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HomeTRAFEED MediaWhy “Using” Huawei Ascend 910B Can Violate U.S. Export Rules: BIS GP10 Guidance Explained
TRAFEED Media

Why “Using” Huawei Ascend 910B Can Violate U.S. Export Rules: BIS GP10 Guidance Explained

Published2026-05-20Updated2026-11-21Checked against sources2026-11-21Ryuta Hamamoto
export controlHuawei Ascend 910BGP10 guidanceFDPRU.S. export regulationsChina AI chipsTRAFEED

BIS's GP10 guidance of May 13, 2025 warned of the risks of using Chinese advanced computing chips such as the Huawei Ascend 910B, 910C, and 910D with knowledge that they were made in violation of the EAR. This piece covers the guidance's logic, the withdrawn "anywhere" phrasing, China's rebuttal, three exposure patterns (cloud, China subsidiaries, co-development), penalties, and five practical steps.

Why “Using” Huawei Ascend 910B Can Violate U.S. Export Rules: BIS GP10 Guidance Explained
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(November 21, 2026) We corrected the penalty summary: criminal penalties under ECRA are fines of up to $1 million and, for individuals, up to 20 years imprisonment, without a "ten times the transaction value" alternative. We also corrected the year Huawei was added to the Entity List from 2020 to 2019.

(November 21, 2026) We corrected Q3 on AI models. Model weights were controlled under ECCN 4E091 in January 2025, and that entry was removed by the November 19, 2026 rule. We also corrected the source for the Japan–India summit paragraph.

Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL. This piece is for people who run AI infrastructure or cloud strategy, commercial or corporate-planning teams with China exposure, and export-control staff.

If you found this by searching “Huawei Ascend 910B use violation,” you may be weighing China-made AI chips or Huawei Cloud for cost reasons, learning that a China subsidiary already deployed 910B-based servers, or hearing partners say “don’t touch Ascend 910B” without a clear legal basis. I hear all three versions in the field.

Bottom line: on 13 May 2025, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published guidance that using Huawei Ascend 910B, 910C, or 910D can violate the EAR.1 Early language said use anywhere in the world could violate U.S. controls. Bloomberg and others covered it widely.2 China called the move “unilateral economic bullying” and warned that firms following the guidance could face the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law.3 BIS later quietly dropped the “anywhere in the world” phrasing, but the guidance framework was not rescinded.4

A framing note up front: Huawei’s Entity List listing and related export-control designations are regulatory classifications under U.S. rules, not a judgment on corporate worth or legitimacy as a commercial counterparty. I map U.S. claims, Chinese rebuttals, and think-tank views at equal distance, then end with what Japanese companies should do next week.


What you will learn

  • What the 13 May 2025 GP10 guidance says, from three beginner terms
  • How Ascend 910B compares with NVIDIA H100 and why it sits in the control debate
  • Parallel views from BIS, China’s MOFCOM, and CSIS/RAND/CSET/ITIF
  • Three patterns that catch Japanese companies (cloud, China subsidiaries, joint development)
  • Violation risk (including the Seagate $300 million settlement) and five practical steps

Three terms: GP10 / FDPR / Ascend 910B

1. Ascend 910B: Huawei’s AI accelerator. Positioned against NVIDIA H100 for training and inference of generative and vision models. Original Ascend 910 was made at TSMC; after Huawei’s Entity List listing in May 2019 (a U.S. regulatory designation) and the May 2020 amendment of the foreign-produced direct product rule for listed entities, TSMC stopped supply and Huawei shifted production to SMIC. That product is 910B.5

2. FDPR (Foreign Direct Product Rule): Foreign-made items fall under the EAR if they are the direct product of specified U.S. technology or software, or are made with plant or major equipment that is itself such a direct product (15 CFR 734.9). What matters is what the item was made with, not how much U.S. content is inside it — the share of U.S. content is the separate de minimis rule (15 CFR 734.4). “Made outside the U.S., so U.S. law does not apply” often fails. For what the FDPR is and how it differs from de minimis, see the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) explained.

3. GP10 (General Prohibition 10): EAR prohibition against knowingly selling, buying, using, transporting, servicing, or otherwise dealing in an item that is the subject of an EAR violation. If you know it is a violation item, almost any involvement can be out of bounds.

BIS’s May 2025 chain of reasoning:

Ascend 910B was likely designed with certain U.S. software or technology, or produced with semiconductor manufacturing equipment that is the direct product of such technology or software (FDPR applies), so it is likely subject to the EAR; BIS licenses were likely required during its design and production, and without them it was likely made in violation of the EAR; knowingly using those items can violate GP10.

If that logic holds, “use alone violates” is a strong claim. China strongly disputes it, and think tanks question enforceability. Both sides below.


Technical position: Ascend 910B vs NVIDIA H100

Item Huawei Ascend 910B NVIDIA H100 (reference)
Process SMIC ~7 nm (N+2, DUV) TSMC 4 nm
Memory HBM2e 64GB HBM3 80GB
Memory bandwidth ~400 GB/s–1.2 TB/s ~3 TB/s
FP16 (nominal) ~320 TFLOPS ~1,000 TFLOPS
INT8 (nominal) ~640 TOPS ~2,000 TOPS
Power ~400W ~700W
Price (indicative) CNY 110,000 (JPY 2.3M) $25–30k (JPY 3.8–4.5M)

Sources: Tom’s Hardware, TrendForce, CSET, and related analyses.6

Roughly 60–70% of H100 performance at lower power. Not leading edge, but competitive enough for generative AI. About 450,000 units were reportedly sold in China in 2024, roughly half of NVIDIA’s China-compliant H20 volume (~1 million).67

Buyers include China Mobile and firms such as iFlytek and SenseTime, plus Baidu, Tencent, and Alibaba at scale. Models such as DeepSeek are optimizing for successor Ascend 950PR-class silicon, extending the ecosystem.78

That 910B is not cutting-edge complicates the debate. BIS’s stated logic is that volume adoption still raises China’s overall AI capability floor. That is a policy claim about compute scale, not a judgment on the legitimacy of the commercial buyers.


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BIS claims: 13 May 2025 GP10 guidance and the withdrawn “anywhere” language

Nature of the document

Official title: Guidance on Application of General Prohibition 10 (GP10) to People's Republic of China Advanced Computing Integrated Circuits (13 May 2025).1

It is not a new statute. GP10 already existed. The guidance explains how BIS applies it to Ascend-class Chinese AI chips, an interpretation that can still be debated legally.

“Anywhere in the world” episode

The initial press language:

"using Huawei Ascend chips anywhere in the world violates U.S. export controls"

Bloomberg led coverage; specialist media followed.2 Export-control teams worldwide reacted immediately.

After MOFCOM pushback, BIS quietly rewrote the language around 20 May, dropping the categorical global claim for softer “alerting industry to the risks” framing.4

The GP10 application framework was not withdrawn. Only the rhetoric changed. Practically, diplomacy softened; the compliance net stayed.

Red flags for industry

BIS's AI Counter-Diversion Industry Guidance, issued the same day, listed diligence red flags, including:910

  • Unclear final delivery / installation site
  • The destination data center cannot affirm it has the infrastructure (power, cooling, physical space) to run the chips
  • Material differences between English and non-English websites
  • Unclear HQ/parent location (especially D:5 arms-embargo destinations such as China/Macau)
  • Refusal or incomplete disclosure

Even “known customers” can trigger BIS expectation of extra diligence, and BIS says it will aggravate penalties when diligence is skipped.9


Chinese rebuttal: “unilateral bullying” and Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law signals

MOFCOM statement

On 15 May 2025, MOFCOM’s spokesperson argued:

  • The guidance is typical unilateral bullying and protectionism3
  • It seriously harms global semiconductor supply-chain stability and undercuts U.S.–China trade negotiation progress11
  • Third-country firms that boycott Huawei Ascend under the guidance may face China’s Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (2021)3
  • Firms that want to keep doing business in China should not simply follow unilateral U.S. demands

The countermeasures signal matters for planning. The 2021 law is the statutory basis for Chinese responses against firms that implement foreign sanctions. Activation examples are still limited, but Japan’s China subsidiaries already face a real caught-between-two-regimes structure.

Huawei’s posture

Huawei itself has been restrained in comprehensive public statements, unlike the more vocal 2019 Entity List period. Sales and service continue while messaging stays closer to government diplomacy. When reading news, note who speaks from which role.


Third-party views: CSIS / RAND / CSET / ITIF

CSET (Georgetown) argues Ascend 910B tests the limits of U.S. controls. SMIC’s ability to mass-produce ~7 nm-class chips suggests effects may be more limited than first assumed.12

CSIS frames DeepSeek, Huawei, and export-control dynamics as a turning point in the U.S.–China AI race while remaining cautious on enforceability: can regulators really police global cloud users?13

RAND supports controlling AI chips but prefers smarter, more targeted tools than broad GP10-style nets that load allied companies and erode credibility.14

ITIF (October 2025 “Backfire”) argues U.S. controls boosted Huawei’s domestic share while U.S. firms lost China market. In that reading, pressure against Chinese products accelerated localization.15

These views neither fully endorse BIS nor fully adopt China’s rebuttal. The mainstream third-party tone is: export controls remain a policy tool, but current design has practical problems. Japanese companies should keep that gray zone in view.


Three patterns that catch Japanese companies

Pattern 1: Indirect use via cloud

Huawei Cloud markets “Ascend AI Cloud Service” resources based on 910B/910C beyond China (reports include UAE, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, South Africa).16

A typical case: a Japanese AI team trials a Huawei Cloud service for cost or features without knowing the backend silicon. Major firms (Crowell & Moring, Mayer Brown, Gibson Dunn, and others) read that as potential GP10 use if the silicon is 910B.171819

GP10 requires knowledge, and the EAR definition (15 CFR 772.1) includes reason to know, awareness of a high probability, and inference from conscious disregard or willful avoidance of facts. Explicitly choosing services marketed as Ascend-powered is especially hard to defend.

Pattern 2: Via China subsidiaries

Local entities may procure 910B servers independently. U.S. law can still reach parent-level knowledge and control. Conversely, Chinese Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law pressure can create exposure if groups exclude Ascend under U.S. pressure. Group compliance must see both regimes.

Pattern 3: Joint development and supply-chain participation

Co-development with Chinese AI firms, or supply into their infrastructure, can place you inside a 910B ecosystem because Baidu, Tencent, and Alibaba also adopt 910B. Full end-to-end visibility is hard. Having a process to check final delivery and installation against BIS red flags still separates prepared teams from reactive ones.


Violation risk: lessons from the Seagate $300 million settlement

Statutory penalties

  • Civil: up to $374,474 per violation (ECRA's $300,000 adjusted for inflation; 15 CFR 6.3) or twice transaction value, whichever higher
  • Criminal: for willful violations, fines up to $1 million, and for individuals up to 20 years imprisonment as well (50 U.S.C. 4819(b))
  • Denial Order: loss of EAR export privileges

OFAC secondary sanctions can escalate to USD clearing freezes and total U.S.-facing business stoppage.

Example: Seagate $300 million civil penalty (April 2023)

Seagate settled with BIS for selling roughly 7.4 million HDDs (429 transactions, about $1.1 billion) to Huawei-related parties under FDPR issues. The civil penalty was among the largest single BIS civil penalties, plus multi-year audit and a suspended five-year Denial Order.20

This is a published enforcement record illustrating diligence stakes for legitimate commercial manufacturers, not a moral judgment on Seagate or on Huawei as a counterparty. Export-control cases often surface years later. Current 910B use can become tomorrow’s investigation.


Also readChina's countermeasures and tighter drone export controls: where should a company trading with both the US and China stand?Where should a company doing business with both the US and China stand?

Five practical steps

Step 1: Inventory AI infrastructure and cloud providers
List AI clouds, servers, and training platforms, including backend silicon. Check direct and indirect Huawei Cloud or Huawei-partnered Chinese AI services.

Step 2: Review China subsidiary IT procurement policy
Ensure HQ can see what local entities buy or plan to buy. Flag Ascend 910B, 910C, 910D, and 950-class immediately.

Step 3: Strengthen counterparty diligence
Turn BIS red flags into checklists for new and ongoing deals: final delivery, language-site gaps, data-center infrastructure, HQ location, disclosure cooperation.

Step 4: Prepare dual-regime scenarios
Model “comply with U.S., face China countermeasures” and “comply with China, face U.S. exposure.” Link U.S. export counsel and China local counsel.

Step 5: Consider export-control AI agents
Humans cannot track every chip, chain, and rule change alone.


FAQ

Q1. “Anywhere” language was withdrawn. Can we relax?
Only the phrasing changed; the GP10 framework remains.4 Treat it as a surviving rule in softer packaging. Do not drop alert levels.

Q2. Does using Huawei Cloud on a China business trip violate rules?
If 910B runs behind the service, GP10 risk exists in theory. Knowledge matters: intentional use of services known to be Ascend-based differs from ordinary cloud use without awareness. Policy should restrict services expressly marketed as Ascend-based until counsel clears them.

Q3. Does training a model on 910B make the model itself controlled?
The January 2025 AI Diffusion Rule controlled the weights of models trained above a compute threshold under ECCN 4E091. That rule was never enforced and has been rescinded, and BIS's interim final rule of November 19, 2026 (91 FR 74970) removed 4E091 from the Commerce Control List. BIS said destination-based and end-use license requirements are a more effective way to address concerns about model weight transfers. There is no longer a classification aimed at model weights alone, but some recipients or uses can still trigger a license requirement, so keep screening who receives the model.

Q4. Is NVIDIA H20 always safe?
H20 was designed as a China-compliant SKU, but the U.S. later moved toward additional licensing for H20 to China as well. Do not assume permanent safety.21

Q5. “U.S. law doesn’t apply to Japanese companies”?
FDPR extraterritoriality can apply directly. U.S. enforcement can cut U.S. trade and USD clearing. “Not illegal under Japanese law” is thin cover against U.S. sanctions effects.


July 2026: the Japan–India summit

By July 2026 the issue sits inside inter-state economic-security cooperation, not only company compliance. At the Japan–India summit in Delhi on 2 July 2026, the two governments issued the Japan–India Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation, committing to project-based cooperation in five priority areas: semiconductors, critical minerals, information and communications technology, clean energy and pharmaceuticals. The two leaders also welcomed that about ¥2 trillion of investment had already been decided toward the ¥10 trillion private investment target set in 2025 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-India Summit Meeting and Luncheon," July 2, 2026, in Japanese). At the joint press announcement, Prime Minister Takaichi said both countries regard strengthening supply chains for critical goods as an urgent task (Visit to India (2), joint press announcement, Prime Minister's Office of Japan, 2 July 2026, in Japanese). How to rebuild supply chains less dependent on any single country is now a policy headline. Practical response to “controls at the use stage” should be prioritized alongside that rewiring (Japan–India summit 2026 and economic security).

Summary: five points

  • BIS published guidance on 13 May 2025 that Ascend 910B “use” can violate GP10. “Anywhere in the world” language was withdrawn; the framework remains
  • U.S. claim: 910B uses U.S. technology; Huawei is Entity Listed; GP10 bars knowing use
  • China’s rebuttal: unilateral economic bullying; following the guidance may trigger Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law
  • Think tanks: enforceability doubts; ITIF argues Huawei gained domestically; many call for more targeted design
  • Japanese practice: watch cloud, subsidiaries, joint development; Seagate’s $300 million settlement shows penalties are real

My view: expanding export controls from manufacture and export stages to use stages is a historic shift. “Just don’t sell, don’t export” is no longer enough. This affects AI infrastructure procurement, cloud strategy, and overseas subsidiary management, not only export-control desks.

If I had to start next week with one action, it would be inventorying AI clouds and China-subsidiary server silicon, then flagging any Ascend 910B/910C/910D exposure for counsel review.

This article does not argue that Chinese AI chips are “bad,” or that listed parties are bad actors. Entity List and GP10 analysis are regulatory facts. The goal is to line up U.S. claims, Chinese rebuttals, and third-party assessments so each company can choose risk calmly.

Related: MATCH Act and U.S. export controls for Japanese SME makers
Related: Japan–U.S. semiconductor export controls 2026
Related: Japanese companies’ China export risk 2026


If you want monitoring of advanced AI-chip rules and counterparty checks to run as a routine process, you can contact us about TRAFEED. An overview of its features is in the TRAFEED service catalog (PDF).

References


Disclaimer: This article summarizes publicly available primary materials, major reporting, and law-firm analysis as of May 2026 (the model-weights answer in Q3 is current as of November 21, 2026). It is not legal advice on any specific transaction. For operational export-control compliance, consult counsel experienced in U.S. export controls.

Footnotes

  1. U.S. Department of Commerce, BIS, "Guidance on Application of General Prohibition 10 (GP10) to People's Republic of China Advanced Computing Integrated Circuits", May 13, 2025. https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/general-prohibition-10-guidance-may-13-2025.pdf ↩ ↩2

  2. Bloomberg, "US Warns That Using Huawei Ascend AI Chip 'Anywhere' Breaks Its Rules", May 13, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-13/us-warns-that-using-huawei-ai-chip-anywhere-breaks-its-rules ↩ ↩2

  3. Washington Times, "China blasts new U.S. rule banning use of Huawei's Ascend advanced computer chips", May 15, 2025. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/may/15/china-rips-new-us-rule-banning-use-huaweis-ascend-advanced-computer/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  4. Communications Daily, "BIS Eliminates Language Saying Use of Huawei Ascend Chips 'Anywhere' Violates Export Controls", May 20, 2025. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. Tom's Hardware, "Huawei's homegrown AI chip examined: Chinese fab SMIC produced Ascend 910B is massively different from the TSMC-produced Ascend 910". https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/artificial-intelligence/huaweis-homegrown-ai-chip-examined-chinese-fab-smic-produced-ascend-910b-is-massively-different-from-the-tsmc-produced-ascend-910 ↩

  6. TrendForce, Ascend 910B and China AI chip market analysis (2024–2025) ↩ ↩2

  7. CSET (Georgetown University), "Pushing the Limits: Huawei's AI Chip Tests U.S. Export Controls". https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/pushing-the-limits-huaweis-ai-chip-tests-u-s-export-controls/ ↩ ↩2

  8. CSIS, "DeepSeek, Huawei, Export Controls, and the Future of the U.S.-China AI Race". https://www.csis.org/analysis/deepseek-huawei-export-controls-and-future-us-china-ai-race ↩

  9. U.S. Department of Commerce press materials on AI Diffusion rescission and new guidance. https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-rescinds-biden-era-artificial-intelligence-diffusion-rule-strengthens-chip-related ↩ ↩2

  10. Arnold & Porter, "Commerce: New Guidance to Curb Adversaries' Access to Advanced AI Tech", May 2025. https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/advisories/2025/05/commerce-new-guidance-curb-adversaries-access-to-advanced-ai-tech ↩

  11. CNBC, "China says U.S. undermined trade talks with Huawei chip warning", May 19, 2025. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/19/china-us-trade-tariffs-chip-huawei.html ↩

  12. CGTN, "New U.S. chip guidance on Huawei reveals deeper fears, tougher realities", May 14, 2025. https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-05-14/New-U-S-chip-guidance-on-Huawei-reveals-deeper-fears-1DniqT0I33W/p.html ↩

  13. CSIS, "DeepSeek, Huawei, Export Controls, and the Future of the U.S.-China AI Race" (same as above) ↩

  14. RAND Corporation, "Leashing Chinese AI Needs Smart Chip Controls", August 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/08/leashing-chinese-ai-needs-smart-chip-controls.html ↩

  15. ITIF, "Backfire: Export Controls Helped Huawei and Hurt U.S. Firms", October 27, 2025. https://itif.org/publications/2025/10/27/backfire-export-controls-helped-huawei-and-hurt-us-firms/ ↩

  16. Covington & Burling, "Unpacking The BIS Guidance On Chinese AI Chip Use", August 2025. https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2025/08/unpacking-the-bis-guidance-on-chinese-ai-chip-use.pdf ↩

  17. Crowell & Moring, "US Department of Commerce Rescinds Biden Administration's AI Diffusion Export Control Rule and Issues New Guidance on Huawei Chips". https://www.crowell.com/en/insights/client-alerts/us-department-of-commerce-rescinds-biden-administrations-ai-diffusion-export-control-rule-and-issues-new-guidance-on-huawei-chips-for-ai-purposes-and-diligence-expectations ↩

  18. Mayer Brown, "US Commerce Department Announces New Export Compliance Expectations Related to Artificial Intelligence", May 2025. https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2025/05/us-commerce-department-announces-new-export-compliance-expectations-related-to-artificial-intelligence ↩

  19. Gibson Dunn, "BIS Initiates Rescission of AI Diffusion Framework, Issues Strong AI and Advanced IC Guidance and Warnings". https://www.gibsondunn.com/bis-initiates-rescission-of-ai-diffusion-framework-issues-strong-ai-and-advanced-ic-guidance-and-warnings-more-to-come/ ↩

  20. U.S. Department of Commerce, BIS, Seagate Technology $300M Settlement, April 2023. https://www.bis.gov/node/20250 ↩

  21. JETRO, Trump Administration expands export-control reach, September 2025. https://www.jetro.go.jp/biznews/2025/09/c92c704c4b353243.html ↩

This article was produced with the help of AI. A human verified the primary sources and edited the text before publication.

Read next

Articles that answer the question you are likely to have next.

  1. 1Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) Explained: de minimis Differences and What Japanese Firms MissHow do US rules reach products made outside the United States?
  2. 2China's countermeasures and tighter drone export controls: where should a company trading with both the US and China stand?Where should a company doing business with both the US and China stand?
  3. 3Does letting someone use a GPU over the network count as an export? The RASA bill, and whether Japan has the same gapHow far does remote use over the cloud count as an export?

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What Is the BIS 50% Rule? Stay Deadline, Extension Deal, and Ownership Math

The BIS Affiliates Rule extends Entity List controls by ownership. On November 9, 2026, BIS published a rule extending the stay through January 10, 2027 (91 FR 70789). How the 50% test works and how to prepare for the next milestone.

2026-05-20