Reading Japan's 2026 Defense White Paper, Part 5 | The Industrial Base and Its People

Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL Inc. This is the fifth and final part of our series reading the Reiwa 8 (2026) edition of Japan's Defense White Paper.

Here is the answer up front. Part IV of the White Paper asks how Japan can strengthen the industrial and technological base that produces defense equipment. Part V asks how Japan can protect and develop the people who operate that equipment. The White Paper says that today's security environment has brought into sharp relief the fact that the defense production and technology base is, in effect, defense capability itself.¹ The idea is simple. Capability needs both the capacity to build and the people to use what is built.

This part sits closest to readers who work in export controls, economic security or manufacturing. The Defense Production Base Strengthening Act, the Defense Equipment Transfer Principles, the Economic Security Promotion Act and the handling of sensitive technology all touch day-to-day practice. If you feel far from defense, you may still want to know how small companies and startups can take part, so this article sorts out the entry points the White Paper describes.

This article explains what the White Paper says, in the White Paper's own terms. Where I write "the White Paper says," that is the government's position, not my evaluation. When I give my own view, I label it "my view." On points where opinions differ, I do not take sides. I only convey the purpose and content that the White Paper describes.

For the series as a whole, Part 1 covered the special feature and Japan's security and defense policy, Part 2 the situation in the United States, China, the Korean Peninsula and Russia, Part 3 the other regions and new ways of warfare, and Part 4 the three approaches to achieving defense objectives. This Part 5 covers the industrial and technological base and the personnel base that support all of them.

Key terms first

This section has many technical terms, so here are the main ones. The everyday comparisons are mine.

Term	Meaning	Everyday comparison
Defense production and technology base	The industry and technology that research, develop, produce and maintain equipment	The farms, wholesalers and kitchen tools behind a restaurant
Prime company	A large company that receives orders directly from the Ministry of Defense	A general contractor on a building project
Supplier	One of the many companies that supply parts and materials to primes	Specialist craftspeople working under the contractor
Defense Production Base Strengthening Act	A law, in force since 2023, under which the state supports stable production in the defense industry	The state helping a vital local workshop with equipment and successors
Dual use	Technology useful for both civilian and defense purposes	A knife that serves in the kitchen and in the workshop
Defense Equipment Transfer Principles	Basic rules for sending defense equipment abroad, set in 2014 and revised in April 2026	House rules for lending things out
Five categories	The old limit on finished-equipment transfers to rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping	A short list of things you may lend
FEFTA	The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, which governs trade in goods and technology	The rules at the customs counter
Economic security	Protecting a country's peace, safety and prosperity through economic measures	Not depending on a single source for key parts
Fill rate	Actual personnel as a share of authorized strength	Occupied seats as a share of all seats

The industry's situation, and the Defense Production Base Strengthening Act

Chapter 1 of Part IV starts with the situation. The White Paper says rapid scientific progress is fundamentally changing security, and countries are accelerating research and development to secure technological advantage. New technologies such as AI, quantum technology and new forms of energy use are being applied to equipment, and the character of conflict is widening from land, sea and air to space, cyber and electromagnetic domains and even the cognitive domain.²

Japan's defense industry has distinctive features. Because Japan has no state-run arsenals for manufacturing equipment, the White Paper says the base relies heavily on many small and medium-sized subcontractors, called suppliers, as well as on large prime companies. It adds that more than 1,000 companies are said to be involved in the parts and assembly of a tank or fighter aircraft, and more than 8,000 in an escort vessel.³

The White Paper is frank about the difficulties. Meeting high performance requirements and information-security measures takes heavy management resources. The only customer is basically the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, so production volumes are small and chances to recover investment are limited. Some companies still feel reluctance or reputational risk about defense work. As a result, companies have been withdrawing or scaling back from time to time, which can disrupt stable procurement and, in the long run, erode fair competition and innovation. The White Paper also points to growing cyber threats suspected to involve state actors, and to the risk that foreign export restrictions could cut off raw materials.³

What the Defense Production Base Strengthening Act supports

The central law is the Defense Production Base Strengthening Act, whose full title is the Act on Strengthening the Foundations for the Development and Production of Equipment Procured by the Ministry of Defense. It took effect in 2023. The White Paper starts from the point that the defense industry takes part in every stage of the equipment life cycle, from research and development to production, maintenance, supply and disposal, so equipment and the industry are inseparable.⁴

The Minister of Defense sets a basic policy under the Act, and it was published in October 2023. It replaces the 2014 Defense Production and Technology Base Strategy. For areas where domestic production is to be pursued, the White Paper lists examples such as items that domestic technology can supply under the required conditions, items essential for sustained response in an emergency (ammunition and ships), and items that should not depend on foreign countries for confidentiality reasons (communications and cryptography). It also says international joint research, joint development and licensed domestic production will be promoted. The policy introduces the idea of a "virtuous cycle between defense and the economy," in which a stronger base serves both civilian and defense markets.⁴

The core mechanism is certification of specific measures. Producing equipment carries risks, such as raw materials becoming unavailable, aging facilities hurting delivery and performance, parts of concern in which malware has been embedded, leaks through cyberattacks, and companies being unable to continue the business. The White Paper groups the measures companies take into four types.⁵

Type	Examples in the White Paper
Supply chain resilience	Domestic production and stockpiling of raw materials, research on substitute materials and parts
More efficient production	Introducing the latest equipment, automating inspection with artificial intelligence
Stronger cybersecurity	Strengthening information systems, training in-house staff
Business succession and others	Maintaining production facilities, training people (acquiring skills and know-how)

A company submits a plan for stable manufacturing, and the Minister of Defense certifies it. After certification the ministry contracts directly with the company and pays without delay under the contract. Equipment that is also used for civilian business can be covered. In fiscal 2025 a total of 164 plans were certified, and 124 of them came from small and medium-sized companies.⁵

The White Paper also describes a fund that subsidizes the cost of adjusting specifications and performance when equipment is transferred (created in March 2024, with a total of 160 billion yen disbursed as of June 1, 2026),⁶ a designation of "equipment secrets" that obliges handlers to manage information strictly and adds penalties for intentional leaks, and a profit-rate revision under which a QCD evaluation (quality, cost, delivery and other factors) sets the rate between 5 and 10 percent.⁷

Key points so far.

• The White Paper describes Japan's defense industry as one without state arsenals, supported by prime companies and many suppliers.
• The Act has the state contract with and pay companies for supply chain resilience, efficient production, cybersecurity and business succession.
• In fiscal 2025, 164 plans were certified, 124 of them by small and medium-sized companies.

How can companies, SMEs and startups take part?

The White Paper calls it extremely important for companies new to the defense industry to participate, and says it is essential to bring in startups with advanced software technology, especially in AI and information and communications.⁸ Here are the entry points it describes.

The first is certification of business plans, described above. The White Paper says certified plans, application procedures and contact points are posted on the website of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA).⁹

The second is the Defense Industry Entry Promotion Exhibition, which ATLA has held since 2016. It gives startups and small companies with strong technology a chance to be matched with defense companies and the Ministry of Defense. In fiscal 2025 it was held in Tokyo for two days each in December and February.⁸

The third is a set of frameworks for startups. They include a joint council of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and joint hearings by technology field. On contracts, an agreement in June 2024 created the "startup technical-proposal evaluation method," under which, for problems without an obvious best solution, the ministry can settle specifications with a company that made a strong proposal and then use a negotiated contract. The White Paper says the ministry signed a contract with Infostellar in March 2025, the first application in the government. It also notes that the Japan Startup Awards added a Minister of Defense Award from 2025 and that Synspective received it.⁸

The "Fast Pass procurement" initiative announced in February 2026 has four elements.¹⁰

1. Use the SBIR program, a government-wide scheme that supports startup R&D, to promote research that reflects the Self-Defense Forces' operational needs.
2. Make further use of the startup technical-proposal evaluation method.
3. Institutionalize agile procurement, in which units work with companies to reach early fielding.
4. Create a "startup support group" that provides end-to-end help with matching to operational needs and with obstacles at the contracting stage.

The environment on the receiving side is also being prepared. In March 2025 ATLA and METI jointly drew up guidelines on fair subcontracting in the defense industry, aimed at passing labor costs on appropriately and securing necessary profit. For information security, a "defense business-eligible company system" was created in June 2025. It certifies a company's security arrangements in advance and concludes contracts per site, which is expected to speed up paperwork. For information that is not classified but needs protection, a standard equivalent to NIST SP800-171 has applied since April 2023, and as of March 2026 more than 100 Japanese defense-related companies had upgraded or introduced information systems.¹¹

The White Paper also carries "voices" from the field, including a company that renewed equipment with the support system, an employee who moved from another industry into welding, and a startup founder. I do not evaluate them here. I only note that the White Paper presents them as voices from the field.¹²

Key points so far.

• The entry points are plan certification, the entry promotion exhibition, the joint council for startups, the technical-proposal evaluation method and Fast Pass procurement.
• Rules for fair transactions and for information security are being prepared alongside them.

Technology base and economic security

Section 2 of Chapter 2 deals with technology. The White Paper says Japan's defense research spending is low compared with the United States and others but has risen sharply in recent years. Because civilian and security technologies are hard to tell apart, it holds that results from both public and private research should be put to use in equipment.¹³

The Defense Technology Guideline 2023, drawn up in June 2023, puts this into practice. Its first pillar is to create early the functions and equipment needed to defend Japan, with fielding within five years or, broadly, within ten. Its second pillar is to widen the public-private research community looking beyond ten years and to secure technological superiority.¹³

Efforts to take in civilian technology include the following.¹⁴

Effort	The White Paper's description
K Program (Economic Security Key Technology Development Program)	The state backs advanced fields such as AI and quantum technology that have more than one use, and ties results to security as well
Funding program for security technology research	Open calls for basic research from universities, research institutes and startups, with 239 projects selected through fiscal 2025
Defense Innovation Science and Technology Institute	Created by ATLA in October 2024 to conduct breakthrough research
Defense Science and Technology Board	An advisory body to the Minister of Defense set up in June 2025, which met six times through March 2026

On the funding program, the White Paper stresses respect for academic freedom. It states that the ministry does not intervene in research, restrict publication of results, classify results as secret or give researchers secret information.¹⁴

Where this sits within economic security

This part is close to the daily work of export control and economic security staff. Drawing on the National Security Strategy, the White Paper describes economic security as securing national interests through economic measures, and says economic measures to raise autonomy and to secure Japan's advantage and indispensability in technology and other fields must be taken comprehensively, effectively and intensively. It summarizes the following developments.¹⁵

• The Economic Security Promotion Act passed in May 2022. In May 2024 the patent non-disclosure system and the core infrastructure system began operating, so all systems under the Act are now in operation.
• Specified critical materials started with 11 items, including semiconductors and storage batteries, in December 2022, rose to 12 with advanced electronic components in February 2024, and reached 16 in December 2025 with four new items including unmanned aircraft and satellites.
• A security clearance system took effect in May 2025 under the Act on the Protection and Use of Critical Economic Security Information.

On the Ministry of Defense's role, the White Paper says it takes part in whole-of-government efforts by offering its accumulated knowledge and needs as the ministry in charge of security, including by sending staff to the Cabinet Office and joining the K Program's designated fund councils.¹⁵ On defense and the economy, it notes that about 80 to 90 percent of the defense budget is spent domestically, that higher defense spending is expected to bring job creation, regional economic benefits and technological spillover to the private sector, and that a working group on the defense industry, co-chaired by the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, was launched in February 2026.¹⁶

Here is one point of my own view. Export restrictions on raw materials, protection of advanced technology, cyberattacks and patent non-disclosure are not only defense issues. They are continuous with the economic security issues that ordinary manufacturers face. For the basics, see What Is the Economic Security Promotion Act?, and for technology leakage prevention, see Reading the Technology Leakage Prevention Guidance (Part 1). The White Paper itself says technological sensitivity is assessed when defense equipment is transferred, with measures against reverse engineering for highly sensitive technology.¹¹

Key points so far.

• The Defense Technology Guideline 2023 sets two pillars, early fielding and technological superiority.
• The White Paper places maintaining the defense production and technology base alongside supply chain resilience and protection of advanced technology as economic security measures.

Equipment Transfer Principles and FEFTA export controls

Chapter 3 is about sending equipment abroad. It is also the point where people in export control practice most often confuse the systems.

What the Transfer Principles are

The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, set in 2014, are the government's basic policy on sending defense equipment abroad. A footnote explains that "transfer" is used because the term covers the provision of technology as well as goods. The framework has three parts.¹⁷

Principle	The White Paper's description
First	Clarifies the cases in which transfer is prohibited, namely where it would violate obligations under treaties or other international agreements, violate obligations under UN Security Council resolutions, or involve a party to a conflict
Second	Limits permissible cases to contributions to peace and international cooperation or to Japan's security, among others. Reviews strictly, deliberates important cases at the National Security Council and discloses information. Notifies the Diet promptly for finished items that count as weapons under the Self-Defense Forces Act
Third	In principle requires the recipient government to obtain Japan's prior consent for use outside the stated purpose and for transfer to third countries, and otherwise ensures appropriate management

The April 2026 revision and the five categories

The White Paper says that, apart from joint development, joint production and licensed production, finished equipment could be transferred only in five categories (rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping). The Principles and their Implementation Guidelines were revised in April 2026, based on the October 2025 coalition agreement between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Innovation Party and the March 2026 ruling-party proposal. As a result, all finished equipment, parts, technology and services such as repair can in principle be transferred under the system. The White Paper adds that welcome and expectation were expressed by countries in Europe, the United States and Southeast Asia, among others.¹⁸

The White Paper also explains the safeguards.¹⁹

• Review considers together the suitability of the destination and end user and the degree of concern for Japan's security, and it is conducted strictly.
• Finished items that count as weapons under the Self-Defense Forces Act are limited to countries with which Japan has concluded an international agreement requiring use consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (the so-called defense equipment and technology transfer agreements).
• In principle, no transfer is made to a country judged to be engaged in actual fighting as part of an armed conflict.
• Review items such as the security environment and the export control system of the destination are made explicit, and the Diet is notified when a transfer is judged permissible.

According to a footnote, such agreements were in place with 17 countries as of April 2026, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and India.²⁰

How this differs from FEFTA export controls

What follows is my own organization based on the White Paper. The White Paper spends many pages on the Principles but does not discuss their relationship with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act in detail. Here is a rough comparison.

Point	Defense Equipment Transfer Principles	Ordinary export controls under FEFTA
Scope	Defense equipment (finished items, parts, technology, services)	Goods and technology in general, under list controls, catch-all controls and so on
Nature	Government policy and implementation guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment	A licensing system based on law
Perspective	Peace and international cooperation, Japan's security, suitability of destination, proper management	Checks on item, destination, end use and end user
Typical procedure	Deliberation at the National Security Council, notification to the Diet	License from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, prior classification of the item

Transfers of defense equipment and export controls on ordinary goods and technology are separate frameworks. The same transaction can involve both, however. That parts and technology can now in principle be transferred does not mean FEFTA procedures disappear. Please confirm early which framework applies to your items and technology. For details, see The Defense Equipment Transfer Principles Explained, Export License vs. Export Approval and FEFTA Article 55-8 Technology Management.

Key points so far.

• The Principles were revised in April 2026, and the five-category limit on finished equipment is gone. Safeguards remain for weapons under the Self-Defense Forces Act, including international agreements, review items and notification to the Diet.
• FEFTA export controls are a separate framework, and where the two overlap an early check matters.

Cooperation with the United States and other partners, and optimizing procurement

Cooperation with the United States

According to the White Paper, defense equipment and technology cooperation with the United States aims to secure the alliance's technological advantage, interoperability, readiness and sustainability. The central forum is the Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS), announced in the April 2024 summit statement. Four working groups (missile co-production, aircraft maintenance, supply chain resilience and ship maintenance) review progress, and at the fourth meeting in April 2026 the two sides agreed, as work moved to an execution stage, to call it DICAS 2.0. The Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) has 16 participating countries, including the United States, Australia and South Korea.²¹ On supply stability, a Security of Supply Arrangement was signed in 2023.²²

New forms of cooperation

In August 2025 the Australian government selected an upgraded version of the Mogami-class frigate for its next general-purpose frigate. Japan and Australia are to co-develop and co-produce 11 ships in total, and in April 2026 a contract for up to the third ship was announced, the White Paper says. The next-generation fighter is being developed with the United Kingdom and Italy under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The intergovernmental organization GIGO was established in December 2024 and the joint venture Edgewing in June 2025, and the first integrated contract was signed in April 2026.²³

Optimizing equipment

Chapter 4 concerns getting needed capability with limited people and budgets. Given population decline, a falling birthrate and tight public finances, the White Paper calls rationalizing the equipment system essential, and names unmanned and labor-saving systems and life-cycle project management as pillars. On contracts, a long-term contract law lets certain equipment be paid for over up to 10 fiscal years, instead of the five generally set by the Public Finance Act. On fairness in procurement, it says that after findings from the special defense inspection of submarine repair contracts in 2024 and 2025, cost and system surveys were made more effective, among other revisions.²⁴

Key points so far.

• DICAS and PIPIR are frameworks for missile co-production, joint maintenance of ships and aircraft, and supply chain resilience.
• The Mogami-class upgrade for Australia and GCAP are examples of new forms of cooperation.

Part V, the personnel base (1) Securing people and improving treatment

Part V begins with the statement that Self-Defense Forces personnel serve at bases and on ships across Japan as well as on remote islands, at sea and overseas, and that each one carries the mission of protecting Japan's peace and independence. About 240,000 personnel serve nationwide, with more than 20,000 civilian officials, technical officials and instructors in addition.²⁵

Where recruitment stands

The White Paper gives the numbers plainly. In a Cabinet Office survey, 90 percent of the public holds a favorable impression of the Self-Defense Forces, yet recruiting is hard. In fiscal 2024 fewer than 10,000 were recruited against a plan of about 15,000, and about 5,600 left mid-career. In fiscal 2025 about 11,000 were recruited against the same plan, and mid-career departures fell by about 1,000 to about 4,600. The White Paper believes the measures under the basic policy have had some effect. Even so, the fill rate stays at about 90 percent, and it calls securing personnel the top priority.²⁶ It cites fiercer competition with private employers for talent, and says making the forces a workplace where people want to join and stay is urgent.²⁷

The basic policy and better treatment

In October 2024 a ministerial council chaired by the Prime Minister was set up, and in December 2024 it produced the Basic Policy on improving treatment and working conditions and establishing a new life plan for uniformed personnel. The fiscal 2026 budget includes about 581.4 billion yen for related costs.²⁶

On pay, more than 30 allowances were created or raised from fiscal 2025, an unprecedented number. In the pay revision that followed the 2025 National Personnel Authority recommendation, personnel in their thirties and forties also gained more than 200,000 yen a year, and the White Paper says pay for all uniformed personnel reached a record high.²⁶ It explains that the salary table was built when the National Police Reserve was formed in 1950 and has not been substantially revised for about 70 years. The government aims to complete a revision specific to uniformed personnel during fiscal 2027, and a new subcommittee of the Defense Personnel Council is examining it.²⁸

Recruitment routes have been reworked too. They include the "officer-candidate NCO" route, which leads to officer status after about five years as an enlisted member or NCO (applications opened in 2025), a specialist officer-candidate category in the Ground Self-Defense Force for fields such as cyber (from fiscal 2025), a new fixed-term enlisted category that abolishes the cadet system and hires people as uniformed personnel from the start (applications from fiscal 2026), fixed-term hiring of specialists, and a higher annual scholarship of 960,000 yen. In fiscal 2025 about 9,300 people were recruited as new enlisted personnel, and the number of general NCO candidates rose for the first time in five years. Reservists also received better treatment, including a new business-continuity benefit for self-employed reservists.²⁸

Life planning after retirement

Many uniformed personnel retire in their mid-fifties or later under an early mandatory retirement system, which keeps the forces in strong condition. The White Paper says easing worries about income and reemployment after retirement matters for recruiting as well. Retirement ages for ranks from colonel-equivalent to sergeant-equivalent were raised by two years between 2020 and 2024, and a further two-year rise is planned between 2028 and 2032.²⁹

In fiscal 2025, 4,027 of the 4,062 early retirees who sought help (99.1 percent) and 727 of the 730 personnel finishing fixed terms (99.6 percent) found jobs. As of the end of March 2026, 692 retired personnel worked in disaster prevention and crisis management departments of local governments. The benefit for early retirees was revised and took effect in fiscal 2026, and the government aims to prepare reemployment support up to age 65 within fiscal 2026.²⁹

Key points so far.

• In fiscal 2025 about 11,000 were recruited against a plan of about 15,000, mid-career departures were about 4,600, and the fill rate was about 90 percent.
• More than 30 allowances were created or raised from fiscal 2025, and a revision of the pay system is targeted for fiscal 2027.
• New recruitment categories, better treatment of reservists, higher retirement ages and wider reemployment support are moving together.

Part V, the personnel base (2) Cyber talent, an inclusive workplace and a safe environment

Securing cyber talent

According to the White Paper, the Defense Buildup Program aims to expand specialized cyber units to about 4,000 people by fiscal 2027 and, with training for personnel in cyber-related work, to bring cyber personnel to about 20,000. The Comprehensive Cyber Human Resources Strategy published in July 2024 sets five pillars (identify, secure, develop, retain and manage, and strengthen the overall approach). It describes career paths that keep people in cyber work from entry, and hiring people with specialist knowledge as specially appointed fixed-term personnel or mid-career officers. It also explains that specialist schools let recruits learn by level after joining, even if they arrive without cyber knowledge.³⁰

Work-life balance and women's participation

The ministry has drawn up and revised action plans for women's participation and work-life balance since 2015, and in 2026 it adopted a new plan with two pillars, work-style reform and participation of diverse personnel. The White Paper lists flexible start times, flextime, telework, encouragement of paternity leave and 9 on-site child care facilities. On women's participation, its figures are as follows.³¹

Item	Current (per the White Paper)	Target (per the White Paper)
Women in uniform	About 20,000 as of March 2026, about 9.3 percent of all uniformed personnel (about 5.9 percent ten years earlier)	13 percent or more by fiscal 2035
Women among new uniformed recruits	18.1 percent (fiscal 2025)	20 percent or more every year from fiscal 2026
Women among civilian officials, technical officials and instructors	About 5,700, or about 28.6 percent (about 23.6 percent ten years earlier)	40 percent or more of recruits from fiscal 2026

The White Paper states that when assignment restrictions were lifted for part of the special weapons (chemical) protection units in July 2025, all assignment restrictions on women in the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces were completely removed.³¹

An environment that does not tolerate harassment

The White Paper describes harassment as something that destroys trust among personnel and shakes the foundation of the organization, and must never happen. It states that 262 people were disciplined for harassment in fiscal 2024, including 8 dismissals, the most severe measure. Consultations through hotlines and similar channels fell from 2,311 in fiscal 2021 to 1,479 in fiscal 2025. Measures include messages from the Minister of Defense, lectures and role-play training for managers, a LINE-based consultation desk that operates on holidays and outside working hours, unified disciplinary standards across the ministry and an annual harassment prevention month.³²

Support for personnel and families, and the medical function

On suicides among personnel, the White Paper says each loss is deeply painful for families and a great loss for the organization, and describes work under the Ministry's basic policy on mental health. For families, an agreement with the Self-Defense Forces Families' Association and the Taiyukai was concluded in March 2025. It also notes that more than 2,100 personnel have died in the line of duty, and describes memorial services held for them.³³

For the medical function, the National Defense Strategy calls for change into an organization that saves the lives of personnel who carry out duties in an emergency at risk to themselves. The three pillars are seamless care and evacuation from the front line to the final destination, stronger joint medical operations, and fundamental reform of the National Defense Medical College. The White Paper mentions building a system to provide care within ten minutes of injury and a capability to secure and stockpile blood products independently.³⁴

Key points so far.

• Plans call for about 4,000 cyber unit personnel and about 20,000 cyber personnel overall by fiscal 2027.
• Women are about 9.3 percent of uniformed personnel, assignment restrictions have been removed, and recruitment and promotion targets are set in numbers.
• Anti-harassment measures, family support, mental health and a reformed medical function appear as ways of protecting the personnel base.

This is one of five parts reading Japan's 2026 Defense White Paper. The other parts are listed below.

• Part 1: the feature, the three documents and the budget
• Part 2: the security environment around Japan (first half)
• Part 3: the world's security picture and new ways of war
• Part 4: Japan's own defense, the alliance and like-minded partners

Wrapping up Part 5, and the series

Here is what we learned in this part.

• The White Paper treats the defense production and technology base as, in effect, defense capability itself, and strengthens it through the Defense Production Base Strengthening Act, systems for startups, information security rules and economic security measures.
• The Defense Equipment Transfer Principles were revised in April 2026. They are a framework separate from FEFTA export controls, and an early check matters where the two overlap.
• On personnel, with recruitment still below plan, treatment, recruitment categories, life planning after retirement, cyber talent, diverse participation, anti-harassment measures, family support and the medical function are being strengthened together.

One last thought. The people who build equipment and the people who use it each have a life of their own. I found it striking that the White Paper deals, in the same document, with pay, workplaces, family support and the memorial services for personnel who died on duty. I would suggest reading defense not only as a list of system names but also as a story about the people who work there. That is what I hoped to share across these five parts.

This brings the five-part series to a close. The White Paper runs to about 900 pages, and we could pick up only a small part of it. If something caught your interest, please check the original published by the Ministry of Defense (https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2026/pdf/).

If your work touches defense, economic security or export controls, you are welcome to see the TRAFEED information or get in touch through the contact page.

References

Footnotes

1. Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense White Paper, Reiwa 8 (2026) edition, overview at the start of Part IV (printed page 478). ↩

2. Same, Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1 (printed page 479). ↩

3. Same, Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 2 (printed page 480). ↩ ↩²

4. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, item 1 "The Defense Production Base Strengthening Act and the Basic Policy" (printed pages 482 to 483). ↩ ↩²

5. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, item 2 "Measures under the Defense Production Base Strengthening Act" (printed page 484). ↩ ↩²

6. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, item 2 (3) facilitating equipment transfer and the designated support corporation (printed page 487). ↩

7. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, item 2 (4) protecting equipment secrets, and "Making defense business attractive" (printed page 488). ↩

8. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, "Revitalizing the defense industry," the startup technical-proposal evaluation method and the Japan Startup Awards (printed pages 491 to 493). ↩ ↩² ↩³

9. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, item 2 (2) examples of certified specific measures (printed page 485). ↩

10. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, "Creation of Fast Pass procurement" (printed page 494). ↩

11. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, "Guidelines on fair subcontracting," "Strengthening defense industrial security" and "Strengthening sensitive technology management" (printed pages 495 to 496). ↩ ↩²

12. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, VOICE columns (printed pages 486, 489, 490, 492, 493 and 496). ↩

13. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2, items 1 and 2 (printed pages 498 to 499). ↩ ↩²

14. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2, items 3 and 4 (printed pages 500 to 505). ↩ ↩²

15. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 3 (printed pages 506 to 507). ↩ ↩²

16. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 4, item 1 (printed page 508). ↩

17. Same, Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1, item 1 "The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology" (printed page 510). ↩

18. Same, Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1, item 2 "Discussion on revising the so-called five categories" (printed page 511). ↩

19. Same, Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1, item 3 "Implementation Guidelines (after revision)" and the commentary (printed pages 511 to 513). ↩

20. Same, Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 3, footnote 1 (printed page 517). ↩

21. Same, Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 2, items 1, 3 and 4 (printed pages 514 to 516). ↩

22. Same, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1, item 3 "Building a resilient supply chain" (printed page 494). ↩

23. Same, Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 3, item 1 "Australia" with commentary, and item 4 "Joint development of the next-generation fighter" (printed pages 518 and 523). ↩

24. Same, Part IV, Chapter 4 (printed pages 525 to 528). ↩

25. Same, opening of Part V, Chapter 1 (printed page 535), Section 1 (printed page 537), and Part V, Chapter 2, Section 2, item 2 (printed page 551). ↩

26. Same, Part V, Chapter 2, Section 1 (printed pages 545 to 546) and Section 2, item 1 (printed page 548). ↩ ↩² ↩³

27. Same, Part V, Chapter 1, Section 2 (printed page 541). ↩

28. Same, Part V, Chapter 2, Section 2, item 2 (printed pages 548 to 549, 553 and 556 to 557). ↩ ↩²

29. Same, Part V, Chapter 2, Section 2, item 2 (6) "Retirement and reemployment" (printed pages 559 to 562). ↩ ↩²

30. Same, Part V, Chapter 2, Section 2, item 3 "Securing cyber talent" (printed pages 566 to 567). ↩

31. Same, Part V, Chapter 2, Section 2, item 4 "Further promoting work-life balance and women's participation" (printed pages 568 to 571). ↩ ↩²

32. Same, Part V, Chapter 2, Section 2, item 5 "Building an environment that tolerates no harassment" (printed pages 572 to 574). ↩

33. Same, Part V, Chapter 2, Section 2, item 6 "Support for personnel and families" (printed pages 574 to 576). ↩

34. Same, Part V, Chapter 2, Section 3, item 1 "Transforming the medical function" (printed pages 577 to 578). ↩