Reading Japan's 2026 Defense White Paper, Part 3 | The World's Security Picture and New Ways of War

Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL. The "world affairs" chapters of Japan's defense white paper throw country names and treaty names at you one after another, and it is hard to follow without a map beside you. The later chapter on "new ways of war" brings its own unfamiliar words, such as drones, satellites and cyber.

This series explains the Reiwa 8 edition (2026) of the defense white paper in five parts for beginners. This is Part 3, and it reads the second half of Part I, "The Security Environment Surrounding Japan" (printed pages 155 to 233). Part 1 covered the opening feature and the three documents, and Part 2 covered the United States, China, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and Russia and Ukraine.

Here is the answer up front. This part clears up four things. First, where the white paper focuses in each region, from Oceania to the Middle East and Africa. Second, that international terrorism, the seas and weapons of mass destruction are written as shared global problems, not as the story of any one country. Third, what the "new ways of war" are, in three pillars. They are the mass use of drones, faster decisions through data and AI, and equipment and tactics swapped out in short cycles. Fourth, how to think about the "unseen battlefields" of space, cyber, the electromagnetic spectrum and the cognitive domain.

Some ground rules. The white paper is an official government document, so I name the subject every time, as in "the white paper states." Military developments in other countries are introduced as the white paper's description, drawing on statements by governments and findings of research bodies that the white paper cites. The parties named may take different positions, and nothing here is meant to portray any country, religion or group of people as dangerous. My own views are labeled as mine. The course of the invasion of Ukraine itself was covered in Part 2, so this part sticks to the lessons the white paper draws from it.

Sources appear in footnotes by printed page number. The PDF page position is 10 higher than the printed page, so printed page 155 is page 165 of the PDF. The Ministry of Defense publishes the PDF¹.

Terms to know first

This part has many terms, so here is a table first. The everyday comparisons are mine.

Term	Meaning	Everyday comparison
AUKUS	A security cooperation framework of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States	A joint development contract among three companies
Unmanned assets	A general term for drones (UAVs), unmanned surface vessels (USVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and similar	Equipment run by remote control
FPV drone	A small drone flown while watching the video from its onboard camera	A radio-controlled toy flown with goggles on
Satellite constellation	Many small satellites working together to cover the earth like a surface	A net spread across the night sky
Electronic warfare	Fighting that jams radio waves or protects against jamming	Drowning out the other side's microphone in a meeting
Cognitive domain	The domain that works on how people perceive and judge	Rumors and word of mouth
Dual-use	Usable for both civilian and military purposes	A commercial drone that can serve farming or reconnaissance
Sustainability of operations	The ability to keep going through a crisis on stockpiles and production capacity. The white paper also calls it "sustained response capability"	Disaster stockpiles

Oceania, Southeast Asia and South Asia

Sections 6 to 8 of the white paper cover the area south of Japan out to the Indian Ocean. What they share is competition among major powers, the importance of the sea lanes, and a widening web of links among allies and like-minded countries.

Oceania (Section 6)

On Australia, the white paper calls it a special strategic partner that shares basic values and strategic interests with Japan. Australia's National Defence Strategy, released in April 2026 (NDS 2026), recognizes a trend away from a rules-based order toward the use of force. It builds on a "denial" strategy and sets out steps such as greater self-reliance and a stronger domestic defense industrial base. A denial strategy aims to head off conflict by making an adversary conclude that an attack will not go its way².

AUKUS was announced in September 2021 by Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. According to the white paper, the first pillar supports Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, with US and UK submarines rotating through the west coast of Australia from 2027 and Australia acquiring up to five US submarines in the early 2030s. The second pillar covers cooperation on cyber, AI, quantum technology and undersea capabilities, and a September 2024 statement named maritime autonomous systems as an initial area of cooperation with Japan. The white paper records that the United States announced a review in 2025 and later made clear that it would push ahead "at full speed"².

On relations with China, the white paper says China is Australia's largest trading partner and that import restrictions were all lifted in December 2024. It also lists incidents announced by the Australian government, namely Chinese fighter jets releasing flares at Australian patrol aircraft (February and October 2025) and a Chinese military helicopter approaching an Australian naval helicopter and interfering with its flight (March 2026). Australia expressed serious concern, and the white paper sets beside this the Chinese foreign ministry's position that its activities are consistent with international law³.

Pacific island countries are small and scattered, and vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change. The white paper says these countries regard climate change as the single greatest threat to their security. It then lists widening involvement by outside powers, including a 2022 security cooperation agreement between China and the Solomon Islands, a 2023 defense cooperation agreement between the United States and Papua New Guinea, and an October 2025 mutual defense treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea. It adds that competition centered on the United States, China and Australia "is drawing attention"⁴. New Zealand plans to raise defense spending to at least 2 percent of GDP within eight years⁵.

Southeast Asia (Section 7)

Southeast Asia sits at the junction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea run through it. The white paper explains that it matters to Japan, which depends on sea transport for most of its goods. It also lists sources of instability, namely territorial disputes, ethnic minority issues, land border disputes, separatist movements, extremism and piracy. Backed by economic growth, countries are raising defense budgets and advancing military modernization and maritime law-enforcement capability. The table below sums up the main points the white paper gives by country⁶.

Country	Main points in the white paper
Indonesia	Non-aligned, all-directions diplomacy. Signed a new security treaty with Australia in February 20267
Cambodia	Issued its first defense white paper in 16 years in 2022. Renovation of Ream Naval Base advanced, with a completion ceremony in April 2025
Myanmar	After the 2021 coup, general elections from late December 2025 to late January 2026, and a president chosen in April 2026. The situation remains unclear
Philippines	Mutual defense treaty with the United States. Its claims in the South China Sea conflict with China's
Singapore, Thailand	Singapore spends 3 percent of GDP on defense and created a fourth service, the Digital and Intelligence Service, in 2022. Thailand set up a specialized cyber command unit in 2024
Timor-Leste	Became the 11th member of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in October 2025
Vietnam	Aims to be a maritime power and pursues all-directions diplomacy with the United States, China, Russia and others. In April 2026 the Communist Party general secretary also became state president

The white paper goes into detail on three points. The first is Cambodia's Ream Naval Base. The white paper says Chinese warships are believed to be berthed there on a continuing basis, and it also records the Cambodian prime minister's statement that Cambodia will not allow foreign military bases and welcomes all friendly countries. Ships from Japan, Vietnam and the United States have also called at the renovated base⁶.

The second is the South China Sea. The white paper says the Philippines and China are at odds over sovereignty in the Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal and elsewhere. The Philippines began arbitration under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and in July 2016 the tribunal gave a ruling that largely accepted the Philippine claims. China has said it does not intend to comply. In June 2024 the Philippine government announced that a Philippine resupply boat had been obstructed by China Coast Guard vessels, including with water cannon, causing human and material damage. China set baselines around Scarborough Shoal in November 2024 and announced in September 2025 that part of the shoal had been designated a nature reserve, and the Philippines and the United States called for compliance with the arbitral award. That is the white paper's account⁶.

The third is the Cambodia-Thailand border. Military clashes broke out near the undelineated border from May 2025, a ceasefire was agreed through mediation in July, clashes continued, and another ceasefire was agreed in December. The white paper says tension remains⁶.

As regional frameworks, ASEAN holds a defense ministers' meeting and an expanded version (ADMM-Plus) that adds eight outside countries including Japan. ASEAN and China continue talks on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and in January 2025 it was announced that the third reading had been completed⁸.

South Asia (Section 8)

On India, the white paper explains that it is the world's largest democracy, favors non-alignment and all-directions diplomacy, and values strategic autonomy. It has undelineated border areas with China and Pakistan and is keenly aware of Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean. After the 2020 clash near the China-India border, the two sides agreed in October 2024 to resume patrols, and in August 2025 Prime Minister Modi visited China for the first time in about seven years, so a step-by-step easing of tension is under way. India signed a defense framework with the United States in October 2025, and the white paper says it keeps its long equipment partnership with Russia while working to produce parts domestically⁹.

On Pakistan, the white paper describes a complex environment, caught between India and Afghanistan and also bordering China and Iran. Its equipment cooperation with China is deep under an "all-weather strategic partnership," and it has also cooperated with the United States on counterterrorism. India and Pakistan differ on the status of Kashmir (India relies on the instrument of accession and the Simla Agreement, Pakistan on a 1948 UN resolution calling for a plebiscite). After a terrorist incident in April 2025, the two exchanged attacks in May, and then agreed to halt military action. Both are believed to hold nuclear warheads, and the white paper gives about 180 for India and about 170 for Pakistan as estimates¹⁰.

Key points so far

What the white paper repeats across these three regions is that they sit on key sea lanes, that major powers are widening their involvement, and that countries are modernizing.

Europe and Canada, the Middle East and Africa

Europe and Canada (Section 9)

The white paper says that after the Cold War many European countries and Canada assumed that the threat of large-scale invasion by a state had disappeared, and that Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has forced them to rethink strategy.

On NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which members promise to defend one another), the white paper records that its June 2022 summit adopted a new Strategic Concept for the first time in 12 years. It describes Russia as "the most significant and direct threat" to allies' security and, for the first time, mentions China, saying that China's ambitions and coercive policies challenge NATO's interests, security and values. NATO says it will work with its four Indo-Pacific partners (IP4), which include Japan, on areas such as support for Ukraine, cyber defense and countering disinformation. At the June 2025 summit, members agreed to raise defense and related spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 (3.5 percent for core defense spending and up to 1.5 percent for related spending)¹¹. The EU, for its part, announced a Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 in October 2025 that puts a European drone defense initiative and eastern flank monitoring first. The debate over production bases that can scale up in a crisis is also moving in Japan, and I summarized it in an article on the Ministry of Defense's capital-investment subsidies and legal-reform study, including a Japan-China comparison of defense spending.

Here are the main countries in a table¹²¹³.

Country	Main points in the white paper
United Kingdom	The Strategic Defence Review of June 2025 puts strengthening European defense first. In 2025 a carrier strike group deployed to the Indo-Pacific for about eight months
France	The National Strategic Review of July 2025 sees a high risk of high-intensity conflict in Europe by 2030. About 7,000 personnel are stationed in the Indo-Pacific
Germany	Under its "turning point" (Zeitenwende), decided to raise defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP by fiscal 2029. Stations a brigade in Lithuania
Canada	Makes securing sovereignty in the Arctic and North America the basis of defense policy. Expected to reach 2 percent of GDP in defense spending during fiscal 2025. The prime minister visited China in January 2026 and announced a "new strategic partnership"

The Middle East (Section 10)

The white paper explains that the Middle East is a geopolitical crossroads linking Asia and Europe and a main source of the world's energy, and that Japan depends on the region for about 90 percent of its crude oil imports. Several developments overlap, so here is a timeline¹⁴¹⁵¹⁶.

Period	What the white paper records
October 2023	Fighting begins between Palestinian armed groups in Gaza and Israel. The white paper notes that many civilians were killed or injured in Gaza
December 2024	The Assad government in Syria falls and a transitional government is set up
June 2025	Israel attacks Iranian nuclear-related facilities and other targets. The United States also strikes nuclear-related facilities, and a ceasefire is announced on the 23rd
January to October 2025	A ceasefire in Gaza takes effect in January, and Israeli forces resume attacks in March. On October 9 a first-phase agreement is reached under a US comprehensive plan
February 28, 2026	An exchange of attacks between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other begins. On April 8 the United States and Iran agree to a ceasefire, and on June 15 agreement is announced on a memorandum on ending the fighting, signed with Pakistan's prime minister as mediator

The white paper says the 2026 exchange of attacks also reached the Gulf states, with many casualties. On the safe passage of the Strait of Hormuz, the United Kingdom and France have taken the lead, and countries including Japan issued a joint leaders' statement on March 19, 2026. Energy shipping routes bear directly on daily life in Japan.

Africa

The white paper says Africa has 54 countries and about 1.5 billion people, with rich mineral resources, and that it matters for Japan's economic security and the securing of its value chains. It also faces conflict, terrorism, political turmoil and piracy. In Sudan, fighting between the army and a paramilitary force has continued since April 2023, and in West Africa military seizures of power have followed one another since 2020, with serious deterioration in security¹⁷.

On outside powers, the white paper records that China has strengthened its military involvement and began operating its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017, that Russia has increased its involvement through arms exports and an "Africa Corps," and that France has been pulling out of West Africa, leaving Djibouti as its only permanent base on the continent¹⁷.

Key points so far

In Europe, higher defense spending and a stronger production base are shared tasks. The Middle East and Africa are written as regions tied to the daily life and economy of Japan through energy, mineral resources and sea transport.

International terrorism, the seas and weapons of mass destruction (Section 11)

International terrorism

The white paper says that in countries with weak governance, such as in the Middle East and Africa, ungoverned spaces tend to become breeding grounds for international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). Such organizations spread violent extremist ideas over the internet, and as a result, in Europe and the United States, individuals and small groups with no formal ties to an organization but influenced by it carry out attacks. The white paper adds that terrorism driven by far-right ideology and targeting particular religions and races also occurs in the West.

By region, it points out that the Sahel in Africa accounted for about 50 percent of the world's terrorism deaths in 2024 and that al-Shabaab continues to carry out attacks in Somalia. In the Middle East, a US-led coalition declared in 2019 that it had liberated 100 percent of ISIL-held territory in Iraq and Syria, but the organization is believed to remain active¹⁸.

Note that the white paper names specific organizations and incidents. It does not refer to the people of any religion or ethnic group as a whole, and readers should keep that in mind.

The seas

Japan is surrounded by sea and relies on maritime transport for its energy imports. The white paper treats the security of sea lanes as a matter of vital importance to the nation's survival. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea sets out freedom of navigation on the high seas, but the white paper says there are many cases in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and elsewhere in which China acts on claims it describes as incompatible with the existing international order, and it also says North Korea's repeated ballistic missile launches are a problem for the safety of aircraft and ships. At the same time, efforts to avoid accidents are advancing, and navies taking part in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium have agreed on the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)¹⁹.

There are three other maritime issues¹⁹²⁰.

Issue	What the white paper records
Attacks on shipping in the Middle East	Since November 2023 there have been attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including the seizure of a Japan-related vessel. No attacks have been confirmed since the Gaza ceasefire of October 2025
Piracy	Incidents peaked at 445 in 2010 and fell to 137 in 2025. Southeast Asia had 95, of which 80 were in the Singapore Strait. Many are minor, but the region accounts for about 60 percent of the world total
The Arctic Ocean	Shrinking sea ice has lengthened the period and widened the area in which ships can sail. Russia, the United States, Denmark, Canada and others have announced steps to strengthen defense and surveillance

Undersea cables are also an issue. The white paper says cable damage has repeatedly occurred in the Baltic Sea and around Taiwan, and that if deliberate it could become a part of hybrid warfare (a mix of military and non-military means). NATO announced a surveillance operation in the Baltic in January 2025, and the EU announced an action plan on cable security the next month²⁰. Japan too is bringing unmanned vessels into the monitoring and patrol of its seas, and there is an article that traces, from procurement records, how the Japan Coast Guard's unmanned vessel came about.

Transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The white paper treats the transfer and spread of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and the ballistic missiles that deliver them as a major post-Cold War problem.

On nuclear weapons, the white paper says 191 countries and regions were party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as of January 2026, while India, Israel and Pakistan still refuse to join as non-nuclear-weapon states. It records that New START, which governed US and Russian nuclear forces, has expired. The Japanese government considers arms control and disarmament efforts involving the United States, Russia and China to be important, according to the white paper²¹.

On biological and chemical weapons, the white paper says they are relatively cheap and easy to make and that much of the material and technology needed is dual-use, so development or acquisition by non-state actors such as terrorists is a concern. It also notes the view that emerging technologies such as AI could raise development capability further. The white paper describes concerns about compliance with treaty obligations on the part of various countries, citing US reports and other sources, but I do not name individual countries here.

For those in export control, the most important part is the description of how proliferation happens. The white paper says the spread of WMD-related technology has been pointed out many times, as with the 2004 transfer of uranium enrichment technology, and that in recent years there are cases of evading international monitoring through forged documents and varied shipping routes. It adds that "intangible technology transfer" is a concern, in which advanced technology applicable to development and manufacturing is obtained through researchers and students sent to major companies and academic institutions in advanced countries²¹. For real cases of technology leakage, see our article that sorts cyberattacks and technology leakage from an export control perspective.

Key points so far

Terrorism, the seas and WMD are all written as problems that cross borders, not as the issue of any single country. The parts closest to daily life in Japan are sea transport, undersea cables, and the control of technology that serves both civilian and military uses.

The new ways of war drawn from Ukraine

We now move to Chapter 4, "Trends in New Ways of War."

The five features the white paper identifies

The white paper sums up the new ways of war seen in the invasion of Ukraine in five points²².

Feature	Summary of the white paper
Space and cyber are hit first	Attacks in the space and cyber domains came before air, sea or amphibious invasion
Cheap, mass-produced drones plus data and AI	Situational awareness on the battlefield has improved, and it has become important to link assets by network and use AI for quick, accurate decisions
Combined attacks and new response costs	Attacks combining missiles and drones impose new response costs on the other side. Effective countermeasures, including electronic warfare, are needed
Quickly reflecting lessons	It has become important to bring changes on the battlefield into equipment and tactics in short cycles
Mobilizing national power	War is being waged by making maximum use of diplomacy, information, military, economic and technological strength (DIMET)

The white paper also says that traditional ways of fighting, such as tanks, artillery and trench warfare, are mixed in, and that conventional equipment remains important.

Cheap drones in large numbers

According to the white paper, Russia has sent in many long-range one-way attack drones alongside missile strikes, saturating Ukraine's air defenses and raising the chance that missiles get through. From around October 2024 it has also increased the number of decoy drones that are hard to tell from attack drones. Ukraine is believed to be striking rear bases with its own long-range drones.

Uses have expanded quickly. Mass drone surveillance lets each side see the positions of enemy vehicles and infantry, and the white paper says the battlefield has become "transparent." FPV drones are used to hit targets ranging from armored vehicles to individual soldiers. In an operation called "Spider's Web" in June 2025, 117 drones were reportedly disguised as cargo, carried into Russia and operated by remote control against several bases. The white paper cites this operation as an example of using cheap means to damage an opponent's expensive equipment. At sea, unmanned surface vessels combined with drones and missiles are used to keep Russian ships away from the coast²³.

When the attacker changes, so does the defender. Ukraine's air force announced that in November 2025 alone it intercepted about 9,600 drones and about 120 missiles. Relying only on expensive interceptor missiles would not last, so Ukraine builds a layered defense of surface-to-air missiles, guns, interceptor drones and electronic warfare systems. It is like not being able to keep using costly needles to pop cheap balloons, so cheaper means are mixed in to handle the numbers²⁴.

Data, AI, satellites and production

Ukraine's forces use a situational awareness system called "Delta" to connect frontline units, drones and satellites over a network and share data processed by AI. A commercial US satellite constellation, "Starlink," was used to keep communications running even when communications infrastructure was attacked, and the white paper says this appears to be one reason Ukraine can keep fighting despite weaker forces²⁴.

On sustaining operations, both sides consume equipment and ammunition at a rapid pace, and stable procurement is a problem for both. On drone output, the white paper presents each side's statements. Russia's President Putin said more than 1.5 million drones were supplied in 2024, and Ukraine announced it produced at least 2.3 million in 2024. It also says Ukraine has introduced a review system in which soldiers rate equipment and a way for frontline units to procure directly, so equipment and tactics are updated in very short cycles²⁴.

What individual countries are doing

Section 2 of the white paper sets out how countries are taking up these lessons. The table gives the main points²⁵²⁶²⁷.

Country	Main efforts in the white paper
United States	An executive order on drones in June 2025. A January 2026 memorandum aiming for an "AI-first" force. Plans to rebuild the defense industrial base
China	Is described as recognizing that warfare is shifting from "informatized" to "intelligentized" warfare. The 15th Five-Year Plan of March 2026 calls for building unmanned and intelligentized operational forces
South Korea, India	South Korea is moving toward a "manned-unmanned combined combat system." India announced "adaptive defence" and set a policy of establishing domestic suppliers of ammunition
United Kingdom	A Defence Drone Strategy in 2024 calls for mass use of cheap drones and rapid improvement. Plans to introduce an AI-based "Digital Targeting Web" in 2027
France	The 2024 to 2030 military programming law puts 5 billion euros over seven years into drones. Updated in April 2026. Includes media education against disinformation
Germany	Plans to invest 10 billion euros in drones. Launched the European Sky Shield Initiative, now with 21 countries. Publishes guidance for citizens on spotting disinformation
Israel	Uses drones and AI. It is pointed out that about half of its counter-drone systems were developed by startups. Is accelerating production of the Arrow air defense system

What the countries share is four things. They are buying more drones, bringing in AI, countering disinformation, and strengthening stockpiles and production bases. In my view, the notable point is that many countries give the speed of production and procurement as much weight in policy as the technology itself.

A column by a researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies explains a shift from "network-centric warfare" to "decision-centric warfare" (it is the researcher's own analysis and not the government's official view). If everything is tied into one thick network, the whole thing stops when it is jammed. So the idea has emerged of building many fine-meshed paths from low-cost sensors and expendable unmanned systems, and combining human command with AI advice²⁸.

Key points so far

The core of the new ways of war lies less in the drone itself than in a system that uses cheap means in large numbers, speeds up decisions with data and AI, and swaps equipment and tactics in short cycles.

The unseen battlefields of space, cyber, electromagnetic and cognitive

Section 3 of Chapter 4 covers the domains and advanced technologies behind the new ways of war. Here I group the four domains that work outside the visible fighting as "unseen battlefields." That label is my own.

Domain	What happens	Everyday comparison
Space	Observation, communications, positioning and missile warning by satellite, and means to interfere with them	Utility poles and maps in the sky
Cyber	Intrusion into networks, theft or alteration of data, disruption of function	The back door of a building
Electromagnetic	Jamming or protecting communications and radar that use radio waves	Drowning out the other side's microphone
Cognitive	Influencing people's judgment and public opinion through disinformation and the like	Rumors and word of mouth

Space

Space has no borders, and satellites can observe, communicate and provide positioning for any region of the earth. Major powers are building up intelligence satellites, early-warning satellites that detect missile launches, positioning satellites and communications satellites. Means of interfering with satellites are also being developed, the white paper says, including anti-satellite missiles (China carried out a destruction test on its own satellite in 2007 and Russia in 2021, creating a lot of debris), jammers that disrupt communications, and high-power lasers. Countries are working on space domain awareness (SDA) to monitor conditions in orbit. The United States announced a "Golden Dome" plan in 2025 to make a missile defense system including space-based interceptors operational within three years. The white paper also reports a view that China holds more than 1,000 satellites and plans to launch several thousand by 2030²⁹.

Cyber

Cyberattacks include unauthorized access, information leaks or disruption through malware, data tampering, and DDoS attacks that send huge volumes of data at once to stop a service. When critical infrastructure such as power or healthcare is targeted, systems can fail. The white paper says cyberspace is also the foundation for command and control and for operating drones, and that attacks are likely in peacetime and ahead of conventional invasion. Because it is hard to identify the source and the means are cheap, many countries are seen to be building capability in this "asymmetric" tool³⁰.

Companies and universities are targeted as well as governments and militaries. The white paper explains advanced persistent threats (APT) as organized campaigns that relentlessly attack specific organizations, and tabulates cases of APT groups associated with several countries, drawing on government announcements. On North Korea, it cites an October 2025 report by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team saying at least 2.8 billion dollars in crypto assets were stolen from January 2024 to September 2025. These are the findings of governments and research bodies, and the parties named take different positions³⁰.

As a countermeasure, the United States requires federal agencies to adopt "zero trust" (a way of thinking that trusts nothing, even inside the network, and verifies at every access). At the Japan-US "2+2" meeting of 2019, the two sides confirmed that a cyberattack can in some cases amount to an armed attack under the Japan-US Security Treaty. For the corporate side of Japan's "active cyber defense," see our explainer on active cyber defense.

Electromagnetic

Radio waves are used in everyday life, in TV, mobile phones and GPS, and in the military for communications, radar and missile guidance. The white paper says that securing superiority in the electromagnetic domain is indispensable to modern operations. Activities fall into electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum management, and electronic warfare is further divided into three types³¹.

Category	Content	Everyday comparison
Electronic attack	Disrupting the other side's communications and radar with strong or false radio waves (jamming, deception and so on)	Drowning out the other side's microphone
Electronic protection	Reducing the effect of jamming by changing frequency or raising power	Switching channels when there is interference
Electronic warfare support	Gathering information on what radio waves the other side uses and how	Learning the other side's habits in peacetime
Spectrum management	Coordinating frequencies, directions and times so friendly forces do not interfere with each other	Booking meeting rooms

In Ukraine, electronic warfare has become active, and in response drones connected by optical fiber and aircraft partly flown by AI have appeared, so the white paper says technological innovation has become a chain reaction²⁴.

Cognitive

The white paper says information warfare is taking place even before a conflict begins, seeking to influence other countries' public opinion and decisions by working on how people perceive things through disinformation and strategic messaging. Social media and influencers are used as channels. With advances in AI, deepfake videos, images and documents have become extremely realistic and can be made quickly with cheap, easy tools, so the threat is more serious. The white paper also says Russia and China are believed to conduct information warfare at home and abroad to create an information environment favorable to themselves. These are claims the white paper cites, and the parties named may take other positions³².

On countermeasures, the EU works under the concept of "foreign information manipulation and interference" (FIMI), and Germany has published guidance for citizens on how to spot disinformation, such as using fact-checking and checking who the source is. The white paper also says there are many cases of information spread to drive a wedge between Japan and Western countries or to erode trust in the Japanese government, including the SDF. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are speeding up their response as one team, with the Defense Intelligence Headquarters at the center and the policy and operations divisions alongside³².

In my view, this domain is continuous with corporate communications and crisis response. The possibility that a fake video or document influences the judgment of business partners or employees is not limited to information warfare between states. It can happen to anyone.

Key points so far

All four domains work outside the visible fighting, and connect directly to the everyday social foundations of communications, positioning, data and human judgment.

Advanced technology and the defense production and technology base

Advanced technology

The white paper takes up five advanced technologies. Many of them blur the line between civilian and military use (dual-use), which puts them close to the work of export control staff³³³⁴³⁵.

Technology	Summary of the white paper
Hypersonic weapons	Fly at Mach 5 or faster. They fly lower trajectories than ordinary ballistic missiles and can maneuver, so detection and interception are said to be harder. The United States, China, Russia and North Korea are developing them. The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) is being developed jointly by Japan and the United States
High-power energy weapons	Lasers, high-power microwaves and railguns. Developed as low-cost ways to intercept small drones and other targets. The UK's "DragonFire" is said to cost about 10 pounds a shot
AI	Generative AI, autonomous AI agents and physical AI acting in the real world are advancing. Uses include supporting command and decision-making, mounting on drones, and use in the cyber domain
Quantum technology	Quantum cryptographic communications, quantum sensing (for example navigation that could substitute for GPS) and quantum computers. Moves to post-quantum cryptography are under study in many countries, in case computers break current encryption
Additive manufacturing (3D printing)	Low-cost manufacturing and parts supply that does not rely on inventory. The US Army is working on units making metal parts in the field

On rule-making for military AI, the white paper notes that lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) have been discussed since 2014 under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and that Japan supports declarations on responsible use such as the 2026 REAIM "Pathways for Action"³⁴³⁵. On AI chips and models, our article on export control in the age of generative AI covers the trend.

The defense production and technology base (Section 4)

The white paper says technological progress in the civilian sector is remarkable and that superiority in industry and technology strongly affects security. Countries are advancing research and development, industrial policy and export support together³⁶.

Aspect	Main efforts in the white paper
Investment in R&D	Of about 31 trillion yen in US federal research funding, about half comes from the Department of War. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) bridges private advanced companies and the department and has produced contracts with 450 companies
Drawing in civilian firms and startups	The UK created a defense innovation body in July 2025 and plans to invest at least about 400 million pounds a year. NATO selected 150 companies from 24 countries
AI, quantum and semiconductors	The United States released an "AI acceleration strategy" in January 2026, and China issued opinions on its "AI Plus" initiative in August 2025. The EU put its Chips Act into effect
Industrial strategy	The US National Defense Industrial Strategy (January 2024) and Acquisition Transformation Strategy (November 2025), the UK Defence Industrial Strategy (September 2025), and the EU's European Defence Industry Strategy (March 2024) and white paper on European defence readiness (March 2025)
Exports	In April 2025 the EU revised its common position on arms exports for the first time in about six years and asked member states to strengthen end-user controls. By share of arms exports for 2021 to 2025, the order is the United States at 42 percent, France at 9.8 percent, Russia at 6.8 percent, Germany at 5.7 percent and China at 5.6 percent

A note of my own. The "Exports" row of the table matters for export control staff. Countries are promoting arms exports strategically, and at the same time they are being asked to strengthen end-user controls. A piece on a domestic AI defense system, read in terms of standards compliance and data sovereignty is also useful. Japan's own defense production and technology base is covered in Part 5.

Key points so far

The white paper says superiority in industry and technology itself now shapes security. Countries are advancing R&D, drawing in private companies, industrial strategy and export support at the same time.

Summary of Part 3, and a bridge to Part 4

In Part 3 we read the second half of Part I. Regionally, the threads were AUKUS and the Pacific islands in Oceania, the South China Sea in Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan in South Asia, rising defense spending in Europe, and energy, resources and sea transport in the Middle East and Africa. Among the new ways of war, the shared keywords were drones, data and AI, short update cycles and sustainability of operations, and the four domains of space, cyber, electromagnetic and cognitive work on the everyday social foundations and on human judgment even in peacetime.

In Part 4 we read the three approaches for achieving defense objectives in Part III. We will go through Japan's own defense posture, the Japan-US alliance, cooperation with like-minded countries, and coexistence with local communities and the environment, following the white paper.

This series is written to be useful for those who handle export control, economic security and supply chains. TIMEWELL's TRAFEED is a product that supports export control and economic security work. If you are interested, please see the TRAFEED overview and the contact page.

A final word from me. This part has many names of countries and technologies, and you do not need to remember them all. Reading again with two questions in mind, which regions connect to Japan's sea lanes and resources, and which domains are closest to everyday social infrastructure, should show you where it touches your own work.

This is one of five parts reading Japan's 2026 Defense White Paper. The other parts are listed below.

• Part 1: the feature, the three documents and the budget
• Part 2: the security environment around Japan (first half)
• Part 4: Japan's own defense, the alliance and like-minded partners
• Part 5: the defense industrial base and the people behind it

References

Footnotes

1. Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2026 (Reiwa 8 edition, white paper). The original text gives https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2026/pdf/ as the location of the PDF. The PDF page position is 10 higher than the printed page. ↩

2. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6, item 1 "Australia," general overview, defense policy and AUKUS (printed pages 155 to 156). ↩ ↩²

3. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6, item 1, external relations (relations with the United States and China) (printed pages 156 to 157). ↩

4. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6, item 3 "Pacific Island Countries" (printed pages 159 to 160). ↩

5. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6, item 2 "New Zealand" (printed page 159). ↩

6. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 7, item 1 "Overview" and item 2 "Security and Defense Policies of Individual Countries" (printed pages 161 to 167). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

7. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6, item 1, external relations (relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific island countries) (printed pages 157 to 158). ↩

8. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 7, item 3 "Cooperation within and outside the Region" (printed page 167). ↩

9. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 8, item 1 "India" (printed pages 168 to 170). ↩

10. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 8, item 2 "Pakistan" and item 3 "Conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir" (printed pages 170 to 172). Warhead estimates are on printed pages 169 and 171. ↩

11. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 9, items 1 and 2 "Strengthening Multilateral Security Frameworks" (NATO, EU, relations with China) (printed pages 173 to 175). ↩

12. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 9, item 3, the United Kingdom, France and Germany (printed pages 175 to 178). ↩

13. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 9, item 3, subitem 4 "Canada" (printed page 178). ↩

14. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10, item 1 "Middle East," overview and Israel (conflicts with Palestinian armed groups, Hezbollah and the Houthis) (printed pages 179 to 181). ↩

15. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10, item 1, subitem 2 (5) "Confrontation with Iran" and subitem 3 "Iran" (printed pages 181 to 182). The UK and French leaders' statement on the Strait of Hormuz is on printed pages 176 to 177. ↩

16. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10, item 1, subitems 4 "Syria," 5 "Yemen" and 6 "Afghanistan" (printed pages 182 to 183). ↩

17. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10, item 2 "Africa" (printed pages 183 to 187). ↩ ↩²

18. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 11, item 1 "International Terrorism" (printed pages 188 to 189). ↩

19. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 11, item 2 "Maritime Developments," subitems 1 "Developments on the 'Freedom of the High Seas' and Related Matters" and 2 "Maritime Security Efforts by Countries" (printed pages 189 to 190). ↩ ↩²

20. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 11, item 2, subitem 2 (2) "Piracy," subitem 3 "The Arctic Ocean and Arctic Region" and subitem 4 "Undersea Infrastructure" (printed pages 190 to 192). ↩ ↩²

21. Same source, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 11, item 3 "Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Figures I-3-11-1 and I-3-11-2 (printed pages 192 to 195). ↩ ↩²

22. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 1, item 1 "Overview" and item 2, subitem 7 "New Ways of Fighting Revealed by the Invasion of Ukraine" (printed pages 196 and 202). ↩

23. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 1, item 2, subitem 1 "Mass Use and Expanded Roles of Unmanned Assets" (printed pages 196 to 198). ↩

24. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 1, item 2, subitems 2 to 6 (air defense, networks, data and AI, space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, sustaining operations, support from allies and like-minded countries) (printed pages 198 to 201). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

25. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 2, item 1 "United States" (printed pages 203 to 204). ↩

26. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 2, items 2 "China," 3 "South Korea" and 4 "India" (printed pages 205 to 206). ↩

27. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 2, item 5 "Europe" (United Kingdom, France, Germany) and item 6 "Israel" (printed pages 206 to 208). ↩

28. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 2, column "Efforts on New Ways of Fighting in the US Military" (printed page 209). It carries a note that it is an analysis from the researcher's personal standpoint and not the government's official view. ↩

29. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 3, item 1 "Developments in the Space Domain" (printed pages 211 to 214). ↩

30. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 3, item 2 "Developments in the Cyber Domain" (printed pages 215 to 220). ↩ ↩²

31. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 3, item 3 "Developments in the Electromagnetic Domain" (printed pages 220 to 222). ↩

32. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 3, item 5 "Developments in the Cognitive Domain" (printed pages 226 to 227). ↩ ↩²

33. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 3, item 4, subitems 1 "Hypersonic Weapons" and 2 "High-Power Energy Weapons" (printed pages 222 to 224). ↩

34. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 3, item 4, subitem 3 "AI Technology" (printed pages 224 to 225). ↩ ↩²

35. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 3, item 4, subitems 4 "Quantum Technology" and 5 "Additive Manufacturing" (printed pages 225 to 226). ↩ ↩²

36. Same source, Part I, Chapter 4, Section 4 "Developments in the Defense Production and Technology Base" and Figure I-4-4 (printed pages 230 to 232). ↩