Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL. How many times larger is China's defense budget than Japan's? What is happening around Taiwan? How far can North Korea's missiles reach? Part I of Japan's Defense White Paper answers these questions with numbers. But Part I alone runs well over 100 pages and is full of military terms, so a first-time reader can easily get lost.
This article is Part 2 of a five-part series, "Reading the Reiwa 8 Defense White Paper." It covers the first half of Part I, "The Security Environment Surrounding Japan," printed pages 39 to 154. We go through the overview, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United States, China, US-China relations and Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and Russia. The opening feature and the Part II policy chapters belong to Part 1 of this series. The regions from Oceania to the Middle East, and the new ways of fighting, belong to Part 3.
The answer first. The White Paper makes three central points in this range. First, it calls the present international situation a "test of the postwar era" and treats Russia's invasion as something that could happen in East Asia too, not a distant European affair. Second, it says large military forces, including nuclear weapons, are concentrated around Japan, and it describes the military trends of China, North Korea and Russia country by country. Third, it looks at how states are linked, through US-China competition, China-Russia alignment and Russia-North Korea military cooperation.
A word on how to read this article. I summarize each country's military trends in the form "the White Paper states that." The assessments belong to the White Paper, a Japanese government document, not to me. When I add my own view, I label it as the author's view. Country names and terms such as "invasion of Ukraine" follow the White Paper's wording, which uses the Japanese word 侵略, rendered here as invasion. All figures come from the White Paper, with the year and unit added. Footnote page numbers are the numbers printed at the bottom of each page, and the PDF position is the printed page plus 10.1
Preparing to Read "The Security Environment"
The security environment is shorthand for the surrounding conditions that affect a country's safety. It includes which countries hold what military power and what they are doing, how states are connected, and how new technology is changing warfare. Think of Part I as a weather map of the area around Japan. Before deciding whether to carry an umbrella, you first look at how the clouds are moving.
Why does a war far away matter to Japan? The White Paper answers in a commentary box in Chapter 1.2 As trade and travel increase, events in one region affect others through exchanges and movement. In military terms this appears as transfers of equipment and technology, and as deployments of troops and assets. In Ukraine, North Korea's weapons and ammunition, including ballistic missiles, were procured by Russia, and North Korean soldiers were sent to Russia. The White Paper adds that nuclear and missile technology could pass from Russia to North Korea, which could affect the Indo-Pacific military balance over the medium to long term.
Each country's section is easier to follow through four lenses. These are military spending, forces and equipment, nuclear weapons and missiles, and new domains plus actual activity around Japan. Bigger numbers do not automatically mean greater strength. The White Paper itself says that comparing military capability depends not only on the quantity and performance of forces and equipment but also on the purpose of an operation, operating posture, personnel training and logistics.3 Please read the tables in this article with that in mind.
Terms to Know First
The table below lists terms that appear repeatedly in this article. The explanations follow the White Paper.4
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Gray zone situation | A broad range of situations that are neither pure peacetime nor wartime. One side tries to change the status quo, for example by frequently showing the presence of an armed organization below the level of an armed attack |
| Hybrid warfare | A method that deliberately blurs the line between military and non-military means, combining unmarked troops, cyberattacks and disinformation |
| Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) | Using long-range capabilities to keep an opponent out of an operating area, and shorter-range capabilities to limit its freedom of action inside it |
| First and second island chains | Terms the White Paper uses with the qualifier "so-called." As the author's note, the first chain generally refers to the line of islands from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines, and the second to a line extending toward Guam |
| ICBM, IRBM, MRBM, SRBM | Ballistic missiles grouped by range, from intercontinental to intermediate, medium and short range. SLBMs are launched from submarines and ALBMs from aircraft |
| Hypersonic (HGV, HCM) | Gliding warheads and cruise missiles. They fly lower than ordinary ballistic missiles and maneuver, which delays detection and makes interception harder |
| Solid fuel, TEL | Solid-fuel missiles reload fast and can be fired again soon. A TEL is a transporter-erector-launcher, a mobile launch vehicle, so signs of a launch are hard to detect in advance |
| New START | A treaty capping US and Russian strategic nuclear forces. It expired in February 2026 |
| Extended deterrence | Using one's own nuclear and other forces to deter threats, including nuclear ones, against allies |
Chapter 1, Overview, the World the White Paper Describes
The White Paper lists four features of today's security environment.5 First, states that do not share universal values and the systems built on them are expanding their influence, and unilateral changes to the status quo by force challenge the international order. It expects US-China competition to intensify. Second, advances in science and technology are fundamentally changing the structure of armed forces and ways of fighting. Third, there are challenges such as cyber risk, information warfare including disinformation, and climate change. Fourth, gray zone situations occur constantly, and hybrid warfare is likely to be carried out in more sophisticated forms.
One sentence matters especially to readers in export control and economic security. The White Paper says issues once not seen as security matters, such as supply chain vulnerabilities and the contest over leadership in advanced technology, have become major security issues, so the scope of security has expanded into the economic field.
The White Paper describes the Indo-Pacific as the core of global vitality, home to more than half of the world's population, a region from which Japan benefits. It also notes that several countries and regions hold large military forces, including nuclear weapons, and do not share universal values and systems, and that diplomatic relations rooted in history are tangled. It concludes that Japan faces its harshest and most complex security environment since the war, and that a serious situation like Ukraine's cannot be ruled out in East Asia.6
Here are the top ranks of the White Paper's force chart. These are approximate figures compiled by the Ministry of Defense from The Military Balance 2026 and other sources, and Japan's figures are actual strength at the end of fiscal 2025.7
| Category | 1st | 2nd | 3rd | Japan |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ground forces (10,000 people) | India 125 | North Korea 110 | China 95 | 13 |
| Naval forces (10,000 tons, ships in parentheses) | US 649 (970) | China 240 (700) | Russia 206 (1,170) | 54 (140) |
| Air forces (combat aircraft) | China 3,340 | US 3,160 | Russia 1,480 | 390 |
For China, the White Paper also shows modern destroyers and frigates rising from 15 in 2001 to 104 in 2026, about 6.9 times, and fourth and fifth generation fighters rising from 90 to 1,838, about 20.4 times. Japan has 52 escort ships, 22 submarines and 344 fourth and fifth generation fighters as of March 31, 2026.8
On missiles, the White Paper says countries and regions around Japan are pointed out as holding thousands of missiles and increasing them. China holds more than 3,000 ground-launched missiles with a range of 300 km or more, North Korea 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles, and Russia various missiles including about 350 ICBMs, and Russia is said to have carried out more than 13,000 missile attacks in Ukraine. The paper then explains that relying on missile defense alone will make complete defense difficult, so Japan intends to use counterstrike capability, as a minimum necessary self-defense measure when no other means exist, to prevent further attacks.9 I do not argue the merits of that policy here.
Key points so far
- The White Paper calls the present a "test of the postwar era" and says the scope of security now reaches the economy and technology.
- It presents the Indo-Pacific as a region from which Japan benefits and also as one where large military forces are concentrated.
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Chapter 2, Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
The White Paper treats the invasion as a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and of international law including the UN Charter, and says that accepting it could wrongly imply that unilateral changes to the status quo by force would be tolerated elsewhere.10 Below I follow its wording, avoid describing combat, and set out only the course of events.11
| Period | Key points in the White Paper |
|---|---|
| Feb 24, 2022 | Russia begins a full-scale invasion |
| Late Mar to early Apr 2022 | Ukrainian forces push Russian forces back from the Kyiv front |
| Sep 2022 | Ukraine succeeds in a counteroffensive in Kharkiv. Russia signs a partial mobilization order and "annexes" four regions in the east and south (the White Paper calls this illegal) |
| Nov 2022 | Ukraine retakes the area north of the Dnipro River, including the city of Kherson |
| May to Jun 2023 | Russian forces appear to take Bakhmut. Ukraine begins a counteroffensive but appears not to reach its initial goals |
| Feb 2024 | Russia's Ministry of Defense announces the occupation of Avdiivka |
| Aug 2024 | Ukrainian forces make a cross-border attack into Russia's Kursk region |
| End of Apr 2025 | The Russian side reports it has retaken all of Kursk. Ukraine's General Staff says defensive operations continue |
| From Jan 2026 | The US, Russia and Ukraine hold intermittent trilateral talks. Peace documents, territory and security guarantees are said to have been discussed |
The White Paper says the progress of peace talks cannot be predicted and that fighting is expected to continue while talks go on. On staying power, it cites an estimate from CSIS, a US research institute, that as of January 2026 casualties were 500,000 to 600,000 for Ukraine and about 1.2 million for Russia, and it says both sides appear to face serious manpower shortages. It also records that Ukraine began its "Drone Line" program in February 2025, integrating drones into frontline operations, and that President Zelensky said about 60 percent of Ukraine's weapons are domestically made.12
Countries' positions differ. Here are the White Paper's descriptions side by side.13
| Country or region | Key points in the White Paper |
|---|---|
| Europe, NATO | Countries are strengthening defenses, and Finland and Sweden joined NATO |
| United States | Security assistance to Ukraine totals over 66.5 billion dollars (as of January 2025). In July 2025 the US and NATO agreed on a framework (PURL) to supply US equipment at European expense |
| EU | Military support of 70 billion dollars (as of December 2025) |
| China | Avoids direct criticism of Russia, calls on both sides for "restraint and dialogue," and criticizes sanctions on Russia. Some say transfers of dual-use goods underpin Russia's staying power |
| India | Stresses a solution through dialogue and diplomacy and avoids explicit criticism of Russia |
| North Korea, Iran | North Korea has supplied weapons and ammunition since 2023 and sent troops in 2024. Iran calls for a diplomatic solution while criticizing sanctions on Russia |
| UN General Assembly | In February 2023 a resolution calling for an immediate halt was adopted with 141 votes in favor. Six countries and regions voted against, and 32, including China and India, abstained |
Key points so far
- The White Paper says the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific cannot be separated.
- Positions among countries differ, and the paper lays out the responses of China, India, North Korea, Iran and others side by side.
Chapter 3, Section 1, the United States Under the Second Trump Administration
The second Trump administration took office in January 2025 and issued its National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2025 and National Defense Strategy (NDS) in January 2026. According to the White Paper, the NSS puts "America First" at its center and lists economic security, including revitalizing the defense industrial base, among its priorities. For the framework of economic security itself, our explainer on Japan's Economic Security Promotion Act is a good entry point. The NDS says the Department of War will focus on restoring "peace through strength" and sets four lines of effort.14
| Four NDS lines of effort | Content |
|---|---|
| Defending the US homeland | Top priority |
| Deterring China | Deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation, and build a strong denial defense along the "first island chain" |
| Greater burden sharing | Urge allies to do more for collective defense, with reference to the 5 percent of GDP standard |
| Strengthening the defense industrial base | Treated as the core foundation for rebuilding and modernizing US forces |
The NDS also positions other countries. As the White Paper reports it, Russia is a persistent but manageable threat to NATO's eastern members, and North Korea is a direct military threat to South Korea and Japan whose nuclear forces pose a "clear and present danger" of nuclear attack on the US homeland. South Korea is described as willing and able to take primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, with the US shifting to important but more limited support. The word "threat" here is the US document's, relayed by the White Paper. On Taiwan, the paper reports that the NSS maintains a declaratory policy of not supporting unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
On homeland defense, the White Paper's commentary box names two items.15 One is the "Golden Dome" initiative, a layered system using space-based sensors and interceptors, including against hypersonic missiles, with a goal of operation within three years. The GPI, a hypersonic interceptor that Japan and the US are developing jointly, is placed within this initiative. The other is modernization of the "nuclear triad" of intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and strategic nuclear submarines, which the paper says plays an indispensable role in extended deterrence for allies and so bears on Japan's defense.
On the numbers, the budget request for US fiscal 2027, announced in April 2026, was about 1.5 trillion dollars for the Department of War, the largest on record and about 42 percent above the previous year, with 18 billion dollars to move the Golden Dome into operation. Forces include about 450,000 Army and about 170,000 Marine Corps personnel, about 970 ships (about 70 of them submarines) totaling about 6.5 million tons, and about 3,200 combat aircraft. Deployed strategic warheads were announced as 1,419 as of May 1, 2023.16 With New START expired, President Trump has proposed arms control that includes China, but China says its nuclear forces are far smaller than those of the US and Russia and does not intend to take part, the White Paper records.
On Japan, a February 2025 summit confirmed America's unwavering commitment to Japan's defense, including the Senkaku Islands, and an October 2025 summit agreed to strengthen the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-US alliance. US Forces Japan began upgrading to a joint force headquarters at the end of March 2025, timed with the creation of the Self-Defense Forces' Joint Operations Command.17 The US section also covers the Middle East, which I leave for Part 3.
Key points so far
- The NSS and NDS center on homeland defense, deterring China, burden sharing and the defense industrial base.
- The White Paper takes strengthening the Japan-US alliance's deterrence and response capability as a premise of Japan's policy.
Chapter 3, Section 2, China, the Country the White Paper Covers in Most Detail
In its opening assessment, the White Paper describes China's external posture and military trends as a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and as the greatest strategic challenge Japan has faced, one to be met with Japan's comprehensive national power together with allies and like-minded countries.18 This is the Japanese government's assessment. China describes the goal of its defense policy as protecting national sovereignty, security and development interests, and its military strategy as "active defense." The White Paper notes that China has not published a defense white paper since July 2019 and has not fully disclosed its defense spending breakdown, and it strongly hopes for greater transparency. China's legal system, including export controls, is summarized in our overview of China's export control framework.
China's stated goals come in three stages. Achieve the centenary goal of the army in 2027, basically achieve modernization of national defense and the armed forces by 2035, and build a world-class military by the middle of the century. The White Paper notes that China has not defined "world-class."19 Defense spending looks like this.20
| Item | White Paper figure |
|---|---|
| Published 2026 defense budget | About 1.9095 trillion yuan (about 40.1 trillion yen at a mechanical rate of 21 yen per yuan), up about 7 percent from the previous year's budget |
| Long-term trend | About 27 times over 30 years from fiscal 1996, about 2 times over 10 years from fiscal 2016 |
| Comparison with Japan | About 4.6 times Japan's fiscal 2026 defense-related spending of 8.8093 trillion yen |
| Actual spending | The published figure is only part of the total, and a US Department of War analysis says actual spending is far higher |
On nuclear forces and missiles, the White Paper says China aims to modernize, diversify and expand its nuclear forces, and that a US Department of War report points to operational warheads in the low 600s in 2024 and possibly more than 1,000 by 2030. China states that it adheres to "no first use" and similar principles, but the paper notes that some now question that explanation. Among delivery systems, China has deployed the DF-41 ICBM (maximum range 11,200 km) and in September 2024 announced it had fired one ICBM toward the Pacific, the first such launch into the Pacific since 1980, 44 years earlier. Short-range missiles such as the DF-16 are deployed in large numbers facing Taiwan, and part of the Nansei Islands, including the Senkaku Islands, appears to be within their range.21
In conventional forces, ground forces are about 950,000, third in the world. The navy has three aircraft carriers after the Fujian entered service in November 2025. China Coast Guard ships of 1,000 tons or more number 175 as of the end of December 2025. Satellites that can serve military purposes number more than 260, about three times the figure ten years earlier.22
What matters most to Japan is actual activity nearby. The White Paper lists the following 2025 events. They are carrier activity in the Pacific in June, abnormal approaches by Chinese military aircraft to Self-Defense Force aircraft in June and July, and intermittent radar illumination of SDF aircraft by Chinese fighters for about 30 minutes in December. It calls the radar illumination dangerous, beyond what safe flight requires, and extremely regrettable.23 Around the Senkaku Islands it gives these figures.24
| Item | White Paper figure |
|---|---|
| Days of China Coast Guard activity in the contiguous zone (2025) | 357 days (record) |
| Consecutive days confirmed in the contiguous zone | 335 days from Nov 2024 to Oct 2025 (record) |
| Territorial water intrusions | Every month in fiscal 2025 as well |
| Armed ships | Four ships entered territorial waters in June 2024. Since then, every coast guard ship in the contiguous zone carries a gun (as of end of March 2026) |
The Japanese government regards the Senkaku Islands as inherent Japanese territory, and the White Paper says Japan has repeatedly protested and demanded withdrawal over intrusions by China Coast Guard ships as violations of international law. The paper also records that the Chinese side, citing its own position on the Senkakus, says patrols of waters it considers its jurisdiction by its vessels are legitimate and lawful. Please keep in mind that the two sides' claims differ. The Liaoning carrier went into the Pacific 13 times and the Shandong 9 times through the end of May 2026. In August 2024 a Chinese military information-gathering aircraft violated Japan's airspace off the Danjo Islands, and the paper notes this was the first airspace violation by a Chinese military aircraft that Japan confirmed and announced.
The White Paper also weighs China-Russia alignment heavily. Since 2019 the two have flown joint long-range bomber flights 10 times, and since 2021 they have held joint ship voyages 6 times. In December 2025 their bombers flew between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and, for the first time in a joint flight, out over the Pacific as far as off Shikoku. The paper calls these activities clearly intended to demonstrate force toward Japan and a serious concern for Japan's security.25 On the South China Sea, it records that the 2016 arbitral award rejected the historic rights underlying China's "nine-dash line" and that China has made clear it will not follow it.
Key points so far
- The White Paper calls China the greatest strategic challenge Japan has faced.
- China's published 2026 defense budget is about 1.9095 trillion yuan, about 4.6 times Japan's defense-related spending.
- Around Japan, the main issues are carrier operations in the Pacific, China Coast Guard activity near the Senkakus, and China-Russia joint activity.
Chapter 3, Section 3, US-China Relations and Taiwan
The White Paper records that US-China competition is becoming visible across politics, economics and the military. The developments from 2025 to 2026 were as follows.26
| Period | Key points in the White Paper |
|---|---|
| Early 2025 | An exchange of US additional tariffs and Chinese tighter export controls on rare earth items |
| Jun 2025 | First US-China summit of the second administration, held by phone |
| Oct 2025 | After a summit in South Korea, agreement on lower US additional tariffs and a one-year suspension of some Chinese rare earth export control measures |
| Nov 10, 2025 | The US decides to suspend for one year a measure extending export controls to subsidiaries of entities on the Entity List |
| May 2026 | President Trump visits China for the first time in about eight and a half years. China announces that President Xi will visit the US this autumn |
On technology and resources, the White Paper says the US has grown more wary of leakage of sensitive technology and added Chinese and other entities to the Entity List in March 2025. That is a list, kept by the US Department of Commerce, of parties for which a license is required to export goods or technology. Being listed is a regulatory classification, not a judgment on the merits of any company. China has put countermeasure laws into force one after another since 2020. For how these dates overlap, see our note on the US-China deadlines around November 10, 2026.
What the White Paper says about Taiwan
From here I summarize the White Paper's passages on Taiwan. I add no judgment of any political position.
The White Paper says China maintains the principle that Taiwan is part of China and that the Taiwan issue is an internal affair, and has repeatedly said it does not renounce the use of force. The Anti-Secession Law enacted in 2005 includes a provision allowing non-peaceful means if the possibility of peaceful unification is completely lost. Taiwan's President Lai took office in May 2024 and, while seeking exchange and dialogue on an equal footing and maintenance of the status quo, is described as refusing to accept the "One China" principle, and dialogue between the authorities on both sides remains cut off.27 The US continues arms sales under the Taiwan Relations Act, and in December 2025 decided on a package of about 11.1 billion dollars, which the paper says is considered the largest single sale to Taiwan by value. The semiconductor side of Taiwan's geopolitics is covered separately in our article on semiconductors and Taiwan.
Based on Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense, the White Paper records growing Chinese military activity around Taiwan.28
| Year | Chinese military aircraft entering (total) | Chinese vessels in waters around Taiwan |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Over 970 | Not stated |
| 2022 and 2023 | Over 1,700 | About 1,900 in 2023 |
| 2024 | Over 3,000 | About 2,500 |
| 2025 | Over 3,700 | About 2,600 |
Large exercises have also been held since August 2022, in April and August 2023, May and October 2024, and April and December 2025. The December 2025 exercise, "Justice Mission 2025," ran three days, with live long-range fire announced, and the White Paper lists a US arms sale that month as the occasion. The paper also carries a column by a researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies, who summarizes the features of Chinese activity as "practical," "publicized" and "routine." Such columns carry a note that they are the researcher's personal analysis and not an official government view.
On Taiwan's side, the White Paper writes the following.29 Ground forces number about 106,000, including marines, and the reserve force that could be mobilized in a crisis is estimated at about 1.66 million. Compulsory service was extended from four months to one year in January 2024. Its defense strategy, "resolute defense and multi-layered deterrence," aims to constrain Chinese forces as far out as possible. The fiscal 2025 defense budget was about 473.9 billion Taiwan dollars, and for fiscal 2026 a plan of about 949.5 billion Taiwan dollars (3.32 percent of GDP), including special budgets, was approved by the cabinet. A comparison of Chinese and Taiwanese forces follows.30
| Item | China | Taiwan |
|---|---|---|
| Total personnel | About 2.04 million | About 170,000 |
| Ground forces | About 950,000 | About 95,000 |
| Ships | About 700, about 2.4 million tons | About 150, about 210,000 tons |
| Submarines | About 70 | 4 |
| Combat aircraft | About 3,340 | About 410 |
| Modern fighters | 1,838 | 323 (fourth generation) |
| Conscription | 2 years | 1 year |
The White Paper says that converted to US dollars at the exchange rate of Taiwan's central bank, China's published fiscal 2025 defense spending is about 17 times Taiwan's. It then adds that comparing military capability depends on many factors, and concludes that the China-Taiwan military balance is shifting rapidly in China's favor overall. As Japan's position, it says peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait matter for the stability of the international community, and that Japan will watch developments with heightened vigilance together with the US and like-minded countries.
Key points so far
- US-China competition now reaches tariffs, export controls and rare earths, and dialogue also moved in 2025 and 2026.
- On Taiwan, the paper sets side by side China's principle, Taiwan's position, US involvement, military activity nearby, and each side's preparations.
Chapter 3, Section 4, the Korean Peninsula
The White Paper says the peninsula has been divided for more than half a century, and ground forces of about 1.4 million face each other across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Forces are as follows.31
| Item | North Korea | South Korea | US Forces Korea |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total personnel | About 1.28 million | About 450,000 | About 30,000 |
| Ground forces | About 1.10 million | About 320,000 | About 20,000 |
| Combat aircraft | About 550 | About 570 | About 70 |
The White Paper positions North Korea's military trends as a threat to Japan's security more serious and imminent than before, one that seriously undermines peace and security in the region and the international community. Here too, "threat" is the White Paper's term. On nuclear weapons, it says North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017, appears to have the ability to attack Japan, and cites the SIPRI Yearbook 2025 estimate of about 50 warheads.32 The missile ranges the paper gives are as follows.33
| Missile | Range | White Paper's description |
|---|---|---|
| Scud-ER | About 1,000 km | Part of Japan appears to be in range |
| Nodong | About 1,300 km (about 1,500 km improved version) | Nearly all of Japan appears to be in range |
| Hwasong-12 | Up to about 5,000 km | Fired twice in 2017 over Japanese territory |
| Hwasong-17, -18, -19 | Could exceed 15,000 km depending on warhead weight | The Hwasong-19 flew about 86 minutes in October 2024, with an estimated peak altitude above 7,000 km |
Short-range ballistic missiles flying low on irregular trajectories have also been fired repeatedly, including on January 27, March 14 and April 19 in 2026. The paper notes that solid fuel has made launches more immediate, and that North Korea has fired missiles it calls "hypersonic" (the Ministry of Defense is still analyzing whether they are hypersonic weapons). At the Ninth Party Congress of the Workers' Party in February 2026, North Korea signaled that it will keep strengthening nuclear forces for the next five years, while also mentioning development goals beyond nuclear weapons and missiles, such as unmanned systems and electronic warfare. On the abduction issue, the paper says Japan will do its utmost to bring all abductees home as soon as possible.
On cooperation with Russia, the White Paper says it should be deeply worrying from the standpoint of regional security.34 In June 2024 President Putin visited North Korea and signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty. A report from the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team records that at least 100 ballistic missiles were supplied from North Korea during 2024 and more than 11,000 troops were sent in late 2024. The paper's concerns are improved missile performance through combat use, expanded production capacity, spread of experience with new ways of fighting, and the possibility that Russian nuclear and missile technology could be transferred to North Korea.
In South Korea, the Lee Jae-myung administration took office in June 2025. The White Paper records that it is active in improving ties with North Korea while preparing through its own deterrence and joint US-South Korea and Japan-US-South Korea responses, that its fiscal 2026 defense budget is about 65.8642 trillion won (up about 7.5 percent), and that in October 2025 it announced a nuclear-powered submarine program and obtained US approval. It adds that North Korea shows no sign of accepting dialogue.35
Key points so far
- The White Paper calls North Korea's trends a "more serious and imminent threat than before," and records about 50 warheads (SIPRI) and 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles.
- The Nodong puts nearly all of Japan in range, and ICBM-class missiles could exceed 15,000 km.
Chapter 3, Section 5, Russia
According to the White Paper, Russia's defense spending has kept rising since the invasion of Ukraine and reached a record of about 13.5 trillion rubles in fiscal 2025 (about 6.3 percent of GDP, amended budget). The initial fiscal 2026 budget is about 12.9 trillion rubles, the first decrease since the invasion, but spending for paramilitary forces is about 3.9 trillion rubles, up about 13 percent. Authorized troop strength was set at 1.5 million by a September 2024 decree, and an Unmanned Systems Force was newly formed in November 2025.36
On nuclear forces, the paper says Russia values them partly for its international standing and partly to compensate for conventional losses. The new intermediate-range ballistic missile Oreshnik has been announced as used three times against Ukraine through May 2026. The November 2024 revision of Russia's nuclear doctrine changed the threshold for using nuclear weapons from a "threat to the state's existence" to a "critical threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity." Its large ICBM Sarmat was announced as successfully launched in May 2026, with deployment planned by the end of the year.37
Around Japan, the paper says Russian forces in the Far East are far below their peak but still include considerable strength, including nuclear forces. The Eastern Military District has about 80,000 ground troops and about 290 combat aircraft, and the Pacific Fleet has about 50 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 10 of them nuclear-powered). The commentary box says the Sea of Okhotsk is valued as an operating area for strategic nuclear submarines, and that new deployments of anti-ship missiles and other systems on the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Kuril Islands, southern Sakhalin and the Northern Territories appear to be part of a "bastion" strategy to keep other forces away.38
The Northern Territories are, in the Japanese government's position, inherent Japanese territory, and the paper writes that Russia continues "active military activity under illegal occupation." It also notes that since the invasion of Ukraine, surface-to-air missiles on Kunashiri and Etorofu have disappeared, apparently redeployed for use in Ukraine, which suggests that the continuing operation in Ukraine is affecting Far East air defense. Recent examples include flights by Tu-95 bombers around Japan confirmed nine times between December 2022 and January 2026, an IL-38 patrol aircraft violating Japanese airspace north of Rebun Island, Hokkaido, in September 2024, and an announcement in March 2026 of aerial refueling training over the Sea of Japan.39 On external relations, the paper summarizes that Russia is stacking up joint activity with China, deepening cooperation with North Korea through the June 2024 treaty, and has stationed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and signed a security guarantee treaty with it.
Key points so far
- Russian defense spending hit a record of about 13.5 trillion rubles in fiscal 2025, and the initial fiscal 2026 budget is about 12.9 trillion rubles.
- Around Japan, Russia's Far East forces are smaller than before, but the paper highlights deployments focused on the Sea of Okhotsk and ties with China.
This is one of five parts reading Japan's 2026 Defense White Paper. The other parts are listed below.
- Part 1: the feature, the three documents and the budget
- Part 3: the world's security picture and new ways of war
- Part 4: Japan's own defense, the alliance and like-minded partners
- Part 5: the defense industrial base and the people behind it
Putting the Numbers Side by Side
Finally, here are the main figures from this article, as the White Paper gives them. Currencies, fiscal years and scope differ, so this is not a table for ranking countries. It is for checking which country a number belongs to, with its year and unit.
| Country or region | Defense spending figure | Total personnel (approx.) | White Paper on nuclear weapons |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | FY2027 request, about 1.5 trillion dollars | Army about 450,000, Marines about 170,000, and others | 1,419 deployed strategic warheads (May 1, 2023) |
| China | 2026 published, about 1.9095 trillion yuan | About 2.04 million | Operational warheads in the low 600s (2024) |
| North Korea | 15.8 percent of the 2026 budget | About 1.28 million | About 50, per SIPRI Yearbook 2025 |
| Russia | Initial 2026 budget, about 12.9 trillion rubles | About 1.26 million | ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers on a scale matching the US |
| South Korea | 2026, about 65.8642 trillion won | About 450,000 | The paper describes the US extended deterrence framework |
| Taiwan | FY2025, about 473.9 billion Taiwan dollars | About 170,000 | Not stated |
| Japan | FY2026 defense-related spending, 8.8093 trillion yen | Ground forces 130,000 | Covered in Parts 1 and 4 |
As the author's view, two reading habits help. The first is to check the subject. Statements such as "appears to" and "is pointed out that," statements the paper asserts itself, and reports of what governments or researchers announced are written differently. The second is not to fill in what the White Paper does not say. Content that appears only in the appendix volume is not covered here.
On to Part 3
Part 3 covers the second half of Part I. It reads the regional sections on Oceania, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe and Canada, and the Middle East and Africa, together with the "new ways of fighting," meaning space, cyber, electromagnetic operations, advanced technology and the defense production base. The use of drones and the movements of national defense industries that came up in this article are organized there.
Putting the year, unit and page next to every number is tedious work. Still, I felt that knowing exactly what the White Paper says is where calm discussion starts. The revision of Japan's three security documents and the economic security debate are covered in our reading of the primary sources on the three-document revision.
If you work on defense, economic security or export controls, please see TRAFEED as well, and you can reach us through our contact page.
Footnotes
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Ministry of Defense of Japan, Reiwa 8 (2026) Defense White Paper (防衛白書), Part I, first half, printed pages 39 to 154. The PDF position is the printed page plus 10. The public location stated in the PDF is https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2026/pdf/ . The separate appendix volume was not at hand, so nothing from it is used. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 1, commentary box on how links between regional security environments affect Japan, printed page 48. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3, item 3, China-Taiwan military balance, printed page 111. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapters 1 and 3, term boxes (gray zone and hybrid warfare on printed page 43, A2/AD on 74, hypersonic weapons on 48, solid fuel on 127, New START on 70). The note on the island chains is the author's general addition. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 1, item 1, the global security environment, printed page 43. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 1, item 2, the security environment in the Indo-Pacific, printed page 44. ↩
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Same, Figure I-1-2, forces of major countries and regions (approximate), printed page 46. Ground forces are based mainly on the Army figures in The Military Balance 2026. Naval tonnage was compiled by the Ministry of Defense from Jane's Fighting Ships 2025-2026. ↩
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Same, Figure I-1-1, printed page 45. Japan's escort ship, submarine and fighter counts are from Figures I-3-2-5 and I-3-2-8 (printed pages 83 and 85). ↩
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Same, commentary box on the growing missile threat around Japan, printed page 48. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 2, item 1, overview, printed page 49. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 2, item 2, course and outlook of the invasion, printed pages 49 to 56. The table summarizes passages in that range. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 2, item 2.8, outlook, printed page 55. The CSIS figure is from footnote 3 on that page (January 27, 2026). ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 2, item 3, effects on the international situation and responses of countries, printed pages 56 to 60. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, items 1 and 2, security policy and defense policy, printed pages 61 to 66. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, commentary box on US homeland defense under the Trump administration, printed page 67. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, printed pages 69 to 71. The expiry of New START and China's response are on printed pages 69 and 70. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, item 1.3, engagement in the Indo-Pacific, printed pages 63, 64 and 68. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 2, item 2.1, overview, and item 3, transparency, printed pages 74 and 75. ↩
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Same, printed page 75. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 2, item 2.4, defense spending, printed page 76. Japan's defense-related spending is from Figure I-3-2-1. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 2, item 2.5 (2), nuclear and missile forces, printed pages 77 to 79. ↩
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Same, items 2.5 (3) to (6), printed pages 80 to 86. ↩
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Same, item 2.6, activities in sea and air domains, printed pages 86 to 88. ↩
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Same, item 2.6 (3), printed pages 90 and 91. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 2, item 3, external relations, printed pages 99 and 100. The South China Sea is on printed page 93. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3, item 1, US-China relations in general, printed pages 103 and 104. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3, items 2.3 and 3.1, Taiwan and relations with China, printed pages 106 and 107. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 2, item 2.6 (4), developments around Taiwan, printed pages 92 and 93. The column is on printed page 102. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3, item 3.2, Taiwan's military and defense strategy, printed pages 107 to 111. ↩
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Same, item 3.3, China-Taiwan military balance, Figure I-3-3-3, printed pages 110 to 112. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 4, Figure I-3-4-1, printed page 114. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 4, item 1, printed pages 115 to 118. ↩
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Same, item 1.3, weapons of mass destruction and missile forces, printed pages 119 to 126. ↩
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Same, item 1.4, progress in military cooperation with Russia, printed pages 129 and 130. ↩
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Same, items 1.6 and 2, South Korea and US Forces Korea, printed pages 131 to 137. ↩
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Same, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 5, items 2.2 and 3, defense spending and military reform, printed pages 140 and 141. ↩
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Same, item 3, printed pages 143 to 145. ↩
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Same, item 3.6, Russian forces around Japan, and the commentary box, printed pages 146 to 148 and 153. ↩
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Same, item 3.6 and item 5, external relations, printed pages 147 to 152. ↩
