Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.
Update, November 20, 2026: The suspension under Announcement No. 70 ran until November 10, 2026, and that date has passed. In its September 28, 2026 explanation, MOFCOM said the two sides had agreed to extend the US–China "joint arrangement" reached in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025 (under which each side suspended some tariff and non-tariff measures until November 10, 2026) to January 10, 2027 (MOFCOM, explanation of the eighth round of China–US economic and trade consultations, item 8, in Chinese). In MOFCOM's 2026 announcement index as checked on November 20, however, I found no announcement that changes the deadline in Announcement No. 70, whose text simply suspends the measures "until November 10, 2026" and does not mention the joint arrangement. Where the body says "suspended until November 10," it describes the position before that date. Before any transaction, check MOFCOM's latest announcements and what your counterparties and customs brokers are seeing.
On January 6, 2026, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued and immediately enforced the "Announcement on Strengthening Export Controls of Dual-Use Items to Japan" (Announcement 2026 No. 1). On February 24 (Announcements No. 11 and No. 12) and June 29 (Announcements No. 27 and No. 28), MOFCOM then placed a total of 80 Japanese companies and institutions on the Export Control List (管控名单) and the Watch List (关注名单). This article reflects the position as of October 29, 2026.
One point first. List placement is a regulatory designation under Chinese law. It is not a finding that a listed company or institution did anything improper or was involved in wrongdoing. Many of the Japanese organizations on the lists run legitimate civilian businesses. I do not reproduce individual names in this article; I stick to how the regime works, how to check your exposure, and what to do in practice. Where the Chinese and Japanese governments have said different things, I set out each statement with its source and take neither side.
Procurement officers in defense, space, and semiconductors keep asking me what stops, when, and how far. I do not rest this piece on press interpretation. I use MOFCOM's announcement texts (in Chinese) as the primary source, supplemented by Japanese public-body summaries (CISTEC, METI).
I treat Chinese measures and Japanese security trade control under FEFTA as parallel security measures. I do not adopt framings that label either side as "retaliation" or "countermeasures."
So that name-spelling variants do not stall your list check: A reference sheet listing all 80 entities on MOFCOM's Control List and Watch List in three renderings — official, Chinese, and English (covering Announcements No. 11, 12, 27 and 28). Listing is a regulatory designation, not a judgment on any company: use it to screen counterparties, or, if your own group is listed, to explain your position internally and to customers. → Download the 80-entity reference sheet (Free. Registration with your company name and work email address is required.)
What You Will Get From This Article
- What MOFCOM Announcements 2026 No. 1, 11, 12, 27, and 28 say, and their legal basis
- How the Control List and Watch List differ, and where Announcement No. 1 fits
- Why Announcement No. 1 has no item list and runs on end use and end user
- How the controls on Chinese-origin goods reach companies that are not listed
- What has changed since the previous update (July 6), as of October 29, 2026
- Five steps to take now in your own procurement and transactions
Then and Now: What Changed as of October 29, 2026
This article first went up on May 20, 2026, and was revised once on July 6. Here is the previous version next to what I can confirm today.
| Item | Previous version (July 6) | Now (October 29) |
|---|---|---|
| Number of listed entities | 40 under Announcements No. 11 and 12 | Announcements No. 27 (Control List, 20 entities) and No. 28 (Watch List, 20 entities) of June 29 bring the total to 8012 |
| Scope of Announcement No. 1 | No item list; three types of criteria | I re-read the text and now describe the prohibition as covering "military users, military end uses, and any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability." MOFCOM has said the ban also reaches Japanese organizations that are not listed if military users or uses are involved34 |
| Reporting violations on strategic minerals | Not covered | Announcement 2026 No. 26 (issued June 24, effective July 1) set up a channel for anyone to report violations involving dual-use strategic-mineral items, and a handling procedure5 |
| Customs inquiry procedure | Not covered | MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs Announcement 2026 No. 52 (issued and effective October 19) sets the procedure when customs suspects goods declared without a license are dual-use items. The shipper must submit materials within 7 working days of the notice6 |
| Measures suspended under the US–China understanding | "Suspended until November 10, 2026" | The deadline in the announcements is November 10, 2026, and no amending announcement had appeared as of November 20, 2026. MOFCOM's September 28 explanation says the two sides agreed to extend the Kuala Lumpur arrangement to January 10, 2027. See the China Rare Earth Export Control Map |
| New Japan-bound listings | Not covered | None found after June 29 (checked against MOFCOM's 2026 announcement index on November 21, 2026). The total remains 80 |
| Article structure | Included examples of listed companies and institutions | Individual names removed; focused on how the regime works and on practice |
The reporting channel and the customs inquiry procedure matter to every company that handles items bound for or originating in China, whether or not it is listed. Under No. 52, customs does not release the goods while an inquiry or appraisal is under way6. What separates smooth from stuck shipments is having ready the materials that show performance specifications, use, and why the goods fall outside the controlled scope.
Three Terms to Learn First
Before the announcement texts, a few terms that often get mixed up.
Military Users and Military Uses
Announcement No. 1 prohibits exports to "military users," "military uses," and "any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability," but the announcement does not define these terms3. In practice the exporter judges each transaction and, where needed, checks with the authorities. The idea of looking at "who uses it and for what" rather than at the item alone also underlies Japan's FEFTA catch-all controls and the US EAR.
Control List (管控名单 / Export Control List)
A list published by MOFCOM under the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations to ban or restrict exports to specific recipients. Once listed, exports of dual-use items to the listed entity are banned, and related activities in progress must stop immediately7.
Watch List (关注名单)
Simplified procedures such as general licenses and the registration-and-filing method become unavailable, and each case needs an individual license. The exporter must also submit a risk assessment report and a written pledge not to use the items for any purpose that helps raise Japan's military capability8. It is not a blanket export ban; the accurate description is a large increase in procedural burden.
| Term | Legal effect (per the announcement text) | In one phrase |
|---|---|---|
| Control List | Exports of dual-use items to listed entities banned; individual applications only in special circumstances | "Cannot export" list |
| Watch List | Individual license only; risk assessment report and pledge required | "Case-by-case review" list |
The "Unreliable Entity List" often seen in the news is a completely separate regime. I address it in the FAQ below.
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Announcement No. 1 (January 6, 2026) in Outline
| Item | Content |
|---|---|
| Official title | MOFCOM Announcement 2026 No. 1, "关于加强两用物项对日本出口管制的公告" (Announcement on Strengthening Export Controls of Dual-Use Items to Japan) |
| Issuer | Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM), Bureau of Industry Security and Export Control |
| Issued / effective | January 6, 2026 (effective on issuance) |
| Legal basis / stated purpose | The Export Control Law and related laws. The text states the purpose as "safeguarding national security and interests and fulfilling international obligations such as non-proliferation"3 |
The announcement text is short; its substance is two sentences3.
- Exports of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for military uses, and for any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability are prohibited.
- Organizations and individuals in any country or region who transfer or provide Chinese-origin dual-use items to Japanese organizations or individuals in violation of this will be held legally liable.
Three practical points follow.
Point 1: No Item List Attached
Announcement No. 1 covers "all dual-use items" and attaches no item list. That differs from the December 3, 2024 announcement toward the United States, which named gallium, germanium, antimony, and the like. So the exporter has to check each case, matching items under the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations against end use and end user.
Point 2: End-Use and End-User Criteria
The prohibited categories are military users, military uses, and any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability. The last category is broad enough that a civilian company can be caught depending on use. Japan's FEFTA and the US EAR also have catch-all controls, so the concept is not unusual in export control. The announcement does not say where the line falls for what "helps raise" capability, which leaves predictability low.
Point 3: MOFCOM Says It Also Reaches Unlisted Organizations
In its February 24, 2026 statement, MOFCOM's spokesperson said that listed entities are subject to the measures in the list announcement, and that for unlisted Japanese organizations, exports of dual-use items are prohibited under Announcement No. 1 if military users, military uses, or any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability are involved4. The same statement said the listing targets only a small number of Japanese entities, the measures target only dual-use items, normal China–Japan economic and trade exchange is unaffected, and Japanese entities that abide by the law and act in good faith need not worry4. Even so, because the announcement spells out so little about the criteria, exporters must check end use and end user case by case, and longer lead times remain likely.
The Four List Announcements (February 24 and June 29, 2026)
Where Announcement No. 1 set the framework, the list announcements apply measures entity by entity. All took effect on issuance.
| Announcement | Issued | List | Entities | Reason given in the announcement | Key measures |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 No. 117 | Feb 24, 2026 | Control List | 20 | Entities that participate in raising Japan's military capability | Export ban. Transfer or provision of Chinese-origin items by organizations and individuals outside China also banned. Activities in progress stop immediately |
| 2026 No. 128 | Feb 24, 2026 | Watch List | 20 | Entities whose end user and end use of dual-use items cannot be verified | No general license or registration method. Individual license with risk assessment report and pledge. No cap on review period |
| 2026 No. 271 | Jun 29, 2026 | Control List | 20 | Same as No. 11 (entities that participate in raising Japan's military capability) | Same as No. 11 |
| 2026 No. 282 | Jun 29, 2026 | Watch List | 20 | Same as No. 12 (entities whose end user and end use of dual-use items cannot be verified) | Same as No. 12 |
The "reason given" column reproduces what the Chinese government states in its announcements. It is not my assessment of any entity. The listed entities are not limited to defense-related organizations; they span materials and chemicals, electronic components, machinery, trading companies, universities, and research institutions. Again: listing is a regulatory designation, not a judgment on any entity.
The authoritative roster is the annex to each announcement. Secondary transcriptions can contain copying errors or miss updates, so use MOFCOM's original texts and the Japanese translations prepared by CISTEC910 for your own screening.
How the Measures Differ Between the Two Lists
| Aspect | Control List | Watch List |
|---|---|---|
| Whether exports are allowed | Dual-use exports banned | Not banned, but procedures tightened |
| General license / registration method | Unavailable (exports banned) | Unavailable (individual license only) |
| Re-export controls (extraterritorial) | Yes. Transfer or provision of Chinese-origin items by organizations and individuals outside China also banned | Not stated in the announcement |
| Transactions in progress | Stop immediately | No provision |
| Extra submissions | Individual applications only in special circumstances | Risk assessment report and a pledge not to use items for purposes that help raise Japan's military capability |
| License review deadline | (Not applicable: exports banned) | Not bound by the deadline in Article 17(1) of the Regulations |
| Removal from the list | No procedure stated in the announcement | Removal can be requested once the duty to cooperate with verification is met |
A simple way to remember it: the Control List says "do not export," and the Watch List says "if you export, expect heavy effort and accountability."
What the Chinese Government Has Said, and the Japanese Government's Position
On June 29, MOFCOM's spokesperson said in a statement that the February measures had aimed to curb Japan's "re-militarization" and ambitions toward nuclear armament, and called the new measures "entirely justified, reasonable and lawful" as well11. The February 24 statement described the purpose in the same words4. According to press reports, Japan's Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary said at a February 24 press conference that the measures were "absolutely unacceptable and extremely regrettable," protested strongly to China, and demanded their withdrawal10. I set out the explanation of the regulating government and the position of the Japanese government that protested as the statements of each, and do not evaluate either.
Not Listed Does Not Mean Not Affected: The Re-Export Reach
The most common misreading is "we are not on the list, so it does not concern us." The Control List measures are not only a matter for the listed entities.
Announcements No. 11 and No. 27 prohibit not only Chinese exporters but also organizations and individuals outside China from transferring or providing Chinese-origin dual-use items to the listed entities17. CISTEC warns that even a domestic transaction between two Japanese companies could be treated as a regulated "transfer within the country" if it hands Chinese-origin dual-use items to a listed entity9. A Japanese trading company imports a component from China and delivers it to a listed entity in Japan: under the structure of Chinese law, that purely domestic transaction can raise an issue.
CISTEC also cites a past case under China's Unreliable Entity List, in which a domestic company in the same country as a listed party was warned by Chinese authorities and asked to submit measures to prevent recurrence, on the grounds that it had circumvented the restrictions to transfer Chinese products to the listed entity9. Transactions by overseas subsidiaries fall in range too. So do third-country routes: if a Chinese-origin component passes through a processing site in Vietnam and ends up with a listed entity in Japan, the Vietnamese organization is within the announcement's wording. The logic is similar to the US EAR re-export rules.
You can gauge your exposure in three stages.
- Check whether your customer, supplier, and delivery-destination master files contain any entity on the official annexes (including spelling variants and affiliates). If not, go to 2.
- Inventory whether the items you handle include Chinese-origin dual-use items. If not, direct exposure is limited. If so, go to 3.
- Check whether those Chinese-origin items could flow, directly or indirectly, to a listed entity, through second and third tiers of your sales channels. If a route is possible, you need to revisit contract terms or block the route.
Step 3 cannot be finished alone, so you need to ask your counterparties. A short inquiry is enough.
[Sample inquiry to counterparties] Thank you for your continued support. Regarding the Japanese entities designated by China's Ministry of Commerce in Announcements 2026 No. 11, 12, 27 and 28 (please refer to the annexes to the MOFCOM announcements), could you confirm whether the sources of the products and components you supply to us, or the destinations to which our products are sold through you, include any designated entity or its affiliates? If so, please also tell us whether Chinese-origin components are used in the items concerned.
How to Think About Affected Items
The announcement text has no item list. The items commonly flagged as practical priorities come from industry analysis based on the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations and earlier measures; the announcement itself does not name them. Which items finally need a license is decided case by case.
- Minerals and metals: rare earths (samarium, dysprosium, terbium, and others) and their magnets, tungsten, molybdenum, and related alloys. These partly overlap with the April 2025 control on seven rare earths under Announcement No. 18. The background is in the China Rare Earth Export Control Map 2025–2026.
- Semiconductors and electronic components: high-precision sensors, lasers, and semiconductor materials and equipment parts that may be dual-use
- Aerospace and marine: carbon fiber, specialty alloys, and related software
Four Routes of Impact on Japanese Companies
The companies that believe "we have nothing to do with defense" are often the ones caught by surprise. The impact reaches them through four routes.
- Direct import stop: you import dual-use items directly from China, and the use or end user falls under the announcement's prohibition.
- Suppliers to listed entities: you supply components to a listed entity. If the products you deliver contain Chinese-origin dual-use items, supply may stop.
- Third-country re-export routes: Chinese-origin components reach you through a processing site in a third country.
- Longer lead times for civilian transactions: even with MOFCOM's statement that civilian use is unaffected, requests for end-use and end-user documents are likely to become more frequent. And under No. 52 of October 19, goods declared without a license that are suspected of being dual-use items are held, and materials must be submitted within 7 working days6.
A separate system from export controls: the provisional anti-dumping determination on Japanese dichlorosilane
Apart from dual-use export controls, China's trade-remedy system has also produced a measure on a Japanese semiconductor material. In Announcement No. 37 of 2026 (7 September 2026), the Ministry of Commerce issued a preliminary determination in its anti-dumping investigation of dichlorosilane from Japan (a process gas used for thin-film deposition in chip manufacturing; tariff line 28539090). It provisionally found dumping, material injury to the domestic industry and a causal link, and from 8 September 2026 importers must post a cash deposit. The deposit rates are 99.2% and 80.8% for the two Japanese producers named in the announcement, and 99.2% for all other Japanese companies. The investigation was opened by Announcement No. 2 of 2026 on 7 January 202612.
This is a measure applied when China imports; it does not require a license to export from Japan. It is a provisional, not a final, determination. Chinese customers may ask to revisit prices or contract terms, so companies exporting semiconductor materials to China should follow the announcement of the final determination.
Comparison With the US-Bound Measure
China's export controls were strengthened toward the United States earlier. Comparing facts only, the formal differences are as follows.
| Item | Toward the US (Dec 3, 2024 announcement) | Toward Japan (Jan 6, 2026 announcement) |
|---|---|---|
| Legal basis | Export Control Law / Dual-Use Items Regulations | Same |
| Target | US military users and military uses | Japanese military users, military uses, and any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability |
| Items | Gallium, germanium, antimony, superhard materials, and others named | No item limitation (all dual-use items) |
| Extraterritorial reach | Yes (re-export control) | Yes (ban on transferring or providing Chinese-origin items) |
The formal feature of the Japan-bound measure is that it names no items and centers on end use and end user.
Japan's own security trade control has moved too. An amendment that took effect on May 28, 2025 added goods and technologies related to critical and emerging technologies to the license requirement13. That is a Japanese non-proliferation and security measure operated separately from China's. Whether to describe the two as "countermeasures" or as "parallel security measures" depends on each company's reading of its business environment; this article takes the latter view. For the latest on the Japanese side, see our plain-language guide to the FEFTA amendments.
Five Practical Steps
For procurement, legal, and export-control teams, this order is realistic.
Step 1: Confirm Whether Your Company or Group Is Listed
Check whether your company and its Japanese and overseas group companies appear in the annexes to Announcements No. 11, 12, 27, and 28 (80 entities in total). Even when you are not listed directly, watch for spelling variants of group names and joint-venture names. Official Japanese names, common names, English names, and Chinese names may not match, so screening against a single rendering will miss entries.
Step 2: Inventory Chinese-Origin Dual-Use Procurement
Identify items procured from China that could be dual-use. Link them not at the HS-code level but down to supplier name, item name, and use.
Step 3: Visualize Third-Country Routes
Even without direct dealings with China, if Chinese-origin goods arrive through a third-country processing site, you are within the re-export reach. Cross-check certificates of origin at import against the origin information you obtain from suppliers for materials.
Step 4: Build End-Use / End-User Certification, and Prepare for Customs Holds
Even for civilian use, the documentation burden rises. Prepare a pledge template for suppliers, an internal end-use check flow, and the technical materials needed for license applications and customs inquiries (performance specifications, use, and why the goods fall outside the controlled scope). For organizing your Japanese classification, the Complete Guide to Non-Applicability Certificates helps.
Step 5: Diversify Sourcing and Consider Alternative Materials
In the medium term, advance sourcing diversification and a switch to alternative materials in parallel. Plan for longer lead times and revisit your safety-stock levels.
Common Misconceptions / FAQ
Q1. Will we immediately be unable to procure Chinese rare earths for civilian end use?
MOFCOM says the measures target only dual-use items and do not affect normal China–Japan economic and trade exchange4. But because the announcement has no item list, the exporter must check end use and end user case by case, and lead times may lengthen in practice.
Q2. Does Watch List placement mean we cannot trade at all?
No. It is not a blanket ban. General licenses and the registration method become unavailable and an individual license is required. A risk assessment report and a pledge must be submitted, and the review-period cap does not apply, so the main effect is a heavier burden of procedure and time8.
Q3. Are third-country products that incorporate Chinese-origin parts and are imported into Japan in scope?
Announcement No. 1 makes a basis for legal liability the transfer or provision, from any country or region and in violation of the above provisions (the ban on exports to Japanese military users, military end uses and the like), of relevant Chinese-origin dual-use items to Japanese organizations or individuals3. It is not every transfer to Japanese organizations or individuals, but transfers to the prohibited users and uses. The text of No. 1 sets no content threshold (de minimis). The extraterritorial rules in Announcement No. 61 of October 2025, which included a 0.1% criterion, had been suspended until November 10, 2026 under the US–China understanding (that date has passed, and no announcement amending it had appeared as of November 20, 2026). Check the current treatment in the China Rare Earth Export Control Map.
Q4. Are the "Control List" and the "Unreliable Entity List" the same thing?
They are separate regimes. The Unreliable Entity List is a different system operated by MOFCOM and can trigger restrictions on trade, investment, entry, and the like. The Japan-bound measures here (2026 No. 1, 11, 12, 27, 28) are export-control measures under the Export Control Law and the Dual-Use Items Regulations, with a different basis and different effects. Keep them clearly separate in internal materials.
Q5. Do the measures suspended under the US–China understanding and the Japan-bound measures move together?
The set of measures that includes Announcement No. 61 of October 2025 was suspended until November 10, 2026 under Announcement No. 70. That date has passed, and no announcement amending it had appeared as of November 20, 2026 (MOFCOM's September 28 explanation says the two sides agreed to extend the Kuala Lumpur arrangement to January 10, 2027). The Japan-bound measures (2026 No. 1 and so on) are a separate matter and are not covered by that suspension. The most accurate current description is that the two are separate measures that do not move together.
Q6. Is list placement permanent?
It depends on the list. For the Watch List, Announcements No. 12 and No. 28 state that an entity that fulfils its duty to cooperate with verification may apply for removal, and MOFCOM may remove it after confirmation82. For the Control List, the announcements say nothing about a removal procedure. CISTEC points out that Article 30 of the Regulations has a provision on removal, but the announcements do not mention it9. In MOFCOM's announcement index as checked on November 21, 2026, I found no case of a Japanese entity being removed from either list.
Q7. How should we describe the relationship between Chinese and Japanese measures internally?
"Parallel security measures" is a restrained way to describe it that avoids asserting cause and effect. Japan's FEFTA-based controls and China's Japan-bound measures stand side by side, each with its own legal basis and purpose. In internal materials, avoid wording such as "retaliation" or "countermeasures" that asserts causation.
Outlook and What I Could Not Confirm
- Confirmed: Four Japan-bound list announcements, 80 entities in total. For Announcement No. 1, I found no amending or repealing announcement within what I checked.
- Not confirmed: whether a third round of listings will come and when; any actual removal from the Control List or the Watch List. These can only be confirmed once announcements appear, so I do not predict them. "No additions after June 29" is based on MOFCOM's 2026 announcement index, checked on November 21, 2026 (up to Nos. 56 and 57 of November 6): after Nos. 27 and 28 of June 29, there is no announcement that adds Japanese entities to either list or removes any from it.
- Related developments: At the Japan–India summit on July 2, 2026, the two governments issued the Japan–India Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation, covering five priority areas: semiconductors, critical minerals, information and communications technology, clean energy and pharmaceuticals. About ¥2 trillion of investment had already been decided toward the ¥10 trillion private investment target set in 2025 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-India Summit Meeting and Luncheon," in Japanese). It gives material for thinking about sourcing diversification, but investment takes time to become actual supply. See also the Japan–India summit and economic security.
Given that the lists doubled from 40 to 80 in four months between February and June, it is worth preparing on the assumption that more additions are possible. That is an inference, though, and not a fact until an announcement appears.
Summary
If you only do one thing this week, confirm whether your company or group appears in the annexes to Announcements No. 11, 12, 27, or 28, then inventory Chinese-origin dual-use procurement. The rest of the map:
- Announcement No. 1 (January 6, 2026): prohibits exports of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for military uses, and for any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability. No item list; run on end use and end user
- Announcements No. 11 and No. 27 (February 24 and June 29): 20 entities each on the Control List, 40 in total. Export ban; transfer or provision of Chinese-origin items from outside China also banned
- Announcements No. 12 and No. 28 (February 24 and June 29): 20 entities each on the Watch List, 40 in total. Individual license; risk assessment report and pledge required
- Listing is a regulatory designation: it is not a judgment on any listed company or institution
- Re-export controls can reach unlisted companies: domestic and third-country transactions can raise an issue if Chinese-origin dual-use items reach a listed entity
- New developments: No. 26 (reporting of strategic-mineral violations, effective July 1) and No. 52 (customs inquiry procedure, October 19)
- Chinese and Japanese measures are best organized as parallel security measures
For procurement and export-control officers, list-placement confirmation and supply-chain inventory come first, then end-use / end-user certification posture.
Related articles:
- How China's Japan-Bound Export Control Lists Work, and What Japanese Companies Should Check
- China Rare Earth Export Control Map 2025–2026
- Basics of China's Export Control Law
- China's Extraterritorial Application: Reexport Controls and Japanese Companies
If you want inventories of Chinese-origin procurement routes and checks on transactions with listed entities to run as a routine process, you can contact us about TRAFEED. An overview of its features is in the TRAFEED service catalog (PDF).
References
Primary Sources (Chinese Government)
Secondary Sources (Japanese Public Bodies)
Footnotes
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Announcement 2026 No. 27, placing 20 Japanese entities on the Export Control List (June 29, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_6607ea694b704da8ac5e863a5568e47c.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Announcement 2026 No. 28, placing 20 Japanese entities on the Watch List (June 29, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_1a0adf5de9b84cd091992669d59e10d4.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Announcement 2026 No. 1, "Announcement on Strengthening Export Controls of Dual-Use Items to Japan" (January 6, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_5acdf51490094b39b7ffb381280b2a3b.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, spokesperson's answers to reporters' questions on Japan-related export control measures (February 24, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/art/2026/art_ecab07b2d57149ecbd800fe40362e8ed.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Announcement 2026 No. 26, on further improving the handling of reports of violations of export controls on dual-use strategic-mineral items (issued June 24, effective July 1, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_0bfdf4e0a0f843b8841f2053c3f0a60a.html ↩
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC and General Administration of Customs, Announcement 2026 No. 52, on further optimizing inquiry and appraisal of dual-use item export controls (October 19, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_92d6cb97a5de472d8ffeaf93be12a30f.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Announcement 2026 No. 11, placing 20 Japanese entities on the Export Control List (February 24, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_9518e83d3c9f45929e3017220ba11607.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Announcement 2026 No. 12, placing 20 Japanese entities on the Watch List (February 24, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_aaa675a5b1b04d8c956d30c91fb929e2.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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CISTEC, flash report on additions to China's Export Control List and Watch List (20 entities each; June 29, 2026; Japanese translation of Announcements No. 27 and 28 with notes). https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260629.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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CISTEC, flash report on China's listing of Japanese companies and universities (February 25, 2026; the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary's remarks are as quoted from press reports in this document). https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260225.pdf ↩ ↩2
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, spokesperson's answers to reporters' questions on Japan-related export control measures (June 29, 2026). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_7f7ba1aa2b1a43a480e7f5c0e6f0e618.html ↩
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Announcement No. 37 of 2026, preliminary determination in the anti-dumping investigation of imports of dichlorosilane originating in Japan (7 September 2026; in Chinese). https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/gg/2026/art/2026/art_89051f27ba814b4a97271861d47b39b5.html (checked 21 November 2026) ↩
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METI, "Amendments to Security Trade Controls under FEFTA (Critical and Emerging Items)" (May 2025; effective May 28, 2025). https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law_document/20250328_ristshiryou.pdf ↩

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