Japan's National Intelligence Council Act (2026): A Complete Guide to Countering Foreign Interference and Its Connection to Export Controls

Hello, this is Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.

On May 27, 2026, the plenary session of the House of Councillors passed the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act.[^1][^2] Press reports and some commentators also refer to it as the "National Intelligence Council Act" or the "Intelligence Reform Act." Reading only the title, you might think this is just internal organisational reshuffling inside Kasumigaseki. But once you actually read the statutory text and the explanatory materials, it becomes clear that this is the kind of institutional change that will gradually but firmly reach the desks of export control practitioners.[^3]

In the past week alone, I have received calls from several export control officers asking, "How does this actually affect us?" and "How is this different from the Specified Secret Protection Act or the Important Economic Security Information Protection and Utilization Act?" The shared underlying feeling is a sense of fog: even after reading the news, the outline does not come into focus. In this article, I want to take time to walk readers like Manager Tanaka, an export-control beginner, through the primary sources, lay out what the National Intelligence Council Act actually contains, and explain what it means for export control practice.

Throughout this article, I use "National Intelligence Council Act" and "National Intelligence Council Establishment Act" interchangeably depending on context, but they refer to the same statute. In government documents, the formal name is "National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill."[^3]

1. What is the National Intelligence Council Act? Organising the facts from primary sources

The National Intelligence Council Establishment Act (hereafter "the Act") creates a "National Intelligence Council" inside the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister, and places a "National Intelligence Bureau" inside the Cabinet Secretariat as its operating arm. The Cabinet approved the bill on March 13, 2026 and submitted it to the Diet. It passed the House of Representatives plenary on April 23, was approved by the House of Councillors Cabinet Committee on May 26, and was enacted at the plenary session of the House of Councillors on May 27.[^1][^2][^4]

The Cabinet Secretariat is the lead ministry for the bill. In a press conference right after enactment, the Prime Minister explained that the purpose of the Act is to build an "intelligence command tower" that aggregates information spread across ministries, performs threat assessments, and feeds those assessments into policy decisions.[^1]

On timing, Supplementary Provision Article 1 states that the Act comes into force "on a date specified by Cabinet Order within six months of promulgation." The National Intelligence Bureau is reported to be on track to launch as early as July 2026 by reorganising the current Cabinet Intelligence Officer and the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office.[^5][^6] The head of the new command tower will be a "National Intelligence Bureau Director" position that succeeds the existing Cabinet Intelligence Officer.

The Council's main duties

According to the bill and the Cabinet Secretariat's explanatory materials, the National Intelligence Council deliberates the following matters.[^3][^31]

• Basic policy on important information activities
• Overall coordination of relevant administrative organs concerning the priorities and the collection, analysis and sharing of important information activities
• Basic policy and measures for the response to foreign intelligence activity
• Important matters concerning the protection and use of specified secrets
• Other intelligence-activity-related matters that the Prime Minister deems necessary

The bill defines "important information activities" as activities related to the collection and investigation of information that contributes to national security, the prevention of terrorism, response to emergencies, and other important operations of national governance.[^31] "Foreign intelligence activity" is framed as intelligence activity directed at Japan by foreign governments or other foreign actors, covering influence operations, technology collection, cyber attacks, human-source operations, and so on. Some of the precise definitions remain to be specified by Cabinet Order or operational guidelines, so certain points are still open at this stage.

Chair and members

Under the bill, the National Intelligence Council consists of a chair and members. The chair is the Prime Minister. The members are the Acting Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Special Missions (Financial Services), the Chair of the National Public Safety Commission, the Minister of Justice, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and the Minister of Defense — nine cabinet ministers in total.[^31][^32] The National Intelligence Bureau handles the secretariat work and pulls together intelligence functions currently distributed across the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, and others into a whole-of-government structure.[^7]

The Act also includes a cooperation duty for related administrative organs: the National Intelligence Bureau may request materials and information from relevant ministries and agencies to the extent necessary for responding to important information activity and foreign intelligence activity, and those organs are obliged to respond.[^3][^31]

When the House of Councillors Cabinet Committee passed the bill on May 26, it also adopted a supplementary resolution. The resolution emphasises that privacy must not be unnecessarily infringed, that the Prime Minister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary must not request information-gathering unrelated to their statutory duties, and that information collection that damages political neutrality must not be conducted.[^33] The Sapporo Bar Association and the Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom (JLAF) have published a chair's statement and an opinion paper opposing the Act, arguing that private-life information of citizens could be aggregated without limit.[^9][^10] The very existence of this opposition itself signals how wide the reach of this law is.

2. What does "malicious foreign activity" actually mean?

The statutory text uses the abstract term "foreign intelligence activity," but when you cross-reference the Cabinet Secretariat's explanatory materials, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office's historical framing, and public materials from the National Police Agency and the Public Security Intelligence Agency, the outline of the threats in scope becomes reasonably clear.[^3][^11] I group them into four categories.

First, information manipulation and influence operations (FIMI/FIIE). FIMI ("Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference") was defined by the European External Action Service (EEAS); FIIE stands for "Foreign Information Influence Engagement." Both describe activity that interferes with the political decision-making or public opinion of a target country through disinformation or pollution of the information environment.[^12][^13] In Japan as well, information manipulation on social media around major elections such as the House of Councillors election has been reported.[^14] The National Intelligence Council is positioned to continuously observe and assess such interference in the information space.

Second, technology leakage and industrial espionage. In June 2023, a senior chief researcher at the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) was arrested for violating the Unfair Competition Prevention Act after allegedly emailing research data on fluorine compounds to a Chinese company; the receiving company filed a related patent application in China about a week later.[^15] Technology leakage routed through research institutions and universities overlaps with the scope of "deemed export" controls under FEFTA.

Third, cyber attacks. In November 2023, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) was hit by cyber attacks across multiple incidents, and information on domestic and overseas contractors may have leaked. The Metropolitan Police Department's Public Security Bureau referred a systems engineer alleged to have acted on orders from the People's Liberation Army to prosecutors.[^16][^17] Cyber threats are spread across multiple authorities — the National Police Agency's Cyber Police Bureau, the Ministry of Defense's Cyber Defense Unit, the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), and the newly created National Cyber Office. The National Intelligence Council sits above them, pulling threat intelligence into a single line of sight.[^18]

Fourth, human-source operations (HUMINT). These are classic methods that draw out information through non-traditional channels such as researchers, legislators, local-government officials, university administrators, religious organisations, and community groups. The case in which the U.S. Department of Justice indicted the mayor of Arcadia, California in May 2026 — where a local politician was found to be disseminating messages from a foreign government through a community news site — is widely cited internationally as a textbook example.[^19] The Act is built on the recognition that Japan is no exception.

None of these four threat categories can be handled by a single ministry. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Defense, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, METI, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and NISC each hold fragments of the picture, and the historical weakness of the system has been the absence of any horizontal command tower to stitch them together.[^7][^20] The National Intelligence Council is the institutional patch for that weakness.

3. What changes — aggregation, threat assessment, and coordination

So what actually changes? Reading the bill summary and several commentaries together, three operational points stand out.[^3][^7][^20]

3-1. Aggregation and "overall organisation" of information

Under the previous arrangement, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office would "organise the information provided by ministries and feed it up to the Prime Minister," but whether a ministry actually provided that information was largely up to the ministry. The Act now explicitly assigns the National Intelligence Bureau a coordination authority, and obliges relevant administrative organs to provide materials and information to the Bureau to the extent necessary for responding to important information activity and foreign intelligence activity.[^3]

This means that, for example, assessments of supply-chain risk regarding China — which the National Police Agency's Public Security Bureau, the Ministry of Defense's Defense Intelligence Headquarters, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, and the Intelligence and Analysis Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have so far analysed separately — will be consolidated under the Council.

3-2. Positioning of threat-assessment reports

The United Kingdom's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Australia's Office of National Intelligence (ONI), and the United States' Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) all routinely produce whole-of-government threat assessments for political leaders.[^21][^22][^23] In functional terms, Japan's National Intelligence Council sits in the same position.

This matters for export controls. The justification for the government to officially identify a particular technology area, country/region, or type of counterparty as "sensitive" will increasingly be anchored in a more consolidated assessment report. METI's circulars and list amendments are likely to reflect that consolidated assessment more directly.

3-3. Stronger coordination among ministries

The chair of the Council is the Prime Minister; the members are cabinet ministers. Day-to-day operations are handled by the National Intelligence Bureau, but a major difference from the previous Cabinet Intelligence Meeting is the existence of a standing cabinet-level forum where the output feeds into actual policy.

In parallel, the government plans to launch the National Cyber Office (the command tower for active cyber defence) and the Disaster Management Agency (the command tower for response to massive disasters) in 2026. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government's explanatory materials describe this as a "trinity command-tower system."[^18] The National Intelligence Council is the security-intelligence core piece of that trinity.

4. Mapping against existing laws — five statutes side by side

By this point, a practitioner like Manager Tanaka will be thinking: "We already have the Specified Secret Protection Act, the Important Economic Security Information Protection and Utilization Act, the Economic Security Promotion Act, and FEFTA. How is this new statute different from any of them?"

That question is fundamental. The clean answer is the table below.

Statute	Main role	Scope of regulation	Penalties
Specified Secret Protection Act (2013)	Protection and clearance for information related to defence, diplomacy, counter-espionage, and counter-terrorism	National secrets	Up to 10 years / JPY 10M
Economic Security Promotion Act (2022)	Four pillars: supply chain resilience, prior review of critical infrastructure, support for advanced-technology development, and patent non-disclosure	Goods, infrastructure, technology	Per pillar
Important Economic Security Information Protection and Utilization Act (2024 / in force May 2025)	Extension of security clearance to the economic domain, designation and eligibility assessment of secrets	Economic security information	Up to 5 years / JPY 5M
FEFTA (export control side)	Security trade control — List Controls, Catch-All Controls, classification	Export and provision of goods and technology	Up to 10 years / JPY 30M, etc.
National Intelligence Council Establishment Act (2026)	Command-tower function: aggregation of information, threat assessment, and policy response	Important information activity / foreign intelligence activity	Penal provisions are not the focus

The four existing statutes on this list are all on the "protect / regulate" side. The National Intelligence Council Establishment Act, by contrast, sits on the "assess / coordinate" side. It is not a direct corporate regulation; it raises the floor of the government's internal information-processing capability.[^24][^25][^26][^27]

There is, however, one important caveat: the results of assessment feed back into the operation of the existing regulations. If the National Intelligence Council assesses that "exports of a particular technology to a specific country's specific industry pose significant security risk," that can show up in how Catch-All Controls under FEFTA are operated, and in the items captured by List Controls. METI carried out list amendments effective on November 15, 2025 and February 14, 2026,[^28] and that revision cycle is likely to accelerate going forward.

Let me also clarify the relationship with the Important Economic Security Information Protection and Utilization Act. That law extends the scope of the Specified Secret Protection Act — which covered defence, diplomacy, counter-espionage, and counter-terrorism — into the economic domain.[^24] Once cleared, an operator can access classified government information. But who actually analyses that classified information, and how, has not been clearly framed in statute. The National Intelligence Council Establishment Act is the missing piece on the information-processing side of that framework. Seen that way, the full picture is easier to grasp.

5. International comparison — is Japan a special case?

The idea of a national intelligence council is not original to Japan. It is closer to standard equipment for major democracies. Three representative examples follow.

United States: the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Created in 2004 in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The DNI oversees 17 federal intelligence agencies including the CIA and provides threat assessments, including the President's Daily Brief (PDB), to the President and the National Security Council.[^22] Japan's National Intelligence Bureau Director is on a smaller scale than the DNI in both staffing and authority, but the functional position is similar.

United Kingdom: the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Founded in 1936. Sits within the Cabinet Office and consolidates inputs from SIS (MI6), the Security Service (MI5), GCHQ, Defence Intelligence, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, the Home Office and others to deliver assessments directly to the Cabinet.[^21] The chair is a senior Cabinet Office official at Permanent Secretary level. Japan's National Intelligence Council is more politically weighted than the JIC because its members are cabinet ministers.

Australia: the Office of National Intelligence (ONI). Established in 2018. Provides integrated management of the National Intelligence Community of 10 agencies and a single line of accountability to the Prime Minister and the National Security Committee of Cabinet.[^23] Functionally, Japan's National Intelligence Bureau is closest in design to ONI.

The common pattern across these three countries is a three-layer structure: agencies that collect information; a command tower that analyses and assesses; and a cabinet-level forum that makes policy decisions. With this new statute, Japan finally moves closer to that standard three-layer structure.

There is one important reservation, though. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia each have dedicated foreign intelligence agencies (CIA, SIS, ASIS). Japan does not have an independent agency whose primary mission is foreign intelligence collection. The Act does not create one either. It is an institutional design that puts a command tower on top of the intelligence functions of existing organisations such as the National Police Agency, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[^3][^7] The question of whether to create a new foreign intelligence agency has been treated as an ongoing matter for consideration in Diet deliberations, and remains an open issue.[^20]

6. Impact on companies: where this connects with export controls

We have spent a lot of words on government structure, so let me bring this all the way down to corporate practice. From the perspective of Manager Tanaka, the export control lead, three implications stand out.

6-1. Threat assessment becomes whole-of-government

The National Intelligence Council is the venue for integrated deliberation on the policy response to foreign intelligence activity, but direct jurisdiction over export controls remains with METI. The Act does not contain a provision that directly changes how export controls are operated. That said, the threat assessments produced by the Council are expected to be reflected in ministry circulars and list amendments. METI has already issued list amendments effective on November 15, 2025 and February 14, 2026,[^28] and the wave of revisions has not stopped. The detailed picture of how the new structure will operate will become clearer in subsequent Cabinet Orders and circulars.

The old habit of "reviewing our internal export control rules once a year" simply will not hold up. Companies will need a structure for monthly or weekly review of releases from METI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CISTEC and JETRO, and for feeding those updates into classification work and counterparty screening.

6-2. UBO (Ultimate Beneficial Owner) information becomes more important

As the National Intelligence Council formulates policy responses to foreign intelligence activity, groups of companies linked to particular foreign governments or military-affiliated organisations will be mapped in greater detail. In export control terms, even if a counterparty is not handling List-Controlled items, Catch-All Controls apply when the end user may use the goods for military purposes in a List-Controlled country.[^29] Making that judgment requires understanding the counterparty's shareholders, the background of its directors, its affiliates, and its government links.

Managing UBO information has traditionally been framed in the context of anti-money-laundering at financial institutions. Going forward, it becomes a core topic in export control as well, integrated into counterparty screening across manufacturing.

6-3. Deemed exports and research security expand

As the AIST case[^15] and the JAXA cyber attacks[^16][^17] show, technology leaks beyond the factory perimeter. Background checks on researchers at hiring, screening of joint-research agreements, technical briefings during business travel, exchange of students with overseas universities — all of these fall under the "deemed export" umbrella. The National Intelligence Council is in the position to perform integrated risk assessment of research security as well.

On the operating side, technical departments, HR, R&D, and export control need to coordinate more tightly.

7. Three things companies should start working on right now

Based on the discussion above, here are three priorities for export control practitioners.

First, reconcile your internal export control rules with the stack of economic security legislation since 2024. The Specified Secret Protection Act, the Economic Security Promotion Act, the Important Economic Security Information Protection and Utilization Act, FEFTA, and now the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act are separate laws, but they connect through a common layer of sensitive information, sensitive technology, and sensitive counterparties. Check whether your internal rules reflect that connection.

Second, stand up an operating model that ingests regulatory updates on a monthly or weekly basis. Set up a workflow that monitors releases from METI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, CISTEC, JETRO, and overseas authorities (U.S. BIS, EU, China's MOFCOM, and others), and feeds changes into your classification master and counterparty screening rules.

Third, build a mechanism to continuously update UBO and affiliate information for counterparties. This is not a one-shot KYC: you need an operation that can keep up with changes in shareholding and director appointments at counterparties over time.

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8. How TRAFEED supports the "regulatory updates × export control" loop

TRAFEED (formerly ZEROCK ExCHECK) is the world's first export control AI agent, and it is designed precisely to implement these three priorities.

It maintains a pipeline that converts regulatory updates from major authorities — METI, U.S. BIS, the EU, China's MOFCOM, and others — into machine-readable form and reflects them in the internal master. Classification work is bootstrapped by AI from product names, model numbers, and specifications, and the system shows the reasoning behind each result. Counterparty screening combines denied-party lists, the SDN list, the Entity List, and continuously updated UBO information, putting the relevant inputs for Catch-All Controls in the same view.

Data is operated on Japanese servers in the AWS Tokyo Region, so highly confidential transaction information can be handled without leaving Japan. Operational logs that align with METI's security trade control standards are retained, so the system also supports internal audits and inspections by regional bureaus of METI.

From the perspective of an export control practitioner, the launch of the National Intelligence Council is a signal that both the frequency and the precision of regulatory updates will rise. Manual annual reviews will fall further behind in the world that is now opening up.

9. Summary and frequently asked questions

To wrap up, the key points of this article.

• The National Intelligence Council Establishment Act was enacted on May 27, 2026, and the National Intelligence Bureau is expected to launch as early as July.
• A cabinet-level National Intelligence Council chaired by the Prime Minister handles the policy response to foreign intelligence activity and overall coordination of important information activities.
• Foreign intelligence activity can be grouped into four categories: information manipulation and influence operations, technology leakage, cyber attacks, and human-source operations.
• The Act stands in a complementary relationship to the Specified Secret Protection Act, the Economic Security Promotion Act, the Important Economic Security Information Protection and Utilization Act, and FEFTA — as "the assessment side" rather than "the regulation side."
• Japan has now moved closer to the standard equipment of major democracies, with a command-tower function analogous to the U.S. DNI, the U.K. JIC, and Australia's ONI.
• On the export control side, companies need to prepare for three shifts: faster regulatory update cycles, the rising importance of UBO information, and broader scope for deemed exports and research security.

For an export-control beginner like Manager Tanaka, I would recommend starting with a review of internal rules and standing up a continuous regulatory-monitoring capability. As the aggregation and assessment of information accelerate under the National Intelligence Council, corporate operations need to keep up in speed.

A note on terminology: when this article uses the phrase "foreign actors," it is not naming any single country as a threat. Government publications and press reports describe specific cases in which involvement by China, Russia, North Korea, and others has been alleged; those descriptions are tied to specific enforcement actions and factual findings, not blanket assertions that any country as a whole is a threat. In export control practice, the principle is to make judgments at the level of specific counterparties, end users, and end uses — not at the level of countries.

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[^1]: Prime Minister's Office of Japan, "Press conference on the enactment of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act," May 27, 2026. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/105/statement/2026/0527kaiken.html [^2]: House of Representatives, "National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill" (bill text and history). https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/honbun/houan/g22109024.htm [^3]: Cabinet Secretariat, "Summary: National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill — Important Information Activity / Response to Foreign Intelligence Activity," March 13, 2026. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/houan/260313/gaiyou.pdf [^4]: Komeito, "Information Council bill clears the House of Representatives; political neutrality secured." https://www.komei.or.jp/komeinews/p508401/ [^5]: Nikkei, "'National Intelligence Bureau' to launch as early as July; intelligence command tower as establishment act enacted," May 27, 2026. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA25A5W0V20C26A5000000/ [^6]: Jiji Press, "National Intelligence Bureau to be set up in July next year; first step of intelligence reform — government coordination," December 5, 2025. https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2025120500958&g=pol [^7]: Dai-ichi Life Research Institute, "One-minute explainer: Reorganisation of Japan's intelligence structure (National Intelligence Bureau / National Intelligence Council concept)." https://www.dlri.co.jp/report/ld/582749.html [^8]: Nagoya TV, "Debate around the 'National Intelligence Council' bill; concerns over privacy infringement; PM says 'no plans to investigate citizens'." https://www.nagoyatv.com/news/seiji.html?id=000499285 [^9]: Sapporo Bar Association, "Chair's statement opposing the enactment of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act," May 22, 2026. https://satsuben.or.jp/statement/2026/05/22/1089/ [^10]: Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom (JLAF), "Urgent opinion paper requesting that the National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill be scrapped," May 19, 2026. https://www.jlaf.jp/04iken/2026/0519_2157.html [^11]: National Police Agency, "Economic security: toward the prevention of technology leakage." https://www.npa.go.jp/bureau/security/economic-security/index.html [^12]: Delegation of the European Union to Japan, EU MAG, "Protecting Europe's information space from foreign interference — the EU's FIMI response." https://eumag.jp/article/feature1125b/ [^13]: Commentary on the European External Action Service (EEAS) second FIMI report. https://note.com/ichi_twnovel/n/n280c4bef1f09 [^14]: Nikkei, "Foreign information manipulation and interference is intensifying; urgent need for measures to prevent division." https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUE0487H0U5A800C2000000/ [^15]: Diamond Online, "Chinese researcher 'advanced technology information' leak case exposes the reality of Japan as a 'spy paradise'." https://diamond.jp/articles/-/324668 [^16]: Kochi Shimbun, "[Cyber attack] JAXA damage cannot be taken lightly." https://www.kochinews.co.jp/article/detail/755216 [^17]: cybersecurity-jp.com, "Possible involvement in cyber attack on JAXA and others under orders from the Chinese military; SE in his 30s arrested." https://cybersecurity-jp.com/news/51551 [^18]: Tokyo Metropolitan Cybersecurity Portal, "The 2026 trinity command-tower structure of the National Intelligence Bureau, the National Cyber Office, and the Disaster Management Agency." https://www.cybersecurity.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/links/731/index.html [^19]: TIMEWELL, column, "The Arcadia mayor was posting 'what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to send'." https://timewell.jp/en/columns/arcadia-mayor-china-influence-2026 [^20]: Senkyo.com, "What changes with the birth of the 'National Intelligence Bureau'? A political reporter explains the upgrade of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office and the role split with NSC." https://go2senkyo.com/articles/2026/04/30/134395.html [^21]: GCHQ (United Kingdom), "Joint Intelligence Committee." https://www.gchq.gov.uk/information/joint-intelligence-committee [^22]: National Diet Library of Japan, "Reorganisation of the U.S. Intelligence Community — Establishment of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) system and its effects." https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/kokusaiseiji/2009/158/2009_158_158_182/_article/-char/ja/ [^23]: Australia, Office of National Intelligence (official site). https://www.oni.gov.au/ [^24]: Cabinet Office, "Act on the Protection and Utilization of Important Economic Security Information." https://www.cao.go.jp/keizai_anzen_hosho/hogokatsuyou/hogokatsuyou.html [^25]: Cabinet Secretariat, "Summary of the Specified Secret Protection Act." https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/keizai_anzen_hosyo_sc/dai5/siryou3.pdf [^26]: House of Councillors Research Office, "The Economic Security Promotion Bill, structured around four pillars." https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2022pdf/20220414003.pdf [^27]: Center for Information on Security Trade Control (CISTEC), "Economic Security Promotion Act." https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/yukan/keizaianzenhoshou_suishin_hou.html [^28]: CISTEC, "FY2025 routine list amendment (commentary)," November 18, 2025. https://www.cistec.or.jp/export/express/251117/12_kaisetsu.pdf [^29]: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), "Complementary export controls (Catch-All Controls)." https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/catchall.html [^30]: National Security Council Establishment Act (e-Gov). https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/361AC0000000071/ [^31]: House of Councillors, "National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill" (detailed bill information). https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/gian/221/meisai/m221080221024.htm [^32]: Jiji Press, "National Intelligence Council, command tower for counter-espionage; members are PM and nine ministers — full picture of the establishment bill." https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026030401030&g=pol [^33]: House of Councillors Research Office and Special Research Office, "Current status and future of the Cabinet's intelligence framework — the creation of the National Intelligence Bureau and its relationship with the strengthening of intelligence functions." https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/keizai_prism/backnumber/r08pdf/202625201.pdf