Japan-Germany Summit 2026: What the Economic Security Declaration Says on Minerals, AI and Defense

Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.

On October 28, 2026, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi sat down with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the Prime Minister's Office in Tokyo. It was Merz's first visit to Japan since he took office in May 2025, and about 30 German companies traveled with him.¹² The headlines say "economic security cooperation" and "comprehensive declaration," but reading them alone, it is hard to tell what that actually means. If you felt that way, you are not alone.

Here is the short answer. This summit produced a political statement in which Japan and Germany put economic security at the center of their cooperation. It has four parts: widening the sources of critical minerals, teaming up on advanced technologies such as semiconductors, AI and nuclear fusion, deepening defense industry cooperation, and sharing concern about economic coercion, including arbitrary export restrictions. What I could not find, in what I was able to confirm, is any agreement that directly changes the laws or export control systems of either country.¹³⁴

Key points (as of October 28, 2026)

• Takaichi and Merz met and, according to reports, issued a joint statement plus two declarations, one on economic security and one on advanced science and technology cooperation
• Confirmed: diversifying sources of critical minerals, cooperation on semiconductors, 6G and nuclear fusion, an AI high-level dialogue, defense industry cooperation, and a review of German participation in GCAP, the Japan-UK-Italy next-generation fighter
• The declarations name neither China nor the United States, but express deep concern about economic coercion
• The full text of the joint documents could not be retrieved from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Quotations here come from Kyodo, Sankei, German media and others

If you want to see how this compares with Japan's other bilateral economic security work, see also our piece on the Japan-India summit.

First, the vocabulary that shows up in this news

Stories like this get hard to read because of the words. Here are the terms that appear most often in coverage of the meeting.

A joint statement and a joint declaration are both political documents issued under the leaders' joint names. Generally, a joint statement sums up the meeting as a whole, while a declaration focuses on one theme and sets out a direction. This time, reports say there was a joint statement and, in addition, declarations on economic security and on advanced science and technology cooperation. Neither is a treaty approved by the Diet that imposes legal obligations.

A memorandum of understanding (MOU) is a document in which companies or institutions agree to cooperate in a given direction. Unlike a contract, it often does not fix detailed rights and duties, and whether it turns into actual business is a separate matter.

Economic coercion means using trade, investment or import-export restrictions as a means of pressure to make another country change its policies. Critical minerals is a collective term for resources that are essential for semiconductors, batteries, motors and more, and whose supply tends to be concentrated in a few countries; rare earths are one example. ACSA is the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, under which the Self-Defense Forces and another country's military supply each other with fuel, food, ammunition and the like. GCAP is the next-generation fighter program being developed jointly by Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy.

What happened on October 28

Let me start with the sequence of events around the meeting. Before Japan, Merz spoke in Singapore on his Indo-Pacific strategy. In Japan he attends a Japan-Germany business summit and talks with investors, and afterwards he goes to South Korea for the German Business Asia-Pacific conference.⁵ Japan is one stop on a larger Asia tour by the German chancellor.

According to reports, the meeting went as follows. The two leaders agreed to issue, in addition to a joint statement, declarations on advanced science and technology cooperation and on economic security. On AI, they confirmed the creation of an "AI high-level dialogue" and a review of German participation in GCAP. A "government-to-government consultation" with the leaders and key ministers is to be held next year in Berlin.¹³

Prime Minister Takaichi reportedly described Japan and Germany as "like-minded" partners who share strategic awareness and resolve, and Merz said there are many areas where the two can work together.¹ It was their first in-person summit since last November.

Pre-summit coverage said the declaration would be the first to deal most comprehensively with security, economic security, defense industry cooperation and more, according to diplomatic sources on both sides. It is meant to provide a "framework" for corporate agreements and MOUs, and drone startup Quantum Systems and others were reported to be planning more than 20 MOUs with Japanese companies.²⁵ That was a pre-meeting report of plans. What was actually signed, and how many, is beyond what I could confirm.

What the economic security declaration says

I could not obtain the full text of the declarations, so this part rests mainly on what the German media outlet Euronews reports.⁴

The first point is deep concern about economic coercion. The declaration reportedly expresses deep concern about economic coercion through arbitrary export restrictions and retaliatory measures involving critical raw materials. It also rejects measures and practices contrary to market principles that cause overcapacity and distortions. It does not say which country it means. The coverage notes that the joint statement and official remarks named neither China nor the United States, and it reports that this is being read as an indirect reference.⁴

The second point is concrete cooperation. The two sides will strengthen cooperation on monitoring and assessing supply chains and consider close cooperation in critical raw materials, semiconductors, batteries, electric vehicles, industrial AI, robotics, pharmaceuticals and wind energy. They also welcomed the signing of a joint letter of intent on critical raw materials, and expressed the aim of widening sources and of making rare earths more substitutable in both countries' auto industries.⁴ Rare earths are rare metals used, for example, as raw materials for powerful magnets in motors. Substitutability means reducing how much is used or replacing it with other materials.

One thing to keep in mind is that a declaration is not a treaty with legal force. Joint declarations and statements are political documents in which governments signal direction, and in general they do not by themselves change domestic law or regulation. Nor does a field marked "we will consider cooperation" turn into budget or institutions overnight. What the reports confirm is direction and framework. I saw no commitment with numbers or deadlines.

Critical minerals: why Japan and Germany, and why now

Of all the parts of economic security, critical minerals is the most concrete this time. The background is a supply problem that Japan has faced.

On January 6, 2026, China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 of 2026, prohibiting the export of all dual-use items, meaning items usable for both civilian and military purposes, to Japanese military end users, for military end uses, and for other end uses that would contribute to improving Japan's military capabilities. The announcement took effect immediately and says that organizations or individuals in any country who transfer or provide Chinese-origin dual-use items to Japanese organizations or individuals in violation of these rules will be held legally liable.⁶ China explains the measure as one taken under its export control law and related rules to safeguard national security and interests and to fulfill nonproliferation and other international obligations. On February 24, Announcement No. 12 added 20 Japanese entities to a "watch list," and administration of the measures has continued.⁷ Being on a list is a regulatory category and not a judgment on the merits of the company concerned.

Japan and China view the standing of this measure differently. This article does not assess either side. It reads the Japan-Germany developments on the premise that supply uncertainty has risen for Japanese industry. We organized the text of this announcement in our full guide to MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 of 2026.

Japan has been diversifying its sourcing in the meantime. Germany's WirtschaftsWoche reports that Japan holds stockpiles and supports companies through JOGMEC, the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security, and is currently negotiating 15 joint ventures in nine countries.⁸ Beyond that, a Japan-France rare earths deal was reported in April 2026, under which Japan plans to secure about 20 percent of its future demand for dysprosium and terbium from a refining plant in France, and in June Takaichi was reported to have proposed a G7 framework for stockpiling critical minerals.⁹

Germany has a different situation. According to reports, the EU targets reducing dependence on any single country for critical raw materials to 65 percent or less by 2030, but Germany's diversification is still at an early stage. The same paper reports that the German raw materials fund has supported only two projects so far, that the finance minister raised it to 1.5 billion euros, and that industry is calling for a state agency like Japan's JOGMEC.⁸ In short, Japan has a mechanism and Germany is still building one. There is much to learn from Japan, in the German view.

AI, semiconductors and nuclear fusion: teaming up on technology

On advanced technology, several concrete moves have been reported.

On AI, the two sides agreed to create a "high-level dialogue" and to cooperate more closely on defending against cyberattacks.³⁴ According to coverage, the agreement came in the context of confirming economic security cooperation with China's export controls in mind.³ The coverage does not say who will take part in the AI dialogue or how often.

Cooperation on semiconductors, 6G and nuclear fusion energy was also confirmed.¹ WirtschaftsWoche compares Japan's support for fabs and industrial clusters in Kyushu and Hokkaido with Germany's TSMC project in Dresden, among other things. On fusion, Merz reportedly visited the Kyoto startup Kyoto Fusioneering, which works with Siemens Energy on turning fusion heat into electricity.⁴⁸

Defense industry and security: the other pillar

Alongside economic security, the summit also confirmed cooperation in defense.

In 2024, Japan and Germany signed an ACSA allowing the Self-Defense Forces and the German armed forces to exchange fuel and ammunition. At the company level, pre-summit coverage noted that Kawasaki Heavy Industries is partnering with Airbus on military drone development and that Rakuten Group is supporting the defense startup Helsing's expansion in Japan.² At this meeting, the two sides agreed on defense industry cooperation and on closer ties between the Self-Defense Forces and the German military. On GCAP, Merz proposed possible German participation and it was confirmed that this will be considered. That is as far as it has gone; it is not a decision.¹⁴

On the security outlook, they confirmed that European and Indo-Pacific security are inseparable, and Merz reportedly stressed the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait.¹ Euronews says the two leaders expressed concern about the East and South China Seas and rejected attempts to change the status quo unilaterally by force or coercion.⁴

A summit built on earlier groundwork

This summit did not come out of nowhere. Japan-Germany economic security cooperation has been built up over several years.

At the first Japan-Germany intergovernmental consultations in March 2023, economic security was the central subject.¹⁰ In July 2024 the leaders confirmed the creation of economic security consultations, and the second round was held in Tokyo on October 14, 2025. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and METI co-chaired for Japan, and Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy and the Federal Foreign Office co-chaired for Germany. They discussed strengthening supply chain resilience, responding to non-market policies and practices, and protecting and promoting critical and emerging technologies, and agreed to deepen cooperation in economic security.¹¹ Most recently, on October 1, 2026, Japan and Germany signed a memorandum of cooperation on assisting each other's nationals abroad in third countries.¹²

This summit sits on top of that flow. The government-to-government consultation to be held in Berlin next year looks like the next milestone after this set of documents.

What this means for companies

Finally, let me consider the practical effects that matter to companies in both countries.

First, the joint declaration did not change Japan's FEFTA or its export control system. Developments in export control are happening elsewhere. For example, public comment on a draft amendment to the Export Trade Control Order opened on October 19, 2026. For details, see our beginner's guide to the FEFTA revisions. The Japan-Germany agreement and Japan's legal amendments are separate streams.

Even so, three things could matter in practice. The first is visibility across the supply chain. As the declaration's language on "monitoring and assessing supply chains" suggests, efforts to understand where critical minerals, magnets and semiconductors come from, down to second- and third-tier suppliers, will likely intensify. The second is the need to look at several countries' rules at once. Japan's FEFTA, Germany's and the EU's dual-use rules, and China's measures increasingly overlap on the same product. The third is connecting government frameworks to company initiatives. Like the MOUs reported at more than 20, corporate cooperation moves within the framework the declaration lays out.

As one way to support such reviews with a system, let me briefly introduce our export control AI agent TRAFEED. It supports classification aligned with METI's criteria and screens counterparties. The final classification decision rests with your export control officer. If you would like to see where your own export control stands first, try the free diagnostic tool.

My view

What I find most solid about this meeting is that Japan and Germany have begun to talk about economic security in the same words. Counting from the 2023 intergovernmental consultations, three years on, they have moved from a consultation framework to a stage where the leaders put two declarations side by side. And in critical minerals, AI and the defense industry alike, an entry point for implementation, corporate MOUs, has been prepared in advance.

There are also points to look at carefully. The declarations carry no legal force, and in what the coverage confirms, numerical targets and deadlines are barely visible. Germany's raw materials fund has so far supported only two projects. There is still a distance between agreeing on a direction and actually changing procurement. For companies, the safest course is neither "reassured because a declaration was issued" nor "worried because a declaration was issued," but to keep moving, steadily, on checking their own sourcing and transactions.

Three things are worth watching next: the full text of the declarations, what comes out of the government-to-government consultation in Berlin next year, and what the more than 20 reported MOUs actually contain.

Summary

The Japan-Germany summit confirmed cooperation on critical minerals, AI, semiconductors and the defense industry, built around two declarations on economic security and advanced technology. The declarations are political documents and do not directly change any law. Even so, the direction they set, monitoring supply chains and diversifying sourcing, will affect corporate procurement and counterparty management.

Economic security is no longer a topic only for large companies. If critical minerals or semiconductors sit in your first- or second-tier suppliers, it is your concern too, including for mid-sized and small firms. If you want to turn this into a review of your own procurement and transactions, please feel free to use our consultation form.

What was and was not checked against the originals

I wrote this on the day of the meeting, October 28, 2026, mainly from news coverage. I could not confirm the full text of the joint statement and the two declarations, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website would not respond to retrieval. The account of the meeting rests on reports by Kyodo, Sankei, Jiji and the German outlets Euronews and WirtschaftsWoche. Some figures and phrasings differ between reports (for example, investment amounts in fusion and AI), so I have not included amounts.

I checked China's Announcement No. 1 against the original Chinese text. Announcement No. 12, the Japan-France agreement and the G7 proposal rely on news reports and search summaries, and I have not read the originals. When official documents are published, I will update this article against them.

References

Footnotes

1. Japan-Germany summit agrees on AI high-level dialogue, confirms consideration of German participation in next-generation fighter (Japanese), Sankei Shimbun via Yahoo! News, October 28, 2026 ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷

2. Japan-Germany leaders to issue comprehensive economic security declaration; over 20 MOUs expected (Japanese), Jiji Press, October 23, 2026 ↩ ↩² ↩³

3. Japan and Germany create AI dialogue, coordinate on economic security with China in mind (Japanese), Kyodo News via Ryukyu Shimpo, October 28, 2026 ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

4. Japan: Takaichi und Merz stärken Wirtschafts- und Technologiekooperation, Euronews (German), October 28, 2026 ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸

5. Japan-Germany leaders to issue comprehensive economic security declaration (Jiji Press report, Japanese), Risk Taisaku.com, October 2026 ↩ ↩²

6. Announcement No. 1 of 2026 of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China on strengthening export controls on dual-use items to Japan (Chinese), MOFCOM, January 6, 2026 ↩

7. Announcement No. 12 of 2026 on adding 20 Japanese entities to the watch list (Chinese), MOFCOM, February 24, 2026 ↩

8. Merz in Japan: Deutschland sollte von Tokio lernen, WirtschaftsWoche (German), October 2026 ↩ ↩² ↩³

9. Japan, France agree rare earths deal to cut China reliance, Kitco (Reuters feed), April 1, 2026; Takaichi proposes G7 framework for stockpiling critical minerals, The Japan Times, June 16, 2026 ↩

10. First Japan-Germany Intergovernmental Consultations: Joint Statement, March 18, 2023, Tokyo (Japanese provisional translation), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ↩

11. Second meeting of the Japan-Germany Economic Security Consultations, EU-Japan Centre, October 2025 ↩

12. Signing of the Japan-Germany Memorandum of Cooperation on Assisting Japanese and German Nationals Abroad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 1, 2026 ↩