Hello, this is Hamamoto from TIMEWELL. Several years have now passed since "economic security" was placed at the center of policy. The place that steers it is the Economic Security Promotion Council. You may have heard the name, but even among practitioners, surprisingly few people can explain who gathers there and what the council actually decides.
In this article, I want to sort out the legal basis on which the Economic Security Promotion Council was established and what has been deliberated there, following primary sources from the Cabinet Secretariat and the Prime Minister's Office. I will cover the five pillars of the Economic Security Promotion Act amendment that the Takaichi government has ordered, the direction of a "supply chain that does not depend on any single country" set out in the policy speech, and the theme of "energy autonomy" that emerges from all this. Finally, I will trace the moves of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), which has ended up playing an unexpectedly large role in this area. If you mix up the various council bodies, the whole picture becomes distorted, so I will be careful to distinguish which announcement was made in which forum.
What Is the Economic Security Promotion Council?
The Economic Security Promotion Council is a council established within the Cabinet Secretariat on the basis of the Prime Minister's decision of November 19, 2021, "Concerning the Convening of the Economic Security Promotion Council."[^1] The Prime Minister serves as chair, and the body that runs the secretariat, that is, the office with jurisdiction, is the National Security Secretariat (NSS) of the Cabinet Secretariat. As the reach of national security spreads into the economic sphere, it may help to think of it as a ministerial-level command tower convened to strengthen and advance economic security.
The subjects of discussion have become more concrete with each meeting. The first meeting was on November 19, 2021, and the most recent, the eighth, was on November 7, 2025; there have been eight meetings in total to date.[^2] The eighth was the first meeting held since the Takaichi government took office. Is the foundation that supports citizens' lives and economic activity overly dependent on any single country? Are there gaps, from a national security standpoint, in the flow of technology, information, and capital? The Promotion Council is the place where such questions are handled not only within the frame of diplomacy and defense, but in the language of the economy.
The council has also been the starting point for building the system itself. The Economic Security Promotion Act followed a path in which the study of legislation began at the first meeting in November 2021, the Act was enacted on May 11, 2022, and it was promulgated on May 18 of the same month.[^9] In other words, the Promotion Council is the backbone of policy: it gives birth to laws, reviews how they operate, and points to the direction of the next amendment. Economic-security issues, which individual ministries tend to pursue in an uncoordinated way, are bundled together by the Prime Minister and the NSS. Once you grasp this structure, everything that follows comes into three dimensions.
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What Was Deliberated at the Council: The Five Pillars of the Act Amendment
What came into focus at the eighth meeting was the amendment of the Economic Security Promotion Act. On November 7, 2025, Prime Minister Takaichi noted that three years had passed since the Act's enactment and that the international situation "continues to change at an unprecedented speed and complexity," and instructed Minister Onoda in charge of economic security to "begin a review toward amending the Economic Security Promotion Act as soon as possible."[^3] Up to this point, this is a fact that can be confirmed in the primary source published by the Prime Minister's Office. The policy of "doing" the amendment was clearly stated from the Prime Minister's own mouth.
So what will the amendment consider? According to reporting, the review items are organized into five pillars.[^4] Strengthening supply chains, revising the core-infrastructure system, supporting the overseas expansion of important projects, creating a think tank, and protecting data. Following discussion by an expert panel, the government reportedly intends to submit an amendment bill to the ordinary Diet session in 2026. From here on, this is an outlook based on reporting by outlets such as the Nikkei, not content finalized as statutory text, and I want to note that in advance.
The substance of each pillar has gradually come into shape. On revising the core-infrastructure system, it is reported that the plan envisions expanding the scope of prior review from the current 15 fields to 16 by adding "medical care," and strengthening defenses against cyberattacks.[^5] Creating a think tank is said to have in mind the establishment of a comprehensive research and analysis institution with the NSS as its command tower.[^6] On the data-protection pillar, it is reported that the government will consider strengthening the framework for protecting important personal data related to security, such as financial, genomic, and location data, and putting in place measures to prevent data outflows to countries of concern such as China.[^7] On overseas-expansion support, the aim is said to be to make financial support possible for "services" such as laying submarine cables, and to promote overseas projects that lead to cooperation with allies and with emerging and developing countries, the so-called Global South, through activities such as port repairs.[^8] I follow the overall picture of the amendment in detail in The Amendment of the Economic Security Promotion Act, and I separately cover the Japanese version of CFIUS, which was named as one of the five pillars, in The Launch of Japan's CFIUS.
The Theme of Energy Autonomy
Looking at the five pillars, behind words like supply chains, overseas expansion, and infrastructure, a single common motive shows through. The idea is a desire to escape a state of being held by a particular country. Where that appears most acutely is in the field of energy.
On February 20, 2026, in his policy speech to the 221st session of the Diet, Prime Minister Takaichi presented, side by side as targets of expansionary fiscal policy, "crisis-management investment" that minimizes risks such as economic security, food security, and energy-resource security, and "growth investment" in areas such as AI, semiconductors, and shipbuilding.[^10] In other words, he spoke of defensive investment and offensive investment on the same footing. As concrete measures to counter economic coercion, he announced a focus on "rebuilding a supply chain that does not depend on any single country" and "strengthening cooperation with like-minded countries to break free from dependence," together with support for important services such as laying submarine cables, strengthening the core-infrastructure system, building a comprehensive think-tank function, and creating a Japanese version of CFIUS (the Committee on Foreign Investment in Japan).[^11] You can see that the five pillars shown at the Promotion Council and the picture drawn by the policy speech overlap cleanly.
Focused on energy, the speech goes further. Accelerate the restart of reactors whose safety has been confirmed, and advance the development and installation of next-generation innovative reactors within the sites where decommissioning has been decided. Build domestic supply chains for perovskite solar cells and next-generation geothermal power, and work on utilizing the seabed rare-earth resources lying in the waters around Minamitorishima.[^12] Each of these is a preparatory move so that the procurement of fuel, resources, and components is not left entirely to a particular country overseas. Nuclear power, next-generation solar cells, geothermal, seabed resources: the lineup may look scattered, but what runs through all of them comes down to a single point, raising the proportion that can be supplied domestically.
Energy autonomy is a story about decarbonization, and at the same time a story about logistics and infrastructure: from where do you carry what, where do you store it, and how do you use it. However much the technology of power generation advances, without the vessels to bring it ashore, transmit it, and store it, it ends as a picture of a rice cake. When you reframe it this way, the name of an unexpected ministry comes to the fore, one that is not the competent authority for resources or energy. That is MLIT.
MLIT's Contribution: Carbon Neutral Ports, Hydrogen Receiving at Ports, and Offshore Wind Base Ports
Here you must be careful not to confuse the council bodies. The stage on which MLIT set out its contribution measures toward energy autonomy was not the Economic Security Promotion Council. On April 27, 2026, MLIT Minister Kaneko submitted to the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy the material "Advancing Infrastructure Development to Make the Japanese Archipelago Strong and Prosperous," and within it, under "Contribution to Energy Security," set out "Mobility Enerlink (tentative name), aimed at improving energy autonomy."[^13] I want to note that this is at the stage of a concept under a tentative name, not a finalized measure with budget scale or a timeline set in stone.
The three concrete measures MLIT listed for the concept are as follows. Promoting the installation of perovskite solar cells using infrastructure spaces; developing hydrogen use and receiving facilities for hydrogen and the like at ports; and supporting the introduction of FCV (fuel-cell vehicle) and EV commercial vehicles, along with implementing systems that supply power while driving.[^14] The idea is to reorganize the "places" under MLIT's jurisdiction, such as roads, ports, and parking lots, into networks for generation, receiving, and charging and discharging. In the same material, taking economic security into account, MLIT also set out strengthening the competitiveness of international container strategic ports through the automation and remote operation of port cargo-handling machinery and digital standardization via Cyber Port, as well as the revival of the shipbuilding industry, that is, developing production systems for next-generation vessels and improving ship-repair capacity to secure stable international maritime transport.[^15] There is a strong emphasis on retempering transport infrastructure itself as a national-security asset.
Decarbonizing ports is further along than the concept stage, with hands already moving. A carbon neutral port (CNP) is a port that seeks to upgrade port functions with decarbonization in mind and to develop receiving facilities for hydrogen, ammonia, and the like; MLIT is advancing their formation under goals such as carbon neutrality by 2050. At the ports of Yokohama and Kobe, demonstrations introducing hydrogen-fueled cargo-handling machinery have already been carried out.[^16] In March 2025, the MLIT Ports and Harbours Bureau published the "Guidelines on Developing Receiving Facilities for Hydrogen and Ammonia at Ports (Interim Summary)," setting out guidance for port managers and private operators when they consider developing receiving hubs.[^17] In the same month, it also created the "CNP Certification (Container Terminals)" system to objectively evaluate the decarbonization of container terminals.[^18] The flow is one of building, starting from ports, the gateways through which next-generation fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia are received into the country.
Offshore wind, too, is tied to ports from a supply-chain standpoint. The system of base ports for offshore wind power generation, formally the base ports for marine renewable energy power generation facilities, was created in February 2020 under the Port and Harbour Act. It is a mechanism by which wharves at base ports designated by the MLIT minister are leased to power-generation operators over the long term and stably. On April 26, 2024, the ports of Aomori and Sakata were newly designated, bringing the total to seven together with the previously designated ports of Akita, Noshiro, Kashima, Niigata, and Kitakyushu.[^19] The introduction targets themselves are set out on the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) side: the "Offshore Wind Industry Vision (First)" of December 2020 sets goals of forming 10 GW of projects by 2030 and 30-45 GW, including floating types, by 2040.[^20] MLIT prepares the bases where enormous turbines are assembled and sent out to sea, and the energy authorities draw the generation targets. On top of this division of roles, a single line called energy autonomy is connected. The question of how to bundle this kind of governance over information and procurement is contiguous with The Economic Security Center and Export-Control Governance and The Establishment of the National Intelligence Council.
Implications for Companies: Reviewing Supply Chains and Infrastructure Procurement
Pulling all of this toward the corporate perspective, two pieces of homework come into view. One is supply chains, the other is infrastructure procurement.
On the supply-chain side, the starting point is to make visible, in peacetime, which of the technologies, cargo, and services your company handles carry dependence on a particular country. Given that the first of the five pillars of the Act amendment is strengthening supply chains, and that the policy speech sets out "rebuilding a supply chain that does not depend on any single country," taking stock of dependence also overlaps with what policy is asking for. From which country does each component come, are there alternative procurement sources, and which transactions include sensitive technology? At its root, this is the same work as classification (applicability determination) and counterparty screening in export control. What our export-control AI agent TRAFEED supports day to day is exactly this visualization: in line with METI's standards, it systematizes the classification of cargo and technology, determinations under list controls and catch-all controls, and screening of end users. I feel that the more a company already runs daily export determinations, the more easily it can repurpose that same foundation for reviewing its supply chain.
It is worth stressing that this is not a one-time exercise. The list of countries of concern, the fields subject to prior review, and the scope of catch-all controls all move over time, and the amendment now under consideration will move them again, for example by adding "medical care" to the fields covered by the core-infrastructure system. A dependence map drawn once and left on a shelf loses its value the moment the underlying rules shift. What holds up is a standing process: a way of continually keeping the relationship between your products, your suppliers, and the applicable regulations in view, so that when a rule changes you can see, on the same day, which transactions are affected. That is the difference between treating economic security as a project and treating it as an operation.
The infrastructure-procurement side is a slightly higher-altitude story. Moves such as hydrogen and ammonia receiving at ports, offshore wind base ports, and CNP certification are, for companies involved in logistics and electric power, signals that the premises of procurement and siting will change going forward. How will your company connect to the supply chain for next-generation fuels, and will decarbonization compliance be built into the criteria by which counterparties select partners? MLIT's "Mobility Enerlink" is still a concept under a tentative name, but I have watched many times as concepts, like CNPs and base ports, settle into frameworks of systems and subsidies. Rather than scrambling once things start moving, finishing the review first is faster in the end. If you would like to take stock of export control, supply chains, and infrastructure procurement as a single connected issue, please reach out through a consultation.
Conclusion: Reading It as One Line, From the Command Tower to On-the-Ground Infrastructure
The Economic Security Promotion Council was a command tower of policy bundled by the Prime Minister and the NSS. The five pillars of the Act amendment shown there mesh with the direction of a "supply chain that does not depend on any single country" set out in the policy speech, and converge toward the theme of energy autonomy. Receiving that theme in on-the-ground infrastructure are MLIT's CNPs, hydrogen receiving at ports, and offshore wind base ports. The abstract discussions in the meeting room and the cargo-handling machinery and wharves moving at ports are, in fact, connected by a single line. What I wanted to convey in this article is that bird's-eye view.
If I may add one thing, my read is that it is better not to leave this kind of policy as "something the state does." In the flow of reducing supply-chain dependence and shifting the premises of infrastructure procurement, there will be a clear gap in response cost over the next several years between companies that have taken stock of their technologies, cargo, and procurement structures and those that have not. Translate distant policy talk into your own review checklist. That steady, unglamorous work is, I believe, the most realistic preparation a company can make in an age of economic security. The command tower will keep issuing new pillars, but the companies that fare best will be the ones that have already turned those pillars into a short, concrete list of things to check in their own operations.
References
[^1]: Economic Security Promotion Council — Cabinet Secretariat — November 19, 2021 (Prime Minister's decision) [^2]: Economic Security Promotion Council (status of the 1st to 8th meetings) — Cabinet Secretariat — November 7, 2025 (8th) [^3]: November 7, 2025 Economic Security Promotion Council — Prime Minister's Office — November 7, 2025 [^4]: Data protection and supply-chain strengthening, PM Takaichi "respond swiftly": instructs amendment of the Economic Security Act — Nikkei — November 7, 2025 [^5]: Data protection and supply-chain strengthening, PM Takaichi "respond swiftly": instructs amendment of the Economic Security Act (revision of the core-infrastructure system) — Nikkei — November 7, 2025 [^6]: Data protection and supply-chain strengthening, PM Takaichi "respond swiftly": instructs amendment of the Economic Security Act (think-tank creation) — Nikkei — November 7, 2025 [^7]: Data protection and supply-chain strengthening, PM Takaichi "respond swiftly": instructs amendment of the Economic Security Act (data protection) — Nikkei — November 7, 2025 [^8]: Data protection and supply-chain strengthening, PM Takaichi "respond swiftly": instructs amendment of the Economic Security Act (overseas-expansion support) — Nikkei — November 7, 2025 [^9]: Economic Security Promotion Act — Cabinet Office — May 18, 2022 (promulgation) [^10]: February 20, 2026 Policy Speech by Prime Minister Takaichi at the 221st session of the Diet — Prime Minister's Office — February 20, 2026 [^11]: February 20, 2026 Policy Speech (supply-chain rebuilding, Japanese version of CFIUS, etc.) — Prime Minister's Office — February 20, 2026 [^12]: February 20, 2026 Policy Speech (energy-resource security measures) — Prime Minister's Office — February 20, 2026 [^13]: Material 3 "Advancing Infrastructure Development to Make the Japanese Archipelago Strong and Prosperous" (material submitted by temporary member Kaneko) — Cabinet Office, Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy — April 27, 2026 [^14]: Material 3 Advancing Infrastructure Development (concrete measures of Mobility Enerlink (tentative name)) — Cabinet Office, Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy — April 27, 2026 [^15]: Material 3 Advancing Infrastructure Development (port automation and revival of the shipbuilding industry) — Cabinet Office, Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy — April 27, 2026 [^16]: Ports: Formation of Carbon Neutral Ports (CNP) — MLIT — June 30, 2025 [^17]: Publication of the "Guidelines on Developing Receiving Facilities for Hydrogen and Ammonia at Ports (Interim Summary)" — MLIT — March 24, 2025 [^18]: Ports: CNP Certification (Container Terminals) — MLIT — March 31, 2025 [^19]: Aomori Port and Sakata Port designated as base ports — promoting the introduction of offshore wind power — MLIT — April 26, 2024 [^20]: Progress of offshore wind policy to date (material of the Offshore Wind Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy) — METI, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy — 2024