Japan's National Intelligence Bureau and Industrial Espionage: How Ministry Information Is Being Consolidated, Where Counter-Espionage Legislation Stands, and What the Economic Security Think Tank Will Do

This is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL. On July 31, 2026, the shape of Japan's intelligence apparatus was rebuilt in law. The National Intelligence Council Establishment Act came into force, and the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office was reorganised into the National Intelligence Bureau.¹

Coverage tends to reach for comparisons with foreign intelligence agencies. If you are responsible for information management at a company, the questions you actually need answered sit further upstream. What does this new agency do? How is the Council different from the Bureau? And if industrial espionage is genuinely a concern for your organisation, which provision of which statute is the one that touches you?

That is where I want to begin. No prior knowledge assumed. The only materials used are the text of the statutes and the official publications of the Cabinet Secretariat and the Cabinet Office. The K Program, another term that gets thrown around without explanation, gets its own section.

One note first. This article names no country and no company as a perpetrator. Article 2 of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act defines its subject as activities "conducted for the purpose of promoting the interests of a foreign country (meaning a country or region outside Japan)" and identifies no country at all.² The provision itself is written neutrally, and the commentary follows that line. Companies, in this regime, are not the suspects. They are the party being protected.

First, separate the two names

This is where most readers get stuck. News coverage uses "National Intelligence Council" and "National Intelligence Bureau" in almost the same breath. They are entirely different things.

Here is the Cabinet Secretariat's own explanation, translated:

The National Intelligence Council Establishment Act (Act No. 28 of 2026), which took effect on July 31, 2026, establishes in the Cabinet a ministerial-level council to serve as the command centre for the government's intelligence activities, upgrading the Cabinet Intelligence Council (at vice-minister level) that existed before this Act. In addition, the supplementary provisions of the Act amended the Cabinet Act (Act No. 5 of 1947) to dissolve the Director of Cabinet Intelligence and the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office and to establish the National Intelligence Bureau as an intelligence organisation directly under the Prime Minister's Office, which also serves as the secretariat of that Council.¹

Everything is there. Laid out side by side:

	National Intelligence Council	National Intelligence Bureau
Nature	Ministerial-level council	Intelligence organisation in the Cabinet Secretariat, directly under the Prime Minister's Office
Head	Prime Minister (chair)	Director of the National Intelligence Bureau
Main role	Deliberates as the command centre for government intelligence activities	Collects and investigates information itself; aggregates and analyses information from relevant administrative organs; serves as the Council's secretariat
Predecessor	Cabinet Intelligence Council (vice-minister level)	Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (headed by the Director of Cabinet Intelligence)
Legal basis	Establishment Act, Article 2 (establishment) and Articles 4 to 6 (organisation)	Article 16-2 of the Cabinet Act (inserted by the Act's supplementary provisions)

By way of analogy only, the Council resembles a board of directors and the Bureau a standing organisation that combines a secretariat with a research arm. Article 8, paragraph 1 states that "the chair and the members shall serve part-time,"² so the Council is not a body that handles daily business. That work sits with the Bureau.

Article 12 is the joint between them:

Affairs concerning the Council shall be processed by the National Intelligence Bureau.²

The Council decides; the Bureau runs it. Hold onto that and everything below reads cleanly.

The official English names are National Intelligence Bureau and, for its head, Director, National Intelligence Bureau.³

The sequence of events

The dates are easy to muddle, so here they are in order.

Date	Event
March 13, 2026	Bill submitted to the 221st session of the Diet (Cabinet Secretariat; the responsible unit at the time was the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office)4
June 3, 2026	Promulgated as Act No. 28 of 20262
July 24, 2026	At the regular Cabinet meeting: the commencement-date order, the order arranging related Cabinet Orders, the appointment of the Bureau Director, and the tidying-up of prior Cabinet decisions were all decided together5
July 31, 2026	Entry into force. First meeting of the National Intelligence Council held the same day678

The commencement date was fixed by Cabinet Order, not by the Act itself. Cabinet Order No. 233 has a single operative sentence: "The date of commencement of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act shall be July 31, 2026."⁶ The e-Gov legal database likewise records the current version of the Act with a commencement date of July 31, 2026.²

The launch itself is confirmed in the Chief Cabinet Secretary's press conference. On the morning of July 31, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kihara said: "Today the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act took effect, and in conjunction with that we have held the first meeting of the National Intelligence Council."⁷ The agenda of that first meeting was "operating policy of the Council and establishment of its various rules."⁸ No attendee list, materials or minutes have been published, so there is nothing further that can responsibly be written about its content.

Personnel moved on the same schedule. The Cabinet meeting of July 24 decided "the appointment of Kazuya Hara as Director of the National Intelligence Bureau."⁵ In the Cabinet Secretariat's leadership listing, the Director of the National Intelligence Bureau now appears immediately after the Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat. The job title of Director of Cabinet Intelligence, which used to sit there, is gone.⁹

What "upgrade" actually changed

The official wording is "upgraded." It is worth seeing what that means at the level of legal text, because it sharpens how you read the coverage.

The Act's supplementary provisions and the associated Cabinet Order rewrote three existing instruments.

Instrument	Change
National Public Service Act (supplementary Art. 2)	Added "and the Director of the National Intelligence Bureau" after "Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat" in Art. 2(3)(v)-3, and deleted ", the Director of Cabinet Intelligence" from Art. 2(3)(v)-4. The Bureau Director now stands alongside the Secretary General as a special-service position10
Cabinet Act (supplementary Art. 5)	"Article 19 is deleted," removing the provision on the Director of Cabinet Intelligence, and moving former Article 19-2 (Cabinet Cyber Officer) up to Article 19. Throughout the Act, phrases such as "the Cabinet Public Relations Secretary and the Director of Cabinet Intelligence" were replaced with "the National Intelligence Bureau and the Cabinet Public Relations Secretary"10
Cabinet Secretariat Organisation Order (Cabinet Order No. 234)	"Four offices" in Article 1 became "three offices" and the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office was struck out. A new Article 5-2 created the post of Deputy Director of the National Intelligence Bureau, who "assists the Director and organises the affairs of the Bureau (excluding those handled by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center)"11

The Cabinet Act change is quiet but telling. Provisions used to be written around a person's job title, the Director of Cabinet Intelligence. They are now written around an organisation.

The internal structure has also been published. Besides the Director, the Bureau has a Deputy Director; eight Cabinet Intelligence Analysts engaged in particularly advanced analysis of specific regions or fields; seven departments (General Affairs, Analysis, Research, Domestic, International I, International II, and Economic); and the Cabinet Intelligence Aggregation Center. The Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center, responsible for information-gathering satellites, also sits within the Bureau.¹

Do not skim that list. An Analysis Department and a Research Department stand on the chart alongside the units that collect, the international function is carried by two separate departments, and there is an Economic Department. Units that gather information and units that digest it both appear on the org chart, and economic affairs has a department to itself. Both points connect directly to the plumbing discussed below.

A word on what I am not claiming here. It would be natural to line this up against the old Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office and say what was added. But the official page that set out that office's internal structure was retired at the reorganisation, and the Cabinet Secretariat Organisation Order never specified its departments. The delta cannot be shown from primary sources, so only the currently published structure is stated.

The lineage is officially documented as well. It begins in 1952 with the Research Office of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, becomes the Cabinet Research Office within the Cabinet Secretariat in 1957, and is reorganised into the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office in 1986. The Cabinet Intelligence Aggregation Center follows in 1996; the Cabinet Intelligence Council and the Cabinet decision to introduce information-gathering satellites in 1998; the elevation of the head of the Office to Director of Cabinet Intelligence and the creation of the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center in 2001; Cabinet Intelligence Analysts in 2008; the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets in 2014; the International Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Collection Unit in 2015; and finally the 2026 commencement of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act.¹ Seventy years of accretion, lifted a level in one go.

One thing I cannot write: the Bureau's staffing establishment. Neither the Cabinet Secretariat's page nor the text of the Cabinet Orders states it. What Cabinet Order No. 234 does show is a change in the fixed numbers of Cabinet Councillors and similar posts under the Cabinet Secretariat Organisation Order (82 to 81, and 114 to 116) and a change in the "organs of the Cabinet" line of the Order on Fixed Numbers of Administrative Organ Personnel (16 to 17).¹¹ None of those is the Bureau's headcount. Without a source, no number goes in.

Why an organisational statute matters to industrial espionage

Here is the crux. Why does a statute about government machinery bear on a company's information management? The answer is in the definitions in Article 2.

Article 2 defines two things. The first is "important information activities," meaning collection and investigation activities that contribute to securing national security, preventing terrorism, responding to emergencies, and otherwise to the conduct of important national affairs. The second is "responding to foreign intelligence activities," and the text reads:²

Responding to activities to acquire information that has not been made public and whose disclosure is likely to impede the conduct of important national affairs (including improper activities carried out as an integral part thereof), where such activities are conducted for the purpose of promoting the interests of a foreign country (meaning a country or region outside Japan).

Long sentence. Break it into elements:

1. Information that has not been made public
2. Whose disclosure is likely to impede the conduct of important national affairs
3. Activities to acquire it (including improper activities carried out as an integral part)
4. Conducted for the purpose of promoting the interests of a foreign country

Elements 1 and 2 are the ones that stop you. "Specially designated secrets" under the 2013 Act and "important economic security information" under the 2024 Act are designation regimes: only information designated by the head of an administrative organ falls inside. Article 2 here contains no such precondition. If information is not public and its disclosure is likely to impede the conduct of important national affairs, it can fall within scope.

That is not my reading imposed on the text. The Cabinet Secretariat writes it out, in its explanation of the Council:¹

Responding to foreign intelligence activities means responding to activities conducted for the purpose of promoting the interests of a foreign country to acquire important secrets of our country's government, companies and others. Such activities also include influence operations, such as the spread of disinformation intended to steer policy decisions or shape public opinion in a manner advantageous to a foreign country.

"Important secrets of our country's government, companies and others." The government put private-sector secrets into its official explanation of scope, and named influence operations alongside them. That is not a small thing.

To be clear about what this is not: it is not a statement that companies are subject to investigation. Article 2 defines a response to activities that seek to acquire secrets for a foreign interest. Companies sit on the protected side of that sentence. My reading is that a leak of a firm's technical information has moved from being treated as one company's accident to being treated as a matter of institutional concern.

The membership points the same way. Article 6, paragraph 1 lists as members the Minister of State designated to act for the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State under Article 11 of the Cabinet Office Establishment Act, the Chairperson of the National Public Safety Commission, and the Ministers of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Economy Trade and Industry, Land Infrastructure Transport and Tourism, and Defence.² The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Minister of Finance are written into the statute by name. So this is not a foreign-affairs-and-defence body. That was settled at the drafting stage.

Which provisions actually carry ministry information into one place

"Ministry information will be consolidated" is a common line in coverage. Which provisions build that pipe is rarely spelled out. This is the core of the article. Three provisions run in series.

First, Article 7. The provision on supplying materials and information:

The Chief Cabinet Secretary and the heads of relevant administrative organs shall, as prescribed by the Council, provide the Council in a timely manner with materials or information concerning important information activities or responding to foreign intelligence activities that contribute to the Council's deliberations. (paragraph 1)²

Paragraph 2 adds that, in addition to the above, the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the heads of relevant administrative organs "shall, at the request of the chair, provide the Council with materials or information, explanations and other necessary cooperation."²

Read carefully, paragraph 1 says "shall provide" as a standing duty, while paragraph 2 attaches a harder obligation to a request from the chair. And in both, the addressee is the Council, not the Bureau. On the face of the statute, ministries deliver to a ministerial-level council.

Second, Article 12. As noted, "affairs concerning the Council shall be processed by the National Intelligence Bureau."² The handling of what arrives at the Council falls to the Bureau.

Third, Article 16-2, paragraph 2, item 4 of the Cabinet Act. This is the outlet. Supplementary Article 5 of the Establishment Act inserted this provision, which enumerates the Bureau's affairs. Item 4 reads:¹⁰

Affairs of comprehensively organising materials or information provided to the National Intelligence Council under Article 7 of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act, and other materials or information relating to the affairs listed in the preceding three items.

What Article 7 gathers at the Council, the Bureau comprehensively organises. Only at that point does the pipe connect end to end.

Stage	Provision	What happens
Inlet	Establishment Act, Art. 7	The Chief Cabinet Secretary and heads of relevant administrative organs supply materials and information to the Council
Junction	Establishment Act, Art. 12	Affairs concerning the Council are processed by the National Intelligence Bureau
Outlet	Cabinet Act, Art. 16-2(2)(iv)	The Bureau comprehensively organises the materials and information provided to the Council
Analysis	Cabinet Act, Art. 16-2(2) (per the Cabinet Secretariat)	The Bureau collects and investigates information itself and produces comprehensive analysis by aggregating information collected by relevant administrative organs1

The Cabinet Secretariat describes the Bureau's mission as follows: it "collects and investigates information itself, and conducts comprehensive analysis and related work by aggregating information collected by relevant administrative organs. It also functions as the secretariat of the National Intelligence Council, handling the administrative work of the Council's deliberations and organising materials, while carrying out overall coordination of intelligence activities by relevant administrative organs and planning cross-ministerial measures." It cites Article 16-2, paragraph 2 of the Cabinet Act as the basis for those affairs.¹

The government's summary sheet draws the relationship as a diagram. On the left sit the Prime Minister's Office, the National Security Council, the National Security Secretariat and the ministries, labelled "customers." On the right sit the intelligence-related organisations, labelled "providers." The Council and the Bureau sit in the middle. From the customers flow "more intelligence interests and requirements"; back to them flows "provision of more, and higher quality, intelligence." Between the centre and the providers, "basic policy" and "materials and information" move in opposite directions, with "overall coordination" drawn as a two-way arrow.¹²

Separating demand from supply is, to my eye, the point of that diagram. Previously there was no institutional statement of the order-and-delivery relationship between the ministries that hold information and the office and ministries that want to use it. The Council and the Bureau have been inserted into that gap.

One technical caution. If you look up the Cabinet Act (law ID 322AC0000000005) on e-Gov, Article 16-2 does not yet appear in the body text as of August 1, 2026. What the database returns is the version in force from July 1, 2025, which still refers to the Director of Cabinet Intelligence. To check the text, use the bill and reasons PDF published by the Cabinet Secretariat¹⁰ together with the Cabinet Secretariat's official explanation.¹ It is an easy trap when working from primary sources.

Where the penalties are: not in this Act

The presence or absence of penalties tells you a great deal about what a statute is for.

The Establishment Act does contain a confidentiality duty, in Article 8, paragraph 2:

The chair and members, persons who were the chair or a member, persons who have acted for a member as a State Minister under Article 6, paragraph 4, and persons who have attended the Council as concerned parties under the following Article, shall not divulge to others any secret that has come to their knowledge in the course of their duties.²

The duty binds the chair, the members, former chairs and members, deputy ministers acting in their stead, and concerned parties who attend. But the Act consists of 14 articles plus supplementary provisions and has no penal chapter.² It is a statute about the flow of information inside government and about organisation. It does not impose duties or punishments on the private sector.

That is an important baseline for corporate practitioners. The commencement on July 31 did not create any new reporting or notification obligation for companies. What changed is the plumbing on the government side. Given that the plumbing explicitly includes economic affairs, though, the possibility that something will be asked of companies at a later stage is built into the design.

Separately, the Bureau publishes an information submission form, stating that it "accepts information from the public concerning threats to our country or to the Japanese people."¹ I note it as a fact: a channel from the private sector to the state exists. The number of submissions, how they are handled, and whether the form is intended to receive corporate enquiries have not been published, so there is nothing more to say about it.

The think tank and the public-private council: plumbing that switches on by December 2026

So much for the intelligence command centre. A second pipe, one that connects directly to companies, was legislated in the same year.

The Act partially amending the Economic Security Promotion Act and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation Act (Act No. 38 of 2026) passed on June 10, 2026 and was promulgated on June 17.¹³ It writes a public-private council and research and study, that is the comprehensive economic security think tank function, into the Economic Security Promotion Act.

The article numbers, as confirmed in the amended text on e-Gov:¹⁴

Article	Content
Art. 3-2	Public-private council, organised by the Prime Minister in accordance with the basic policy
Art. 3-3	Basic guideline for research and study, set by the government and published after Cabinet decision
Art. 3-4	Research and study, conducted by the Prime Minister, with part of the work assignable to RIETI and part entrustable to research institutions
Art. 95(1)(i)	Breach of the confidentiality duties under Art. 3-2(9) and Art. 3-4(5) and others: imprisonment for up to one year or a fine of up to 500,000 yen

The public-private council (Article 3-2) is defined as "a council on information sharing and countermeasures for preventing, through public-private cooperation, acts that harm the safety of the state and its people carried out in relation to economic activity." Its members are the Prime Minister, the heads of relevant administrative organs, and certified supply-assurance business operators under Article 10(1), designated critical infrastructure operators under Article 50(1), and other business operators the Prime Minister deems necessary (limited to those who consent). Academic experts and others may be added.¹⁴

For corporate practice, paragraph 4 onwards is where it bites. Matters for consultation include "measures the public and private sectors should take" and "measures necessary to manage the relevant information appropriately." Paragraph 5 provides that members shall, based on the results of consultation, "appropriately manage information obtained at the council that contributes to preventing those acts, and take other necessary measures." Paragraph 6 allows the council to request members to provide materials, give explanations and state opinions, and provides that "the member concerned shall comply with the request except where there is a justifiable reason not to." Paragraph 7 allows a member providing materials to attach an opinion on how they are to be handled, and requires other members to "give consideration to that opinion." That duty comes with a proviso: it does not apply where consideration is deemed particularly necessary in order to prevent, through public-private cooperation, acts carried out in relation to economic activity that harm the safety of the state and its people.¹⁴

A company that hands over material can attach conditions on how it is used. Willing to share, but wanting the use bounded: that is an entirely reasonable corporate position, and it has been picked up at the level of statutory text. Note the proviso, though. Do not hand information over on the assumption that an attached opinion will always hold; decide what to hand over on the assumption that it might not.

On confidentiality, read the addressee precisely. Article 3-2, paragraph 9 provides that "a person who is or was engaged in the affairs of the public-private council shall not, without justifiable reason, divulge or misappropriate any secret that has come to their knowledge in connection with those affairs," and the penalty in Article 95(1)(i) attaches there.¹⁴ The Cabinet Office's summary of the amendment describes it as requiring "members and persons engaged in the council's affairs to observe confidentiality equivalent to that of national public servants,"¹⁵ but in the statutory text the criminal sanction expressly attaches to those engaged in the affairs. Members are addressed through the appropriate-management duty in paragraph 5 and the opinion mechanism in paragraph 7. When you brief this internally, keep the two apart.

The think tank (Articles 3-3 and 3-4). Article 3-4, paragraph 2 provides that "the Prime Minister may have the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) carry out part of the work relating to research and study," naming RIETI as the vehicle. Paragraph 3 allows part of the research to be entrusted to entities meeting four criteria: professional capability; capability to collect, organise and store domestic and foreign information; capability to work with relevant domestic and foreign institutions; and implementation of information security measures. Paragraph 4 provides that "the heads of relevant administrative organs may, at the request of a person entrusted under the preceding paragraph, provide the information and materials necessary to carry out the entrusted research."¹⁴ In other words, there is a route by which the think tank side can request information from administrative organs. The Cabinet Office describes the function as adding to RIETI's remit "work to conduct comprehensive research and policy recommendations, with the Cabinet Secretariat as the command centre, bringing together expertise in diplomacy, intelligence, defence, economics and technology."¹⁵

The origin of the amendment is on the record. At the 8th Economic Security Promotion Council on November 7, 2025, the Prime Minister instructed the Minister in charge of economic security to "begin work promptly toward amending the Economic Security Promotion Act," and asked the relevant ministers for "active cooperation on institutional development, beginning with the creation of a comprehensive think tank."¹⁶ The meeting ran from 8:00 to 8:10. Ten minutes to fire the starting gun.

On timing, do not misread the position. As of August 1, 2026, neither the public-private council nor the research and study function is in force. The Cabinet Office summary gives the commencement date for both as "within six months of promulgation," and e-Gov records the relevant revision as not yet in force. Absent an earlier date fixed by Cabinet Order, the outer limit is December 16, 2026.¹⁴¹⁵ Other parts of the same amending Act are staggered: the expansion of the funds eligible for designated-fund councils and similar provisions took effect one month after promulgation, on July 17, 2026; the newly created framework for promoting important overseas projects takes effect within one year; and the addition of the medical field to the critical infrastructure regime within one year and six months.¹⁵

Preparation on the government side is under way. At the 6th Meeting on Priority Issues in Economic Security (director-general level) on June 11, 2026, it was published that, on deepening risk reviews of critical goods and infrastructure, "discussion was held on the way forward, including establishing a review cycle linked with the think tank and public-private council to be set up under the Economic Security Promotion Act."¹⁷ What has not been published, as of August 1, 2026, is the actual launch timing, the identity of participating operators, the content of the basic guideline for research and study, and the scale of the structure RIETI will run. There is nothing to write there, so nothing is written.

What the K Program actually is

The think tank discussion tends to travel alongside the "K Program," so here it is from scratch. The name sounds like a code word; the substance is straightforward.

Its formal name is the Economic Security Key Technologies R&D Promotion Program, in English the Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program. The K comes from that initial.¹⁸

What it does, in the Cabinet Office's words:

This programme promotes research and development, and the use of its results, in advanced critical technologies that are indispensable if Japan is to continue to secure a firm position in the international community over the medium to long term — covering not only civilian use but also public use, in light of the multiple applicability of science and technology. Specifically, it advances work from research and development through to technology demonstration swiftly and flexibly, taking appropriate technology-leakage countermeasures according to the characteristics and maturity of each technology, while reflecting Japan's economic security needs.¹⁸

"Multiple applicability of science and technology" is the official phrasing for what is usually called dual use: the same technology serving civilian and public purposes. The state cultivates such technologies with leakage countermeasures attached. That is the K Program.

The mechanics break down as follows:¹⁸¹⁹

• Decision-making: run under two ministerial-level bodies, the Economic Security Promotion Council and the Integrated Innovation Strategy Promotion Council. Decisions on R&D visions go through deliberation on economic security at the National Security Council
• Implementation: led by the Cabinet Office, MEXT and METI, on a cross-ministerial basis. A programme meeting of experts deliberates, the two ministerial councils then decide the "R&D vision," and open calls follow
• Funding: funds established at JST (Japan Science and Technology Agency) and NEDO (New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization). Those funds are designated under the Economic Security Promotion Act²⁰

The operating rules were set out in "Basic Approach to the Operation of the Economic Security Key Technologies R&D Promotion Program" (Prime Minister's decision, June 17, 2022). That document already stated: "In doing so, use shall be made of expert knowledge, information held by relevant ministries and agencies, and the think tank function that the state is separately developing."¹⁹ The premise of using a think tank was in the founding document in 2022. The think tank now legislated closes a loop set up four years earlier.

For companies, the most concrete piece is the "designated fund council," a public-private forum established for each adopted R&D project. As of August 2026, councils No. 1 through No. 42 have been established, and their themes are published.²⁰ A sample:

No.	Theme
5	Establishing a verification base for eliminating malicious functions in semiconductor and electronic device hardware
16	Strengthening advanced cyber defence and analytical capability
19	Establishing malicious-function verification technology for supply chain security
24	Development of technology for disinformation analysis
25	Establishing AI security technology for a data-driven economy and society permeated by AI
31	Cryptographic technology underpinning secure data distribution (advanced cryptography)

The themes map almost exactly onto the subject matter of this article: verification of malicious functions, supply chain verification, disinformation analysis. What the regime is trying to protect and what it is trying to grow point the same way. On the aggregate size of the funds, a figure that circulates widely: it could not be confirmed as a number from the Cabinet Office's K Program page or from the basic approach document. No figure goes in.

Joining a council brings discipline with it. Under Article 62, the matters for consultation include "matters concerning measures necessary to appropriately manage information relating to the research and development of the specified critical technology"; Article 62, paragraph 7 imposes a confidentiality duty on those engaged in the council's affairs, with the penalty in Article 95(1)(i). Designated fund councils under Article 63 apply those provisions mutatis mutandis. The confidentiality duties for the newly created public-private council and think tank line up in the same Article 95(1)(i).¹⁴ Accepting support means accepting information-management discipline.

Where a Japanese "spy prevention law" actually stands

This question comes up in every conversation about industrial espionage. The answer first.

As of August 1, 2026, no government-sponsored bill amounting to a spy prevention law can be confirmed.

The Cabinet Secretariat's list of bills submitted to the 221st Special Session shows, for bills under its own jurisdiction, five items: amendments to the Imperial House Act and related laws; amendments to the Act on Promotion of Administration Utilising Information and Communications Technology and related laws; the National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill; the Disaster Management Agency Establishment Bill; and the related arrangement bill for the latter.⁴ No counter-espionage Cabinet bill appears. Running through the Cabinet bills in the House of Representatives listing for the 221st session produces the same result: no government bill squarely addressing counter-espionage.²¹ For reference, the same listing records the National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill as Cabinet Bill No. 24, status "enacted."²¹

There was movement on the member-sponsored side. The Bill on the Promotion of Measures Concerning Counter-Espionage was submitted to the House of Councillors as Bill No. 5 of the 221st session, sponsored by Mr. Sohei Kamiya and four others, received by the House of Councillors on April 2, 2026 and received for preliminary review by the House of Representatives on April 6. In both Houses, the fields for referral date and committee, conclusion of committee examination and its result, conclusion of deliberation and its result, and date of promulgation and act number are all blank.²² The House of Representatives listing for the session records the bill's status as "not completed."²¹ In other words, it was not enacted.

The House of Councillors publishes the text, so the contents can be stated as fact. The bill ran to three chapters, 19 articles and supplementary provisions. Article 2 defined "counter-espionage" as preventing the adverse effects of two categories of activity conducted by a foreign country: first, activities to acquire information not made public whose disclosure is likely to impede Japan's national security, and other improper activities; second, activities exerting undue influence on elections, referendums or policy decisions through the dissemination of false information and similar means.²³

There was a provision addressed to companies, Article 7:

Business operators shall, in accordance with the basic principles, be aware of the importance of counter-espionage with respect to the information they manage in their business, and shall endeavour to cooperate with counter-espionage measures implemented by the state.²³

A duty of effort. Beyond that, Article 16 called for a notification and periodic reporting regime, to be created within two years of commencement, covering the activities of persons acting on instruction or request from a foreign country; Article 18 set out a basic policy of establishing a "Cabinet Intelligence Research Bureau" within the Cabinet Secretariat; and Article 19 called for consideration of a new body to verify and inspect the propriety of the measures from an independent and impartial standpoint.²³

At the same time, Article 3, paragraph 2 read: "There shall be no undue infringement of the fundamental human rights of the people, and full consideration shall be given to the freedom of reporting and news-gathering that contributes to guaranteeing the people's right to know."²³ The promoting provisions and the restraining provisions sat in the same bill.

Bill No. 6 from the same sponsors was received on the same April 2. It would have added provisions to the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets and the Act on the Protection and Utilisation of Important Economic Security Information imposing heavier penalties for disclosure to foreign governments or to those obliged to cooperate with foreign intelligence collection (new Article 23-2 in each), and would have written "experience of travel to or residence in a foreign country and other circumstances relating to foreign connections" into the investigation items for security clearance evaluations.²⁴ Its status is likewise recorded as "not completed."²¹

One further member-sponsored bill went all the way to a floor vote. House of Representatives Bill No. 3 of the 221st session, the Bill on the Promotion of Development of Japan's Intelligence Framework, was sponsored by Mr. Mikihiko Hashimoto and two others, received by the House on March 10, 2026, referred to the Committee on Cabinet on April 21, rejected in committee on April 22, and rejected in the plenary session on April 23.²⁵ The session listing records its status as "concluded in this House."²¹ Its subject was the development of intelligence capabilities rather than counter-espionage as such, but it stands on the public record as an instance where a bill in this area reached a vote.

I offer no view on the merits of any of these bills. They are member-sponsored bills, and I stop at the public record: sponsor, date of receipt, and the outcome of the vote. Nor could I confirm, from Cabinet Secretariat or Prime Minister's Office sources, any timing or policy for a future government bill of this kind. So no forecast.

The government has not been left without a task, though. Supplementary Article 7, paragraph 1 of the amending Act discussed in the previous section (Act No. 38 of 2026) provides:²⁶

The government shall promptly consider the appropriate form of measures necessary to prevent situations that harm the safety of the state and its people in relation to economic activity, and shall take the required measures on the basis of the results of that consideration.

Under supplementary Article 1, item 1 of the same Act, that provision has been in force since promulgation on June 17, 2026.²⁶ The public-private council and the think tank have not started, yet the duty to consider is already running. What will be produced, and when, is not written down, so I make no prediction. But the fact that considering "the appropriate form of preventive measures" is a statutory obligation on the government is worth holding onto. The honest answer on a Japanese spy prevention law is therefore not "there is no bill" but "the assignment has been set and the answer has not been handed in."

For corporate practice, that is not the decisive point anyway. Even without new counter-espionage legislation, laws protecting corporate technical information already exist. That is the next section.

Today, the protection runs through the Unfair Competition Prevention Act

The main arena for industrial espionage, as things stand, is the trade-secret regime of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. Read the definition carefully.

Article 2, paragraph 6:²⁷

"Trade secret" as used in this Act means technical or business information useful for business activities, such as manufacturing methods or sales methods, that is kept secret and not publicly known.

Three requirements: kept secret (secrecy management), useful for business activities (usefulness), and not publicly known (non-public nature).

Secrecy management is where most of the work sits. The requirement means that information for which no secrecy-management measures are taken inside the company receives no trade-secret protection even if it leaks. However valuable a drawing may be, if it sits in a shared folder that anyone can open, your legal position is weak.

The penalty levels are worth knowing. Article 21, paragraph 1 provides for imprisonment of up to ten years or a fine of up to 20 million yen, or both, for acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret through means such as breach of management. Paragraph 2 applies the same to officers, employees and others shown a trade secret who misappropriate, use or disclose it, including use or disclosure after leaving the company. Paragraphs 4 and 5 raise the fine ceiling to 30 million yen for acquisition for the purpose of use outside Japan and for use outside Japan. Attempts and extraterritorial offences are punishable. For legal entities, the dual-liability provision in Article 22, paragraph 1 — under which the company is fined in addition to the individual who committed the act — sets fines of up to 1 billion yen in connection with Article 21(4), up to 500 million yen in connection with Article 21(1), and up to 300 million yen in connection with Article 21(3).²⁷

Up to 1 billion yen for a company. As a matter of institutional design, this is already heavy. I have set out the structure in more detail in trade secret protection under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.

I will not name past cases and the companies involved. Holding up a real organisation as a cautionary example is not fair to the parties, and the point carries perfectly well from the structure of the statute alone. That point is simple. Because the gateway to protection is whether the information is kept secret, the work on the company side is not something to postpone until the law changes. It is internal management, starting today.

The security clearance regime is still in its opening phase

One more regime that involves companies: the Act on the Protection and Utilisation of Important Economic Security Information (Act No. 27 of 2024), the security clearance statute, which took effect on May 16, 2025.²⁸

The first-year operating figures were reported to the Diet and published on June 26, 2026,²⁸ covering May 16 to December 31, 2025, which is roughly seven and a half months. From the summary:²⁹

Item	Figure
Designations of important economic security information	20 across 9 organs (one released within the year, leaving 19 across 9 organs at year end)
Holdings of administrative documents recording such information	43 across 8 organs
Reports to the whistle-blowing contact points on violations	0
Security clearance evaluations conducted	18 across 2 organs (0 for employees of certified business operators)
Organs requesting evaluation investigations from the Prime Minister	217 across 11 organs
Certifications of business operators	0

I am not using these numbers to criticise the regime, nor to assert that companies are being reluctant. They are the figures for a seven-and-a-half-month ramp-up, and should be read as such.

There is a practical inference, though. Zero certified business operators means that preparation on the private-sector side is only now beginning in earnest. The Cabinet Office publishes the protection rules of each administrative organ, the list of whistle-blowing contact points, and the list of grievance and consultation contact points for clearance evaluations, alongside the operating standards, the guidelines (administrative organ edition and certified business operator edition), and a Q&A on evaluations.²⁸ Reading is a reasonable place to start. Oversight has also been exercised: during 2025 the Cabinet Office's Inspector General for Public Records Management issued one request for correction to an administrative organ concerning the marking of important economic security information, the organ concerned took the necessary corrective measures, and the Cabinet Office issued a notice to all administrative organs.²⁹

I have covered the regime in more detail in the basics of Japan's security clearance system and corporate responses to the Important Economic Security Information Act.

What companies can start on today

The institutional side has moved. What should a company do? In priority order.

1. Make secrecy management stand up on paper. Identify what your trade secrets are, restrict who can access them, and take measures that make their secret status recognisable. Protection under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act reaches only information you have done this work on.²⁷ Start by taking stock of drawings, recipes, process conditions, jig and tool designs, and customer lists as separate units.

2. Put access control and export logging around technical information. Who viewed which drawing, when, and where did they send it. Without records you can reconstruct afterwards, you cannot prove anything when a leak occurs. Drawings flowing to overseas sites and subcontractors travel the same channels as deemed exports and export control risk in drawings. If you already maintain an export-control register, adding a column to it is the shortest route.

3. Close the contractual gaps. NDAs, joint research agreements, subcontracting agreements, and separation agreements. Article 21, paragraph 2 reaches use and disclosure after departure,²⁷ but before anything becomes a criminal matter, what can be prevented by contract and operation should be. The same applies to industry-academia collaboration; I have written about the practice in the basics of research integrity and research security.

4. Make counterparty screening a continuing process. Confirming who you are dealing with, and who the end user is beyond them, is not a one-off exercise. Control lists in every jurisdiction keep changing. One thing worth stating plainly: appearing on a control list is a regulatory classification, not a judgement on the company concerned. The purpose of checking is not to walk away from business but to avoid missing a procedure that applies. This is the area where TRAFEED, the export-control AI agent we build, supports classification — deciding whether your product or technology falls under a controlled item — as well as counterparty screening, and preserves the evidence trail. But before the question of tooling comes the question of whether you have an operation that records who confirmed what, and when. I have set out the approach in end-user screening and customer due diligence.

5. Decide your rules for sharing before the public-private council starts. Commencement falls by December 16, 2026. Who decides, and what level of information can be shared. Settling those two questions in advance changes how you move if you are approached. The opinion mechanism in paragraph 7 is the tool for exactly that.¹⁴

6. Treat certified business operator status as a live option. Zero certifications so far also means there is room to be present while the operating practice settles.²⁹ Whether or not you move now, it is worth reading the certified business operator guidelines to understand the requirements you would need to meet.

None of this is dramatic. But now that the state has built plumbing to consolidate information, a missing pipe on the company side simply means that things you could have protected go unprotected.

Summary

• On July 31, 2026, the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act (Act No. 28 of 2026) came into force on the date set by Cabinet Order No. 233, and the first meeting of the National Intelligence Council was held the same day, as announced by the Chief Cabinet Secretary that morning
• The Council is a ministerial-level body chaired by the Prime Minister; the Bureau is an intelligence organisation in the Cabinet Secretariat directly under the Prime Minister's Office. Article 12 joins them: "affairs concerning the Council shall be processed by the National Intelligence Bureau." The Director of Cabinet Intelligence and the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office were dissolved
• Consolidation of ministry information runs through three provisions: Article 7 (supply to the Council), Article 12 (the Bureau processes the Council's affairs), and Cabinet Act Article 16-2(2)(iv) (the Bureau comprehensively organises). Note that Article 7 addresses the Council, not the Bureau
• The Article 2 definition of "foreign intelligence activities" does not presuppose a designation regime, and the Cabinet Secretariat itself refers to "important secrets of our country's government, companies and others." That is the primary basis for saying corporate secrets sit within the regime's concern
• The Act has no penal chapter, and its commencement created no new obligations for companies
• The public-private council (amended Act, Article 3-2) and the economic security think tank (Articles 3-3 and 3-4, delivered through RIETI) are not in force as of August 1, 2026. Commencement is within six months of promulgation; absent an earlier Cabinet Order, the outer limit is December 16, 2026
• The K Program is a cross-ministerial critical-technology programme run through designated funds at JST and NEDO. Designated fund councils No. 1 to No. 42 have been established and their themes published. The size of the funds, and the Bureau's headcount, could not be confirmed from primary sources and are therefore not stated
• No government-sponsored spy prevention bill can be confirmed as of August 1, 2026. The member-sponsored Bill on the Promotion of Measures Concerning Counter-Espionage (HC Bill No. 5) is recorded in the House of Representatives listing with the status "not completed" and was not enacted; the Bill on the Promotion of Development of Japan's Intelligence Framework (HR Bill No. 3) was voted down in the plenary session on April 23, 2026
• Supplementary Article 7, paragraph 1 of the amending Act does, however, require the government to consider promptly what measures are needed to prevent situations that harm the safety of the state and its people in relation to economic activity, and that provision has been in force since promulgation on June 17, 2026. No bill, but a statutory duty to consider
• Today, the centre of gravity for protecting corporate technical information is the trade-secret regime of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. The gateway is whether information is kept secret, and that is internal work which does not wait for legislation

The institutions have been rebuilt so that information converges in one place. What flows through that pipe, though, is information held by government. Nobody else is going to protect the drawings and recipes sitting inside your company. Trade-secret management and counterparty checks are work that has to be completed on your own register. With the state's pipework now thicker, this is a good moment to find the narrow sections of your own.

View the TRAFEED service page

Related articles

• What the National Intelligence Bureau is
• The National Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Bureau explained
• Spy prevention law and the Important Economic Security Information Act from a business perspective
• Comparing counter-espionage laws across jurisdictions
• The 2026 amendment to the Economic Security Promotion Act (Act No. 38)
• What the K Program is
• Trade secret protection under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act
• The basics of Japan's security clearance system

---

References

• Cabinet Secretariat, "National Intelligence Council / National Intelligence Bureau"
• Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Order No. 233 (commencement date) and Cabinet Order No. 234 (arrangement of related Cabinet Orders)
• Cabinet Secretariat, National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill: bill text and reasons
• Cabinet Secretariat, "Outline of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act"
• Prime Minister's Office, Chief Cabinet Secretary press conference (morning, July 31, 2026); Cabinet meeting agenda, July 24, 2026
• e-Gov: National Intelligence Council Establishment Act; Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures; Unfair Competition Prevention Act
• Cabinet Office: Economic Security Promotion Act; Important Economic Security Information Act; K Program; support system for advanced critical technologies
• Cabinet Secretariat: 8th Economic Security Promotion Council minutes; 6th Meeting on Priority Issues in Economic Security (results)
• House of Representatives list of bills and bill progress records, 221st session; House of Councillors bill texts, 221st session

Footnotes

1. Cabinet Secretariat, "National Intelligence Council / National Intelligence Bureau" (organisation, mission, history, explanation of the Council, information submission form) https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/nic_nib.html ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹

2. e-Gov, "National Intelligence Council Establishment Act" (Act No. 28 of 2026; promulgated June 3, 2026; in force July 31, 2026), Articles 2 and 4 to 14 https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/508AC0000000028 ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹²

3. Cabinet Secretariat, "List of English Names of Cabinet Secretariat Organisations and Posts" https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/eibun/index.html ↩

4. Cabinet Secretariat, "Bills Submitted to the Diet (221st Special Session)" https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/houan/221.html ↩ ↩²

5. Prime Minister's Office, "Agenda of the Regular Cabinet Meeting, Friday, July 24, 2026" https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugi/2026/kakugi-2026072401.html ↩ ↩²

6. Cabinet Secretariat, "Cabinet Order Specifying the Date of Commencement of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act" (Cabinet Order No. 233), original PDF https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/kokkajyouhokaigi_kijitsu.pdf ↩ ↩²

7. Prime Minister's Office, "Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary," morning of Friday, July 31, 2026 https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/202607/31_a.html ↩ ↩²

8. Cabinet Secretariat, "National Intelligence Council: Meetings Held" (FY2026, 1st meeting, July 31, 2026; agenda: operating policy of the Council and establishment of its various rules) https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/nic_kaisai.html ↩ ↩²

9. Cabinet Secretariat, "Senior Officials" https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/kanbu/index.html ↩

10. Cabinet Secretariat, "National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill: Bill Text and Reasons" (submitted to the 221st session, March 13, 2026), supplementary Articles 2, 3 and 5 https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/houan/260313/houritsuanriyuu.pdf ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

11. Cabinet Secretariat, "Cabinet Order on the Arrangement of Related Cabinet Orders Accompanying the Enforcement of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act" (Cabinet Order No. 234), original PDF https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/kokkajyouhokaigi_seibi.pdf ↩ ↩²

12. Cabinet Secretariat, "Outline of the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act," PDF https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/kokkajyouhokaigi_gaiyou.pdf ↩

13. Cabinet Office, "Economic Security Promotion Act" (passage and promulgation of the amending Act; overview of the regime) https://www.cao.go.jp/keizai_anzen_hosho/suishinhou/suishinhou.html ↩

14. e-Gov, "Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures" (Act No. 43 of 2022), as amended by Act No. 38 of 2026: Articles 2, 3, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 62, 63 and 95. The relevant revision has a commencement date of December 16, 2026 and is not in force as of August 1, 2026 https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/504AC0000000043 ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸

15. Cabinet Office, "Outline of the Act Partially Amending the Economic Security Promotion Act and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation Act," PDF https://www.cao.go.jp/keizai_anzen_hosho/suishinhou/doc/houangaiyo.pdf ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

16. Cabinet Secretariat, "8th Economic Security Promotion Council: Minutes" (November 7, 2025), PDF https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/keizai_anzen_hosyo/dai8/gijiyoshi.pdf ↩

17. Cabinet Secretariat, "6th Meeting on Priority Issues in Economic Security (Results)" (held June 11, 2026; published June 15, 2026), PDF https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/keizai_anzen_hosyo/kentokaigi_dai6/gaiyo.pdf ↩

18. Cabinet Office, "Economic Security Key Technologies R&D Promotion Program (K Program)" https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/anzen_anshin/kprogram.html ↩ ↩² ↩³

19. Cabinet Office, "Basic Approach to the Operation of the Economic Security Key Technologies R&D Promotion Program" (Prime Minister's decision, June 17, 2022), PDF https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/anzen_anshin/20220617_kihonteki.pdf ↩ ↩²

20. Cabinet Office, "System for Supporting the Development of Advanced Critical Technologies" (designated funds, status of designated fund councils, model council rules) https://www.cao.go.jp/keizai_anzen_hosho/suishinhou/technology/technology.html ↩ ↩²

21. House of Representatives, "List of Bills, 221st Session of the Diet" (status listing for Cabinet, House of Representatives and House of Councillors bills; HC Bills No. 5 and No. 6 are both recorded as "not completed," HR Bill No. 3 as "concluded in this House," and Cabinet Bill No. 24, the National Intelligence Council Establishment Bill, as "enacted") https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/kaiji221.htm ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵

22. House of Representatives, "Bill Progress Information: House of Councillors Bill No. 5, 221st Session, Bill on the Promotion of Measures Concerning Counter-Espionage" https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/keika/1DE2532.htm ↩

23. House of Councillors, "221st Session, HC Bill No. 5, Bill on the Promotion of Measures Concerning Counter-Espionage," text PDF https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/gian/221/pdf/t1002210052210.pdf ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

24. House of Councillors, "221st Session, HC Bill No. 6, Bill Partially Amending the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets and the Act on the Protection and Utilisation of Important Economic Security Information," text PDF https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/gian/221/pdf/t1002210062210.pdf ↩

25. House of Representatives, "Bill Progress Information: House of Representatives Bill No. 3, 221st Session, Bill on the Promotion of Development of Japan's Intelligence Framework" (received March 10, 2026; referred to the Committee on Cabinet April 21, 2026; rejected in committee April 22, 2026; rejected in plenary April 23, 2026) https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/keika/1DE1E7E.htm ↩

26. e-Gov, supplementary Article 1, item 1 and supplementary Article 7, paragraph 1 of Act No. 38 of June 17, 2026, as carried in the record of the Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures (supplementary Article 7, paragraph 1 in force from the date of promulgation) https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/504AC0000000043 ↩ ↩²

27. e-Gov, "Unfair Competition Prevention Act" (Act No. 47 of 1993), Article 2(6), Articles 21 and 22 https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/405AC0000000047 ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

28. Cabinet Office, "Act on the Protection and Utilisation of Important Economic Security Information" (operating standards, guidelines, contact point lists, oversight framework) https://www.cao.go.jp/keizai_anzen_hosho/hogokatsuyou/hogokatsuyou.html ↩ ↩² ↩³

29. Cabinet Office, "Report on the Status of Designation and Release of Important Economic Security Information, Implementation of Security Clearance Evaluations, and Certification of Business Operators," summary PDF (dated June 2026; period covered May 16 to December 31, 2025) https://www.cao.go.jp/keizai_anzen_hosho/kokkaihoukoku/houkoku_gaiyou.pdf ↩ ↩² ↩³