Reading Japan's 2026 Defense White Paper, Part 1 | The Feature, the Three Documents and the Budget

Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL. If you have opened the Japanese Ministry of Defense's annual white paper and found yourself facing 900 pages with no idea where to start, you are not alone.

This series walks through the Reiwa 8 (2026) edition in five parts, written for first-time readers. This is Part 1, the entry point to the whole series.

Here is what Part 1 answers, up front. First, the opening feature section of the white paper presents defense buildup as something connected to daily life and the economy. Second, Japan's security policy rests on "three documents," and they stack on top of each other in a specific order. Third, the FY2026 defense budget is 8,809.3 billion yen on an expenditure basis, and we can see what it pays for. Fourth, there is a clear legal basis for each situation in which the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) act.

A few ground rules for reading. The white paper is an official government document, so this article names the subject every time, as in "the white paper states" or "the government's position is." Where I add my own view, I label it "my view." On points where opinions differ, such as constitutional interpretation or the size of the defense budget, I explain what the white paper says and what the government's position is, and I do not evaluate whether it is right.

Sources appear in footnotes by printed page number. The PDF page position is 10 higher than the printed page, so printed page 1 is page 11 of the PDF. The Ministry of Defense publishes the PDF¹.

Terms to know first

There is a lot of specialized vocabulary, so here is a table first. The everyday comparisons are mine.

Term	Meaning	Everyday comparison
Three documents	The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program	A company's corporate strategy, business strategy and mid-term plan
Exclusively defense-oriented defense	Using defensive capability only after receiving an armed attack	Not throwing the first punch, and acting only to protect
Deterrence	Making an adversary think "it is better not to" and so refrain	Seeing a security camera and deciding not to break in
Expenditure basis	Money actually paid in that fiscal year	This year's total bank withdrawals
Contract basis	Total value of contracts signed in that fiscal year	The total of loans signed this year
Deferred obligations	Contracted amounts to be paid in later years	The remaining installments
Civilian control	The principle that elected politics takes priority over the military	The owner, not the driver, holds the steering wheel
Joint operations	Running the ground, maritime and air forces as one	One manager over three departments
Defense operations	An order for the SDF to act to defend Japan	The heaviest kind of fire department call-out

The opening feature, "Security That Connects to the Future"

The feature section is about 35 pages before the main text begins. It has many photos and diagrams and short passages, and it is designed as an entry point.

What the feature aims to do

The white paper opens by saying that Japan's security environment is severe, and that it is important to build a posture that makes anyone considering an invasion of Japan think "it is better not to." The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are therefore pursuing further strengthening and transformation of defense capability. The feature is built to convey that these efforts also have a positive effect on daily life and the economy².

The following pages list challenges such as a falling birth rate, rising prices, tense international affairs and the decline of rural areas. They say the government is investing across many fields to turn that into growth, and that investment in defense also leads to economic growth³. In short, the white paper begins by tying defense to life and the economy.

New ways of fighting, and the environment around Japan

The first heading is "new ways of fighting." The white paper points to the large numbers of inexpensive and varied drones used in the invasion of Ukraine, attacks that combine missiles with cheap decoy drones, and the spreading of false information to confuse an opponent. It concludes that in today's conflicts, the use of technology and information carries greater weight⁴. It also gives an example of how fast things change. As attacks that jam drones with radio interference spread, drones connected by optical fiber cable came into use. The invasion of Ukraine has lasted more than four years, and the white paper's view is that holding equipment and supplies in peacetime, and being able to increase production in an emergency, becomes more important for national defense⁵.

The next heading is the security environment around Japan. The white paper states that there are moves to change the status quo unilaterally by using military force in ways that violate the rules of the international community, for example to gain territory. For the Indo-Pacific, it describes, as its own assessment, that China and North Korea are increasing their military capabilities and that each is deepening ties with Russia⁶. I cover the regional descriptions in detail in Parts 2 and 3.

What Japan does to defend itself

The center of the feature is its explanation of why defense buildup is needed. The white paper says attention should go to the fact that a country with high military power, such as Russia, formed at some point the intention to invade another country. Because it is hard to know a state's thinking and behavior accurately from the outside, it is important to prepare the defense capability needed to respond based not only on an adversary's intentions but also on the capabilities it holds⁷.

The white paper then says strengthening defense capability is meant to prevent aggression in advance by being adequately prepared, and so to protect the peace and independence that daily life depends on. It adds that peace and independence are essential for economic growth, and that defense buildup also helps prepare the foundation for continued growth in a stable environment⁷. This is a description of the white paper's position, and I do not evaluate it here.

The table below lists the specific efforts the feature presents.

Feature heading	What the white paper says
Defense using drones (SHIELD)	Together with missiles that can be launched from beyond an adversary's reach, layer many drones across ground, maritime and air domains, so that SDF personnel suffer less harm while responding
Securing "decision superiority"	Process large volumes of data with AI and other tools so commanders can judge faster and more accurately than the adversary
Cooperation across the whole country	Companies that build SDF equipment could face cyberattacks, so all companies and organizations need better security
Cooperation with allies and like-minded countries	No country can keep peace alone, so cooperation is strengthened to protect an order based on the rule of law
Securing sustained response capability	Maintain and strengthen peacetime production capacity and be able to expand it as needed. Investment in dual-use technology also supports the competitiveness of Japanese firms
Securing technological superiority	Work with universities, national research institutes and startups, including a mechanism that lets startups contract quickly with the government

The feature also covers improved treatment and recruitment for SDF personnel, who include uniformed officers, civilian officials, technical officials and instructors⁸. In the white paper's explanation SHIELD stands for Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated and Enhanced Littoral Defense, and a diagram presents small aerial, surface and underwater unmanned systems numbered one to ten⁸.

One note of my view. For export control and economic security staff, the two most relevant items are "cooperation across the whole country" and "dual-use." A company that holds technology or parts usable for both defense and civilian purposes can become part of the defense supply chain through its customers. This theme returns in Parts 3 and 5.

Key points so far

The feature shows the new ways of fighting and the environment around Japan, and explains that strengthening defense capability is meant to prevent aggression, protect peace and independence, and underpin economic growth.

The basic approach to security and defense

Now we move to Part II of the white paper, which covers the policies and mechanisms of Japan's security and defense. Its first chapter explains the thinking behind Japan's defense.

Diplomacy comes first

The white paper says that to protect people's lives and livelihoods, the first priority is active diplomacy. It calls the Japan-US alliance the cornerstone and says cooperation with like-minded countries and multilateral cooperation are essential. At the same time, diplomacy needs defense capability behind it, so Japan pursues diplomacy toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific while fundamentally strengthening defense capability, including the possession of counterstrike capability⁹.

How the government views the Constitution and self-defense

This is a topic on which opinions differ. Here I only set out the government's view as the white paper states it, and I do not weigh in on whether it is right.

According to the white paper, Article 9 of the Constitution contains provisions on the renunciation of war, the non-maintenance of war potential and the denial of the right of belligerency. Since Japan is an independent country, the government holds that these provisions do not deny the inherent right of self-defense of a sovereign state, and that maintaining the minimum necessary level of force for self-defense is permitted under the Constitution. On that thinking, the white paper explains, Japan maintains the SDF as an organization of force under the Constitution, with exclusively defense-oriented defense as its basic policy¹⁰.

The main points of the government's view are as follows¹¹.

Point	The government's view as stated in the white paper
Defense capability that may be held	Only the minimum necessary for self-defense. The concrete limit has a relative side that changes with the international situation and the level of military technology, and the Diet judges it through deliberation on each year's budget
Weapons that may not be held	So-called offensive weapons, used solely to devastate an adversary's territory, are not permitted. Examples given are intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers and offensive aircraft carriers
Geographic scope	The area in which force may be used for self-defense is not necessarily limited to Japan's territory, territorial waters and airspace. Dispatching armed units to other countries to use force, so-called overseas deployment, is generally not permitted
Right of belligerency	Not the right to fight, but a collective name for the various rights a belligerent has under international law. Using the minimum necessary force in exercising self-defense is allowed, but occupying an adversary's territory is not

The condition for using force as a self-defense measure is the "three requirements for the use of force," shown in a Cabinet decision on July 1, 2014. First, an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or an armed attack against another country in a close relationship with Japan has occurred and, as a result, there is a clear danger that Japan's survival is threatened and that people's right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned. Second, there is no other appropriate means to repel it and ensure Japan's survival and protect its people. Third, the use of force is limited to the minimum necessary. Force may be used when all three are met¹¹.

Five basic policies

The white paper states that, under the Constitution, Japan has followed these lines. It holds to exclusively defense-oriented defense, does not become a military power that threatens other countries, maintains the Japan-US security arrangements, ensures civilian control and upholds the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as policy¹².

Exclusively defense-oriented defense is described as a passive defense posture in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution. Defense capability is used only after an armed attack, only to the minimum extent necessary and only at the minimum level necessary. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons¹².

On civilian control, the white paper points to the following. The Diet decides the number of SDF personnel and the main organizations through laws and budgets, and approves defense operations. The Prime Minister and the ministers of state must be civilians under the Constitution, and the Prime Minister holds supreme command and supervision of the SDF. It adds that even with a system in place, making it work takes deep public interest in defense¹³.

Key points so far

The white paper puts diplomacy first, says defense capability must back it, and states the government's position that, under the Constitution, Japan adheres to exclusively defense-oriented defense and maintains the minimum necessary force for self-defense. Use of force is limited to cases that meet the three requirements.

What the three documents are

The three documents are the center of Part 1. Japan's security policy is not a single paper but three that connect from top to bottom. In company terms, it runs corporate strategy, business strategy, mid-term plan and annual budget. That comparison is mine.

The role of each document

According to the white paper, the three documents are as follows, and all were decided by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022¹⁴.

Document	Role	Period
National Security Strategy	The highest-level security policy document. It gives strategic direction to policy across a wide range of fields, including economic security, technology and intelligence as well as diplomacy and defense	About ten years in view
National Defense Strategy	Sets defense objectives and the approaches and means to achieve them	About ten years in view
Defense Buildup Program	Sets the level of defense capability, the SDF posture about ten years out, the five-year total cost and the quantities of major equipment	Five years, FY2023 to FY2027

The National Security Strategy was first adopted in 2013, replacing the "Basic Policy on National Defense." A new strategy was adopted in 2022, and in the same year the National Defense Strategy was adopted for the first time. It replaces the "National Defense Program Guidelines," which had been issued six times since 1976. The Defense Buildup Program replaces the earlier Mid-Term Defense Program and combines the level of defense capability with the five-year total cost in one program¹⁴.

The relationship runs like this. The National Defense Strategy is built on the guidance of the National Security Strategy, the Defense Buildup Program makes its objectives concrete, and annual budgets are drawn up based on the projects that program defines¹⁵.

What the strategy and the program contain

The National Defense Strategy has three defense objectives. One is to create a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force. Another is to deter and respond to such changes or attempts together with allies and like-minded countries, and to settle a situation early. The last is that if an invasion of Japan does occur, Japan takes primary responsibility for responding and, with support from allies, blocks and eliminates it.

The three approaches to reach these are strengthening Japan's own defense posture, joint deterrence and response under the Japan-US alliance, and cooperation with like-minded countries. Part 4 reads each of them in turn. The seven functions and capabilities to emphasize in the fundamental strengthening of defense are stand-off defense capability, integrated air and missile defense capability, unmanned defense capability, cross-domain operations capability, command and control and intelligence functions, mobile deployment capability and civil protection, and sustainability and resilience¹⁶¹⁷.

The white paper defines "counterstrike capability" as follows. It is the capability to deliver an effective counterstrike in an adversary's territory, as the minimum necessary self-defense measure to stop an attack, based on the three requirements, when an armed attack against Japan has occurred and ballistic missiles or similar are used. It states that this is within the Constitution and international law, does not change the principle of exclusively defense-oriented defense, is exercised only when the three requirements are met, and that a preemptive strike before an armed attack has occurred is not permitted¹⁸. I do not evaluate it here.

Timelines are also stated. By FY2027, five years after adoption, Japan is to strengthen its defense so that it can respond with primary responsibility and, with allied support, block and eliminate an invasion. The top priority in that period is to speed up investment in raising equipment availability, securing ammunition and fuel and making key defense facilities resilient, so that existing equipment is used to the fullest. Around ten years after adoption, defense is to be strengthened further so that an invasion can be blocked earlier and farther out¹⁹.

The Defense Buildup Program is where "what, at what cost, by when" is written. The amount for the defense buildup level over the five years from FY2023 to FY2027 is about 43 trillion yen, the defense-related expenses accompanying budget compilation are about 40.5 trillion yen (about 8.9 trillion yen in FY2027), and the contract amount (object expenses) for newly required projects is about 43.5 trillion yen²⁰. On SDF posture, the white paper records that the standing Joint Operations Command and the SDF Maritime Transport Group were established in March 2025, the Information Operations Group and the Surface Fleet in March 2026, and that the Air Self-Defense Force is to become the Air and Space Self-Defense Force during FY2026²¹.

The revision of the three documents

Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4 covers the revision of the three documents. It describes the government's moves as of the white paper's publication.

The white paper says that the security environment has changed at an accelerating pace in many fields since 2022, and gives three reasons. First, challenges to a free and open international order based on the rule of law are gaining momentum. Second, in the Indo-Pacific, it sees further military buildup by China and North Korea and closer China-Russia and Russia-North Korea ties. Third, countries are hurrying to prepare for new ways of fighting, including mass use of unmanned assets, and for prolonged conflict, drawing lessons from the invasion of Ukraine²².

On that basis the white paper says that the "2 percent of GDP level" set in the current National Security Strategy was brought forward and provided for within FY2025, counting the initial budget and the supplementary budget together. The FY2025 total is about 11.0 trillion yen, about 2.0 percent compared with the GDP at the time of the strategy's adoption (FY2022). The government is also examining the revision of the three documents with a view to doing it within 2026²². On structure, the Ministry of Defense set up the Defense Transformation Promotion Headquarters under the Minister of Defense in October 2025. In April 2026 an expert panel, the "Council of Experts on Considering Security from the Perspective of Comprehensive National Power," was established in the Cabinet Secretariat, and its first meeting was held with the Prime Minister attending²².

The white paper adds that security needs to be considered from the viewpoint of comprehensive national power, combining diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, intelligence and human resource strength. That includes coast guard capability, research and development, public infrastructure, cybersecurity and international cooperation, organizing efforts across the government. The economic security side is covered in our article reading the expert panel's discussion of economic security from primary sources. For the legal basics of Japan's economic security framework, see our primer on the Economic Security Promotion Act. This series does not cover developments after the white paper's publication.

Key points so far

The three documents move from policy to numbers in the order National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Defense Buildup Program. The white paper says the environment has changed faster since 2022, and that the government is examining a revision within 2026.

How big is the defense budget, and what does it pay for

The last of the three documents connects to the annual budget. This section unpacks the figures of Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4, for first-time readers. The numbers follow the white paper exactly.

The FY2026 defense budget

According to the white paper, the FY2026 defense budget for costs covered by the Defense Buildup Program is 8,809.3 billion yen on an expenditure basis, up 334.5 billion yen (3.9 percent) from the previous year. On a contract basis it is 8,260.7 billion yen, down 172.5 billion yen (2.0 percent). The white paper says that, amid rising prices and a weak yen, it will push efficiency and rationalization and increase efficient acquisition through bulk purchases and long-term contracts²³.

The white paper's table compares FY2025 and FY2026. The unit is 100 million yen.

Category	FY2025	FY2026	Change from previous year
Expenditure	84,748	88,093	3,345 (3.9 percent)
of which personnel and provisions	23,508	23,897	389 (1.7 percent)
of which materiel	61,240	64,196	2,956 (4.8 percent)
Deferred obligations	153,886	168,274	14,388 (9.3 percent)

These figures exclude SACO-related costs and the local burden reduction portion of the costs for the realignment of US forces. Including them, total expenditure is 8,700.5 billion yen for FY2025 and 9,035.3 billion yen for FY2026²³. The white paper's trend chart shows a period of ten consecutive years of decline in the initial budget, followed by fourteen consecutive years of increase²⁴.

Expenditure basis and contract basis

People often confuse these two. Defense buildup often involves items that take years from contract to delivery, such as ships and aircraft. The year a contract is signed and the year payment is made therefore differ. At signing, the government commits to payments in later years, in principle within five years. That commitment is a "deferred obligation."

It resembles buying an appliance on a loan. The total amount contracted this year is the contract basis, and the amount actually withdrawn this year is the expenditure basis. Withdrawals include payments on things contracted in earlier years, not only this year's. The white paper calls "payments this year on past contracts" expenditure from past contracts²⁵. The comparison is mine.

According to the white paper's diagram, the FY2026 expenditure of 8,809.3 billion yen consists of 2,389.7 billion yen for personnel and provisions, 4,539.8 billion yen for payments on past contracts and 1,879.8 billion yen for general materiel contracted and paid in the same year. The contract-basis 8,260.7 billion yen is that general materiel plus 6,380.8 billion yen of new deferred obligations²⁵.

What it pays for

The white paper classifies spending by purpose. This is the FY2026 breakdown²⁶.

Purpose	Contents	Amount	Share
Personnel and provisions	Pay and severance for personnel, meals in barracks	2,389.7 billion yen	27.1 percent
Maintenance and similar	Training, fuel for ships and aircraft, equipment repair	2,826.7 billion yen	32.1 percent
Equipment acquisition	New equipment such as tanks, destroyers and fighters	1,708.1 billion yen	19.4 percent
Research and development	Investment in advanced technology	775.8 billion yen	8.8 percent
Facilities	Construction of hangars, barracks and similar	267.0 billion yen	3.0 percent
Base-related costs	Support for local governments	536.1 billion yen	6.1 percent
Other		305.9 billion yen	3.5 percent

The white paper says that equipment acquisition and research and development together exceed 20 percent, continuing the past three years. It also explains that, on the expenditure budget, obligatory costs, namely personnel and provisions plus payments on past contracts, make up 80 percent of the total²⁵. My view is that when you hear in the news that "defense spending rose," it helps to separate whether the increase is new equipment purchases, payments on past contracts or personnel costs.

Cost reduction and funding

The white paper says the FY2026 budget aims to reduce costs by about 373.4 billion yen through measures such as lower equipment prices, review of projects with low cost effectiveness and bulk or long-term contracting²⁷.

On funding, the white paper states that the Defense Strengthening Fund was created by the Defense Funding Act of 2023, that about three quarters of the needed funds are to be met through spending reform, use of surplus funds from the settled accounts and non-tax revenue, and that the remaining quarter or so is to be covered by tax measures, securing a little over 1 trillion yen in FY2027²⁸. Specifically, it records a 4 percent surtax on corporate tax from April 2026, a staged review of tobacco tax, and a 1 percent Special Defense Income Tax on income tax from January 2027, together with a 1 percentage point cut in the Special Reconstruction Income Tax rate and an extension of its period to 2047²⁸.

Comparison with other countries

The white paper cautions that international comparison of defense spending is difficult. There is no internationally unified definition, published figures do not always make the breakdown clear, and budget systems differ. It then presents a table converted to US dollars using OECD purchasing power parity, together with the ratio to GDP²⁹. These are the FY2025 figures for major countries.

Country	Defense spending (100 million dollars)	Ratio to GDP
Japan	892	1.28 percent
United States	8,684	2.82 percent
China	5,245	1.27 percent
Russia	4,507	6.32 percent
South Korea	755	2.30 percent
Australia	421	2.01 percent
United Kingdom	893	1.97 percent
France	892	2.01 percent
Germany	1,225	1.93 percent

A note in the white paper says the amount China publishes as defense spending is thought to be only part of its actual military expenditure, and that according to US Department of Defense analysis the actual figure is considerably larger. It also notes that NATO figures can include items such as veterans' pensions²⁹. Read the table with the white paper's own caveat in mind, that conversion and definitions differ by country.

For the wider debate on international comparison and on production capacity that can scale up in an emergency, see our article on the defense ministry's capital investment subsidies and planned legal changes, including the Japan-China comparison. From the angle of the 2026 Basic Policy, there is our article reading the defense buildup in the 2026 Honebuto policy with the original text and figures. Both rely on sources other than the white paper.

Key points so far

The FY2026 defense budget is 8,809.3 billion yen on an expenditure basis and 8,260.7 billion yen on a contract basis. About 80 percent is obligatory cost, namely personnel and provisions and payments on past contracts. The white paper says funding combines spending reform and similar measures with tax measures.

The organizations that carry out security and defense

Policy and budget are not enough without organizations to carry them out. Part II, Chapter 3 explains them.

The National Security Council

The National Security Council is established in the Cabinet as the body that deliberates important matters of national security. According to the white paper, it serves as the control tower for diplomatic, defense and economic policy. It has met 369 times from its creation in December 2013 to the end of March 2026, and the 2022 three documents were decided after its deliberation. The National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat serves as its permanent secretariat³⁰.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are one organization

The white paper starts with the basics. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF refer to the same organization. "Ministry of Defense" captures the administrative side, which manages and runs the ground, maritime and air forces, while "SDF" captures the operational side, an organization of force that takes unit actions to defend Japan³¹.

As of March 31, 2026, the white paper gives 247,154 SDF uniformed personnel (the statutory number), 20,345 civilian officials and 882 clerks and similar staff (statutory numbers). Outside the statutory number, it lists 47,900 reserve personnel, 7,981 ready reserve personnel and 4,621 reserve candidates. On support for the Minister of Defense, the number of senior vice-ministers was raised from one to two in FY2026. The white paper explains that support from the policy viewpoint (the internal bureaus) and support from the military professional viewpoint (the Joint Staff and the service staff offices) are kept in balance, like the two wheels of a cart³².

Joint operations and the Joint Operations Command

SDF operations are based on "joint operations," in which ground, maritime and air forces act as one. The Joint Staff Office is the organization for joint operations and its head is the Chief of the Joint Staff. The Minister's command goes through the Chief of the Joint Staff, who executes the Minister's orders³³.

In March 2025 a standing "Joint Operations Command" was set up in Ichigaya, headed by the Commander of the Joint Operations Command. The white paper explains that until then, joint task forces drawing on two or more of the ground, maritime and air forces were formed temporarily when needed. Under that arrangement it was hard to build a flexible defense posture quickly as a situation evolved, or to prepare in peacetime for cross-domain operations. The new command lets command of joint operations be unified from peacetime, and allows closer coordination with US forces on operations³⁴. A simple picture is that a team once assembled ad hoc for each game now trains and is led as one team every day. That comparison is mine.

The white paper separates the roles clearly. The Joint Staff Office is a "staff organ" that assists the Minister on operations, while the Joint Operations Command is a "unit" that commands forces nationwide from peacetime, and the new command does not change the Joint Staff Office's role³⁵.

Key points so far

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are two faces of the same organization. The National Security Council deliberates policy, policy support and military professional support run side by side under the Minister of Defense, and the Joint Operations Command was newly established in March 2025.

When does the SDF act, and on what basis

Part II closes with Chapter 4, the most practical part. The SDF always acts on a legal basis.

How SDF missions are classified

Under Article 3 of the SDF Law, SDF missions divide into a "primary mission" and "secondary missions"³⁶.

Category	Contents	Examples
Primary mission	Defense operations to defend Japan, a mission only the SDF can perform	Defense operations
Secondary mission (paragraph 1)	Maintaining public order	Public security operations, maritime security operations, destruction measures against ballistic missiles, disaster relief, measures against airspace violations
Secondary mission (paragraph 2)	Carried out under other laws as long as the primary mission is not impeded	Response to situations of important influence, international peace cooperation

Together they are called "original missions." There are also "incidental duties," which use skills and experience the SDF has built, such as transporting visiting state guests or supporting sports events³⁶.

When Japan is attacked

The law for defending Japan is the Situation Response Act. The white paper explains that it provides for responding to an armed attack situation (an armed attack from outside has occurred, or a clear danger of one is imminent), an anticipated armed attack situation (not yet at that point, but tension has risen and an armed attack is anticipated) and a survival-threatening situation (an armed attack on another country in a close relationship with Japan has occurred, threatening Japan's survival and posing a clear danger of overturning people's rights)³⁷.

The procedure runs like this. The government drafts a basic response policy, consults the National Security Council and receives its report, adopts the policy in the Cabinet and seeks Diet approval. If the Diet does not approve, the response ends promptly. When it recognizes an armed attack situation or a survival-threatening situation, the policy also states why there is no other appropriate means and why the use of force is necessary. The Prime Minister, when necessary, can then order the SDF to conduct defense operations, which in principle requires prior Diet approval. The SDF ordered into defense operations may use force only when the three requirements introduced earlier are met³⁷. Evacuation and relief of residents are provided for separately in the Civil Protection Act³⁸.

Situations short of an armed attack

There are also frameworks for SDF action in situations that do not amount to an armed attack. The table lists the main ones the white paper presents³⁹.

Action	What the white paper says
Public security operations	The Prime Minister orders them when ordinary police power cannot maintain order (in principle submitted to the Diet within 20 days). They may also follow a request from a prefectural governor
Communications protection measures (in force October 1, 2026)	For highly organized and planned cyberattacks from outside Japan against certain important computers, where there is a special need for the SDF to respond, the Prime Minister orders measures to access and neutralize the computers used in the attack. The SDF handles it jointly with the police
Maritime security operations and anti-piracy operations	Ordered by the Minister of Defense with the Prime Minister's approval, to protect lives and property at sea, maintain order or deal with piracy
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles and similar	Where no armed attack is recognized, ordered by the Minister of Defense with the Prime Minister's approval. For sudden cases with no time to seek approval, emergency response procedures can be approved in advance in peacetime
Disaster relief	Dispatched on request from a prefectural governor or similar. Judged against three requirements, urgency, public nature and non-substitutability. In especially urgent cases, voluntary dispatch without a request is also possible
Measures against airspace violations	When a foreign aircraft enters territorial airspace, measures such as guidance, warnings and the use of weapons are taken to make it land or leave. This is an exercise of police power
Protection and transport of Japanese nationals overseas	At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and when certain requirements are met, guarding, rescue and transport
Protection of weapons and similar of US and other forces	Protects the weapons and similar of US and other forces actually engaged in activities that contribute to Japan's defense in cooperation with the SDF. It allows only an extremely passive and limited minimum use of weapons

The white paper explains that disaster relief covers not only natural disasters such as storms, heavy rain, earthquakes and tsunamis but also fires, marine accidents, aircraft crashes and train accidents. Emergency patient airlift from the sea or remote islands, where the Japan Coast Guard or local governments find it hard to respond, is also carried out in this framework³⁹.

Links to the international community

Secondary missions under paragraph 2 relate to the international community. A situation of important influence is one that, if left alone, could lead to a direct armed attack on Japan, or otherwise has an important influence on Japan's peace and security. In that case, under the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations of Important Influence, the SDF can conduct logistics support, search and rescue and ship inspection. In logistics support, weapons are not provided, but ammunition can be, and fueling and maintenance can be given to aircraft preparing to depart. Measures to avoid integration with another country's use of force are also set out, such as not operating where combat is actually taking place⁴⁰.

The white paper explains that a survival-threatening situation is, as a concept, included within a situation of important influence, so a situation of important influence can also meet the requirements of a survival-threatening situation as events progress⁴⁰.

There is also the International Peace Support Act, under which Japan can provide cooperation and support to foreign forces working for international peace and security, on the requirement of a UN resolution⁴¹. Participation in UN peacekeeping operations follows the "five principles for participation," namely a ceasefire agreement, consent of the host state and parties to the conflict, strict neutrality, withdrawal if the principles cease to be met, and use of weapons limited to the minimum necessary⁴². International disaster relief, which sends units for rescue and medical work after major disasters abroad, is another part of the framework⁴³.

Key points so far

Every SDF action has a legal basis, with rules on who orders it and whether the Diet or Prime Minister must approve. Defense operations to defend Japan are limited to cases that meet the three requirements and in principle require prior Diet approval.

Summary of Part 1, and a bridge to Part 2

Part 1 read the "entry" and the "foundation" of the white paper. The feature section shows the new ways of fighting and the environment around Japan, and connects defense buildup to daily life and the economy. Part II shows that Japan's defense rests on the basic policy of exclusively defense-oriented defense under the Constitution, is made concrete from policy to numbers through the three documents, and includes a FY2026 defense budget of 8,809.3 billion yen on an expenditure basis. When the SDF acts, the ordering authority and procedure are set by each law.

Part 2 reads the first half of Part I. It sets out how the white paper describes the global security environment, Russia's invasion and Ukraine, the United States, China, US-China relations and Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and Russia, again as the white paper's own descriptions.

I wrote this series to be useful to people in export control, economic security and supply chain roles as well. TIMEWELL's TRAFEED is a product that supports export control and economic security work. If you are interested, please see the TRAFEED overview and the contact page.

A closing word from me. A 900-page white paper buries you in figures and systems if you read it in one sitting. If you first keep the structure of the three documents and the budget in mind, the numbers in later chapters become easier to place.

This is one of five parts reading Japan's 2026 Defense White Paper. The other parts are listed below.

• Part 2: the security environment around Japan (first half)
• Part 3: the world's security picture and new ways of war
• Part 4: Japan's own defense, the alliance and like-minded partners
• Part 5: the defense industrial base and the people behind it

References

Footnotes

1. Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2026 (Reiwa 8 edition, white paper). The original text gives https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2026/pdf/ as the location of the PDF. The PDF page position is 10 higher than the printed page. ↩

2. Same source, opening feature section "Security That Connects to the Future," introduction (printed page 1). ↩

3. Same source, feature section "Turning Anxiety About the Future into Hope" (printed page 3). ↩

4. Same source, feature section "The Emergence of New Ways of Fighting" (printed pages 5 to 6). ↩

5. Same source, the continuation of that section (printed pages 7 to 8). ↩

6. Same source, feature section "The Severe Security Environment Around Japan" (printed pages 9 to 17). ↩

7. Same source, feature section "To Defend Japan" (printed pages 19 to 20). ↩ ↩²

8. Same source, feature section from "Defense Using Drones" to "Conclusion" (printed pages 21 to 36). The full name of SHIELD and the unmanned systems diagram are on printed page 22. ↩ ↩²

9. Same source, Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1 "Measures to Ensure Security" (printed page 237). ↩

10. Same source, Part II, Chapter 1, Section 2, item 1 "The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense" (printed page 237). ↩

11. Same source, Part II, Chapter 1, Section 2, item 2 "The Government's View on the Purport of Article 9" (printed page 238). ↩ ↩²

12. Same source, Part II, Chapter 1, Section 2, item 3 "Basic Policies" (printed pages 238 to 239). ↩ ↩²

13. Same source, Part II, Chapter 1, Section 2, item 3, subitem 4 "Ensuring Civilian Control" (printed page 239). ↩

14. Same source, Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3 "The System of Security Policy" (printed page 241). ↩ ↩²

15. Same source, Part II digest and Figure II-1-3-1 "Relationship among the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the Defense Buildup Program and Annual Budgets" (printed pages 236 and 241). ↩

16. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2 "Outline of the National Defense Strategy" (printed pages 244 to 246). ↩

17. Same source, Figure II-2-2-1, the seven functions and capabilities to emphasize (printed page 247). ↩

18. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2, item 1 (1) (a) (printed pages 245 to 246). ↩

19. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2, item 1 (1) (a) (printed page 245). ↩

20. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 3, item 4 "Required Costs" (printed page 252). ↩

21. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 3, item 2 "SDF Posture" (printed pages 251 to 252). The dates of establishment are in the notes on those pages. ↩

22. Same source, Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4 "On the Revision of the Three Documents" (printed pages 242 to 243). The figure of about 2.0 percent for FY2025 is in note 8 of Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4, item 5 (printed page 258). ↩ ↩² ↩³

23. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4, item 1 "Overview of the FY2026 Defense Budget" and Figure II-2-4-1 (printed page 253). ↩ ↩²

24. Same source, Figure II-2-4-2 "Trend of the Defense Budget (Initial Budget)" (printed page 254). ↩

25. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4, item 2 "Breakdown of the Defense Budget" and Figure II-2-4-4 "Structure of the Defense Budget" (printed pages 254 to 256). ↩ ↩² ↩³

26. Same source, Figure II-2-4-3 "Defense Budget by Purpose (FY2026)" (printed page 255). ↩

27. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4, item 3 "Optimization Efforts" (printed page 257). ↩

28. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4, item 4 "Securing Funds for Strengthening Defense" (printed page 257). ↩ ↩²

29. Same source, Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4, item 5 "Comparison with Other Countries" and Figure II-2-4-5 "Defense Spending of Major Countries (FY2025)" (printed page 258). ↩ ↩²

30. Same source, Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1 "National Security Council" (printed page 260). ↩

31. Same source, Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2, item 1 "Organizations That Support Defense Capability" (printed page 261). ↩

32. Same source, Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2, Figures II-3-2-2 and II-3-2-5, and "Structure to Support the Minister of Defense" (printed pages 262 and 265). ↩

33. Same source, Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2, item 2 "SDF Joint Operations Structure" (printed pages 265 to 266). ↩

34. Same source, Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2, item 3 "Joint Operations Command," subitem 1 "Significance" (printed page 266). ↩

35. Same source, Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2, item 3, subitem 2 "Relationship with the Joint Staff" (printed pages 266 to 267). ↩

36. Same source, Part II, Chapter 4, item 1 "SDF Missions" and Figure II-4-1 (printed page 268). ↩ ↩²

37. Same source, Part II, Chapter 4, item 2 "Defense of Japan," subitems 1 and 2, and Figure II-4-2 (printed pages 268 to 270). ↩ ↩²

38. Same source, Part II, Chapter 4, item 2, subitem 3 "Civil Protection" (printed pages 269 to 270). ↩

39. Same source, Part II, Chapter 4, item 3 "Maintaining Public Order and Responding to Infringements Short of Armed Attack," selected actions (printed pages 270 to 275). ↩ ↩²

40. Same source, Part II, Chapter 4, item 4 "Response to Situations of Important Influence" (printed pages 275 to 276). ↩ ↩²

41. Same source, Part II, Chapter 4, item 5, subitem 1 "Response to International Peace Joint Response Situations" (printed pages 276 to 277). ↩

42. Same source, Part II, Chapter 4, item 5, subitem 2 "International Peace Cooperation Assignments" (printed pages 277 to 278). ↩

43. Same source, Part II, Chapter 4, item 5, subitem 3 "International Disaster Relief" (printed page 278). ↩