TIMEWELL
Solutions
Free ConsultationContact Us
TIMEWELL

Unleashing organizational potential with AI

ISO/IEC 27001 (ISMS) certification mark (SGS / ISMS-AC)

ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certified Certificate No. JP26/00000255 Scope: Planning, development and operation of SaaS products utilizing AI technology

Services

  • ZEROCK
  • TRAFEED
  • TIMEWELL BASE
  • WARP
  • WARP 1Day
  • WARP NEXT Corporate
  • WARP BASIC
  • WARP ENTRE
  • Alumni Salon
  • WARP for Schools
  • Alumni Ventures
  • FDE
  • AI Consulting
  • EMC GLOBAL

Company

  • About Us
  • Team
  • Why TIMEWELL
  • News
  • Contact
  • Free Consultation

Content

  • Insights
  • Knowledge Base
  • Case Studies
  • Whitepapers
  • Events
  • Solutions
  • AI Readiness Check
  • ROI Calculator

Legal

  • Privacy Policy
  • Manual Creator Extension
  • WARP Terms of Service
  • WARP NEXT School Rules
  • Legal Notice
  • Security
  • Anti-Social Policy
  • ZEROCK Terms of Service
  • TIMEWELL BASE Terms of Service

Newsletter

Get the latest AI and DX insights delivered weekly

Your email will only be used for newsletter delivery.

© 2026 株式会社TIMEWELL All rights reserved.

Contact Us
HomeTRAFEED MediaAI Diffusion Rule Withdrawal and What Replaced It — Five Checks Japanese Companies Should Make Now
TRAFEED Media

AI Diffusion Rule Withdrawal and What Replaced It — Five Checks Japanese Companies Should Make Now

Published2026-05-20Updated2026-11-22Checked against sources2026-11-21Ryuta Hamamoto
Export ControlAI Diffusion RuleGP10 GuidanceAI Training End-Use ControlsU.S. Export ControlTier 1 Tier 3TRAFEED

BIS announced the rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule on May 13, 2025, two days before compliance was due, and formally rescinded it in the interim final rule of November 19, 2026 (91 FR 74970), which removed ECCN 4E091 and added new destination and data-center controls.

AI Diffusion Rule Withdrawal and What Replaced It — Five Checks Japanese Companies Should Make Now
Share

(November 21, 2026) We corrected Q3, which said that purchasing the chips was not itself prohibited; GP10 lists ordering and buying among the prohibited activities. We also corrected the description of Japan's May 2023 controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which we had called a "notice"; it was an amendment to the Goods and Technologies Ordinance (METI Ordinance No. 25 of 2023).

(November 21, 2026) We corrected the Japan–India summit paragraph. The source is now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs readout "Japan-India Summit Meeting and Luncheon" (July 2, 2026), and we corrected the citation that had treated the Prime Minister's pre-departure press conference as a joint press conference. The five priority areas of the Japan–India Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation and the roughly ¥2 trillion of investment already decided toward the ¥10 trillion target follow the Ministry's original text. We also dated the July statement that there had been no major new U.S. AI export control publication, in light of the November 19 rescission.

(November 22, 2026) In the November 21 correction we wrote that as of July 2026 there had been no major new publication on U.S. AI export controls. That was not accurate: in July, BIS issued a rule (91 FR 43034, effective July 10) giving the UAE Government and approved UAE commercial entities license-free access to advanced computing items. What had not yet been issued in July was a rule formalizing the rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule.

Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.

The "AI Diffusion Rule," which was meant to systematize U.S. AI export controls in one stroke, had its rescission announced on May 13, 2025, only two days before compliance was due. On November 19, 2026, an interim final rule formalizing that rescission was published in the Federal Register and took effect the same day.

Update, November 20, 2026: BIS published the interim final rule "Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors" (91 FR 74970, RIN 0694-AK50) on November 19, 2026, effective the same day. Its preamble says it "formally rescinds the regulations implementing the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule" and that the rule "has never been enforced." In outline: (1) it removes ECCN 4E091 (model weights), the model-weights FDP rule (§734.9(l)), License Exceptions AIA (§740.27) and LPP (§740.29), the Data Center VEU, and the country tiers; (2) it drops the worldwide license requirement for advanced computing items (3A090, 4A090 and .z items) and instead, under §742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), requires a license for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, and Thailand (excluding ultimate consignees or end users headquartered in the United States, subject to §743.10 reporting) and, under (A)(2), for D:1, D:4, and D:5 (excluding A:5 and A:6) and the UAE; (3) entities headquartered in D:5 or Macau are covered by §744.23(a)(3)(i)(A); (4) new §744.24 requires a license for exports to data centers that provide more than 12,000,000 aggregate TPP to companies headquartered in D:5 or Macau; (5) License Exception ACM and the advanced computing FDP rule (§734.9(h)) are retained. The savings clause runs to December 21, 2026, and comments are due January 19, 2027. The rule uses "SI" (Super Intelligence) in place of "AI" under Executive Order 14434. Passages below saying the text "remains" or that no successor rule exists describe the position as of August 2026.

Over the past several months I have received a visible uptick in questions about what this means for a company's AI development and export-control program. I wrote this for people who are new to export control: original structure, path to withdrawal, substitute measures, and what Japanese companies should do in practice.

What this piece covers

  • What the AI Diffusion Rule was designed to regulate, with the key terms explained
  • The timeline through the May 13, 2025 rescission and the three reasons BIS gave
  • The meaning of the three substitute guidance documents issued the same day (GP10, AI training end-use controls, and the diversion red-flag set)
  • Why the phrase "15% fee on exports to friendly countries" is a misunderstanding, and why the correct target is China-bound H20 / MI308
  • Five practical issues Japanese companies should check now

Three terms to learn first

Before the main discussion, three minimum terms.

(1) AI Diffusion Rule (Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion). The export-control rule for AI semiconductors and AI model weights published by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on January 15, 2025. BIS administers the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). In Japanese terms it is closest to METI's Security Trade Control Division.

(2) Tier classification. The core of the AI Diffusion Rule was a three-tier structure: Tier 1 for trusted partners (Japan, the UK, Germany, France, and 19 countries/regions in total), Tier 2 for most other countries with quantitative caps, and Tier 3 for China, Russia, and other destinations subject to a near-total ban.

(3) FLOPs threshold. FLOPs stands for Floating-Point Operations, a unit of computational volume used to train an AI model. The AI Diffusion Rule would have controlled the weights of closed-weight AI models trained on more than 10^26 computational operations. That threshold sits above GPT-4-class systems and would have captured only a handful of developers worldwide. Closed-weight means model parameters are not released externally (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and similar). Open-weight models (Llama, DeepSeek-R1, and similar) were out of scope.

The original structure of the AI Diffusion Rule

The rule has been rescinded, but understanding its structure still matters for reading any successor framework.

Publication history and form

The formal title was "Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion." Publication date: January 15, 2025. Scheduled compliance date: May 15, 2025 (Federal Register citation 90 FR 4544). The form was an Interim Final Rule (IFR), a fast-track device that allows a rule to take effect while comments are still being received, without a prior notice-and-comment cycle. The choice of form itself signaled urgency around AI controls.

The three-tier structure

The core design divided the world into three tiers.

Tier Character Main destinations
Tier 1 Trusted partners; largely unrestricted Japan, the United States, the UK, Germany, France, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and others — 19 countries/regions in total
Tier 2 Quantitative caps; case-by-case review India, Singapore, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and most other countries
Tier 3 Near-total ban China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Belarus, and others

Singapore's placement in Tier 2 drew attention at the time, and the split of EU member states between Tier 1 and Tier 2 produced a wave of diplomatic concern.

Technologies in scope

Two technology clusters were in view. (a) High-performance AI semiconductors such as NVIDIA H100, H200, Blackwell, and AMD MI300X (ECCN 3A090.a and related). (b) Closed-weight AI model weights — for the first time, AI models themselves would have been controlled under a new ECCN 4E091. The threshold was closed-weight models trained on more than 10^26 computational operations. Open-weight models were out of scope. It was a symbolic moment in which controls moved from hardware into software.

Industry pushback

NVIDIA, Oracle, Microsoft, and governments including Germany, Spain, and Poland publicly opposed the rule. The main arguments were three: (1) the mix of license exceptions (LPP, NAC, and others) and data-center VEU authorizations (UVEU and NVEU) was too layered and compliance cost was excessive; (2) placing much of the EU in Tier 2 damaged alliance relationships; and (3) if Tier 2 countries could not obtain U.S. AI semiconductors, demand would shift toward Chinese alternatives such as Huawei, ultimately benefiting China's AI ecosystem.

Replace siloed classification work with AI.

METI's FY2024 data shows 52% of foreign exchange law violations stem from classification errors. Download the TRAFEED product catalog covering features and rollout.

Download Product CatalogContact About TRAFEED

Path to withdrawal

BIS announced the rescission just short of the May 15, 2025 compliance date, after a change of administration.

The announcement date was May 13, 2025, only two days before compliance would have begun. Internal instructions went to BIS enforcement not to enforce the rule, followed by a public rescission announcement in a press release.

One thing to get right: until November 2026, the rescission was not issued as a rule

This matters in practice, so let me be precise. *As of August 2026, no Federal Register rule rescinding the AI Diffusion Rule had been published. (It was formally rescinded on November 19, 2026 by 91 FR 74970; see the update above.)

BIS said in its May 13, 2025 press release that it planned to publish a regulation formalizing the rescission and would issue a replacement rule in the future. Neither appeared until November 2026. Until then, ECCN 4E091, the worldwide license requirement in §742.6, the country-level ceilings, and the red flag aimed at IaaS providers all remained in the Code of Federal Regulations.

BIS has acknowledged this on the record. In the July 2026 rule that moved the UAE into a more favorable country group, BIS noted that the worldwide license requirement is specified in the EAR and that it is only enforcing that requirement for certain country groups.

So until November 18, 2026 the state was "on the books but unenforced." The November 19 rule removed the text and replaced the worldwide requirement with the five-country and D:1/D:4/D:5/UAE license requirements, the end-use control for entities headquartered in D:5 or Macau (§744.23), and the new data-center control (§744.24).

BIS listed three reasons in its press release:

  1. Burdensome new regulatory requirements — the release says the rule would have "saddled companies with burdensome new regulatory requirements"
  2. Stifled American innovation — the rule would slow AI development and exports that the United States should lead
  3. Damaged relations with allies — "downgrading them to second-tier status" would have undermined relations with dozens of countries

The language of the rescission closely tracked the industry critiques. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick stated that U.S. allies can purchase AI semiconductors, provided certified U.S. data-center operators and certified cloud operators are involved. My reading: a policy switch driven by industry and ally pushback, not merely a post-election housecleaning.

Substitute measures: three guidance documents

On the same day as the rescission, May 13, 2025, BIS published three guidance documents. Until the November 19, 2026 rule, they were the operational baseline (the GP10 guidance and red-flag set remain useful references for due diligence).

(1) GP10 guidance on Huawei Ascend chips

The guidance warns that using, selling, transferring, financing, or providing services for Huawei AI chips such as Ascend 910B / 910C / 910D carries a high risk of violating U.S. export controls.

The key mechanism is General Prohibition 10 (GP10), the tenth of the EAR's general prohibitions. It bars the sale, transfer, or service of an item when a party knows that an EAR violation has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended. Two points matter: (1) GP10 applies to non-U.S. persons as well as U.S. persons (including Japanese companies handling items inside Japan); and (2) the standard is "knew or had reason to know," so even without deliberate intent, overlooking objective red flags can create violation risk. When Huawei AI chips are used in operations, the company itself bears a duty to confirm they were not produced in violation of U.S. export controls.

(2) Guidance on items for AI training

The guidance warns that access to advanced computing ICs for training AI models can enable military-intelligence and WMD end uses in Country Group D:5 countries (including China) or Macau. When there is knowledge that the model will be used for a WMD or military-intelligence end use or end user, it says the catch-all controls in part 744 of the EAR may require a license for exports, reexports, or in-country transfers of advanced computing ICs to parties such as IaaS providers known to train models for or on behalf of parties headquartered in D:5 countries or Macau, for in-country transfers of chips already held to such users, and for U.S. persons supporting such training. The important point is that controls reach U.S.-person support ("services"), not only "goods."

(3) Industry counter-diversion red-flag set

The third document functions as a due-diligence playbook. It flags indicators such as "a customer that never received exports of advanced computing ICs before October 2022, or saw a significant increase thereafter," "the ultimate delivery or installation address is unknown, or the customer will not disclose where its headquarters or ultimate parent is located," "the data center cannot affirm it has the power, cooling, or physical space to run the servers," and "an IaaS provider cannot affirm that its users are not headquartered in the PRC," and it sets out due-diligence actions to take for new customers. It is a practical document that can be built into routine screening.

Important correction: "15% fee on friendly countries" is a misunderstanding

In the context of the AI Diffusion Rule withdrawal, the "15% fee" is often misstated. Clear the record.

Media and social posts sometimes claim that "the United States now charges a 15% fee on AI chip exports to friendly countries." That is not correct. What actually happened is a China-bound arrangement, announced on August 10, 2025, under which licenses to export NVIDIA H20 and AMD MI308 to China require payment of 15% of sales to the U.S. government. President Trump initially sought 20%; NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang proposed 15%, and the parties agreed. In December 2025 an extension toward H200 and related products at 25% was indicated, and it was formalized by presidential proclamation on January 14, 2026.

In other words, the deal is China-bound, not friendly-country-bound. Internal materials must state the destination country explicitly. Separately, the U.S. Constitution bars export taxes and federal law restricts fees on export licenses, so constitutional debate continues.

Alongside the rescission, large "deal-by-deal" arrangements also advanced. During President Trump's May 2025 Middle East visit, the UAE was cleared to import up to 500,000 units per year of leading-edge NVIDIA AI semiconductors for 2025–2027, and Saudi Arabia's Humain received an immediate shipment of 18,000 NVIDIA Blackwell (GB300) units. Emblematic cases of deal-based administration.

Five impacts on Japanese companies

Impact 1: The Tier 1 auto-approval premise disappeared. The expectation that Japan-based users could freely procure AI semiconductors as Tier 1 parties is gone; the ordinary EAR individual-license regime is back. Predictability is lower, but the Tier 1 benefit never actually took effect, so practical harm is limited.

Impact 2: Comprehensive controls on closed-weight AI model exports are absent. The license requirement for weights of closed-weight AI models trained on more than 10^26 computational operations, including ECCN 4E091, was removed by the rule of November 19, 2026. The preamble says BIS decided that destination-based or end-use license requirements are a more effective way to address concerns over model-weight transfers. There is currently no U.S. text that controls model weights as such, but exports of advanced chips to data centers used for training are now governed by the new §744.24.

Impact 3: New GP10 risk on Huawei Ascend use. If a Japanese company deploys Chinese AI semiconductors (Huawei 910B/C/D and similar) while knowing they were produced in violation of U.S. export controls, GP10 risk can attach. Typical scenes include a Chinese subsidiary deploying Huawei Ascend, AI development support for Chinese customers on Huawei environments, and data centers for the company's own AI services that depend on Huawei. BIS has imposed substantial civil penalties for GP10 violations; pre-clearance is essential.

Impact 4: New end-use management on AI training support contracts. When you supply advanced computing chips or support services for AI training to customers headquartered in D:5 countries (including China) or Macau, whether you know the model will be used for a WMD or military-intelligence end use or end user determines whether the catch-all controls require a license. Cloud compute and engineering support can all come under review, regardless of form.

Impact 5: Japan's own FEFTA controls are unchanged. On May 23, 2023, METI promulgated an amendment to the Goods and Technologies Ordinance (METI Ordinance No. 25 of 2023, in force July 23, 2023) that added 23 types of high-performance semiconductor manufacturing equipment to export controls. That is an independent Japanese regime, not a derivative of the U.S. AI Diffusion Rule. The withdrawal does not change Japanese classification or licensing workflows under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act.

Honestly, Impact 3 and 4 are where I see Japanese teams under-prepared. Tier 1 nostalgia is less dangerous than silent GP10 exposure.

The successor rule (interim final rule of November 19, 2026)

When this piece was first written in May 2026, BIS had said only that a successor rule would come "in the future." It arrived on November 19, 2026 as an interim final rule (91 FR 74970). As summarized in the update at the top, the tiers and model-weight controls are gone, replaced by license requirements for five countries and a data-center end-use control (§744.24). Because it is an interim final rule, it may be amended after comments close on January 19, 2027. Japan is not among the five countries or in D:1, D:4, or D:5, but reexports from Japan to those five countries, or to data centers serving companies headquartered in D:5, can be caught.

Also readBIS Advanced Computing Guidance (May 31, 2026): How the D:5 Headquarters Test Changes AI Chip and Data Center TransactionsHow do you read guidance where the headquarters location changes the outcome?

Five practical steps

For export-control officers at Japanese companies, five steps to start now.

Step 1: Strengthen counterparty location and bona fide demand checks. Build the BIS red-flag set into internal due diligence. Add final delivery address, consistency between declared end use and order specifications, and payment-path complexity to the screening sheet for new transactions.

Step 2: Inventory Chinese AI semiconductor handling. Confirm whether the company, subsidiaries, or counterparties use Huawei Ascend 910B/C/D or similar. Companies with Chinese sites especially need visibility into actual server procurement. If you cannot immediately answer "we do not use them," inventory introductions by semiconductor vendor once.

Step 3: Screen AI training support contracts. Check whether end users are Chinese or Russian companies or related entities. Treat cloud APIs, dataset provision, and engineering support as "services," and make end-user collection and verification a required item at classification time.

Step 4: Internal education on GP10 exposure. Because GP10 turns on "knew or had reason to know," front-line staff need to recognize risk signals. GP10 overview training, a clear escalation path for "stop when you notice something," and internal publication of a translated red-flag summary, run once over a six-to-twelve-month cycle, meaningfully raise organizational sensitivity.

*Step 5: Apply the November 19, 2026 rule and monitor later amendments. License Exceptions AIA and LPP are gone, and the five-country requirement and §744.24 are in. Remove the deleted provisions from internal classification flows and review shipments against the savings-clause deadline of December 21, 2026. Amendments may follow the January 19, 2027 comment deadline, so keep checking the Federal Register and BIS announcements.

If I had to pick one checklist item this week, it would be Step 2. Most teams still cannot answer semiconductor inventory questions without a multi-week hunt.

Common misconceptions / FAQ

Q1. Was the AI Diffusion Rule ever enforced? No. Its rescission was announced on May 13, 2025, two days before the compliance start date, and the text was formally rescinded on November 19, 2026 (91 FR 74970).

Q2. Have China-bound exports been relaxed? Not in a general sense. China-bound exports of NVIDIA H20 and AMD MI308 resumed in August 2025, but only under the 15%-of-sales payment condition to the U.S. government. A rule of January 15, 2026 changed the review policy for the H200 and similar chips bound for China and Macau from a presumption of denial to case-by-case review, subject to certain conditions, but a license is still required. The case-by-case policy covers chips with a TPP below 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth below 6,500 GB/s; chips above those levels are outside this change. The GP10 warning on Huawei Ascend was also added.

Q3. What is the problem if a Japanese company buys Chinese AI semiconductors? The activities GP10 prohibits include ordering and buying, not only using, reselling, or servicing. Buying, using, reselling, or servicing those chips while knowing they were produced or acquired in violation of U.S. export controls creates GP10 risk. BIS's guidance says a party that has not received BIS authorization should confirm with its supplier, before any GP10 activity, that authorization existed for the transfer of the production technology from designer to fabricator and of the chip from fabricator to designer or other supplier.

Q4. When will a successor rule appear? It appeared on November 19, 2026 as an interim final rule (91 FR 74970), centered on the five-country license requirement, controls for entities headquartered in D:5 or Macau, and the data-center control in §744.24. Comments are due January 19, 2027.

Q5. Are open-weight AI models (DeepSeek-R1 and similar) controlled? Neither under the AI Diffusion Rule nor after the November 19, 2026 rule are open-weight model weights themselves a direct export-control object (that rule also removed 4E091, which covered closed-weight model weights). Separately, the semiconductors and data-center operations that run those models may still be controlled.

July 2026: the Japan–India summit

As of July 2026, BIS had not yet issued a rule formalizing the rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule; that came with the interim final rule of November 19, 2026 (91 FR 74970; see the update at the top). In the same month, BIS did issue a rule giving the UAE enhanced favorable treatment (91 FR 43034, effective July 10 and published July 14), under which the UAE Government and approved UAE commercial entities have license-free access to advanced computing items. Related economic-security moves were also accelerating. At the Japan–India summit in Delhi on July 2, 2026, the two governments issued the Japan–India Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation, committing to project-based cooperation in five priority areas: semiconductors, critical minerals, information and communications technology, clean energy and pharmaceuticals. The two leaders also welcomed that about ¥2 trillion of investment had already been decided toward the ¥10 trillion private investment target set in 2025 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-India Summit Meeting and Luncheon," July 2, 2026, in Japanese). At the joint press announcement, Prime Minister Takaichi said both countries regard strengthening supply chains for critical goods as an urgent task (Visit to India (2), joint press announcement, Prime Minister's Office of Japan, July 2, 2026, in Japanese). Bundling those supply chains among allies and partners aligns with the U.S. "deal-by-deal + end-use management" approach discussed above. My reading is that as AI semiconductor procurement networks are reorganized under intergovernmental frameworks, end-user screening at Japanese companies becomes more, not less, important. Related developments are summarized in the 2026 Japan–India summit and economic security.

Summary

Do not read "the rule was rescinded" as "controls disappeared." Shifting the center of gravity to end-use management and GP10 readiness is the most rational posture at present.

  • The AI Diffusion Rule's rescission was announced on May 13, 2025, two days before compliance was due, and formalized on November 19, 2026 (91 FR 74970)
  • As substitutes, BIS published three documents: GP10 guidance, AI training end-use controls, and a counter-diversion red-flag set
  • The "15% fee" targets China-bound H20 / MI308, not friendly countries
  • For Japanese companies, the Tier 1 auto-approval premise disappeared, while GP10 risk around Huawei Ascend became a new issue
  • The successor rule arrived on November 19, 2026, centered on the five-country license requirement and the data-center control in §744.24; comments are due January 19, 2027

The withdrawal was a turning point at which U.S. AI export control shifted from a comprehensive framework toward case-by-case licensing plus end-use management. Monday morning: confirm whether any Huawei Ascend (or similar) sits in your estate, then map AI training support contracts to end users before the next board asks "are we clean?"

If you want classification of AI chips and models, and counterparty checks, to run as a routine process, you can contact us about TRAFEED. An overview of its features is in the TRAFEED service catalog (PDF).

Related articles

  • The AI Diffusion Rule Withdrawal and H200 China Release — Three Axes of Export Control in the Generative-AI Era
  • China–Japan Export Control Trends in 2026
  • Complete Guide to the BIS Affiliates Rule (50% Rule)
  • China Export Risk 2026

References

  • Federal Register, "Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors" (91 FR 74970, published and effective November 19, 2026; FR Doc 2026-23529): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/11/19/2026-23529/addressing-remote-access-to-advanced-semiconductors
  • BIS, "Rescission of Biden-Era Artificial Intelligence Diffusion Rule" (May 13, 2025): https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-announces-rescission-biden-era-artificial-intelligence-diffusion-rule-strengthens
  • BIS, "General Prohibition 10 Guidance" (May 13, 2025): https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/general-prohibition-10-guidance-may-13-2025.pdf
  • BIS, "AI Counter-Diversion Industry Guidance" (May 13, 2025): https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/ai-counter-diversion-industry-guidance-may-13-2025.pdf
  • Federal Register, "Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion" (January 15, 2025): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion
  • Federal Register, "Promoting the Export of the American AI Technology Stack" (EO 14320): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/28/2025-14218/promoting-the-export-of-the-american-ai-technology-stack
  • Morrison Foerster, "AI Diffusion Rule Out, But BIS Increases Compliance Expectations": https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/250617-ai-diffusion-rule-out-but-bis-increases-compliance
  • Akin Gump, "BIS Rescinds its AI Diffusion Rule and Issues Compliance Guidance": https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/bis-rescinds-its-ai-diffusion-rule-and-issues-compliance-guidance-regarding-advanced-computing-items
  • CBS News, "Nvidia, AMD chip sales to China subject to 15% fee": https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nvidia-amd-chip-sales-china-15-percent-h20-mi308/
  • RAND (L. Heim), "Understanding the AI Diffusion Framework": https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA3776-1.html

This article was produced with the help of AI. A human verified the primary sources and edited the text before publication.

Read next

Articles that answer the question you are likely to have next.

  1. 1Why “Using” Huawei Ascend 910B Can Violate U.S. Export Rules: BIS GP10 Guidance ExplainedWhat can be at issue when you merely use certain AI chips?
  2. 2BIS Advanced Computing Guidance (May 31, 2026): How the D:5 Headquarters Test Changes AI Chip and Data Center TransactionsHow do you read guidance where the headquarters location changes the outcome?
  3. 3U.S. Export Rule Change Playbook: Read the Federal Register and Triage Impact in Three HoursWhen a US rule changes, what should your team check first?

This article is part of TRAFEED Media, our practical media on export controls and economic security

Back to TRAFEED MediaThis week's regulatory updates

52% of FY2024 export-control violations stem from classification errors. Is your team covered?

METI FY2024 data shows over half of violations stem from classification. Start with a free 5-question light check (~2 min, no email), then continue to the full 10-question report.

Contact About TRAFEED
Contact About TRAFEEDContact form (about 3 min)TRAFEED product briefFeatures & rollout in PDF

Share this article if you found it useful

Share

Newsletter

Get the latest AI and DX insights delivered weekly

Your email will only be used for newsletter delivery.

Free download

Recommended materials

China MOFCOM Lists (Control & Watch): 80-Entity Reference Sheet (through the 29 Jun 2026 wave)

All 80 entities on China MOFCOM's Control List and Watch List, in official / Chinese / English names. Being listed is a regulatory designation, not a judgment of the company — useful both for counterparty screening and for listed companies to understand where they stand. Based on primary sources (Announcements No. 11/12/27/28); as of 20 November 2026 there had been no additions or removals (checked through No. 56).

The BIS Affiliates Rule (50 Percent Rule) Readiness Checklist (2026)

A fill-in working checklist for trade compliance teams preparing for the BIS Affiliates Rule. Covers what the rule actually does (aggregation across owners and across lists, cascade/carry-forward, the rule of most restrictiveness, and why exactly 50% is in while below 50% is not automatically out), what is stayed and what is in effect now, where ownership data typically breaks, and a six-phase preparation list from scoping through governance. The stay was due to end on 9 November 2026; on that day BIS published a rule extending it to 10 January 2027 (91 FR 70789). The sheet is built to work whether the rule then returns, is stayed again, or is modified (as of 21 November 2026). Based on primary sources (90 FR 47201, 90 FR 50857, 91 FR 70789, 15 CFR, and China's Ministry of Commerce). Designation is a regulatory classification, not a judgement about a company; final determinations rest with your export-control officer and the authorities' current guidance.

EAR Classification Flow & EAR99 Practical Checklist (for exporters from Japan, 2026)

A fill-in working sheet covering "subject to the EAR? → ECCN on the CCL? → EAR99?", the crucial "when EAR99 still needs a license" (embargoes, end-use, end-user), de minimis / FDP, counterparty screening, and the two-track cross-check with Japan's classification (FEFTA / Appended Table 1). Based on primary sources (15 CFR, the Federal Register, BIS, METI); the EAR changes frequently, so treat the authorities' latest guidance and your export-control officer as authoritative.

See all materials

Related Knowledge Base

Export Control Guide

Solutions

Strengthen Export ComplianceStreamline compliance with complex export regulations

Talk with us about export-control operations

Share your screening, classification, or compliance workflow. We will map where TRAFEED can help—via our contact form (no cold booking).

Contact UsDownload Catalog

Related Articles

Why “Using” Huawei Ascend 910B Can Violate U.S. Export Rules: BIS GP10 Guidance Explained

Why “Using” Huawei Ascend 910B Can Violate U.S. Export Rules: BIS GP10 Guidance Explained

BIS's GP10 guidance of May 13, 2025 warned of the risks of using Chinese advanced computing chips such as the Huawei Ascend 910B, 910C, and 910D with knowledge that they were made in violation of the EAR. This piece covers the guidance's logic, the withdrawn "anywhere" phrasing, China's rebuttal, three exposure patterns (cloud, China subsidiaries, co-development), penalties, and five practical steps.

2026-05-20
Export Control Changes in 2026: U.S. and Japan, Rechecked Against Primary Sources (Corrected)

Export Control Changes in 2026: U.S. and Japan, Rechecked Against Primary Sources (Corrected)

We rechecked the 2026 export control changes against the Federal Register and Japan's e-Gov. The AI Diffusion Rule is a January 2025 rule that was never enforced and was formally rescinded on 19 November 2026. The IC designer application deadline is now 31 December 2026. We also list the effective dates of Japan's recent amendments.

2026-05-13
The Shockwaves of the AI Diffusion Rule Rollback and H200 China Unlock | Three Axes of Generative AI Export Control [2026 Latest]

The Shockwaves of the AI Diffusion Rule Rollback and H200 China Unlock | Three Axes of Generative AI Export Control [2026 Latest]

The Shockwaves of the AI Diffusion Rule Rollback and H200 China Unlock | Three Axes of Generative AI Export Control [2026 Latest].

2026-04-24
What Is Appended Table 1 of Japan's Export Trade Control Order? Items 1–16 Explained

What Is Appended Table 1 of Japan's Export Trade Control Order? Items 1–16 Explained

What Japan's Appended Table 1 covers, how its 17 rows map to the export control regimes, how to classify against it, and how the Item 16 catch-all varies by destination. Includes the draft amendments whose comment period closed on November 18, 2026.

2026-07-07
Japan's Certificate of Non-Applicability Explained — What Foreign Suppliers Must Provide Japanese Buyers [Feb 14, 2026 Update]

Japan's Certificate of Non-Applicability Explained — What Foreign Suppliers Must Provide Japanese Buyers [Feb 14, 2026 Update]

Japan's certificate of non-applicability is not an ECCN letter. What foreign suppliers must provide Japanese buyers after the February 2026 list update.

2026-01-23
What Is the BIS 50% Rule? Stay Deadline, Extension Deal, and Ownership Math

What Is the BIS 50% Rule? Stay Deadline, Extension Deal, and Ownership Math

The BIS Affiliates Rule extends Entity List controls by ownership. On November 9, 2026, BIS published a rule extending the stay through January 10, 2027 (91 FR 70789). How the 50% test works and how to prepare for the next milestone.

2026-05-20