China's Reporting Regime for Strategic-Mineral Export Control Violations: MOFCOM Announcement No. 26 [2026] in the Original

This is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.

MOFCOM Announcement No. 26 of 2026, issued on 24 June, has been in effect since 1 July¹. Its title translates as "Matters concerning further improving the handling of reports on unlawful and non-compliant conduct in the export control of strategic-mineral dual-use items." It drew little coverage outside China, and yet I consider it the single Chinese document from the first half of this year with the most direct bearing on day-to-day compliance work.

The reason is simple. Listing announcements resolve into a matching exercise: are we dealing with anyone on this roster? This announcement asks a different question: how does our transaction look to someone outside the company who is watching it? Counterparties, former employees, competitors, forwarders, customs brokers, banks. Plenty of people can see the shape of a trade flow. Announcement No. 26 opens an intake channel to all of them.

One thing up front. I am not going to argue here about whether the regime itself is a good or a bad thing. MOFCOM's spokesperson noted in a same-day Q&A that using reports to exercise oversight of export control violations is common international practice and that many countries have such provisions². Debating whether the regime is good or bad moves no compliance work forward. This piece is written from the perspective of the party being reported on. Being reported on is not the same as being in violation — the announcement itself sets out when a report will be refused and how malicious reports are handled. The goal is to be in a state where you can explain yourself calmly if a report does come in.

The shape of Announcement No. 26

All of this is verifiable from the original text posted by MOFCOM's Bureau of Industry Security and Import and Export Control¹.

Item	Detail
Document number	MOFCOM Announcement No. 26 of 2026
Title (original)	关于进一步完善战略矿产两用物项出口管制违法违规行为举报处理工作有关事项
Issuing unit	Bureau of Industry Security and Import and Export Control, MOFCOM
Date of issue	24 June 2026
Effective date	1 July 2026 ("本公告自2026年7月1日起正式实施")
Legal basis cited	Export Control Law and Foreign Trade Law of the PRC, among others
Structure	Articles 1 through 9

The preamble states the purpose as "giving full play to the role of social oversight and cracking down on unlawful and non-compliant conduct in the export control of strategic-mineral dual-use items." Only one week separates publication from entry into force, which fits a document that codifies existing practice rather than creating something new. The spokesperson's Q&A says as much: MOFCOM had already been carrying out related practice in report handling, and it had become necessary to further clarify the manner and content of reports².

As the legal basis, the Q&A cites Article 31 of the Export Control Law. That article provides that any organisation or individual has the right to report conduct suspected of violating the law to the national export control authority, that the authority shall handle reports promptly according to law, and that it shall keep the reporter's identity confidential³. The right to report, and confidentiality for the reporter, were already in place at statutory level.

Who may file, and what a report must contain

Article 1 opens with "任何组织和个人有权举报" — any organisation and individual has the right to report. There is no limitation by nationality or place of establishment. Nor is there language expressly excluding, or expressly including, persons outside China. The text simply does not qualify it.

There are constraints on the reporter's side. Article 3 states that the reporter bears responsibility for the truthfulness of the report. Article 6 states that for conduct suspected of being a malicious report, MOFCOM will work with the relevant departments to rigorously screen (甄别) and handle the matter according to law. That reads as a check on nuisance filings by competitors or disgruntled counterparties.

Reports are to be in Chinese ("以中文为准"). Article 3 lists six items: (1) the reporter's basic circumstances; (2) the reporter's contact details; (3) the reported party's basic circumstances; (4) the specific circumstances of the suspected violation; (5) whether the same matter has already been reported to another institution; and (6) any other matters the reporter considers require explanation. Item (5) stands out: it anticipates the same story arriving through multiple channels.

The thirteen reportable categories

Article 1 enumerates categories (1) through (13). This is the heart of the announcement, so here is each one paired with how I would read it in practice¹.

No.	Substance of the original text	Practical reading
(1)	Exporting strategic-mineral dual-use items without a licence	Unlicensed export. A classification error lands here by its result
(2)	Exporting beyond the scope, conditions or validity period stated on the export licence	Not only over-shipment, but also shipping against an expired licence
(3)	Exporting items whose export is prohibited	A missed check against prohibited items
(4)	Circumventing licensing by modification, or by splitting items into parts or components	Design changes and part-level supply can present the same external appearance
(5)	Circumventing the rules by routing through a third country or region	Ordinary logistics hubs look identical from outside without an explanation
(6)	Unlawful outbound transfer of controlled strategic-mineral technology through trade exports and also through intellectual property licensing, investment, exchanges, gifts, exhibitions, displays, inspection, testing, assistance, instruction, joint R&D, employment or being employed, consulting and similar means	Intangible transfer. Routine technical engagement is listed here
(7)	Knowingly providing agency, freight, delivery, customs clearance, third-party e-commerce platform, financial and similar services to an export operator engaged in violations	"明知" — knowingly — appears as an element in the original
(8)	Instigating or assisting export operators, importers or end users in circumventing the rules	Advice or arrangement that facilitates circumvention
(9)	Transacting in breach of the rules with importers or end users on the Control List	A failure of list screening
(10)	Failing to apply for a licence where the export operator knew or should have known that strategic-mineral-related goods, technology or services outside the control list and temporary controls may present the risks in Article 12 of the Export Control Law	Catch-all non-compliance is itself reportable
(11)	A domestic importer or end user breaching an undertaking given to MOFCOM	Breach of undertaking on the demand side inside China
(12)	Accepting, or promising to accept, without authorisation a foreign government's request for a visit or on-site verification related to export control	Handling another jurisdiction's end-use checks
(13)	Other violations	A catch-all residual provision

The ones I see as most relevant to non-Chinese manufacturers are (4), (5), (6), (7), (10) and (12).

What (4) and (5) name, and how it looks from the inside

Category (4) was not invented by this announcement. Article 39 of the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (State Council Order No. 792 of 2024, in force 1 December 2024) already lists "circumventing licensing by modification or splitting into parts or components" alongside unlicensed export, exceeding licence scope and exporting prohibited items, with penalties applied under Article 34 of the Export Control Law⁴. An existing violation category has now been made explicitly reportable.

For (5) I could find no equivalent head-on enumeration in Article 39. What I did find is Article 48 of the Regulations, which applies the Export Control Law and the Regulations to the transit, transshipment, through transport and re-export of dual-use items, and to exports abroad from customs special supervision areas and bonded supervision premises⁴. The notion that changing the route removes the licensing requirement does not get off the ground in the first place.

Here I want to be straightforward about how this looks from the position of the company concerned. Legitimate civilian trade frequently produces flows that, viewed only from outside, resemble (4) or (5). The specification was changed at the customer's request. The contract calls for supply at part level rather than as a finished assembly. Logistics routes through a hub in a third country. Each has a real reason behind it.

The regulatory category and the external appearance of ordinary commerce overlap exactly here. So the remedy is not to abandon such structures. It is to hold a contemporaneous record of why this configuration and why this route: the engineering rationale for the design change, the contractual history that led to part-level supply, the logistics reasoning behind the transit point. An explanation written at the time and an explanation constructed afterwards carry entirely different weight.

Intangible transfer under (6), and the "reporting parties" in (7)

Category (6) is where readers tend to stop. Alongside trade exports, the text lists intellectual property licensing, investment, exchanges, gifts, exhibitions, displays, inspection, testing, assistance, instruction, joint R&D, employment or being employed, and consulting. It closes with "and similar means," so the list is not exhaustive. Anyone at a materials company will recognise this as a list of ordinary business activity. Hiring engineers at a Chinese site. Running evaluation tests with a joint-venture partner. Showing samples and data at a trade show. None of it is a violation as such — whether the technology is controlled is the dividing line. But if your mental model of "export" is limited to loading goods onto a ship, this enumeration falls outside your field of view.

Article 9 adds that reports concerning conduct suspected of violating the provisions of the Regulations on Technology Import and Export Administration relating to strategic-mineral technology exports shall be handled by reference to this announcement¹. So the scheme covers the technology-export route based on the prohibited and restricted technology catalogue as well. On that side, MOFCOM and MOST Announcement No. 28 of 2025 states that technologies qualifying as military-civil dual-use are brought into export control administration⁵. The two routes connect.

Reading (7), by contrast, as "forwarders and banks are now enforcement targets" mistakes the shape of the regime. The element is "明知" — knowingly. Article 20 of the Export Control Law prohibits providing such services and Article 36 sets the penalty, but the penalty provision is itself confined to service provided while knowing that the export operator is engaged in a violation³. It is not drafted to catch someone who shipped or settled a payment without knowing. And there is a reverse side: the second part of Article 36 of the Regulations requires these service providers, on discovering conduct suspected of violating dual-use export controls, to report promptly to the commerce department of the State Council⁴. Forwarders, customs brokers, e-commerce platforms and banks are less enforcement targets than reporting parties built into the regime. Article 40(2) even provides the penalty for failing to perform that duty: a warning and an order to rectify, with a fine of up to 100,000 yuan available, and 100,000 to 500,000 yuan in serious cases.

From the exporter's side, the implication is this. The external parties who see your transactions most clearly not only know the reporting channel exists — they are under a duty to report. Getting past a logistics or settlement counterparty with an unnatural explanation is not a course the regime contemplates. There is nothing to do but keep the documents consistent.

Catch-all under (10), and foreign-authority requests under (12)

Category (10) covers goods, technology or services related to strategic minerals that appear neither on the control list nor under temporary controls, where the export operator knew or should have known of the risks in Article 12 of the Export Control Law but did not apply for a licence. Article 12(3) names three risks: endangering national security and interests; use in the design, development, production or use of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles; and use for terrorist purposes³.

The same article also offers relief. Article 12(4) allows an exporter that cannot determine whether an item is controlled to make an enquiry to the authority, which must respond promptly³. Rather than pushing a grey-zone case through on your own judgement, this gives you a formal channel and a record of having used it. The underlying logic has much in common with Japan's regime, so our piece on the three catch-all requirements may help with the comparison.

Category (12) covers accepting, or promising to accept, without authorisation a foreign government's request for visits or on-site verification related to export control. The parent provision is Article 38 of the Regulations: PRC citizens, legal persons and unincorporated organisations receiving such a request must report immediately to the commerce department of the State Council, and may not accept or promise to accept it without that department's consent⁴. The penalty sits in Article 43: a warning and up to 500,000 yuan, 500,000 to 3 million yuan in serious cases, and suspension of business for rectification in particularly serious cases.

For companies with operations in China this is a concrete problem. When another jurisdiction's end-use check or site visit request arrives at a Chinese site, a well-meaning "of course, come ahead" from someone on the ground can be treated on the Chinese side as a procedural breach. Who receives such a request, who it escalates to, and what is reported before any answer is given — settle that flow in advance. On how the regime reaches beyond China's borders, see the extraterritorial reach of China's export control regime.

If you need to walk your own China-related transactions through this: We publish a fill-in screening sheet covering the Export Control Law and the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations, the mineral-related control announcements, and all four counterparty-list systems (Control List, Watch List, Unreliable Entity List, countermeasure list). It is a procedure for what to verify before you trade, not a roster of who is listed, and the completed sheet becomes your internal record and the document you can share with a counterparty. Listing is a regulatory designation, not a judgment about the company. → Download the China-Related Transactions Export-Control Screening Sheet (2026) (Free. Your company name and work email are required.)

Intake channels, the four grounds for refusal, and the distance to a penalty

Article 2 designates two channels¹. One is online filing through the "reporting platform for suspected violations in the export control of strategic-mineral dual-use items" on the website of MOFCOM's Bureau of Industry Security and Import and Export Control (https://aqygzj.mofcom.gov.cn). The other is the intake telephone number 010-12369, staffed on statutory working days from 8:30 to 11:30 and 14:00 to 17:00.

To be straightforward: we have not been able to confirm the entry screen for the online platform. The announcement gives only the portal domain, with no direct URL, and the portal's top page as retrieved on 30 July 2026 did not surface an entry point we could identify. On the telephone number, we have confirmed that it appears in the original text, but we have not found a primary document explaining whether the line is dedicated to export control or shared with other functions. What can be stated is what the announcement says.

With that said, the most consequential provision is Article 4, which lists four situations in which a report will not be accepted.

1. The matter does not fall within the categories listed in Article 1
2. Key elements are missing so that the report cannot serve as a lead for handling a suspected violation, and it remains incomplete or unclear after MOFCOM has requested supplementation or correction
3. The matter has already been dealt with and the reporter files again on the same facts or grounds
4. Other circumstances in which a report will not be accepted

In other words, this is not a regime in which filing a report guarantees an investigation. A report missing key elements gets a request for correction, and if the gap remains, it is not accepted. Recycling the same story is not accepted. Read together with Article 6 on malicious reports, it is plainly not designed to maximise report volume. The spokesperson's Q&A also states that the relevant departments will carry out report handling in accordance with law and regulation and will "safeguard the lawful rights and interests of compliant trading enterprises"².

Article 5 addresses named reports: MOFCOM will give feedback in an appropriate manner on whether the lead has been accepted, and where a report is verified as true, may reward the named reporter in accordance with relevant provisions. No amount or method appears in the announcement — it is delegated to "relevant provisions," and we could not identify which, so any discussion premised on the size of a reward would be speculation. Article 8 requires departments, units and individuals involved in handling reports to keep confidential the state secrets, trade secrets and personal privacy they learn in that work — the basis, from the reported party's side, for protecting commercial information.

There is also distance between a report and a penalty. Article 30 of the Export Control Law allows the authority to take measures such as regulatory interviews (监管谈话) and the issuance of warning letters (出具警示函) to guard against violation risk³, and Article 34 of the Regulations makes the report-triggered version explicit: where the commerce department of the State Council, acting on its own authority or on the basis of suggestions or reports from relevant quarters, finds a risk of violation, it may take those measures⁴. There is a stage at which you are heard and cautioned rather than fined outright. The corollary is that the quality of your explanation at that stage shapes the outcome.

The investigative powers are also on the face of the provisions. Article 28 of the Export Control Law permits entry and inspection of premises, questioning, inspection and copying of vouchers, agreements, accounting books and business correspondence, inspection of transport used for export, sealing or seizure of items, and enquiries into bank accounts — with sealing, seizure and bank-account enquiries expressly requiring written approval from the head of the authority³. Article 32 of the Regulations gives the party under inspection the right to refuse where fewer than two enforcement officers are present, or where credentials and legal documents are not produced⁴. The authority is bound by confidentiality under Article 29(3), while Article 29(2) imposes a duty to cooperate; breach is penalised under Article 38 with a warning and 100,000 to 300,000 yuan, rising to suspension of business or revocation of export qualifications in serious cases³. Cooperate, but verify that the procedure is regular. The provisions allow both.

How to read the voluntary self-report in Article 7

Article 7 gave me the most to think about. My translation of the original¹:

Where an export operator or other entity discovers that conduct violating the relevant provisions on export control of strategic-mineral dual-use items exists on its own part, or believes that it may have violated the relevant provisions, it shall proactively report to MOFCOM. The circumstance of having proactively reported shall be a factor considered in the lighter or mitigated punishment of the relevant unlawful or non-compliant conduct.

Three points. First, the subject is "export operator or other entity" — not confined to exporters. Second, the trigger includes "believes that it may have violated," so a suspicion that has not been confirmed is already within scope. Third, the effect: "a factor considered in lighter or mitigated punishment." A factor. Not a guarantee of immunity. Reading it as "report and you will not be sanctioned" is wrong.

So how should it be framed? I would take it out of cost-benefit calculation altogether, because of Article 40(1) of the Regulations. Where an export operator fails to perform its reporting obligations, it faces a warning and an order to rectify; in serious cases, confiscation of unlawful gains plus a fine of 5 to 10 times the unlawful business turnover where that turnover is 500,000 yuan or more, or 500,000 to 3 million yuan where there is none or it falls below that⁴. Failing to report is independently sanctionable. "Staying quiet because reporting might hurt us" looks like an option but is not one.

And the trigger sits earlier than most people assume. Article 25 of the Regulations requires export operators and importers, on discovering any of the following, to halt the export immediately, report to the commerce department of the State Council and cooperate with verification⁴: the end user or end use has changed or may change; the end-user and end-use certification documents are forged, altered or invalid; or such documents were obtained through fraud, bribery or other improper means. Article 35 adds that on discovering the circumstances in Articles 14(3), 18(4) or 25, or on being notified of them, the export operator shall report promptly, take the measures required to eliminate or mitigate harm, and cooperate with the investigation. Article 16(2) of the Export Control Law is to the same effect.

The practical issues around end-user certification are covered in end-user screening and customer due diligence. Treat the familiar moment — "something looks off in these documents, but stopping the shipment blows the delivery date" — as the situation in which Article 7 actually operates.

The only evidence you will have is five years of records

When you are the party being reported on, records are what you have. That is the practical conclusion.

Article 27 of the Regulations requires export operators to retain end-user and end-use certification documents relating to dual-use exports, together with contracts, invoices, accounting books, vouchers, business correspondence and similar materials, for no less than five years, subject to any longer period set by other laws or administrative regulations⁴. Note that business correspondence (业务函电) is on the list: email and chat are in scope. And business correspondence is precisely among the materials the authority may inspect and copy under Article 28 of the Export Control Law³.

Working backwards, what to retain becomes clear.

• The classification conclusion and its reasoning. Which specifications you looked at, which control code you concluded the item did or did not fall under, the date, and who decided
• The end-user and end-use verification record. Who you asked, how, which documents you received, and what you did not find suspicious
• The list-screening record. When, against which list, and as of which version. A "no hit" result still matters, because the fact that you screened is itself the record
• Why you chose this trade structure and route. The material that answers categories (4) and (5)
• Consistency with the customs declaration. MOFCOM and General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 18 of 2025 states that export operators should strengthen item identification, note in the remarks column at declaration whether the item is controlled, and where it is, specify the dual-use export control code. Where customs has doubts about the information declared, it will raise a query in accordance with law, and the goods will not be released while the query is pending⁶

That last point is easy to miss. The design has you writing your own classification conclusion into the customs paperwork. If your internal determination and the declaration diverge, that divergence is itself something you will be asked to explain. It is worth reconciling the practice in the customs clearance document checklist with your classification workflow.

We built TRAFEED so that classification and counterparty screening are retained with their supporting basis, because meeting a five-year retention requirement by hand is not realistic. People remember that they made a determination; six months later, almost nobody can reconstruct which passage of which document led them there. That said, the final classification and the decision on whether to trade rest with each company's export control officer. What we do is make the materials and the reasoning retrievable afterwards.

Fines are not the heaviest part — qualifications and individuals are

Looking only at monetary levels misreads the structure of the risk. As a description of the regime, here are the levels set by the provisions.

Conduct	Basis	Level of fine
Unlicensed export / exceeding licence scope, conditions or validity / export of prohibited items	Export Control Law art. 34	5–10 times unlawful business turnover where turnover is 500,000 yuan or more; 500,000 to 5 million yuan below that or where there is none. In serious cases, suspension of business up to revocation of export qualifications
Transacting with Control List importers or end users in breach of the rules	Export Control Law art. 37	10–20 times turnover at 500,000 yuan or more; 500,000 to 5 million yuan below that
Knowingly providing services	Export Control Law art. 36	3–5 times turnover at 100,000 yuan or more; 100,000 to 500,000 yuan below that
Instigating or assisting circumvention	Regulations art. 41	3–5 times unlawful gains at 100,000 yuan or more; 100,000 to 500,000 yuan below that (calculated on unlawful gains, not turnover)
Failure to perform reporting obligations (export operator)	Regulations art. 40(1)	Warning and order to rectify. In serious cases, 5–10 times turnover at 500,000 yuan or more; 500,000 to 3 million yuan below that
Failure to perform reporting obligations (service provider)	Regulations art. 40(2)	Warning and order to rectify; a fine of up to 100,000 yuan may be imposed; 100,000 to 500,000 yuan in serious cases
Domestic importer or end user breaching an undertaking	Regulations art. 42	3–5 times turnover at 500,000 yuan or more; 300,000 to 3 million yuan below that. Applications for end-user and end-use documentation may also be refused for five years
Accepting a foreign government's verification request without authorisation	Regulations art. 43	Warning and up to 500,000 yuan; 500,000 to 3 million yuan in serious cases; suspension of business in particularly serious cases

The 10–20 times multiple in Article 37 catches the eye, but the heavier provision in practice is Article 39 of the Export Control Law. From the date a penalty decision takes effect, the authority may decline to accept the operator's licence applications for five years. The directly responsible person in charge and other directly responsible personnel may be barred from relevant export activity for five years, and permanently where there has been criminal punishment for an export control violation. The violation is also entered into credit records³. Article 20 of the Regulations bites as well: an operator criminally punished for a dual-use export control violation, or one that has received an administrative penalty with serious circumstances within five years, cannot apply for a general licence or obtain export documentation by registration-and-filing⁴. It means losing the streamlined routes.

Reports also feed the listing decisions. Article 28 of the Regulations provides that the commerce department, acting on its own authority or on the basis of suggestions or reports, may decide to place importers and end users on the Control List where, among other things, they have breached end-user or end-use management requirements⁴. Article 26 allows placement on the Watch List where a party fails to cooperate with verification in time so that the end user and end use cannot be confirmed, and exports to Watch List parties cannot use general licences or registration-and-filing. There is a way out too: Article 30 allows an application for removal from the Control List through cooperation with the investigation, statement of the facts, cessation of the conduct, proactive measures to eliminate harm, and performance of undertakings. Lists are not one-way.

Since this touches the listing regime, let me restate one point. Placement on a control list or roster is a regulatory designation under that country's export control regime; it is not a judgment about the listed company or institution. Regimes differ in purpose, criteria and procedure. A listing means a verification step is required; it is not a basis for treating an organisation's business or reputation negatively. MOFCOM's 2026 announcement index shows No. 23 (ten US companies to the Control List), No. 27 (twenty Japanese companies to the Control List), No. 28 (twenty Japanese companies to the Watch List) and No. 30 (fourteen EU entities to the Control List) around No. 26⁷. Companies based in Japan, the United States and the EU are already among those designated. See our analysis of MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 of 2026 and Announcement No. 30 on fourteen EU entities.

Scope: separate what is in force from what is suspended

I will be careful here. Announcement No. 26 contains no definition of "strategic minerals." I read the original in full; there is no definition provision. Scope has to be inferred from the individual control announcements.

Two are confirmed as being implemented as of July 2026. MOFCOM and General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 18 of 2025 (issued 4 April 2025, effective on publication) controls seven elements — samarium (1C902), gadolinium (1C903), terbium (1C904), dysprosium (1C905), lutetium (1C906), scandium (1C907) and yttrium (1C908) — covering metals and alloys, target materials, oxides and compounds and their mixtures, samarium-cobalt permanent magnet materials, and neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnet materials containing terbium or dysprosium, with reference HS codes given⁶. Announcement No. 10 of 2025 (issued 4 February 2025) controls tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum powder and indium items (including indium phosphide and trimethylindium), together with the associated production technology and data⁸. Strategic minerals extend well beyond rare earths.

And there is a fact not to drop. Six mineral-related announcements dated 9 October 2025 have been suspended. MOFCOM and General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 70 of 2025 (issued 7 November 2025) suspends, from that date until 10 November 2026, the implementation of Announcements Nos. 55, 56, 57 and 58 of 2025 and MOFCOM Announcements Nos. 61 and 62 of 2025⁹. From the MOFCOM index, the titles cover superhard materials (No. 55), certain rare earth equipment and raw and auxiliary materials (No. 56), certain medium and heavy rare earths (No. 57), lithium batteries and artificial graphite anode materials (No. 58), extraterritorially related rare earth items (No. 61) and rare-earth-related technology (No. 62). On the US-specific side, MOFCOM Announcement No. 72 of 2025 (issued 9 November 2025) suspends, from that date until 27 November 2026, the second paragraph of MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2024¹⁰. We have not obtained the text of No. 46, so I will not characterise what that paragraph contains.

Treating suspended measures as current imposes unnecessary internal burden. Equally, the suspensions carry end dates. The minimum discipline is to hold an internal register that separates "in force" from "suspended (with an end date)" and to put those dates on a calendar. The chronology of the rare-earth announcements is set out in our map of China's rare earth export controls.

What thirty minutes this week will buy you

1. Build the "in force / suspended" register. List the announcements touching the minerals and materials you handle, mark each as implemented or suspended, and record the end date for the suspended ones. This alone makes internal discussion coherent
2. Reconcile the customs remarks column with your internal classification. Check recent exports from your Chinese site one shipment at a time, and understand any divergence before anyone asks
3. Check that you can state the reason for each structure and route in one line. Part-level supply, third-country transit, specification changes. The cases where you cannot, grounded in contemporaneous documents, are the cases that will need explaining
4. Fix the intake flow for foreign-government visit and verification requests. Who receives it, who it escalates to, when MOFCOM is notified, and what is said in the meantime, built on Article 38 of the Regulations. The riskiest state is one where the person on the ground answers on the spot in good faith
5. Tell sales and engineering that business correspondence falls under the five-year retention duty. Email and chat are retained materials and may be inspected and copied during an investigation
6. Decide the escalation path for suspicions. Article 25 requires an immediate halt to the export on discovering document irregularities. Few companies let one person on the ground make that call, so decide in advance who is told, and how fast

How to build the programme itself is covered in building an export control programme. Note too that the Chinese regime recognises internal compliance. Article 14 of the Export Control Law provides that where an export operator establishes an internal export control compliance programme and operates it well, the authority may grant facilitation measures such as general licences³. Article 6 of the Regulations has the commerce department publish compliance guidance and encourage both exporters and providers of freight, third-party e-commerce, financial and similar services to establish internal rules⁴. Programme building is not purely defensive spend.

Summary

• MOFCOM Announcement No. 26 of 2026 was issued on 24 June and took effect on 1 July 2026, setting out the manner, content, acceptance criteria and self-report treatment for reports of export control violations involving strategic-mineral dual-use items
• Any organisation or individual may report; the original contains no limitation by nationality or location. The channels are an online reporting platform and the intake number 010-12369 (statutory working days, 8:30–11:30 and 14:00–17:00)
• There are thirteen reportable categories. Circumvention by modification or splitting into parts (4), third-country routing (5), outbound technology transfer through a broad range of channels (6), catch-all non-compliance (10) and unauthorised acceptance of a foreign government's verification request (12) can coincide in outward appearance with entirely legitimate civilian trade
• Providers of logistics, customs, e-commerce and financial services fall under (7) only where they act knowingly, and Article 36 of the Regulations simultaneously places them under a duty to report suspicions. They are reporting parties within the regime more than enforcement targets
• A report, in itself, does not mean a penalty. Article 4 sets four grounds for refusal, Article 6 provides for rigorous screening of malicious reports, and Article 30 of the Export Control Law with Article 34 of the Regulations provide graduated measures
• The self-report in Article 7 is "a factor considered in lighter or mitigated punishment" and not a guarantee of immunity. Meanwhile Article 40 of the Regulations makes failure to report independently sanctionable, so self-reporting belongs in the category of statutory duty rather than commercial calculation
• Records are the only evidence. Article 27 requires retention for no less than five years of end-user and end-use documents, contracts, invoices, accounting books, vouchers and business correspondence. The heaviest consequences sit in Article 39 of the Export Control Law: five years of refused licence applications, a five-year bar on responsible individuals, a permanent bar after criminal punishment, and entry into credit records
• The announcement does not define "strategic minerals." The six announcements from October 2025 are suspended until 10 November 2026 under Announcement No. 70 of 2025, so what is in force and what is suspended must be tracked separately. Operational statistics since entry into force — reports accepted, cases opened, penalties imposed, Article 7 applied — had not been published by MOFCOM as of 30 July 2026, as far as we could confirm

A closing thought. Almost no new violation categories were created by the reporting regime. Most of the thirteen already have counterpart provisions in the Export Control Law and the Dual-Use Items Regulations, and where the announcement adds detail — third-country routing in (5), the list of transfer channels in (6) — it is tracing the outline of controls that already existed. What changed is that they can now be raised from outside, and that reporting at the stage of suspicion is expressly required.

Which means the response is simply the substance of compliance. Retain the classification with its reasoning. Retain the record of how you verified the end user. Retain the reason for the trade structure and route. Keep all of it retrievable for five years. None of that is dramatic, but the companies that can explain themselves calmly when a report lands are the ones that did it. This is less something to fear than a question of recordkeeping habits.

If you are unsure where to start on your China-related transactions, talk to our TRAFEED team. Running the free export control self-assessment first tends to make that conversation faster and more concrete.

References and primary sources

Footnotes

1. Bureau of Industry Security and Import and Export Control, Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, "MOFCOM Announcement No. 26 of 2026: Matters concerning further improving the handling of reports on unlawful and non-compliant conduct in the export control of strategic-mineral dual-use items" (issued 24 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) https://aqygzj.mofcom.gov.cn/flzc/gzjgfxwj/art/2026/art_bebe67f8f9114426bf8275bd8ee1d9f7.html ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶

2. Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, "MOFCOM spokesperson answers press questions on further improving the handling of reports on unlawful and non-compliant conduct in the export control of strategic-mineral dual-use items," 24 June 2026 https://aqygzj.mofcom.gov.cn/zhxx/art/2026/art_70cd24108cfc41fe90fadcfc5793ab60.html ↩ ↩² ↩³

3. Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China (in force 1 December 2020), Articles 12, 14, 16, 20, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38 and 39 https://aqygzj.mofcom.gov.cn/flzc/fl/art/2020/art_4fda791e3ada460b8c7ef0b6d8a62724.html ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰

4. Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items of the People's Republic of China (State Council Order No. 792 of 2024, promulgated 30 September 2024, in force 1 December 2024), Articles 6, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48 and 49 https://aqygzj.mofcom.gov.cn/flzc/fg/art/2024/art_94746fc2d7f24462b9ea7fe13e747718.html ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹²

5. Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Science and Technology of the PRC, "Announcement No. 28 of 2025" (issued 15 July 2025, partial adjustment to the Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2025/art/2025/art_aaaf4e92c93b4809a1edc45d8ab9c070.html ↩

6. Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs of the PRC, "Announcement No. 18 of 2025" (issued 4 April 2025, export controls on seven medium and heavy rare earth elements) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2025/art/2025/art_5e663d0bfec7452dabd950d0f0e42153.html ↩ ↩²

7. Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, "Policy Releases > Departmental Rules and Announcements > 2026 MOFCOM Announcements" index https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/index.html ↩

8. Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs of the PRC, "Announcement No. 10 of 2025" (issued 4 February 2025, export controls on tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium items) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2025/art/2025/art_3a5e07e8ebf647caa68dedf747f966f3.html ↩

9. Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs of the PRC, "Announcement No. 70 of 2025" (issued 7 November 2025, suspending Announcements Nos. 55, 56, 57 and 58 of 2025 and MOFCOM Announcements Nos. 61 and 62 of 2025 until 10 November 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2025/art/2025/art_da147202d0934ddebe252772e95ed7b3.html ↩

10. Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, "Announcement No. 72 of 2025" (issued 9 November 2025, suspending the second paragraph of MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2024 until 27 November 2026) https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2025/art/2025/art_bc4513421bb24faaa84e44c2e4f36dc5.html ↩