Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.
China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has tightened its dual-use export controls on Japan step by step during 2026: Notice No. 1 on January 6, Notices No. 11 and No. 12 on February 24, and Notices No. 27 and No. 28 on June 29. This article explains how the measures work and what Japanese and global exporters should check in their own transactions. It draws on the MOFCOM notices themselves and the provisional translations by CISTEC (the Center for Information on Security Trade Control), and reflects the situation as of October 29, 2026.
Three points up front.
- In two waves, February 24 and June 29, 80 Japanese organizations and companies in total were placed on two lists: the Export Control List, which is effectively a ban, and the Watch List, which tightens review.
- The Export Control List measures reach beyond the listed parties. Passing Chinese-origin dual-use items to a listed entity can be covered even in a purely domestic transaction.
- Listing is a regulatory classification under Chinese law, not a judgment on any company. Many of the listed parties are legitimate businesses. We do not reproduce individual names in this article; we focus on how to check and what to do.
If you want a quick read on whether your export-control program can absorb list expansion at this pace, take the free export-control readiness check before you dig into the action list below.
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What Changed as of October 29, 2026
Since the previous update (July 18, 2026), we confirmed the following.
| Item | Previous (July 18 edition) | Now (as of October 29, 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| New Japan-related listings | Through the June 29 second wave (80 in total) | None found in MOFCOM's 2026 announcement list (through October 19). Still 80 |
| Reporting of violations involving strategic minerals | Not covered | Announcement No. 26 of 2026 (issued June 24, effective July 1) set up a reporting channel, open to anyone, and a handling procedure for violations involving strategic-mineral dual-use items1 |
| Customs "inquiry" procedure | Not covered | Announcement No. 52 of 2026 (MOFCOM and General Administration of Customs, October 19, effective on issue) sets out what happens when customs suspects a shipment declared without a license is a dual-use item. The shipper must supply documents within 7 working days of the notice2 |
| Rare earth suspension expiry | Not covered | The latest on the expiry of the suspension tied to the U.S.–China truce (November 10, 2026 as written in the announcement) is in the China rare earth export control map |
| Article structure | Full roster of listed names | Roster removed; focus on how to read the official annexes and on practice |
The reporting channel and the customs inquiry procedure matter to every company that handles China-bound or Chinese-origin dual-use items, listed or not. Under Announcement No. 52, customs does not release the goods while an inquiry or identification is under way. Being able to produce performance specifications, intended use, and the reasons your item falls outside the controlled scope makes the practical difference.
The Big Picture: Four List Notices and Notice No. 1
The list notices are four in number, each effective on the date of promulgation.
| Notice | Published (effective) | List | Added | Stated reason for listing (per the notice) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Notice 2026 No. 113 | February 24, 2026 | Export Control List (export ban) | 20 entities | Entities involved in enhancing Japan's military capability |
| Notice 2026 No. 124 | February 24, 2026 | Watch List (strict review) | 20 entities | End user and end use of dual-use items cannot be verified |
| Notice 2026 No. 275 | June 29, 2026 | Export Control List (export ban) | 20 entities | Same as above |
| Notice 2026 No. 286 | June 29, 2026 | Watch List (strict review) | 20 entities | Same as above |
Before these, Notice No. 1 of January 6, 20267 prohibited the export of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for military uses, and for any other end use that helps raise Japan's military capability. It also says that anyone, in any country or region, who transfers or supplies Chinese-origin dual-use items to Japanese organizations or individuals in violation of that rule will be held legally liable. The list notices read as the entity-level application of that policy.
The two lists sound similar. The operational weight is not.
| Aspect | Export Control List | Watch List |
|---|---|---|
| Legal basis | Articles 28 and 29 of the Dual-Use Items Regulations8 | Article 26 of the same Regulations8 |
| Whether exports are allowed | Dual-use items prohibited in principle | Not prohibited, but procedures tightened |
| General license and registration filing | Cannot be used (exports banned outright) | Cannot be used (individual license only) |
| Re-export rule (extraterritorial reach) | Yes; supply of Chinese-origin items by parties outside China also prohibited | Not specified in the same form |
| Ongoing transactions | Immediate suspension | No automatic suspension provision |
| Additional documents | Individual application under special circumstances only | Risk assessment report and pledge of non-diversion to military use |
| License review deadline | Not applicable; exports banned | Exempt from the 45-day deadline in Article 17 of the Regulations |
| Stated reason for listing | Involvement in enhancing Japan's military capabilities | End user and end use cannot be confirmed |
In plain English: the Control List says do not ship. The Watch List says if you ship, accept heavier process, documentation, and timeline risk. Before you size the matching workload, glance at the TRAFEED product catalog (PDF). Whether you automate screening changes the estimate.
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How to Check the Listed Names: Use the Official Annexes
The names of listed parties are in the annex to each notice. We do not reproduce individual names here, for two reasons. First, listing is only a regulatory classification, and a list of names can be read as an assessment of those parties. Second, the authoritative roster is always the MOFCOM notice itself, and secondary transcriptions can carry copying errors or miss updates.
For your own screening, use these official sources:
- Export Control List: the annexes to Notice No. 113 and Notice No. 275
- Watch List: the annexes to Notice No. 124 and Notice No. 286
- CISTEC's provisional translations and notes: February9 and June10 (Japanese)
One caution for matching: names vary across four layers, namely the formal Japanese corporate name, informal names, English names, and Chinese renderings. The notices are mainly in Chinese. The annexes to Notices No. 27 and No. 28 give English names and addresses together, while those of Notices No. 11 and No. 12 give English names only. Screening that hits only one layer will miss entries. For the formal Japanese name, the CISTEC translation is the safest reference.
The listed parties are not limited to defense-related organizations. They span materials, electronic components, machinery, trading companies, universities, and research institutions. The point to hold onto is that listing is a regulatory classification under Chinese law, not a finding that any party engaged in improper trade or military diversion. The parties include legitimate civilian businesses caught inside a broadly drawn category. For a listed company, the classification is a starting point for understanding where it has been placed and for explaining that to its customers.
Legal Basis: Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Regulations
China's dual-use export controls rest on the Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items (in force since December 1, 2024). The full system is covered in Understanding China's Export Control Law system. For these lists, the operative articles are:
The Export Control List rests on Articles 28 and 29 of the Regulations108. Article 28 allows importers and end users to be listed for violating end-user and end-use management requirements, potentially endangering national security and interests, or using dual-use items for terrorist purposes. Article 29 provides the menu: transaction bans, transaction restrictions, and export suspension orders. The notices invoke the ban and the suspension. On top of that, the notice text bars organizations and individuals outside China from transferring or supplying Chinese-origin dual-use items to listed entities. It is, in effect, a re-export rule written into Chinese domestic law.
The Watch List rests on Article 26108. Importers and end users whose end use cannot be confirmed (non-cooperation with verification within the deadline, or failure to submit supplementary materials) can be listed. Once listed, general licenses and registration-based export documentation become unavailable. An individual license application must carry a risk assessment report on the listed entity and a written pledge that the items will not be used in any way that contributes to enhancing Japan's military capabilities. Easy to miss: Notice No. 28 states that license review is not bound by the deadline in Article 17(1) of the Regulations6. Ordinary export license reviews must be decided within 45 days of acceptance; Watch List reviews have no such ceiling. For a business with delivery dates, that can work like a de facto embargo.
How China framed the policy, and Japan's response
On June 29, the MOFCOM spokesperson described the measure as aimed at stopping what China calls Japan's "remilitarization" and nuclear aspirations, and at curbing what it calls "neo-militarism"11. The February statement ran along the same lines12. Read that as a continuing policy track, not a one-day measure. The same statement also said the targets are limited to a small number of Japanese entities and to dual-use items, that normal China–Japan economic and trade exchanges are unaffected, and that law-abiding Japanese entities have nothing to fear11. That language does not change the operational duty to screen.
Japan's government responded the day the first wave landed. Press reports quoted Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kei Sato calling the measure unacceptable and lodging a protest9. We set out each government's stated position as published and take no side in it.
Rare earths sit in the same sequence. China had already tightened dual-use exports destined for Japan, including rare earths, in January 202613. For the full rare-earth chronology, see the China rare earth export control map.
Not on the List? The Re-Export Rule Can Still Reach You
The most common misreading is "we are not named, so this does not apply." The Export Control List measures are not only a problem for the listed parties.
Notices No. 11 and No. 27 bar not only Chinese exporters but also organizations and individuals outside China from transferring or supplying Chinese-origin dual-use items to listed entities53. CISTEC has cautioned that even a transaction between two parties inside Japan can be treated as a covered "domestic transfer" when Chinese-origin dual-use items move to a listed company10. A Japanese trading company that imports a component from China and delivers it to a listed domestic customer is engaged in a purely domestic transaction, yet under the structure of the Chinese text it can be a violation.
This is not hypothetical. According to CISTEC, in past practice around China's Unreliable Entity List, a domestic company in the same country as a listed party was warned by Chinese authorities after allegedly transferring Chinese products to the listed company in circumvention of the rules; it was asked to submit recurrence-prevention measures and told it would be listed itself if it did not comply10. Transactions by overseas subsidiaries are in scope too.
You can judge your own exposure in three steps:
- Match your customer, supplier, and delivery-destination masters against the entries in the official annexes (including name variants and affiliates). If none match, go to step 2.
- Inventory whether the items you handle include Chinese-origin dual-use items (relevant HS codes and controlled items). If not, direct exposure is limited. If so, go to step 3.
- Check whether those Chinese-origin items could flow, directly or indirectly, to a listed party, down to the second and third tier of your sales channels. If a path is possible, revise the terms or close the path.
Step 3 cannot be finished alone, so you need to ask your counterparties. The inquiry can be simple. In practice, something like this is used:
[Sample counterparty inquiry] Thank you for your continued support. MOFCOM Notices 2026 No. 11, No. 12, No. 27, and No. 28 designated Japanese organizations and companies (please refer to the annexes to the notices). Could you confirm whether the sources of the products and components you supply to us, or the destinations of our products sold through you, include any designated party or its affiliates? If so, please also tell us whether the items in question contain Chinese-origin components.
Repeating that for every counterparty is the real workload, and above a certain volume it is worth considering automation. Load your own and your counterparties' lists into TRAFEED and it screens across national lists, including China's Control List and Watch List, and returns whether there is a risk and the basis for it.
Is There a Way Off the List?
For a listed party, or a company that wants to keep trading with one, the question of removal matters. The institutional answer differs by list.
For the Watch List, a removal route is written into the text. Notice No. 28 provides that a listed entity that fulfills its verification-cooperation duty under Article 26 of the Regulations may apply for removal, and MOFCOM may remove it after verification6. In effect, cooperate with the end-use verification and show there is no improper change or transfer, and you can come off.
For the Export Control List, the notices say nothing about removal procedures. Article 18 of the Export Control Law and Article 30 of the Regulations contain provisions on removal, but the notices do not mention them, CISTEC notes10. In the short term, a business plan that assumes removal from the Control List is not realistic. As of October 29, 2026, we have found no removal of any Japan-related entry.
Five Practical Actions for Export Control Teams
Five actions, in priority order.
First, full re-screening of the counterparty database. Match every entry in the customer and supplier masters against the official annexes. Ideally include delivery destinations through subcontractors and distributors. Names shift across four layers; one name form alone is not enough.
Second, inventory Chinese-origin dual-use item flows. The re-export rule cannot be managed without locking down both the inlet where Chinese-origin dual-use items enter and the outlet where they leave. Identify which China-sourced materials, components, and equipment qualify as dual-use, and make ultimate destinations traceable.
Third, review classification documentation and prepare for a customs hold. If transactions with Watch List entities remain, risk assessment reports and pledges will be required. Separately, under Announcement No. 52 of October 19, goods declared without a license that customs suspects are dual-use are held, and documents are due within 7 working days2. Revisit classification document formats and approval flow now. If classification paperwork is the bottleneck when Japanese customers ask for certificates, see the certificate of non-applicability guide.
Fourth, update internal rules and train non-export functions. This measure lands on sales, procurement, and logistics. The point that a domestic transfer can be caught if Chinese-origin items are involved is exactly what non-export teams often miss. Brief them, even briefly. On the Japanese licensing side, the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer and operational guidelines were amended on April 21, 202614; China's lists and Japan's licensing regime now belong in the same screening flow. The amendment is covered in the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer guide.
Fifth, decide whether manual matching still scales. A few dozen screenings a month can be handled by hand. A global manufacturer with tens of thousands of transactions a year will need weeks just to reflect new additions and re-run matching. The number doubled from 40 to 80 in four months, from February to June. Manual operations are close to their limit.
METI's December 2025 analysis of FEFTA violations (FY2024) found that 52 percent originated in classification decisions and 36 percent in management-framework gaps15. Japanese export control operations had already passed the breaking point of brute-force methods before China's restrictions expanded. Details: FEFTA violation analysis. U.S. teams that already live with Entity List velocity will recognize the pattern.
Outlook, and What We Could Not Confirm
Here is what was confirmed as of October 29, 2026, and what was not.
- Confirmed: The Japan-related list notices number four, 80 entries in all, and MOFCOM's announcement list shows no addition after June 29. For Notice No. 1, we found no amending or repealing announcement as of October 29, 2026.
- Not confirmed: Whether a third wave will come, and when; and any actual removal from either list. These can be confirmed only when a notice is issued, so we do not forecast them.
- Surrounding developments: Press reports say the Japanese government plans to revise its three national security documents within the year, and how China would respond is uncertain. On October 19, 2026, MOFCOM also issued a notice placing certain machinery, including shield tunneling machines, under export control (effective November 18, 2026). It is not specific to Japan, but companies sourcing machinery and parts from China should check how the dual-use list has been updated.
Given that the number doubled in four months, preparing on the assumption of a third wave is reasonable. It remains an assumption until a notice is issued.
When Spreadsheet Matching Stops Working
Sanctions and control lists grow by the month. Ownership structures tangle. Regulatory originals publish in Chinese. Chasing all of that by hand is not realistic.
The AI export control agent TRAFEED, developed by TIMEWELL, was built for this workload. Upload your counterparty list and the AI cross-references it against sanctions and dual-use risk sources worldwide, including China's Control List and Watch List, and shows whether there is a risk, with source trails for audit. It also traces ownership chains through parents and subsidiaries, reducing misses from naming variations and affiliate structures. TRAFEED is decision support; final classification always rests with your export control officer.
If you want to check supply-chain exposure or redesign screening around China's measures on Japan, book a consultation. We will organize the work around your current masters and flows.
Related Articles
- China rare earth export control map
- Understanding China's Export Control Law system: complete guide
- Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer: April 21, 2026 amendment
- Certificate of non-applicability: classification procedures and catch-all practice
- FY2024 FEFTA violation analysis: classification as the top failure mode
- Entity List, MEU List, and SDN List: how they differ
China's dual-use measures involving Japan are applied as a policy built up in stages, not as a one-off. Do not stop at "is my company on the list?" Build the ability to see Chinese-origin item flows and counterparties past the first tier, now.
References
- Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notice 2026 No. 1 (strengthening dual-use export controls on Japan, January 6, 2026)
- Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notices 2026 No. 11 and No. 12 (promulgated and effective February 24, 2026)
- Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notices 2026 No. 27 and No. 28 (promulgated and effective June 29, 2026)
- Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notice 2026 No. 26 (handling of reports on strategic-mineral dual-use violations, June 24, 2026; effective July 1)
- MOFCOM and General Administration of Customs, Announcement 2026 No. 52 (inquiry and identification procedure for dual-use items, October 19, 2026)
- MOFCOM spokesperson Q&A on export control measures related to Japan (June 29, 2026 and February 24, 2026)
- CISTEC, flash reports (June 29, 2026 and February 24, 2026), including provisional translations of the notices
- Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items (CISTEC provisional translation ver. 3, October 22, 2024)
- METI, "Partial Amendment of the 'Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer'" (April 21, 2026)
- METI, "Analysis of FEFTA Violation Cases (Security Trade Control) (FY2024)" (December 2025)
Footnotes
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Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notice 2026 No. 26, on improving the handling of reports of violations of strategic-mineral dual-use export controls (June 24, 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_0bfdf4e0a0f843b8841f2053c3f0a60a.html ↩
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Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs, Announcement 2026 No. 52, on further optimizing the inquiry and identification of dual-use export controls (October 19, 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_92d6cb97a5de472d8ffeaf93be12a30f.html ↩ ↩2
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Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notice 2026 No. 11, adding 20 Japanese entities to the Export Control List (February 24, 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_9518e83d3c9f45929e3017220ba11607.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notice 2026 No. 12, adding 20 Japanese entities to the Watch List (February 24, 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_aaa675a5b1b04d8c956d30c91fb929e2.html ↩ ↩2
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Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notice 2026 No. 27, adding 20 Japanese entities to the Export Control List (June 29, 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_6607ea694b704da8ac5e863a5568e47c.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notice 2026 No. 28, adding 20 Japanese entities to the Watch List (June 29, 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_1a0adf5de9b84cd091992669d59e10d4.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notice 2026 No. 1, on strengthening dual-use export controls on Japan (January 6, 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_5acdf51490094b39b7ffb381280b2a3b.html ↩
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Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items (CISTEC provisional translation ver. 3, October 22, 2024) https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20241021_yaku.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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CISTEC, flash report on the placement of Japanese companies and universities on the Export Control List (20 entities) and Watch List (20 entities) (February 24, 2026), including provisional translations of Notices No. 11 and No. 12 and an explanation of the legal framework (Japanese) https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260225.pdf ↩ ↩2
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CISTEC, flash report on the addition of Japanese companies to the Export Control List (20 entities) and Watch List (20 entities) (June 29, 2026), including provisional translations of Notices No. 27 and No. 28 and points to note (Japanese) https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260629.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
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Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, spokesperson Q&A on export control measures related to Japan (June 29, 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_7f7ba1aa2b1a43a480e7f5c0e6f0e618.html ↩ ↩2
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Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, spokesperson Q&A on export control measures related to Japan (February 24, 2026, background to the first wave) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/art/2026/art_ecab07b2d57149ecbd800fe40362e8ed.html ↩
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CISTEC, "Tightening of China's Export Controls on Dual-Use Items Destined for Japan" (January 6, 2026) https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260106-2.pdf ↩
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METI, "Partial Amendment of the 'Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer'" (April 21, 2026) https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2026/04/20260421003/20260421003.html ↩
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METI, "Analysis of FEFTA Violation Cases (Security Trade Control) (FY2024)" (December 2025) https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/gaitameho_document/ihanjireigaitamehou6.pdf ↩






