the war, about 85 ships a day went through.

It helps to be precise about the word "closure." No international legal procedure shut the strait. Once attacks became real, shipowners and insurers stopped sending ships, and commercial traffic all but stopped. Japan's government describes it as passage through the strait having become "effectively difficult"³. That is the sense in which I use "closure" here.

Here are the main events of the eight months since.

Date	What happened
Feb 28	The U.S. and Israel begin strikes on Iran1
Mar 1–4	AIS-visible transits fall to 20, then 4, then zero2
Mar 11	IEA members agree to release 400 million barrels from emergency stocks4. Japan decides to cap gasoline at around 170 yen per liter, with payments from March 195
Mar–May	Japan releases national crude reserves in two rounds (about 8.5 million and 5.8 million kiloliters)6
Apr 13	U.S. forces begin blockading shipping to and from Iranian ports7
Jun 17–18	The U.S. and Iran sign a memorandum; on the 18th the U.S. military lifts its port blockade8
Jun 20	Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declares the strait closed again; the U.S. military disputes it9
Jul 7–14	A run of attacks on tankers; on the 14th U.S. forces resume the port blockade10
Late Aug	U.S. Central Command says the Traffic Separation Scheme has been cleared of mines11
Sep 13	Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline is shut by drone attacks (restarted Sep 22)12
Sep 25–26	Iran offers a "seven-day" reopening plan; President Trump rejects it13
Sep 28	A Kuwaiti tanker is struck in the strait14
Oct 2	G7 leaders agree a 100-million-barrel coordinated release over four months15
Oct 4	Iran's chief negotiator says the strait will not open until seven conditions are met16
Oct 6	EIA publishes its October outlook, assuming Middle East crude flows stay constrained through the end of Q417
Oct 29	Japan's gasoline subsidy rises to 52.4 yen per liter (Oct 29 to Nov 4)18

Lay it out like this and one thing stands out. The past eight months were not a straight slide. In June a memorandum was signed, the U.S. lifted its port blockade, and ships started moving. Two days later the IRGC said the strait was closed again⁹. July brought renewed attacks and a renewed blockade¹⁰. Then in September the main bypass for crude, Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, went down too¹². I find it more accurate to describe this period not as "a closure that keeps dragging on" but as eight months in which the region's energy exits, bypass routes included, were knocked out one after another.

What Changed Since the October 4 Update (Then and Now)

My last update was on October 4. Here is how things compare three weeks later.

Item	Then (October 4, 2026)	Now (October 29, 2026)
Transits (PortWatch, AIS-visible ships)	Average of 3.7 a day, September 1 to 27	Average of 3.5 a day, October 1 to 25; 2 on October 252
Diplomacy	Iran's seven-day plan rejected by the U.S.	Iran's chief negotiator says the strait stays closed until seven conditions are met (October 4). No government has given a reopening date16
Brent (EIA spot)	$113.96 on September 29	$135.51 on October 2, $130.18 on October 8, $115.22 on October 2019
EIA outlook	September edition: constraints through year-end	October edition: Middle East crude flows constrained through end of Q4; Q4 Brent average $10517
Japan's gasoline subsidy	50.7 yen per liter (from October 1)	52.4 yen per liter (October 29 to November 4); 42.8 yen the week before18
Japan's average gasoline price	170.2 yen (September 28)20	170.1 yen (October 26)18
Unsubsidized price (calculated)	221.2 yen	212.9 yen (the October 26 price plus the previous week's subsidy)18
Tolls and U.S. sanctions	Toll-related designations (May, July) and an updated alert (August 24)212223	We could not find a new designation or alert in OFAC's publications for October

What moved over these three weeks is prices and subsidies. Brent rose to $135.51 on October 2 and eased to $115.22 by October 20. The per-liter subsidy went from 42.8 yen the previous week to 52.4 yen. Japanese pump prices stay near 170 yen because the subsidy absorbs the gap. Transit numbers, by contrast, barely changed. I come back to that below.

The "tolls and U.S. sanctions" row lands directly on counterparty screening: OFAC now encourages maritime service providers to find out who a vessel coordinated with to transit the strait and whether it paid, or will pay, any passage fee (more on this below). We publish a fill-in procedure workbook covering five sanctions systems (U.S. OFAC, U.S. BIS, EU, U.K., and U.N.) plus Japan's End User List: which official source to check, how often, and what to match against, along with the 50% ownership test and red flags. A listing is a regulatory designation under each jurisdiction's law, not a judgment on the listed party. → Download the Sanctions Screening Procedure Workbook (2026 edition) (Free. Your company name and work email are required.)

Can Ships Get Through the Strait of Hormuz in October 2026?

Short answer: the traffic you can see from outside is under 5 percent of normal, and how much traffic you cannot see depends on whom you ask.

Start with public data. Counting PortWatch's daily transits for October 1 to 25, the average was 3.5 ships a day. The busiest day had 8 (October 5), and two days had none (October 1 and 17)². Monthly averages ran 12.9 in June, 10.2 in July, 4.7 in August, 3.7 in September, and 3.5 in October, so the partial recovery over the summer has kept fading. PortWatch publishes with a lag of a few days, so I could count only through October 25. I tallied the full daily series in a separate piece, 512 Days of Hormuz Transit Data.

The U.S. government tells a busier story. According to Reuters, a U.S. official said about 60 commercial vessels transited on September 23, about 40 of them coordinating with the U.S. military, carrying roughly 22 million barrels of oil out of the Gulf. Reuters noted it could not independently verify the figures²⁴. The usual explanation for the gap is that many ships switch off AIS to avoid being targeted, and AIS-based datasets like PortWatch cannot see them. I do not read this as one side being wrong. There is traffic you can verify from public data and traffic the government says it can see. A company can only check the first kind for itself, so that is the number I would plan around.

LNG shows the same pattern. In August, Qatar-linked LNG carriers disappeared from ship-tracking data; in September, several were again seen transiting the strait, according to Reuters²⁵. The danger has not gone away. On September 28 a Kuwaiti tanker sailing dark was struck while transiting, and the IMO's running count stands at 86 incidents involving merchant ships in the region since the war began, with 24 seafarers killed¹⁴.

The bypass routes are under strain too. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline carries crude from the Gulf coast to the Red Sea port of Yanbu and is one of the few ways to export without going through Hormuz. Before the attack it was reportedly moving about 4 million barrels a day, around 4 percent of world supply. It was shut by drone attacks on September 13, restarted at low rates on September 22, and full flows are expected to take weeks¹². Japan's Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Ryosei Akazawa, also referred to the outage at his September 15 press conference and said the government was watching the repairs²⁶. On the Red Sea side, Japan's foreign ministry warned on September 20 that attacks between Yemen's Houthis and Saudi Arabia were continuing and the outlook was unclear²⁷. Hormuz stays shut while the exits meant to replace it are carrying more risk. If I had to describe October in one line, that would be it.

The EIA's October edition adds a counterweight. It says shut-in output in the Middle East in September was the smallest since the conflict began, and it expects flows to recover gradually through escorted transits, bypass routes, and ship-to-ship transfers. It also cautions that physical flows and prices can stay volatile, as the attack on the Saudi East-West pipeline showed¹⁷.

Some reports in late October describe ships damaged by mines near the strait and a renewed declaration of closure by Iran. I could not confirm them against multiple primary sources, so I have not used them for any figure here.

How Long Will the Strait of Hormuz Closure Last? Three Steps to Reopening

No government has set an end date. The U.S. Energy Information Administration's Short-Term Energy Outlook of October 6 assumes Middle East crude flows stay constrained through the end of the fourth quarter of 2026 and recover gradually through escorted transits, bypass routes, and ship-to-ship transfers. It puts the fourth-quarter Brent average at $105 a barrel, $14 above the prior month's forecast, with $96 for 2026 as a whole and $84 for 2027. The outlook uses information as of October 1, so it does not reflect the G7 statement of October 2. The next edition is due November 10¹⁷. The September 9 edition had regional crude output staying below pre-conflict averages until the second quarter of 2027²⁸. Even the official baseline does not have things back to normal this year.

Instead of a date, I find it more useful to ask what has to happen. I break it into three steps.

The first is a political agreement. On September 25, at the U.N. General Assembly, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi set out a seven-day plan: if the United States released frozen Iranian funds, lifted oil sanctions, and ended its naval blockade of Iranian ports within four or five days, Iran would reopen the strait and negotiations on a final agreement would start by day seven. On September 26 President Trump said the proposal "would not be acceptable"¹³. A day later he said he expected talks with Iran to resume the following week²⁹. On October 4, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran's chief negotiator, said the strait would not open until seven conditions under the memorandum are met, and that the U.S. had sent "some proposals" through mediators¹⁶. Japan's foreign ministry says that on October 1 Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, noting the indirect exchanges between the U.S. and Iran since the previous week, urged Iran to show maximum flexibility³⁰. The door to talks is open. The gap between the two sides' terms is still wide. As of October 29, I have found no official announcement that an agreement has been reached.

One of the sticking points is cost. In her September 22 address to the U.N. General Assembly, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said it was extremely important that all ships be able to pass through the Strait of Hormuz freely and safely, as before, without additional costs³¹. The G7 leaders' statement of October 2 called for the immediate and full restoration of navigational rights and principles in the strait¹⁵. Iran has set up a body to handle transit authorizations and fees; under the June memorandum it said it would charge nothing during a 60-day negotiation window, while leaving the door open to fees later⁸. Whether a deal includes tolls matters directly to anyone shipping or insuring cargo through the strait.

The second step is the agreement holding. June showed how hard that is. The memorandum was signed on the 17th, the U.S. lifted its port blockade on the 18th, ships started moving, and on the 20th the IRGC declared the strait closed again⁸⁹. Even in June, PortWatch transits averaged only 12.9 a day, about 15 percent of normal². Between a deal being announced and shipowners deciding it is safe to go, I would assume at least several weeks of watching and waiting.

The third step is getting the physical and commercial pieces back to normal. In late August the head of U.S. Central Command said the internationally recognized shipping lanes, the Traffic Separation Scheme, had been cleared of mines, but the Joint Maritime Information Center, which shares maritime security information with industry, warned of continuing risk from drifting or uncharted mines¹¹. After that come war-risk insurance terms, crew willingness to sail, and restarting the Gulf oil fields and LNG trains that have been shut in. This is why the EIA's September edition did not see regional output recovering until 2027.

So what should you watch? If I were running the weekly check, I would track five things: a formal U.S. response to Iran and what the mediators are doing; whether the U.S. lifts its blockade of Iranian ports; the IMO's count of attacks on merchant ships; whether PortWatch daily transits get back into double digits; and war-risk insurance terms. I would rather see all five start moving the same way than try to call a date. One good signal on its own can reverse within days, as June showed.

Impact on Japan's Economy: Fuel, Power, and Crude Supply in October

Gasoline is where households feel it first. Japan's Agency for Natural Resources and Energy reported a national average of 170.1 yen per liter for regular gasoline on October 26¹⁸. On March 9, just after the war began, it was 161.8 yen⁵, so the rise looks modest. But this is a subsidized price. On March 11 the government decided to pay the full amount by which the national average would exceed about 170 yen, starting March 19; on March 16 the price had reached 190.8 yen⁵¹⁸. The subsidy for October 29 to November 4 is 52.4 yen per liter. Adding last week's payment of 42.8 yen to the October 26 retail price of 170.1 yen gives an unsubsidized price of about 212.9 yen. Diesel, kerosene, and heavy fuel oil get the same 52.4 yen, and jet fuel gets 41.9 yen. The payment is set as the expected next-week retail price (this week's price, plus last week's payment, plus the change in crude cost, plus the change in the adjustment unit) minus the 170-yen benchmark; this time crude added 6.0 yen and the adjustment unit added 3.5 yen. The monthly "adjustment" for the premium refiners pay on alternative supply rose from 3.7 yen for October to 7.2 yen for November¹⁸.

At a September 18 press conference, Japan's industry minister said the government would review the subsidy rate and an exit from the program, taking ruling-party recommendations into account³. The agency's program page lists no end date as of October 28¹⁸. Pump prices look calm, but they can move quickly once the subsidy changes. For transport, construction, and farming, which burn a lot of gasoline and diesel, I would put a scenario with prices tens of yen per liter higher into next year's budget.

Power and gas bills are moving on a different track. Government support for electricity and city gas bills covered July to September usage and has ended. At the industry minister's September 29 press conference, a reporter noted that Tokyo Electric Power's October bill for a standard household was expected to hit a record in the 9,300-yen range; the minister said the support had been aimed at summer peak usage and that the government would watch how oil and LNG prices feed into power and gas tariffs³². JKM, the Northeast Asian LNG spot benchmark, was in the low $11s per million Btu in February before the war, reached the high $29s on September 14, and stood in the low $25s on September 25. Japan's average LNG import price in August, though, was $14.16, which suggests long-term contracts are absorbing much of the spot spike³³.

Physical supply first. Japan relies on the Middle East for more than 90 percent of its crude, but only about 10 percent of its LNG, because LNG supply is far more diversified⁶. Japan held about eight months of oil reserves as of February 2026 and released national crude stocks in two rounds between March and May⁶. On September 15 the industry minister said Japan held about 200 days of combined government and private reserves, with private stocks back up to about 95 days, so no further release was needed for October; later months would depend on the Saudi repairs and private procurement²⁶. I could find no published decision on November onward as of October 29. Internationally, on October 2 the G7 agreed a coordinated release of 100 million barrels through the IEA over four months, with a substantial diesel release in the first 20 days. The statement does not give country-by-country volumes¹⁵.

On price, EIA's Brent spot series shows $71.32 a barrel on February 27, before the war, a high of $138.21 on April 7, and a dip into the high $60s in late June and early July. In September the Saudi pipeline outage pushed it to $130.80 on September 15, and it fell to $113.96 on September 29. It then rose to $135.51 on October 2, and eased to $130.18 on October 8 and $115.22 on October 20¹⁹. The EIA's October edition puts the fourth-quarter average at $105¹⁷. Japan's average crude import price (the Japan Crude Cocktail) was $101.66 a barrel in August³³.

At the macro level, the Cabinet Office's September monthly economic report (published September 29; I could not confirm an October edition at the time of writing) says the economy is recovering moderately but that the effects of the situation in the Middle East and of natural disasters need to be watched. It flags the same risk for corporate profits and notes that exports to the Middle East, after falling, are showing signs of bottoming out³⁴. In her U.N. address, Prime Minister Takaichi said supply concerns over fuel, chemical products, and medical supplies were weighing heavily on daily life and business³¹.

Put the numbers together and Japan is holding prices down with subsidies and holding volumes up with reserves and alternative supply. Both are stopgaps with a shelf life. For a company, "will the closure run into next year?" is close to the same question as "how long will those stopgaps last?" That is how I read it, anyway.

What Companies Should Recheck Now: Sourcing, Contracts, and Sanctions Screening

Start with sourcing. Japan's government compiled a package in August to strengthen the country's energy supply and demand structure. It includes support for the extra freight and other cost differences when crude is rerouted, and for building alternative routes such as pipelines, and the government is drafting legislation for the autumn extraordinary Diet session³². I cover the policy side in Japan's Economic Security Promotion Council and the "energy autonomy" agenda. The September pipeline attack adds a new assumption, though. The bypass itself can go down. When you review your bill of materials, sort items not by "do we trade with the Middle East?" but by three questions: does it move through Hormuz, does it move through the Red Sea, and does its feedstock trace back to Middle East production? Naphtha-based chemicals are the classic miss, because the supplier's name tells you nothing about where the feedstock came from. Japan's energy agency also runs a reporting channel for companies facing shortages of fuel or petroleum-derived chemicals⁶.

Contracts and insurance deserve a second read with a long disruption in mind. For supply, freight, and EPC contracts, check what triggers force majeure, what triggers price revisions, and where late-delivery penalties are capped. More than eight months in, whether the same event can still be treated as force majeure may depend on the contract wording and the governing law, so I would have counsel review Japanese-law and English- or U.S.-law contracts separately. On marine cover, check at each renewal whether the scope and excluded areas of hull war and cargo war policies have shifted.

On sanctions, the U.S. position on Hormuz "tolls" has become steadily more specific since April. OFAC FAQ 1249, published April 28 and updated May 29, says payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC for safe passage are not authorized for U.S. persons²¹. On May 27 OFAC designated the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), which it describes as Iran's toll-collecting body, and on July 29 it designated two related entities, an insurance company and a marine services authority²²²³. OFAC's updated alert of August 24 says that U.S. and non-U.S. persons risk sanctions by engaging with these entities, including accepting their insurance or responding to their information demands for guarantees of safe passage, even with no payment involved, and it flags secondary sanctions exposure for foreign financial institutions. It strongly encourages maritime service providers to ask counterparties who they coordinated with to transit and whether any fees were or will be paid²³. For a company outside the United States, the exposure runs through dollar clearing, U.S. insurers and reinsurers, and U.S. subsidiaries. A listing is a regulatory designation under U.S. law, and nothing here is a judgment on the listed parties.

At the United Nations, China and Russia vetoed a Security Council draft on September 17 that would have extended the panel of experts monitoring Iran sanctions, and the General Assembly debated the veto on October 1. The permanent members disagree on whether U.N. sanctions on Iran are in force at all³⁵. I summarized that debate in what world leaders said on security at the UNGA 2026 General Debate. The practical answer is to manage sanctions by jurisdiction: your home country's measures first, and U.S. sanctions wherever U.S.-origin goods, U.S. persons, or dollar payments are involved. The list systems and screening steps are laid out in Sanctions and Restricted-Party Lists Explained.

Other rules keep moving at the same time. Japan revised its catch-all controls on October 9, 2025, and a new goods and technology matrix took effect on February 14, 2026³⁶³⁷. China's Ministry of Commerce Notice No. 1 of January 6, 2026 restricted dual-use exports to Japanese military end users and military end uses³⁸. Look for an alternative supplier and you often run into another country's rules. For day-to-day classification and screening practice, see Export Compliance in Practice.

Doing all of this by hand every week does not scale. OFAC designations, the U.N. sanctions dispute, and Japanese and Chinese rule changes each arrive on their own schedule. TRAFEED is our AI first-pass analyst for export control. It screens counterparties against the U.S. Consolidated Screening List, OFAC's SDN List, and EU, U.K., U.N., and Japanese lists, drafts the Japan export classification, and keeps the evidence on file. It is a good fit for rechecking, against freshly updated lists, whether a newly designated party like the PGSA has turned up as a counterparty or intermediary. Your export control officer makes the final call, and nothing here is legal advice. Where the planning assumptions themselves need rework, we pair it with WARP consulting.

Conclusion

• The de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz began on February 28, 2026 and is still in place as of October 29. Traffic returned for a few days in June, then stopped again.
• Publicly visible transits averaged 3.5 a day from October 1 to 25 against about 85 before the war. The U.S. says about 60 ships crossed on September 23, including ships sailing dark, but that has not been independently verified.
• No government has set an end date. Reopening needs a U.S.-Iran deal, the deal holding, and normalization of mines, insurance, and Gulf output. The EIA's October outlook assumes Middle East crude flows stay constrained through the end of Q4.
• Japan's gasoline averaged 170.1 yen per liter on October 26, but only because of a 52.4-yen subsidy (from October 29); unsubsidized, it would be about 212.9 yen. Japan holds about 200 days of oil reserves, and the G7 has agreed a 100-million-barrel release.
• Companies should re-sort items by Hormuz route, Red Sea route, and Middle East feedstock, review force majeure and war-risk cover by governing law, and feed the U.S. toll-related designations into counterparty screening.

I know "no date yet" is an unsatisfying answer. But what would move the strait toward reopening can be written down, and the list is concrete. My advice is to stop waiting for a date, watch those five signals every week, and switch your stopgaps when they start moving together. After eight months of reversals, that feels like the more realistic way to plan.

For a feature overview, see the TRAFEED service catalog (PDF). If you are not sure where to start on counterparty screening or your export control program, book a one-on-one consultation.

References

Footnotes

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Overseas Safety Website, "Alert regarding the attack on Iran" (in Japanese) — February 28, 2026 — https://www.anzen.mofa.go.jp/info/pcspotinfo_2026C016.html ↩ ↩²

2. IMF PortWatch, "Daily Chokepoint Transit Calls and Trade Volume Estimates" (Strait of Hormuz; counts only ships broadcasting AIS). Daily CSV retrieved from the distributor https://straits.live/data/transits.csv on October 29, 2026; data through October 25, 2026 tallied by TIMEWELL. The distributor's CSV itself carries no source statement; the distributor's site describes the data as a republication of IMF PortWatch figures. Treat the October numbers as indicative and re-check them on the IMF's own site — https://portwatch.imf.org/ ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵

3. Press conference by Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akazawa (in Japanese) — METI — September 18, 2026 — https://www.meti.go.jp/speeches/kaiken/2026/20260918001.html ↩ ↩²

4. Germany and Japan to tap oil reserves as IEA and G7 weigh record release (32 IEA members agree to release 400 million barrels) — Euronews — March 11, 2026 — https://euronews.com/2026/03/11/germany-and-japan-to-tap-oil-reserves-as-iea-and-g7-weigh-record-release ↩

5. Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, "Emergency price-stabilization measures in light of the situation in Iran" (Prime Minister's instruction of March 11, 2026; payments from March 19) (in Japanese) — March 11, 2026 — https://nenryo-teigakuhikisage.go.jp/ ↩ ↩² ↩³

6. Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, "Response on oil and related products in light of the Middle East situation" (Middle East share of crude over 90 percent and of LNG about 10 percent; about eight months of oil reserves as of February 2026; national reserve release schedules; supply reporting channel) (in Japanese) — https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/category/others/energysecurity/index.html ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

7. US blockade halts ship traffic to Iranian ports, CENTCOM says — Army Times — April 14, 2026 — https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/04/14/us-blockade-halts-ship-traffic-to-iranian-ports-centcom-says/ ↩

8. US military says it has lifted naval blockade of Iranian ports (including the 60-day no-fee commitment under the memorandum) — Al Jazeera — June 18, 2026 — https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/18/us-military-says-it-has-lifted-naval-blockade-of-iranian-ports ↩ ↩² ↩³

9. Iran says Strait of Hormuz shut as U.S.-Iran talks set for Sunday in Switzerland — Michigan Public (NPR) — June 20, 2026 — https://www.michiganpublic.org/2026-06-20/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-shut-as-u-s-iran-talks-set-for-sunday-in-switzerland ↩ ↩² ↩³

10. U.S. fires a new wave of strikes on Iran and hits a tanker trying to skirt its blockade — NPR — July 15, 2026 — https://www.npr.org/2026/07/15/nx-s1-5894582/us-iran-updates ; CENTCOM declares resumption of naval blockade against Iranian ports — The Peninsula — July 15, 2026 — https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/15/07/2026/centcom-declares-resumption-of-naval-blockade-against-iranian-ports-additional-round-of-strikes ↩ ↩²

11. U.S. military says it has cleared Iran's mines from Strait of Hormuz shipping lanes — gCaptain — August 27, 2026 — https://gcaptain.com/u-s-military-says-it-has-cleared-irans-mines-from-strait-of-hormuz-shipping-lanes/ ↩ ↩²

12. Saudi pipeline restarts operations, oil exports to resume (shut September 13, restarted September 22, about 4 million barrels per day) — RTÉ (Reuters/AFP) — September 22, 2026 — https://www.rte.ie/news/middle-east/2026/0922/1592449-middle-east/ ↩ ↩² ↩³

13. Trump rejects Iran's seven-day roadmap to end war and reopen Hormuz — Al Jazeera — September 26, 2026 — https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/26/trump-rejects-irans-seven-day-roadmap-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz ↩ ↩²

14. Kuwaiti Tanker Struck in the Strait of Hormuz (IMO count: 86 incidents, 24 seafarer deaths) — The Maritime Executive — September 29, 2026 — https://maritime-executive.com/article/kuwaiti-tanker-struck-in-the-strait-of-hormuz ↩ ↩²

15. G7 Leaders' statement on global energy security and market stability — Prime Minister of Canada — October 2, 2026 — https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2026/10/02/g7-leaders-statement-global-energy-security-and-market-stability ↩ ↩² ↩³

16. Iran says Strait of Hormuz to remain closed until US meets conditions — Al Jazeera — October 4, 2026 — https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/4/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-to-remain-closed-until-us-meets-conditions ↩ ↩² ↩³

17. Short-Term Energy Outlook (October 2026 edition; published October 6, forecast cutoff October 1; next edition November 10) — U.S. Energy Information Administration — https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/ ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵

18. Emergency price-stabilization measures in light of the Middle East situation (subsidy from October 29, 2026 of 52.4 yen; October 26 national average of 170.1 yen, the payment formula, and the adjustment unit; the October 1 figures were on the September 30 version) (in Japanese) — Agency for Natural Resources and Energy — updated October 28, 2026 — https://nenryo-teigakuhikisage.go.jp/ ; https://nenryo-teigakuhikisage.go.jp/current_graph.pdf ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸

19. Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (daily; release of October 21, 2026, latest value October 20) — U.S. Energy Information Administration — https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/RBRTED.htm ↩ ↩²

20. Petroleum product price survey results (published September 30, 2026; survey of September 28) (in Japanese) — Agency for Natural Resources and Energy — https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/statistics/petroleum_and_lpgas/pl007/results.html ↩

21. FAQ 1249: Are "toll" payments to Iran for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz authorized? (released April 28, 2026; updated May 29, 2026) — U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC — https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1249 ↩ ↩²

22. Economic Fury Targets Iranian Maritime Extortion (designation of the PGSA) — U.S. Department of the Treasury — May 27, 2026 — https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0507 ↩ ↩²

23. OFAC Alert: Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage (update; includes the July 29 designations of PGMIC and Hormuz Safe) — U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC — August 24, 2026 — https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/936751/download?inline= ↩ ↩² ↩³

24. Some 60 ships passed through Strait of Hormuz on Wednesday, US official says — Reuters (via BOE Report) — September 24, 2026 — https://boereport.com/2026/09/24/some-60-ships-passed-through-strait-of-hormuz-on-wednesday-us-official-says/ ↩

25. Defying conflict, Qatar-linked LNG tankers return to the Strait of Hormuz — Reuters (via Baird Maritime) — September 28, 2026 — https://www.bairdmaritime.com/shipping/tankers/defying-conflict-qatar-linked-lng-tankers-return-to-the-strait-of-hormuz ↩

26. Press conference by Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akazawa (in Japanese) — METI — September 15, 2026 — https://www.meti.go.jp/speeches/kaiken/2026/20260915001.html ↩ ↩²

27. Alert on the Middle East situation (September 20) (in Japanese) — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Overseas Safety Website — September 20, 2026 — https://www.anzen.mofa.go.jp/info/pcwideareaspecificinfo_2026C042.html ↩

28. Short-Term Energy Outlook (September 2026; next release October 6) — U.S. Energy Information Administration — September 9, 2026 — https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/ ↩

29. Trump expects talks with Iran to resume this week after rejecting proposal — CBS News — September 27, 2026 — https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-trump-strait-of-hormuz-7-day-proposal/ ↩

30. Japan-Iran Foreign Ministers' Telephone Talk (in Japanese) — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — October 1, 2026 — https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/pressit_000001_04239.html ↩

31. Address by Prime Minister Takaichi at the General Debate of the 81st Session of the U.N. General Assembly (in Japanese) — Prime Minister's Office of Japan — September 22, 2026 — https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/105/statement/2026/0922enzetsu.html ↩ ↩²

32. Press conference by Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akazawa (in Japanese) — METI — September 29, 2026 — https://www.meti.go.jp/speeches/kaiken/2026/20260929001.html ↩ ↩²

33. Natural gas and LNG monthly report, September 2026 (JKM, Japan's average LNG import price, Japan Crude Cocktail) (in Japanese) — JOGMEC — September 30, 2026 — https://journal.jogmec.go.jp/oilgas/nglng/monthly-report/202609.html ↩ ↩²

34. Monthly Economic Report, September 2026 (in Japanese) — Cabinet Office, Government of Japan — September 29, 2026 — https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/getsurei/2026/0929getsurei/main.pdf ↩

35. Meetings Coverage GA/12792 (General Assembly debate on the Security Council veto) — United Nations — October 1, 2026 — https://press.un.org/en/2026/ga12792.doc.htm ↩

36. On the revision of supplementary export controls (effective October 9, 2025) (in Japanese) — METI — https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/apply-01/20251009_catchminaoshi/20251009catchall.html ↩

37. Cabinet Order partially amending the Export Trade Control Order (new goods and technology matrix, effective February 14, 2026) (in Japanese) — METI — November 11, 2025 — https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2025/11/20251111001/20251111001.html ↩

38. China imposes escalated export controls on dual-use items to Japan (analysis of MOFCOM Notice No. 1 of 2026) — Greenberg Traurig — February 2026 — https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2026/2/china-imposes-escalated-export-controls-on-dual-use-items-to-japan ↩