China's Revised Defense Mobilization Law Takes Effect: What Applies to Companies in Peacetime

Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.

China's revised National Defense Mobilization Law took effect on October 1, 2026. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted it on August 28, rewriting the 2010 law from top to bottom. The new text runs to 14 chapters and 82 articles¹².

Around the effective date, Japanese newspapers and TV led with words like "civilian requisition" and "a Taiwan contingency." That is a natural way to headline it. Read the text from the first article, though, and the picture shifts. The law mixes two kinds of provisions: ones that only switch on after mobilization is declared, and ones that bind companies right now, with or without any mobilization. If you work in export control, I think the second group is the one to worry about.

Below I go through the text by article number: what changed, who it applies to, and when. For the wider map of China's export control system, see my guide to China's Export Control Law and the dual-use regulations. If you want a quick read on your own program, the 3-minute export compliance check is a good place to start.

Summary: China's revised National Defense Mobilization Law (adopted August 28, 2026; effective October 1; 14 chapters, 82 articles) fully replaces the 2010 law (72 articles). Expropriation and requisition of civilian resources, and special measures such as sector-wide controls over commerce and trade, apply only after the state decides to implement mobilization. By contrast, the duty to supply data for mobilization-potential surveys (Article 26(4)), the penalties for refusing (Article 79), and the requirement for units in transport, telecoms, cybersecurity and other sectors to maintain specialized support teams (Article 60) apply in peacetime. Nothing in the law exempts foreign companies, so a Chinese subsidiary of a Japanese company is treated as an ordinary enterprise.

What changed: from 72 articles to 82

Some background first. The original law was adopted on February 26, 2010 and took effect on July 1 that year³. In October 2021, the NPC Standing Committee passed a decision temporarily adjusting how certain provisions applied while China reformed its defense mobilization system, and said the relevant laws should be revised "once the reform measures have matured"⁴. This revision answers that. The draft had its first reading in April 2026 and its second at the 24th session in August, where it passed⁵.

At an August 21 press briefing, Huang Haihua, spokesperson for the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee, listed four main changes in the second draft⁵: a definition of "national defense mobilization"; new language on applying advanced technology and building mobilization capacity in emerging domains; clearer obligations for those surveyed on mobilization potential; and a requirement that special measures follow the principles of necessity and reasonableness and be adjusted as circumstances change. Public comments, he said, centered on the definition, collection of mobilization data, and how requisition and compensation would work in practice.

Here is the old law against the new one, limited to the parts that matter for companies.

Item	2010 law (72 articles)	2026 law (82 articles, effective October 1, 2026)
Definition	None	Article 2(2) defines "national defense mobilization," including converting economic and social strength into defense strength
Data and technology	None	Article 7 creates a data support system for mobilization; Article 8 adds the application of advanced technology
Mobilization-potential surveys	Statistics agencies supply data (Art. 19)	Those surveyed must supply truthful, accurate, complete and timely data (Art. 26(4)); refusal or false data can lead to an order to correct, then compelled performance and fines (Art. 79(1))
Strategic materials	Reserves run by State Council departments (Art. 33)	A government-led system with public participation; companies encouraged to hold physical, technology and capacity reserves (Arts. 40, 41(4)); distribution added (Art. 43)
Military supply chains	None	New security assessments of military-product industrial and supply chains (Art. 46)
What must be reserved or supplied first for military production	Equipment, materials, components, technology (Arts. 39, 41)	Data and software added to the list (Arts. 47, 49)
Civilian resources	Requisition only (Art. 54)	Expropriation and requisition (Art. 63); vehicles named expressly; compensation must be "fair and reasonable" (Art. 67)
Special measures	Five categories including sector controls (Art. 63)	Same five categories, with radio added to the sectors (Art. 73); new necessity and reasonableness principle (Art. 76)
Corporate liability	Seven items (Art. 69)	Nine items (Art. 79), adding refusal to supply survey data and failure to hold required strategic reserves

On paper this looks dry. Still, naming data and software, and turning survey cooperation into a duty backed by fines, are not small changes for a business. One more thing I noticed when I searched the text: the words "foreign," "overseas" and "foreign-invested" never appear. No country or region is named either. There is no provision that treats foreign companies differently, and none that exempts them. A Japanese subsidiary incorporated in China reads this law as an ordinary Chinese "enterprise."

What applies now, and what waits for a mobilization decision

The single most useful thing you can do with this law is sort each article by when it applies. Under Article 13, the NPC Standing Committee decides on general or partial mobilization and the President issues the mobilization order. Article 14(2) adds that when sovereignty or security faces a direct threat requiring immediate action, the State Council and the Central Military Commission may take necessary mobilization measures and report to the Standing Committee at the same time. Many articles open with "after the state decides to implement national defense mobilization." That decision is the trigger.

The provisions on civilian resources, the ones the headlines focused on, belong to this second group. Article 63 lets people's governments at county level and above "expropriate and requisition" civilian resources under law once mobilization has been decided and reserves cannot meet demand. Civilian resources means facilities, equipment, vehicles, premises and other resources owned or used by organizations and individuals. The 2010 law spoke only of requisition. So what is the difference? In Chinese legal usage, requisition (zhengyong) means temporary use followed by return, while expropriation (zhengshou) transfers ownership. Article 117 of the Civil Code also requires "fair and reasonable" compensation for expropriation and requisition in the public interest⁶, and Article 67 of the new law uses the same words. Some protections carry over: the duty to return requisitioned property, compensation for losses, and exemptions for items people need for daily life (Art. 65). One sentence did not survive. Article 57 of the old law said the state would bear the cost of modifying requisitioned resources; I could not find that sentence in the new Article 66, and Article 67(2) now says funding follows "relevant state provisions."

Special measures under Article 73 also wait for a mobilization decision. They include controls over sectors such as finance, transport, postal services, telecoms, publishing, broadcasting, information networks, radio, energy and water supply, health, food and grain supply, and commerce and trade; restrictions on where people can go and where goods and vehicles can move; and special working arrangements in enterprises and institutions.

Then there are the articles that do not wait. These are the ones export control and subsidiary management teams tend to miss.

The first is the mobilization-potential survey. Article 26(4) says those surveyed must provide the data the survey needs, truthfully, accurately, completely and on time, in line with law and state provisions. An enterprise that refuses, delays or provides inaccurate data can be ordered to correct within a deadline; if it does not, performance can be compelled and a fine imposed (Art. 79(1)). The old law had neither the duty nor the penalty. The text does not say what will be surveyed. Since the point is to measure mobilization "potential," I would expect production capacity, equipment, inventory, vehicles and technical staff to be central. That last point is my own inference.

It is worth adding that a peacetime duty to cooperate with such surveys is not unique to China. Article 16 of Taiwan's All-out Defense Mobilization Readiness Act requires public and private producers to cooperate with surveys of key materials and fixed facilities and to provide relevant mobilization-capacity data⁷.

The second is specialized support teams. Article 60 says units in transport, postal services, telecoms, cybersecurity, health, food and grain supply, construction, energy and chemicals, large water facilities, civilian nuclear facilities, news media, defense research and production, and municipal services must take on national defense service under law, and must in peacetime form specialized support teams and run training and drills. The old law had nearly the same provision (Art. 51). What is new is that cybersecurity now appears on the list.

The third is education and cooperation. Requiring enterprises to have staff learn basic defense knowledge and skills (Art. 70) and to assist with reserve personnel work (Art. 34(2)) are peacetime duties. If a Chinese employee is called for national defense service, they keep receiving the wages, allowances and benefits of their original employer during the service (Art. 62). The duty covers Chinese citizens, men aged 18 to 60 and women aged 18 to 55 (Art. 58). Foreign expatriates are not included.

Where it meets export control in practice

This is the part I care most about. The National Defense Mobilization Law is not an export control law. Even so, I see at least three places where an export control team cannot ignore it.

The first is end-use undertakings. When Japanese companies ship machinery or components to China, many ask the customer to sign a statement that the goods will not be used for military purposes. With an honest counterparty, that works fine in peacetime. What happens after a mobilization decision? Article 49 requires anyone supplying energy, equipment, materials, components, technology, data or software to units carrying out military research, production or maintenance to give priority to military needs. Expropriation and requisition under Article 63 do not depend on the owner's consent either; the duty to accept them sits in Article 64. So however honest the customer is, its obligations under its own country's law come before a contractual promise.

This is not unique to China. Japan's Self-Defense Forces Act, Article 103, lets prefectural governors order goods to be held, or expropriate them, when the SDF is ordered to defense operations⁸. Japan's Civil Protection Act, Article 81, also allows specified goods to be expropriated⁹. In the United States, the Defense Priorities and Allocations System requires companies to accept rated defense orders even in peacetime (15 CFR 700.13)¹⁰. Many countries have laws that redirect private resources for defense or emergencies. An undertaking cannot sit above the counterparty's national law. License conditions and re-transfer restrictions need to be built on that assumption.

The second is the US Export Administration Regulations. Section 744.21 of the EAR prohibits the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) of items listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 744 for a military end use or a military end user in China without a license¹¹. Suppose a Japanese company's subsidiary in China holds US-origin controlled items, or equipment containing US technology. If that property is requisitioned after a mobilization decision and put to military use, how does the EAR treat it? I could not find any interpretation from the Bureau of Industry and Security on whether a compulsory requisition counts as a "transfer." Honestly, there is no clean answer yet. Without one, the least you can do is keep a register of which EAR-controlled items sit at which site in China.

The third is sourcing. Special measures include controls over commerce and trade and restrictions on the movement of goods and vehicles (Art. 73(1) and (2)). Shipments from a mobilization area could stop. There is a peacetime mechanism too. The State Council Provisions on Industrial and Supply Chain Security (State Council Order No. 834), published and effective in April 2026, allow emergency measures such as emergency dispatch, release of reserves, and organizing production, transport and supply when supply stability in critical sectors is threatened (Art. 11)¹². Put that next to the existing licensing regime for dual-use items such as gallium, germanium and rare earths, and sourcing from China can be interrupted at three layers: peacetime export licensing, peacetime emergency dispatch, and wartime mobilization. The practical job is to set supplier diversification and inventory levels so the business keeps running whichever layer stops. I keep a running summary of the rare earth situation in my China rare earth export control map.

A word on data. The new law sets up a data support system for mobilization (Art. 7) and asks units with military production tasks to reserve data and software (Art. 47). It also spells out a duty to protect trade secrets and personal information learned in mobilization work (Art. 11). When a survey or task request arrives, Article 11 is a useful hook for confirming what has to be provided and how it will be kept confidential. China's information-related laws more broadly are covered in my article on the Counter-Espionage Law and National Intelligence Law.

Other Chinese measures from the same period

Between mid-August and early October, China announced several other measures touching export control and economic security. Here they are alongside this year's main regulations, so you can see how they fit together.

Date	Measure	Key points	How it reaches companies
Published April 7, 2026	State Council Order No. 834, Provisions on Industrial and Supply Chain Security	Monitoring and early warning in critical sectors; emergency dispatch (Art. 11); investigations and measures where a foreign organization or individual breaks off normal transactions contrary to normal market principles (Art. 15)	Peacetime. Could come up when ending business with a Chinese counterparty
Published April 13, 2026	State Council Order No. 835, Regulations on Countering Improper Foreign Extraterritorial Jurisdiction	Identifies foreign measures as improper extraterritorial jurisdiction and bars anyone from implementing or assisting them (Art. 6); prohibition orders (Art. 13); export control and similar areas follow their own rules where they exist (Art. 19)	Peacetime. Could come up when a foreign authority requests cooperation
Published July 22, 2026; effective September 15	State Council Order No. 841, Provisions on Exit and Entry Administration	Commerce and other authorities may bar Chinese citizens from leaving the country if they violated export control or technology import-export rules and may endanger industrial or technological security (Art. 4(3))	Peacetime. HR and business travel for Chinese engineers
August 19, 2026	Ministry of Justice announcement on the EU's investigation of JD.com under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation	Under Arts. 3 and 6 of Order No. 835, the EU's cross-border investigative practice is identified as improper extraterritorial jurisdiction, and no one may implement or assist it. The second such announcement, after the Nuctech case on May 15	Effective on publication
Adopted August 28, 2026; effective October 1	Revised National Defense Mobilization Law	As covered above	Two layers: peacetime and post-mobilization
September 22, 2026	MOFCOM and four other departments, Announcement No. 40 of 2026	Two substances added to the catalogue of precursor chemicals (chemicals that can be used to make narcotics) controlled for export to specific countries; exports to the US, Mexico and Canada need a license	Effective on publication
September 28, 2026	MOFCOM Department of American and Oceanian Affairs briefing	Agreement to extend, from November 10, 2026 to January 10, 2027, the suspension of certain tariff and non-tariff measures under the October 2025 Kuala Lumpur arrangement	Suspension of measures toward the US extended

Sources: Order No. 834¹², Order No. 835¹³, Order No. 841¹⁴, the Ministry of Justice announcements¹⁵¹⁶, Announcement No. 40¹⁷, and the suspension extension¹⁸. I covered Order No. 841 in my article on China's exit controls for engineers, and the August 5 measures toward the US in China's countermeasures and tighter drone export controls. The suspension extension is tracked in my piece on the November 10 deadline. Companies named in the table appear only as subjects of foreign investigations; nothing here is a judgment on them.

Laid out this way, you can see laws with different jobs arriving within six months: peacetime supply chain security (Order No. 834), responses to foreign measures (Order No. 835), movement of people (Order No. 841), and wartime mobilization (the revised law). The precursor chemicals update also lines up in time with the September US-China summit, whose outcomes included counternarcotics cooperation¹⁹. I will not weigh in on the policies here. The fact is simply that the number of laws a company operating in China needs to track has grown noticeably over the past six months.

What companies should check now

Here is what export control and subsidiary management teams can start on today. None of it is about predicting a mobilization. It is about preparing for the articles that already apply and keeping a record of your decisions.

1. Review your China sites against Articles 60 and 28. Sites in transport, telecoms, cybersecurity, health, energy and chemicals, construction and similar sectors may fall under the peacetime support-team requirement. I could not confirm whether the catalogue of construction projects and key products closely related to national defense (Art. 28) is public. A realistic step is to ask local authorities or counsel whether your business is covered, and keep a record of the answer.

2. Set a procedure for mobilization-potential survey requests. Decide who receives them, who reviews before submission, how headquarters is informed, and where copies are kept. The duty to respond rests on Article 26(4), and refusal falls under Article 79. Article 11's confidentiality duty gives you a basis to confirm the scope of what must be provided.

3. Revisit force majeure clauses. Check whether supply contracts with Chinese counterparties treat national defense mobilization, special measures, and expropriation or requisition as force majeure. Whether you are the buyer or the seller, it helps to write the contract on the assumption that delivery priorities can change by law (Arts. 43 and 49).

4. Keep a register of technology, data and software sent to the subsidiary. Now that Articles 47 and 49 name data and software, you should know what moved from Japan to the subsidiary and tie it to export license numbers and conditions. Flag US-origin items and technology separately with Section 744.21 of the EAR in mind.

5. Align HR assumptions. Check local work rules against the possibility that Chinese employees are called for national defense service, and against Article 62 on pay during that service.

TRAFEED keeps Japan export classification results and counterparty screening against national restricted party lists on file together with the evidence behind each decision. Lists published by the Chinese government are screened as reference. The National Defense Mobilization Law itself is not something we screen against, but I think it fits well with a practice of noting, in each counterparty record, the obligations that the counterparty's own laws may impose. See the TRAFEED page for details.

Key takeaways

• China's revised National Defense Mobilization Law was adopted on August 28, 2026 and took effect on October 1. It fully replaces the 72-article 2010 law with 14 chapters and 82 articles
• Expropriation and requisition of civilian resources, and special measures, apply only after the state decides to implement mobilization. Compensation must be "fair and reasonable"
• Survey data duties (Art. 26(4)) and penalties (Art. 79), and specialized support teams in transport, telecoms, cybersecurity and other sectors (Art. 60), apply in peacetime
• Nothing exempts foreign companies. A Japanese subsidiary in China is an ordinary enterprise under the law
• The touchpoints with export control are the limits of end-use undertakings, the EAR's in-country transfer rules, and sourcing from China
• Japan, the US and Taiwan also have laws that redirect private resources in emergencies

Follow only the headlines and this looks like a story about a contingency that may or may not come. Read the text and you find survey cooperation and support teams, which are peacetime obligations that started on October 1. Rather than treating it as something uniquely Chinese, I find it more useful to read it with the same yardstick as comparable laws in Japan, the US and Taiwan and to keep your transactions organized by jurisdiction. Start by listing which articles touch each of your China sites. If a transaction leaves you unsure, we can work through it together in a one-on-one consultation.

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Footnotes

1. National Defense Mobilization Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted February 26, 2010; revised August 28, 2026 at the 24th session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress), full text, Xinhua, Beijing, August 28, published on the Ministry of National Defense conscription office website. https://www.gfbzb.gov.cn/zbbm/zcfg/byfg/202609/20260909/2293944855.html ↩

2. Xinhua, "全国人大常委会表决通过新修订的国防动员法" (August 28, 2026). http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0828/c1001-40788289.html ↩

3. Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), provisional Japanese translation of the 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law (last updated March 12, 2026). https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/jfile/country/cn/invest_11/pdfs/cn13A060_kokuboudouin_law.pdf ↩

4. China News Service, "中国修订国防动员法 突出新兴领域国防动员工作" (August 28, 2026). https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2026/08-28/10686198.shtml ↩

5. Press briefing by the spokesperson of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee (August 21, 2026), as reposted by the Beijing Municipal National Defense Mobilization Office (August 28, 2026). https://gdb.beijing.gov.cn/rf_ywdt/rf_hydt/202608/t20260828_4841424.html ↩ ↩²

6. Civil Code of the People's Republic of China (adopted May 28, 2020; effective January 1, 2021), Article 117. ↩

7. Taiwan, All-out Defense Mobilization Readiness Act (全民防衛動員準備法, last amended June 19, 2019), Article 16, Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic of China (Taiwan). https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=F0070013 ↩

8. Self-Defense Forces Act (Act No. 165 of 1954), Article 103. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/329AC0000000165 ↩

9. Act on Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc. (Act No. 112 of 2004), Article 81. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/416AC0000000112 ↩

10. 15 CFR § 700.13 Acceptance and rejection of rated orders (Defense Priorities and Allocations System). https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/section-700.13 ↩

11. 15 CFR § 744.21 Restrictions on certain 'military end uses' or 'military end users'. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/section-744.21 ↩

12. State Council Order No. 834, "国务院关于产业链供应链安全的规定" (signed March 31, 2026; published and effective April 7, 2026). https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202604/content_7064837.htm ↩ ↩²

13. State Council Order No. 835, "中华人民共和国反外国不当域外管辖条例" (signed April 7, 2026; published and effective April 13, 2026). https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202604/content_7065398.htm ↩

14. State Council Order No. 841, "国务院关于出境入境管理的规定" (published July 22, 2026; effective September 15, 2026), on the MOFCOM website. https://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ggfw/crjfw/crjzcwj/202607/7209.html ↩

15. Ministry of Justice of the People's Republic of China, "关于欧盟外国补贴调查相关做法构成不当域外管辖的公告" (August 19, 2026). https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/gwxw/xwyw/202608/t20260819_538687.html (announcement text and spokesperson Q&A confirmed via the Beijing News repost: https://finance.sina.com.cn/tech/roll/2026-08-19/doc-ininwawh8318454.shtml ) ↩

16. Xinhua, "司法部发布关于欧盟外国补贴调查相关做法构成不当域外管辖的公告" (May 15, 2026, the Nuctech case). http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0515/c1008-40720829.html ↩

17. MOFCOM, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Emergency Management, General Administration of Customs and National Medical Products Administration, Announcement No. 40 of 2026, "关于调整《向特定国家（地区）出口易制毒化学品管理目录》的公告" (September 22, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2026/art_7dad5aea5c7a40c992c99aedfa7d2ebd.html ↩

18. MOFCOM, "商务部美大司负责人解读第八轮中美经贸磋商成果" (September 28, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfb/sjfzrfb/art/2026/art_cd060e0649964da8ae13216c3bb1a645.html ↩

19. Xinhua, "中美达成八点成果共识" (September 25, 2026), reposted on the MOFCOM website. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_1de2d87336ce458eb0b7dc77e6529ee2.html ↩