Hello, this is Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.
(November 21, 2026) We corrected the date of the U.S.-China summit in the timeline to May 14–15 and put the rows in date order. We also made clear that approval of H200 exports to China is based on press reports and could not be confirmed in U.S. government announcements.
(November 21, 2026) We previously described Article 48 of the Dual-Use Items Regulation as covering "transit and re-export of Chinese-origin goods" and applied it to re-exports from Southeast Asian sites. We have corrected this: Article 48 provides that transit, transshipment, through shipment, re-export, and exports out of special customs supervision zones and similar locations are handled under the Export Control Law and the Regulation, and it does not mention origin or shipments from Southeast Asia. We also corrected our reference to an item list "annexed to the Regulation"; the Regulation has no annex, and the list is formulated by MOFCOM and other authorities under Article 11.
On January 6, 2026, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued and immediately enforced the "Announcement on Strengthening Export Controls of Dual-Use Items to Japan" (Announcement No.1 [2026], hereafter "Announcement No.1 [2026]"). Some press outlets have framed this with language like "retaliation" or "sanctions against Japan", but on the export-control desk, headlines do not move the work — only the statutory text and the operational practice do. For practitioners, the more useful reading is the structural one.
This article is written so that procurement and legal staff who are new to export controls can understand Announcement No.1 [2026] from primary sources, grasp its structure, and translate it directly into an internal checklist starting tomorrow morning. We treat China's measures and the export-control regimes of the United States and Japan in parallel, as sovereign security measures by sovereign states. We do not insert value judgments.
This piece sits as a hub article in TIMEWELL's China export-control series. For each sub-topic, please follow the internal links to the dedicated articles.
A fill-in sheet for the internal check you run next: We publish the China-Related Transactions Export-Control Screening Sheet free of charge. It walks a single transaction through the Export Control Law and the Dual-Use Items Regulations, the critical-minerals announcements, and the four counterparty-list systems (Control List, Watch List, Unreliable Entity List, countermeasure list), so you can keep the same flow as the five steps in this article as a per-transaction screening record. Being listed is a regulatory designation, not a judgment of any company. → Download the screening sheet (Free. Your company name and work email address are required.)
What You Will Get From This Article
- The primary information on Announcement No.1 [2026] and the three-layer statutory structure that backs it
- The relationship between Article 44 of China's Export Control Law (third-party liability outside China) and Article 49 of the Dual-Use Items Regulation (extraterritorial reach over foreign goods containing Chinese-origin content)
- Impact on Japanese companies' Chinese subsidiaries and on re-exports routed through Southeast Asia
- The functional symmetry with the U.S. BIS regime (FDPR, Affiliates Rule)
- A five-step practitioner playbook
The Big Picture of Announcement No.1 [2026]
Let us start with the raw primary information. Reading the official text before reading the press dramatically improves resolution.
| Item | Content |
|---|---|
| Official name | MOFCOM Announcement 2026 No.1 "Announcement on Strengthening Export Controls of Dual-Use Items to Japan" |
| Issuing authority | Bureau of Industry Security and Import-Export Control, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China |
| Date of issuance / effective date | January 6, 2026 (effective from the date of issuance) |
| Legal basis | China Export Control Law (effective December 2020) / Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (effective December 1, 2024) |
| Targeted country | Japan |
| Scope | All dual-use items (first sentence; exports to Japan falling under the three categories below are prohibited), and the transfer or provision, from any country or region, of the relevant Chinese-origin dual-use items to Japanese organizations or individuals in violation of the above (second sentence) |
| Regulatory trigger | Japanese military users, military uses, and any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability (original: 其他最终用户用途) |
| Itemized list attached | None (the Regulation has no annex; refer to the dual-use export control list formulated by MOFCOM and other authorities under Article 11 of the Regulation) |
The standard way to read this is to break it into three layers. The top layer is the Export Control Law (2020). The middle layer is the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (2024). The bottom layer is the announcement itself (2026). The announcement does not stand alone — it operates as an enforcement notice issued under the upper-tier statutes.
Three Types of End-Use Triggers
The first sentence of the announcement reads: "禁止所有两用物项对日本军事用户、军事用途,以及一切有助于提升日本军事实力的其他最终用户用途出口." The prohibited scope falls into three categories. The text is short, but the third reads broadly, which makes it the practical pressure point. The announcement does not define any of these terms.
- Exports to Japanese military users (not defined in the announcement; it is natural to read it as including bodies such as the Self-Defense Forces and the Ministry of Defense, but the scope depends on how the authorities apply it)
- Exports for military end use: design, development, production, or use of military equipment
- Exports to any other end users or for any other end uses that help raise Japan's military capability
The third category structurally allows application even to transactions with civilian firms, depending on use and end recipient. This pattern — catch-all controls tied to use and end user — is the same conceptual template used in EAR Part 744 (the U.S. military end-use / military end-user rule) and in the catch-all controls under Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. In export-control statutory design, it is a common shape.
What It Means That There Is No Itemized List
Unlike the December 3, 2024 announcement targeting the United States (which explicitly named gallium, germanium, antimony, and similar items), Announcement No.1 [2026] does not attach an itemized list. Instead, the outer boundary of its reach is the approximately 1,000 entries on the dual-use export control list that MOFCOM and other authorities formulate under Article 11 of the Regulation (see The 2026 Edition of China's Dual-Use Items Catalog), with case-by-case determination inside that boundary based on end-use criteria.
For exporters, this means a steady state in which "what gets stopped is not fixed in advance". Greenberg Traurig's analysis lists likely in-scope sectors as advanced minerals (tungsten, molybdenum, samarium-cobalt magnets, NdFeB magnets), electronics and sensors (high-precision telemetry, lasers), and aerospace and marine (carbon fiber, specialty alloys, marine engineering software).
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Article 44 of the Export Control Law — The Core of Extraterritorial Application
What determines the reach of Announcement No.1 [2026] is not the body text of the announcement, but the provisions of the upper-tier statutes. Among them, Article 44 of the Export Control Law is the key clause on third-party liability outside China.
Article 44 reads: "Where any organization or individual outside the People's Republic of China violates the export control administration provisions of this Law, harms the national security and interests of the People's Republic of China, and hinders the fulfillment of non-proliferation and other international obligations, it shall be dealt with and held legally liable in accordance with law" (our translation of 中华人民共和国境外的组织和个人,违反本法有关出口管制管理规定,危害中华人民共和国国家安全和利益,妨碍履行防扩散等国际义务的,依法处理并追究其法律责任).
There are two points to flag. First, the article places an explicit cross-border provision on the responsible party. A Japanese headquarters, a U.S. headquarters, or a Singapore office can each become a responsible party where they have facilitated circumvention. Second, beyond a breach of the provisions, the article refers to harm to China's national security and interests and to hindering international obligations, but it does not list which acts qualify. Aiding a violating export, making false declarations, participating in a scheme designed to evade controls — in our reading, the range of conduct is broad. The structure resembles the U.S. EAR concept of "causing a violation" and OFAC's "facilitation" doctrine.
Often paired with Article 44 is Article 49 of the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items. The division of labor between the two looks like this:
| Provision | Primary function | Object captured |
|---|---|---|
| Export Control Law Article 44 | Liability of third parties and related persons outside China | Captures "persons and conduct" |
| Dual-Use Regulation Article 49 | Extraterritorial reach over foreign goods containing Chinese-origin content | Captures "things" |
| Dual-Use Regulation Article 48 | Transit, transshipment, through shipment and re-export of dual-use items, and exports out of special customs supervision zones and similar locations | Captures "routes" |
In practice, the three provisions function as a set. Article 44 covers the violating "conduct", Article 49 covers the "object", and Article 48 covers the "route" — a three-prong design. For deeper coverage see MOFCOM Announcements No.61 and No.62 and the 0.1% / 50% Rules.
A Structure That Mirrors the U.S. FDPR
The U.S. and Chinese export-control regimes are mirror images of each other in functional terms. Setting aside any ranking of value, the underlying idea — that a sovereign state asserts jurisdiction over the global flow of technologies and goods originating from its own territory — has become globally common. We are simply describing factual structure.
| U.S. EAR | Corresponding Chinese provision |
|---|---|
| De minimis rule (10% / 25% U.S.-origin content) | Dual-Use Regulation Article 49 |
| FDPR (Foreign Direct Product Rule) | Dual-Use Regulation Article 49 (technology component) |
| Affiliates Rule (extension to 50%-owned subsidiaries) | Unreliable Entity List / Controlled List |
| Causing a violation | Export Control Law Article 44 |
The Chinese framework took its current shape with the Dual-Use Items Regulation that took effect on December 1, 2024, and entered substantive operational use only with the October 2025 Announcements No.61 and No.62 — so the body of operational practice is still being built. There is nothing yet comparable in depth to the body of case law and interpretive guidance under the U.S. EAR. From an exporter's seat, the stage is best described as "the rule exists, but the operational standard is still hard to read". Industry pieces sometimes use the phrase "Chinese FDPR", but because the functional symmetry coexists with differences in detail, this article does not adopt that label. We use the neutral term: "the Chinese extraterritorial framework that corresponds to the U.S. EAR".
Impact Scenarios for Japanese Companies
Now we bring this down to the practitioner level. We organize how Japanese companies' activities can be affected, using three scenarios.
Scenario 1: Shipments from a Chinese subsidiary to third countries. A Chinese manufacturing subsidiary of a Japanese maker ships Chinese-origin dual-use items to affiliates in Southeast Asia or Mexico. The Chinese subsidiary is directly in scope as a domestic operator in China. If the structure of the onward flow ends up at "a use that may contribute to enhancing Japan's military capability", the catch-all clause can pull the transaction into the individual-license regime. If license review drags on, the impact propagates across the parent company's entire supply chain.
Scenario 2: Re-export routed through Southeast Asia. Chinese-origin items are processed or assembled at a Southeast-Asian base — an EMS in Malaysia, an assembly plant in Vietnam — and then shipped to the Japanese market or to Japanese-owned overseas sites. This comes within reach where MOFCOM requires it under Article 49 (extraterritorial jurisdiction) of the Dual-Use Regulation. (Article 48 sets out how transit, transshipment, through shipment, re-export and exports out of special customs zones are handled; it does not say it applies to shipments from Southeast Asian sites.) In low-value-add pass-through models, the proportion of Chinese-origin content remains high, and the transaction can become controlled depending on the Article 49 threshold. Country-of-origin documentation, bills of materials, and process records are now more important than ever.
Scenario 3: Technology transfer and cross-border movement of technical data. The Regulation covers not only "goods" but also "technology". A Japanese headquarters emailing drawings to engineers at its Chinese subsidiary, or sharing technical data at a joint development site — these acts raise the same kind of "deemed export" issues that the Export Control Law contemplates. Joint R&D contracts and the scope of expatriate engineers' duties need to be reviewed not just from an IP perspective, but from an export-control perspective as well.
For more depth, please also read China's Strengthening of Dual-Use Export Controls Toward Japan and A Systematic Guide to China's Export Control Law.
Suspension of the U.S. BIS Affiliates Rule and Running the Two Regimes in Parallel
The U.S. and Chinese regimes move alternately. Here is the chronology.
| Date | U.S. side | China side |
|---|---|---|
| December 1, 2024 | — | Dual-Use Regulation takes effect |
| September 29, 2025 | BIS Affiliates Rule takes effect | — |
| October 9, 2025 | — | Announcements No.61 and No.62 (substantive use of extraterritorial application) |
| November 7, 2025 | — | Announcement No. 70 (suspends Nos. 61, 62 and others until November 10, 2026) |
| November 10, 2025 | Affiliates Rule frozen for one year | — |
| January 6, 2026 | — | Announcement No.1 [2026] takes effect |
| January 15, 2026 | BIS revises export review policy for advanced AI chips | — |
| February 24, 2026 | — | Announcements No.11 and No.12 (40 Japanese companies, universities, research institutions and other entities listed) |
| May 14–15, 2026 | U.S.-China summit in Beijing; the truce on tariffs and export controls continues (per CISTEC's summary1). Press reports say H200 export licenses for China were granted, but we could not confirm this in U.S. government announcements | — |
| June 29, 2026 | — | Announcements No.27 and No.28 (40 more Japanese entities listed; 80 in total) |
| November 9, 2026 | Original end date of the Affiliates Rule freeze; BIS extends it through January 10, 2027 (91 FR 70789) | MOFCOM spokesperson answers: suspension of the measures under Announcement No. 21 of 2025 (16 U.S. entities on the export control list) and on the Unreliable Entity List (11 U.S. entities) continues for two months from November 10 |
| November 10, 2026 | — | End date of the Announcement No. 70 suspension (passed; no amending announcement in MOFCOM's list as of November 20, and the two spokesperson answers of November 9 do not mention the measures covered by No. 70, such as Nos. 61 and 62; how they have been handled since is unconfirmed) |
Tracking only one side leads to a distorted picture. For the cross-cut view, see The Simultaneous Impact of the EAR, China, and EU Regimes. The three pain points we hear most often from customers running both regimes in parallel are: duplicated paperwork formats, terminological inconsistencies, and the operational difficulty of keeping up with list updates. "Military End User", "軍事エンドユーザー", and "军事最终用户" are defined slightly differently across regimes, and any operation that maintains a separate internal master per regime will eventually break.
Five Steps Practitioners Should Take
To make this immediately actionable, here are five steps in priority order.
Step 1: Inventory the items that fall under the dual-use catalog. Identify the items in your own procurement and sales lists that appear on the dual-use export control list formulated under the Dual-Use Regulation. Sorting them into three buckets — "items handled by Chinese subsidiaries", "items imported from China", and "items manufactured using Chinese-origin technology" — makes it easier to prioritize the downstream steps.
Step 2: Screen counterparties. Run your counterparty list (down to second- and third-tier distributors) against the Controlled List, the Watch List, and the Unreliable Entity List. You also need to map out your relationships with the 80 Japanese entities listed in February and June 2026. Listings can happen abruptly, so a weekly-or-better refresh cadence is the baseline expectation.
Step 3: Update the end-use undertaking form. Prepare an undertaking that lets you confirm the three end-use criteria with the customer. Practically, building on your existing U.S. EAR undertaking and adding China-specific language is the realistic path. Make explicit the seniority range of authorized signers, the validity period, and the triggers for re-confirmation. A document that only looks right on paper will not survive a later investigation.
Step 4: Build out origin and BoM data. Be able to demonstrate, per case, how much Chinese-origin content sits inside a foreign-manufactured product. Putting your internal origin rules and BoM records in order — before MOFCOM finalizes the Article 49 threshold through future notices — prevents rework once the rule operationalizes. This requires coordination across finance, procurement, logistics, and quality assurance. The export-control function cannot close it alone.
Step 5: Move to integrated screening. Continuing to handle Steps 2 through 4 with point tools and spreadsheets will not scale. In the medium term, moving to a setup that can query U.S., Chinese, Japanese, and EU regulatory lists in a single pass — and auto-match them against your internal counterparty master — is unavoidable.
Wrap-Up and Related Articles
Announcement No.1 [2026] marks a turn in which China's export controls have structurally expanded from a "list-based" model into a model that also operates on "end-use criteria". The U.S. EAR, Japan's FEFTA, and EU 2021/821 already operate with end-user and end-use considerations — this is the global direction of travel. Rather than reading the announcement quickly as "retaliation" or "sanctions", we believe the most cost-efficient mental model for practitioners is to place it in parallel as a structural element of global export controls.
The key points, summarized:
- Effective January 6, 2026; backed by a three-layer structure of the Export Control Law (2020) and the Dual-Use Regulation (December 2024)
- No itemized list in the announcement body; operated on three catch-all categories — military end user, military end use, and contribution to enhancing military capability
- A three-prong design: Article 44 of the Export Control Law (third-party liability outside China), Article 49 of the Dual-Use Regulation (extraterritorial reach over goods containing Chinese-origin content), and Article 48 (re-export)
- Functionally symmetrical with the U.S. EAR (FDPR, de minimis, Affiliates Rule), though the body of operational practice is still being built
- Three concrete scenarios for Japanese companies: Chinese subsidiaries, Southeast-Asia re-export, and technology transfer
- The U.S. BIS Affiliates Rule is frozen; the freeze was extended on November 9, 2026 through January 10, 2027 (91 FR 70789; updated November 20, 2026). Assume the U.S. and Chinese regimes will keep moving alternately, and run both in parallel
- The five practitioner steps: catalog inventory → counterparty screening → undertaking-form update → origin and BoM build-out → integrated screening
Related Articles (China Export Control Series)
- China's Strengthening of Dual-Use Export Controls Toward Japan (January 2026) — MOFCOM Announcements No.1, No.11, No.12
- The Complete Guide to China's Japan-Directed Export Controls: 40-Company Blacklist, Dual-Use Controls, and What Japanese Companies Must Do
- China's Extraterritorial Clauses — MOFCOM Announcements No.61 and No.62 and the 0.1% / 50% Rules
- The Complete Systematic Guide to China's Export Control Law
- Reading the 2026 Edition of China's Dual-Use Items Catalog
- China Rare-Earth Export Control 2025-2026 Map
- BIS Affiliates Rule 50% Rule Complete Guide
- The Simultaneous Impact of the EAR, China, and EU Regimes
If you want counterparty checks and classification that cover both Chinese and U.S. lists to run as a routine process, you can contact us about TRAFEED. An overview of its features is in the TRAFEED product catalog (PDF), and other materials are in the resource library.
References
- Greenberg Traurig LLP, "China Imposes Escalated Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan", February 2026 — https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2026/2/china-imposes-escalated-export-controls-on-dual-use-items-to-japan
- Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted October 17, 2020; effective December 1, 2020)
- Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items of the People's Republic of China (State Council Order No.792, issued September 30, 2024; effective December 1, 2024)
- International Trade Insights, "BIS Suspends Affiliates Rule for One Year Following U.S. Agreement With China", November 2025 — https://www.internationaltradeinsights.com/2025/11/bis-suspends-affiliates-rule-for-one-year-following-u-s-agreement-with-china/
- exa-technologies, "H200 Exports to China Re-Approved, NVIDIA Prepayment, TSMC Supply", May 2026 — https://exa-technologies.jp/semicon-info/h200-china-nvidia-prepayment-tsmc-shortage/
- METI (Japan), "Complementary Export Controls (effective October 9, 2025)" — https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/
- METI (Japan), "Export Trade Control Order Annex 1 and Foreign Exchange Order Annex (February 14, 2026 edition)" — https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law09.html
- JETRO, "Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (January 2025) — Information on China's Security Trade Control System" — https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/_Reports/01/c4f5a32439d71ff8/20240038_03.pdf
- CISTEC, "Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items under China's Export Control Law — Effective December 1 (2nd Revised Edition)", October 2024 — https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20241021.pdf
- Morgan Lewis, "BIS Revises Export Review Policy for Advanced AI Chips Destined for China and Macau", January 2026 — https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2026/01/bis-revises-export-review-policy-for-advanced-ai-chips-destined-for-china-and-macau
- Global Times, "China tightens export control of dual-use items to Japan, with immediate effect: MOFCOM", January 2026 — https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352441.shtml
- CISTEC, "Overview of the U.S.-China Summit (May 14–15, 2026) (second revised edition)", May 21, 2026 (in Japanese) — https://cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260515.pdf (checked November 21, 2026)
Footnotes
-
CISTEC, "Overview of the U.S.-China Summit (May 14–15, 2026) (second revised edition)", May 21, 2026 (in Japanese). https://cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260515.pdf . The meeting took place in Beijing on May 14 (as recorded in its translation of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs release). The document does not mention the H200. Checked November 21, 2026. ↩
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