(November 22, 2026) In the November 21 correction we cited the Foreign User List's purpose as "introductory guidance v3.0, p. 15". We have corrected the page to p. 16, where the definition appears in the original.
Hello, this is Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.
First, the premise of this article. Export control is not a system for sorting people by nationality or by the university they came from. Appearing on a public list such as the Foreign User List is a regulatory classification, not an assessment of the institution or the individual. What you check is not nationality but facts: funding, affiliations and contracts. Japanese faculty and students can fall under the same check items. These are fact checks for export control and research security, which serve a different purpose from a background investigation into matters unrelated to a person's aptitude or ability. For hiring faculty and researchers, how to keep the checks compatible with fair recruitment is covered in our HR article.
I strongly support the internationalization of universities and research institutions. This guide is for the people who handle admission of students and foreign researchers and joint research with overseas institutions, and sets out what to check, and in what order, in a form you can use at your desk. Please read it as a procedure that research administration and export control staff can apply identically to everyone being hosted, with a record kept. HR staff do not need to carry out these checks themselves. Our HR article recommends that research promotion or the export control office carry out these checks separately from hiring decisions, and that HR not ask candidates about their country of origin or nationality background for export control purposes.
Why checks are asked for at admission
Semiconductors, AI, quantum technology and new materials are all ordinary civilian research topics, and all are dual-use technologies as well. National rules ask host institutions to carry out a certain level of checking so that research outcomes are not used in ways nobody intended.
Deemed exports and the "specified categories" (May 2022)
For a long time in Japan, providing technology to residents was outside export control, whatever their nationality. Someone who has been in Japan for six months or more since entry, or who works at an office in Japan, is a resident (the residency criteria are set out in "Interpretation and Operation of Foreign Exchange Laws and Regulations" [Kurakoku No. 4672], and p. 39 of METI's guidance for universities and research institutions, fifth edition, shows the same criteria; in Japanese). Under that framework, controlled technology could be handed over to a person acting under a foreign government's influence simply because they were in Japan.
In May 2022 METI clarified how "deemed export" control under FEFTA operates [1]. Even a resident now needs authorization for the provision of controlled technology if they fall under one of the following "specified categories":
- Category 1: they have an employment, mandate or similar contract with a foreign corporation or similar entity (such as a foreign company or university) or a foreign government or similar entity, and are subject to its direction or owe it a duty of care (with exceptions, such as where the contract with a Japanese corporation is agreed to take priority)
- Category 2: they receive, or have agreed to receive, a large amount of money or other significant benefit from a foreign government or similar entity (25% or more of their annual income)
- Category 3: they receive instructions or requests from a foreign government or similar entity regarding their conduct in Japan
(Wording based on item 1(3)(sa) of METI's services circular. Category 2 is limited to a foreign government or similar entity.)
What matters is that this is a classification regardless of nationality. A Japanese professor or student can fall under it, for example by signing a contract with an overseas institution and taking its direction. Falling under a category is a procedural classification, not an assessment of the person. What is regulated is the provision of controlled technology; teaching and supervision as such are not prohibited. Awareness on the ground is still thin, which is exactly why settling on a verification procedure is worthwhile.
Management after admission: the AIST case
Checks do not end at admission. A former lead researcher at the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) emailed research data on fluorine compound synthesis to an overseas company of which his spouse was the representative. He was prosecuted under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act and convicted by the Tokyo District Court in February 2025: two and a half years' imprisonment suspended for four years, and a fine of 2 million yen [2].
This is a judgment about one individual's conduct, and not a case to be read in terms of nationality or origin. It is better read as one that tested organizational controls: access rights to data, records of what leaves the organization, and oversight of external collaboration. Whoever you host, taking out information from the inside cannot be prevented completely, which is why the answer has to be built as a system.
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What Japanese and U.S. public sources ask for
As a baseline, three sources: METI, MEXT and the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR).
METI's Foreign User List
METI operates "catch-all controls" to prevent leakage of technology that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and the like. At the core is the Foreign User List [3]. The revision announced on 29 September 2025 (applied from 9 October) brought the list to 835 organizations in 15 countries and regions, an increase of 87 (confirmed in METI's announcement and in the listing table of the Introductory Guidance, version 3.0) [3].
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Purpose | To give exporters information on organizations of concern for involvement in WMD development and on foreign organizations requiring checks on conventional weapons development and transaction status (introductory guidance v3.0, p. 16) |
| Scale | 835 organizations from 15 countries and regions (revision applied 9 October 2025) |
| Regulatory role | Under catch-all controls (row 16 goods and technology), if the counterparty is listed, a METI license is required unless it is clear, from the use and the terms and conditions of the transaction, that the item will not be used to develop WMD or conventional weapons (for conventional weapons, limited to row 16(1) items). For list-controlled technology (rows 1 to 15), check whether a license is needed regardless of listing |
| Concern categories | Fields such as biological (B), chemical (C), missiles (M) and nuclear (N). Since the version applied on 9 October 2025, organizations requiring checks for conventional weapons development and transaction status are also listed |
This list is not an assessment of listed organizations or of individuals who belonged to them. Being listed does not mean transactions are prohibited, and provision can be possible with authorization. The list is a "regulatory classification" you use in the checking procedure. Turning someone away merely because they came from a listed organization is not what the system asks. Check, put authorization and conditions in place if needed, and keep a record. That is the intended response.
MEXT's research integrity
MEXT asks universities to ensure the soundness and fairness of research (research integrity). In March 2025 it published a "Research Integrity Near-Miss Case Collection" sharing situations that nearly went wrong [4]. What is asked is that every incoming researcher disclose work history, research history, concurrent positions and external funding on the same form, and that risk be assessed by comparing that with information obtainable separately, such as the Foreign User List and other countries' lists.
When reading the collection, what to look at is not individual attributes but whether the mechanism for collecting disclosures and the record of checks were working.
Extraterritorial reach of the U.S. EAR
The EAR, administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce, includes restrictions such as the Entity List, set for U.S. national security and foreign policy reasons [5]. Here too, being listed is a regulatory classification, not an assessment of the organization.
What matters for Japanese organizations is that the EAR can apply extraterritorially. However, technology or software that arises during, or results from, fundamental research and is intended to be published is not subject to the EAR (15 CFR 734.8(a)) [8]. Using U.S.-made equipment or software in research does not by itself make the results subject to the EAR. The point to watch is providing U.S.-origin technology or software that is subject to the EAR (such as non-public technical documentation for an instrument) in order to carry out the research: a note to 734.8(a) says the exclusion does not apply to technology released to conduct fundamental research. Giving such technology to researchers connected with an Entity List organization can bring even an exchange inside Japan under U.S. rules.
In practice: how to proceed
Items to check in disclosure documents
The first step is reviewing submitted CVs and disclosure documents. Ask everyone the same items and check against the same standard. The following follow what the rules actually ask for. If you use the university forms in METI's fifth-edition guidance, see our field-by-field guide to the pre-acceptance check sheets and review form.
- The sequence of affiliations and posts. Gaps have many causes: childcare, illness, preparing for further study. A gap is not itself a problem; it is an item where you listen to the explanation and record it
- The source of study and research funding and its conditions. Where funding comes from a foreign government or foreign institution, check the terms of the contract; it is information needed to judge the specified categories
- Concurrent employment and contracts with other institutions, including what is expected after admission
- Plans after the hosting period ends. If the person expects to return to a former employer, check whether that institution is on the Foreign User List
- Collaboration and co-authorship. Research links are normal for most researchers and are not in themselves a concern
Databases published by private bodies and research institutes can serve as reference, but base the decision on public lists and the person's own disclosure. Do not treat someone unfavorably on reference material alone. When collecting disclosures, explain how personal information will be handled and obtain consent.
Using the CSL Search
The Consolidated Screening List (CSL), provided free by the U.S. government, lets you check several public lists in one screen [6]. It searches across lists administered by the Departments of Commerce, State and the Treasury.
| List name | Administrator | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Entity List | Department of Commerce BIS | A classification of organizations for which authorization is required for exports, for security reasons |
| Military End User List | Department of Commerce BIS | A classification of military end users for which provision of specific items is restricted |
| Denied Persons List | Department of Commerce BIS | Individuals and organizations whose export privileges are restricted |
| SDN List | Department of the Treasury OFAC | Individuals and organizations designated for sanctions such as asset freezes (terrorism-related, among others) |
| Non-SDN CMIC List | Department of the Treasury OFAC | A list restricting investment in the securities of specified companies |
Go to trade.gov/consolidated-screening-list and enter a name. The Fuzzy Name Search handles variation in how names are spelled in the Latin alphabet, and data is updated daily. CSV, JSON and an API are also available, so universities with high volumes can build it into their own systems.
A name match does not mean the same person or organization. To avoid confusing someone who merely has a similar name with a listed party, confirm using other information such as date of birth and address, and record the outcome where there is doubt.
Cross-referencing against the Foreign User List
In parallel with the CSL, check against METI's Foreign User List: is the person's affiliation listed? Commentary from TMI Law Partners says that for someone who was formerly at a listed institution, you should confirm plans and certainty of returning to it, to see whether the end user has effectively become a listed institution [7]. So do not rely on the fact of resignation alone; ask the person about future plans and record the answer.
If the counterparty is listed, assess and record whether it is clear, from the use and the terms and conditions of the transaction, that the technology will not be used to develop WMD or conventional weapons. If that is not clear, a METI license is required.[3] That record is what lets you say later that the judgment was reasonable at the time.
Organizational arrangements
If checking relies on an individual, judgments will vary. Make these three points organizational procedure.
- Keep looking after admission: Check activity in the laboratory, the scope of data accessed and external exchanges, within the scope set at admission. Minimize access rights and control entry to experimental facilities. This applies to everyone in the same way
- Decide in an independent forum: Positive motives such as "the citation count is high" or "this leads to a big grant" tend to make concerns look smaller. Conversely, right after seeing a news story it is easy to become over-cautious and cut off useful international exchange. Set up a review committee and decide on objective inputs: disclosure documents and list-matching results
- No blanket detriment: Blanket refusal or restriction of research opportunities because of nationality or origin does not fit the purpose of the system. If the checks show that authorization or conditions are needed, put them in place and host the person
In closing
Academic freedom and open science are principles worth protecting. The aim is not to stop hosting people but to keep hosting them, with a verification procedure and records in place. That is all this article is meant to say.
Checks are made not to suspect anyone but to protect the researcher and the organization. Ask everyone the same items, check against the same standard, keep a record. If your acceptance flow does not yet have such a procedure, start reviewing it today.
If you want acceptance screening and records of matching against the Foreign User List and similar lists to run as a routine process, you can contact us about TRAFEED. An overview of its features is in the TRAFEED product catalog (PDF).
References
[1] METI, Trade Control Department, "To Newly Hired Employees: A Request for Cooperation from METI — Clarification of Deemed Export Management" (November 2021) https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law_document/minashi/jp_kigyou.pdf (in Japanese). The start of application (May 2022) is from METI's "On the Clarification of Deemed Export Management" https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law_document/minashi/meikakukanitsuite2.pdf (both originals checked on 21 November 2026)
[2] Yomiuri Shimbun, "Former Chinese Researcher at AIST Found Guilty; Had Sent Research Data to Chinese Company" (February 25, 2025) https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/20250225-OYT1T50178/
[3] METI, "Foreign User List Revised" (29 September 2025) https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2025/09/20250929006/20250929006.html (in Japanese). The count was confirmed against the original text of this METI press release ("after the revision, the list contains a total of 835 organizations (87 added) in 15 countries and regions"; checked on 21 November 2026) and the listing table in METI's Introductory Guidance, version 3.0 (revision of 9 October 2025, total 835). The license requirement follows METI's notice on the End User List (20250922 Bōkyoku No. 1, applied 9 October 2025; https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/20250929_2.pdf, in Japanese; original retrieved in a browser on 20 November 2026).
[4] MEXT, "Research Integrity Near-Miss Case Collection" (March 2025) https://www.mext.go.jp/content/20250331-mxt_kagkoku-000019002_1.pdf
[5] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, "Entity List" (viewable through the CSL) https://www.trade.gov/consolidated-screening-list
[6] U.S. Department of Commerce, "Consolidated Screening List" https://www.trade.gov/consolidated-screening-list
[7] TMI Law Partners, "What Is Research Integrity Compliance and What Does It Require?" https://www.tmi.gr.jp/eyes/blog/2024/15676.html
[8] eCFR, 15 CFR 734.8, "“Technology” or “software” that arises during, or results from, fundamental research" (version as of 18 November 2026; checked 21 November 2026) https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-734/section-734.8
Updated 20 November 2026: the title and introduction were revised to state at the outset that this is not a system that judges by nationality, and the wording on military matters was replaced with facts and check items.






