Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.
On 19 November 2026, reports said that TSMC and Samsung had temporarily halted some chip shipments to China. The same day, an interim final rule from the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) took effect. It is the same rule we covered in our article on GPU cloud and export controls, published that day.
That article centered on the new data center provision (section 744.24). The shipment reports are being linked to a different part of the same rule: the provisions on foundries, which make wafers in the front-end stage, and OSATs, which handle packaging and testing in the back-end stage. This article reads those provisions against the text.
The conclusion in three lines.
- What changed: two of the ways a foundry or OSAT can show that an IC is not 3A090.a, the ones based on transistor-count attestations, now carry conditions on the designer's location and on where the designer's ultimate parent is headquartered.
- A new provision (section 744.23(a)(3)(i)(C)) requires a license when a foundry or OSAT exports, to any destination, an advanced logic IC specified in 3A090.a that was designed by a company that is neither approved nor authorized.
- The rule does not order any shipment to stop. The pause is a company response that has been reported. Its scope and reasons are not confirmed by official sources.
This article does not assess any country or company. The rule sets regulatory categories, and falling within a list or category is not a judgment on the merits of the company concerned. We write about TSMC, Samsung, Chinese companies and the U.S. government alike only to the extent of the text and published facts. Where we give our own reading, we mark it with "in our reading" or "the text can be read as follows," to keep it apart from fact.
What has been reported
First, the line between reports and facts.
A social media bulletin dated 19 November 2026 said that Samsung and TSMC had halted shipments of some chips to China following the new U.S. rule. It cited the Financial Times and Reuters. We have not been able to read either original, because one is behind a paywall and both rely on anonymous sources. What follows is what we could confirm through secondary sources1.
- Secondary accounts of the Financial Times report say that TSMC and Samsung told some Chinese customers they would temporarily suspend supply of certain processors while license applications are made to the U.S. Commerce Department. Named as affected customers are Xiaomi, Oppo and Vivo for TSMC, and Baidu's AI data center unit (Kunlun) and ByteDance for Samsung.
- Secondary accounts of the Reuters report say that TSMC halted orders at 16 nm and below from Chinese chip designers that do not hold a U.S. export license, and that it is examining customers' locations, parent companies, major shareholders, packaging vendors and shipping routes.
- Secondary accounts of Chinese media reporting say that TSMC notified several customers of shipment halts, and that the products involved at 12 nm and below relate to telecom equipment and smartphones.
Note the scope of the reports. What is reported is "some chips," "specific customers" and "a pause while a license is sought." No report says that all shipments to China have stopped. We have also not confirmed whether products already qualified for volume production are covered. As of 20 November 2026 we have found no on-the-record comments from TSMC or Samsung.
Some surrounding events, within what we could confirm. In a response to reporters on 17 November, a spokesperson for China's Ministry of Commerce said China was "strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposed to" the U.S. measures of 16 November restricting remote access to advanced semiconductors2. Reports of TSMC's share-price fall on 17 November range from about 2% to nearly 5%, and we have no confirmed figure3. TSMC's third-quarter 2026 revenue was US$46.72 billion (its Form 6-K)4. A figure of "about 5% of sales from China" circulates in posts and reports, but we could not reconcile it with TSMC's official materials, so we do not use it here.
One more premise. The BIS press release of 16 November 2026 speaks of preventing diversion through third-country data centers and does not mention foundries, IC designers or China5. The foundry provisions sit in the text and preamble of the rule published in the Federal Register6.
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What changed: the text, side by side
What the foundry "presumption" is
First, how the provision works. ECCN 3A090.a designates advanced computing ICs. But a foundry or OSAT is poorly placed to know the performance of an IC a customer has designed. So Note 1 to 3A090.a sets a presumption: when a foundry or OSAT exports, reexports or transfers (in-country) an "applicable advanced logic integrated circuit," the IC is presumed to be 3A090.a and designed or marketed for data centers7.
Under the EAR definition in section 772.1, an "applicable advanced logic integrated circuit" is a logic IC produced using the 16/14 nm node or below, or using a non-planar transistor architecture8. Note 1(d) lists the ICs that a foundry or OSAT must presume to be 3A090.a and designed or marketed for a datacenter when there is no attestation of total processing performance and performance density from an approved IC designer. The text names ICs whose aggregated approximated transistor count after packaging is "below" the thresholds (30 billion and so on), and ICs whose count the foundry or approved OSAT cannot confirm. The January 2025 rule that created this presumption explains it differently. Section III.F of its preamble describes the presumption as applying to ICs "destined for an item with an 'aggregated approximated transistor count' exceeding the applicable number of transistors" within the package, and to items whose count the foundry or OSAT cannot confirm9. That reading fits paragraphs b and c, under which an attestation that the count is below the threshold rebuts the presumption. We read paragraph d along the lines of that preamble: ICs above the threshold, and ICs whose count cannot be confirmed, are the ones presumed to be 3A090.a. We have not found any BIS document that explains the word "below" in paragraph d, though, so check both the regulatory text and the preamble before relying on it. The approximated transistor count is the die's transistor density multiplied by the die area.
The presumption can be rebutted, in three ways (a to c). This is the center of the change, so here is each one.
A note on the codes: A:1, A:5, D:1, D:4 and D:5 are the EAR's country groups. A:1 and A:5 are groups of countries that cooperate on export controls, D:1 covers countries of national security concern, D:4 countries of missile technology concern, and D:5 countries subject to a U.S. arms embargo, among others.
- Paragraph a: the IC designer is an "approved" or "authorized" designer, and its datasheet or other attestation shows, from total processing performance and performance density, that the IC is not 3A090.a. Approved designers are listed in Supplement No. 6 to Part 740. Before 31 December 2026, an authorized designer meets all three of these: it is headquartered in Taiwan or in Country Group A:1 or A:5; it is not located in Macau or D:5 and has no ultimate parent headquartered there; and it has agreed to submit the information in section 743.9(b). After 31 December 2026, it must also have applied for approval, and loses authorized status 180 days after the application.
- Paragraph b: the designer is not located in, and has no ultimate parent headquartered in, D:1, D:4, D:5 or any of the five countries in section §742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1) (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil), and the foundry packaged the die outside Macau and D:5. The foundry's attestation that the packaged IC's approximated transistor count is below 30 billion rebuts the presumption. For ICs without high-bandwidth memory the threshold is below 35 billion for exports and the like completed in 2027, and below 40 billion for 2029 and after. The text names 2027 and 2029 onward; we found no entry for 2028.
- Paragraph c: the same designer conditions as in b, with an attestation of the same content from an approved OSAT listed in Supplement No. 7 to Part 740.
Paragraph d says that relying on the attestation of an end user or other party to confirm the ECCN is not enough. Only a to c rebut the presumption.
Before and after
Section V of the preamble, "Amendments to the Presumptions Faced by Front-End Fabricators and OSAT Companies," describes the amendment this way: paragraphs b and c of Note 1 are amended so that an IC designer located in Country Group D:1, D:4 or D:5 or in the five countries of section §742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), or with an ultimate parent headquartered there, can no longer use them to rebut the presumption. The stated aim is to address diversion pathways for advanced ICs7.
| Item | Before (our reading) | After (the text) |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Note 1, paragraphs b and c | A foundry or approved OSAT could rebut the presumption by attesting that the packaged IC's approximated transistor count was below the threshold. As we read it, there was no condition excluding designers located in D:1, D:4, D:5 and the like (the preamble speaks of removing eligibility for them) | The attestation rebuts the presumption only if the designer is not in D:1, D:4, D:5 or the five countries above and has no ultimate parent headquartered there. For designers outside that condition, a transistor-count attestation does not rebut it |
| 2. New section 744.23(a)(3)(i)(C) | None | A license is required when a foundry or OSAT exports, reexports or transfers (in-country), to any destination, an EAR-subject applicable advanced logic IC specified in 3A090.a and designed by a company that is neither approved nor authorized |
| 3. Effective date and savings clause | Not applicable | Effective 19 November 2026. Items that lost License Exception or NLR eligibility and were en route aboard a carrier to the port of export on 19 November under actual orders may proceed under the previous eligibility if completed by 21 December 2026 |
| 4. License review standards | Section 744.23(d) | Unchanged. The rule amends only paragraph (a)(3)(i) of section 744.23; paragraph (d), which sets the review standards, is not amended8. Paragraph (d) provides (1) a presumption of denial for Macau, D:5 and entities headquartered (or with an ultimate parent headquartered) there, unless (2) or (3) applies; (2) a presumption of approval for end users headquartered in the United States or A:5/A:6 that are not majority-owned by an entity headquartered in Macau or D:5; and (3) case-by-case review for items such as 3A090 (other than items designed or marketed for data centers that meet the 3A090.a parameters) and for all other applications. We read paragraph (d) as also governing applications under the new (C) |
| 5. Other changes in the same rule | (Outside the scope of this article; see our earlier article) | The new data center provision (section 744.24), a 90-day grace period for data centers that were already providing compute to companies headquartered in D:5 or Macau before publication (§744.24(b)(3)), license requirements for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil (section 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1); consignees and end users headquartered, or with an ultimate parent headquartered, in the United States fall outside this requirement if the exporter files the reports under new section 743.10), and tidying of what remained of the AI Diffusion Rule |
The "before" in row 1 is what we read back from the amended text; we have not done a redline against the pre-amendment Federal Register text. That the designer conditions in b and c are the new part is confirmed by the preamble. The five countries in row 5 are as named in the Federal Register preamble.
On row 2, the preamble says the provision ensures that a license requirement continues to apply to foundries and OSATs making advanced ICs for non-approved, non-authorized designers wherever located. The Note 1 presumption continues, and the preamble says it can be rebutted if the Note's due diligence steps are followed. On the words "exported from abroad," BIS notes in the preamble that their inclusion is simply descriptive and is not intended to indicate that exporting from places other than the United States is not captured by EAR provisions where the phrase is omitted. In other words, other provisions can also reach exports from outside the United States. (On 20 November 2026 we corrected an earlier version that had read this note the other way round.)
For the data center provision in detail, see our earlier article. The background to the withdrawal of the AI Diffusion Rule is in AI Diffusion Rule withdrawal and alternatives.
What in the text may lie behind the reported pause
From here on this is a reading of the text, our own. It does not assert what any company intended or why it acted.
Put yourself in the foundry's position and follow the text in order.
First, if a customer's designer is located in D:1, D:4, D:5 or the five countries above, or has an ultimate parent headquartered there, paragraphs b and c are unavailable. Even if the transistor count is below the threshold, the route of attesting to it to rebut the presumption is closed under the text.
Second, paragraph a depends on the designer being approved or authorized. The authorized-designer conditions were headquarters in Taiwan or A:1 or A:5, no location in Macau or D:5, and no ultimate parent headquartered there. A designer that does not fit that profile cannot rebut through paragraph a either. Under paragraph d, an attestation from a counterparty cannot substitute.
Third, where the presumption cannot be rebutted, the IC is treated as 3A090.a and the foundry must comply with the license requirements for 3A090.a items. In addition, section 744.23(a)(3)(i)(C) requires a license for exports and the like of ICs from designers that are neither approved nor authorized, to any destination.
In our reading, this means two things. One: orders that used to proceed on a "below the threshold" transistor-count attestation, where the designer's profile falls within this condition, can no longer be exported without a license. Two: foundries and OSATs have more reason than before to check the customer's location, ultimate parent, packaging site and shipping route. Secondary accounts of the Reuters report say TSMC is examining customers' locations, parents, major shareholders, packaging vendors and routes, which is consistent with the structure of the text.
Holding shipments that may fall within the rule while a license is sought is, then, a natural reading of the reported "pause." The savings clause covers only items en route on 19 November, which fits the point that new shipments after the effective date are hard to move until the license question is settled. But this is one reading from the text, not the companies' reasons. Which criteria the companies actually used, and which orders they held, is not confirmed officially.
Two points need to be kept apart.
The first: the rule does not stop shipments. It sets a license requirement and narrows the ways to rebut the presumption. Whether a license is granted is decided in license review. Nothing in the text or the preamble reads as saying Chinese companies cannot obtain licenses.
The second: the rule text contains no category of smartphone chips. Reports name smartphone makers among TSMC's affected customers, and some say smartphone chips are likely to be approved but delayed by procedure. But the text's criteria are not use. They are the designer's location, the location of the ultimate parent's headquarters, and the type of IC (node and transistor count). Press language and the text's categories should be read as separate things.
A neutral note on Taiwan, since TSMC is a Taiwanese company. The authorized-designer conditions expressly include designers headquartered in Taiwan. That does not mean Taiwanese design houses are treated favorably across the board. The conditions also require no location in Macau or D:5, no ultimate parent headquartered there, and agreement to submit information.
What we have not confirmed
This is what remains unconfirmed as of 20 November 2026, when this article was written.
Scope and duration of the pause. What is reported is "some," "specific customers" and "a pause while a license is sought." The products, customers, start date and outlook for resumption are unconfirmed. Whether products already qualified for volume production are included is also unknown. The same goes for company comments: we have not found on-the-record statements from TSMC or Samsung, and the reports rely on anonymous sources.
The outlook for licenses is not clear yet either. We read the review standards as section 744.23(d), as set out in row 4 of the comparison table. We have not confirmed which category a given application will fall into (in particular, how the data-center question is decided) or how long decisions will take, and we have not found any BIS document explaining the review policy for (C) specifically. Nor have we done a redline of Note 1 before and after the amendment.
Application to Japanese companies is the point readers most want settled, and the one with the least material. Section D of the preamble makes no change to the advanced-computing foreign direct product rule (FDPR, §734.9(h)). It keeps the worldwide destination scope in §734.9(h)(2)(i) and says the provision applies expansively. It gives the example of an item subject to the EAR that is later incorporated into another foreign-produced product, such as a GPU board or a server, where jurisdiction continues. The text of the data-center provision (§744.24) also says that de minimis provisions cannot be relied on where there is knowledge of a prohibited end-use. What we have not confirmed is how this applies to foundry transactions, or to any specific transaction by a Japanese company. We have also not confirmed an official view from Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
We have not found official reactions to this rule from the governments of Taiwan, Korea or Japan. For Taiwan, we have not confirmed a publication on this rule from the Ministry of Economic Affairs' Administration of Foreign Trade. The size of the share-price fall and the share of TSMC's revenue from China have not been reconciled with official materials either.
We will update this article if the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry or BIS issues further guidance.
What Japanese companies should check now
Five practical checks, within what the text supports. This is a general outline, not a judgment on any specific transaction.
First, the location of the designer and of the ultimate parent's headquarters for the ICs you handle. The criteria are not the counterparty to your contract but the designer's location and where its ultimate parent is headquartered. Being able to trace ownership is the starting point, and the work overlaps with checks under the BIS 50% rule.
Relatedly, the preamble of the same rule explains the phrase “for an entity” in §744.23(a)(3)(i)(A) (exports and the like for an entity headquartered, or with an ultimate parent headquartered, in D:5 or Macau). It says the control is not limited to cases where such an entity is the ultimate consignee or end user, but extends to exports on its behalf, giving as examples an entity of concern that is the purchaser in the transaction (directly or indirectly) or the exclusive or primary (more than 50 percent of total compute) remote end user of a data center's computing capacity6. This is a different paragraph from the foundry provision in (C), but check it as well when you ship advanced computing items to data centers abroad. The background is in the D:5 headquarters guidance.
Second, the routes for contract manufacturing and packaging. Where is front-end work done, where is the die packaged, and which company finally ships it? Paragraphs b and c also set conditions on the packaging location. Where there are subcontractors behind subcontractors, you need to know the route.
Third, confirmations from counterparties. Foundries and OSATs may step up questions to customers. Check whether you can answer, on request, where the designer is, who the ultimate parent is and what the end use is. Being unable to answer could slow a transaction. If you are the designer and a foundry has already asked, reply templates (can answer, still checking, cannot answer) and the records to keep are in When a Foundry Asks for Your Location and Ultimate Parent.
Fourth, your internal decision on whether a license is needed. Are you handling items subject to the U.S. EAR? Whether they are is decided case by case, including through the reach of the FDPR and the de minimis logic. The preamble says §734.9(h) is unchanged but applies expansively (the advanced-computing FDPR keeps its worldwide scope, with jurisdiction continuing after incorporation in its example). That judgment belongs to your export control officer and specialists.
Fifth, tracking updates from Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and BIS. Rules in this area are changing over short periods. The comment period runs to 19 January 2027, and the content could change after that. 21 December 2026 (end of the savings clause) and 31 December 2026 (when the authorized-designer conditions change) are dates to put in the diary now. For listing deadlines and sorting your cases, our U.S. rule change impact triage sheet (Excel, in Japanese) has sheets for the deadlines, six questions on whether the rule applies, case sorting, a one-page board summary and a decision record. Our guides on the D:5 headquarters test and the U.S.-China AI semiconductor rule calendar cover the history so far, and the map of semiconductors and economic security helps with the industry's overall structure. For looking behind a thin counterparty, see AI chip diversion and spotting thinly substantiated counterparties.
Finally, this article is a general summary of information. Whether the rule applies to a particular transaction, and whether a license is required, should be decided with your internal export control officer and with lawyers or other specialists.
How to respond to this change
Designer locations, ultimate parents, subcontracting routes, rule updates. With this many items and this pace of change, relying on one person's memory scatters the grounds for your decisions.
If you would like to take stock of where your checks stand, our 3-minute export compliance check is available. If you want the ownership behind counterparties in a checkable form, you can contact us about TRAFEED.
Related practical guides
Footnotes
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Reports of the pause in TSMC and Samsung shipments: the Financial Times (19 November 2026), Reuters, and Chinese media reporting (Caijing), confirmed through secondary sources (aiweekly.co, MLQ.ai, BigGo, Mobile World Live and others). We could not read the originals because of paywalls and similar limits. We have not confirmed on-the-record comments from TSMC or Samsung. ↩
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China's Ministry of Commerce, "商务部新闻发言人就美商务部发布限制远程获取先进半导体相关措施答记者问" (17 November 2026, 20:20), in Chinese. The original reads "中方对此强烈不满,坚决反对." https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/art/2026/art_c9c0beb01b8640d3ba9160b73d315716.html (checked in the original on 21 November 2026) ↩
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Reports of TSMC's share-price fall on 17 November 2026 put the decline between about 2% and nearly 5% (secondary information). We have not confirmed the final figure. ↩
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TSMC third-quarter 2026 results (Form 6-K, announced 15 October 2026): revenue of US$46.72 billion (NT$1,494.24 billion). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001046179/000104617926000726/a3q26e_withguidancexfinal.htm . The 6-K document we checked has no breakdown of sales by region. ↩
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U.S. Department of Commerce, BIS press release "BIS Issues Rule Addressing Remote Access to American Super Intelligence Technology," 16 November 2026. https://bis.gov/press-release/bis-issues-rule-addressing-remote-access-american-super-intelligence-technology . The text we checked speaks of preventing diversion through third-country data centers and does not mention foundries, IC designers or China. ↩
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U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, interim final rule "Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors." Federal Register document number 2026-23529, 91 FR 74970-74999, RIN 0694-AK50, docket BIS-2026-0628. Published and effective 19 November 2026; comments due 19 January 2027. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/11/19/2026-23529/addressing-remote-access-to-advanced-semiconductors ; PDF at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-11-19/pdf/2026-23529.pdf . We checked the provisions against the final published text on 20 November 2026. ↩ ↩2
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Preamble section V ("Amendments to the Presumptions Faced by Front-End Fabricators and OSAT Companies"), preamble section III.B, Note 1 to ECCN 3A090.a (paragraphs a to d), new section 744.23(a)(3)(i)(C), the savings clause, the license review policy in section 742.6, and new section 743.10, all from the final text of the Federal Register document above, checked by us on 20 November 2026. BIS's note on "exported from abroad" is from the preamble. ↩ ↩2
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U.S. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (eCFR), 15 CFR §744.23(d) ("License review standards") and the definition of "Applicable advanced logic integrated circuits" in §772.1, as of the 18 November 2026 version (reflecting amendments through 91 FR 1687, 15 January 2026). Amendatory instruction 15 of the interim final rule (91 FR 74970) reads "Revise Sec. 744.23(a)(3)(i)" and does not amend paragraph (d); we confirmed this in the Federal Register text. Checked by us on 20 November 2026. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-744/section-744.23 ↩ ↩2
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U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, interim final rule "Implementation of Additional Due Diligence Measures for Advanced Computing Integrated Circuits; Amendments and Clarifications; and Extension of Comment Period." Federal Register document number 2025-00711, 90 FR 5298-5321, published 16 January 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00711/implementation-of-additional-due-diligence-measures-for-advanced-computing-integrated-circuits . Preamble section III.F ("Revisions To Clarify the Scope of ECCN 3A090.a," 90 FR 5305) reads: "any logic IC produced using the '16/14 nanometer node' or below, or using a non-planar transistor architecture and destined for an item with an 'aggregated approximated transistor count' exceeding the applicable number of transistors (as specified for the year of the export, reexport, or in-country transfer) within the package, or where the 'aggregated approximated transistor count' of the final, packaged item cannot be confirmed by the 'front-end fabricator' or 'OSAT' company as described above, is presumed to be a 3A090.a item designed or marketed for a datacenter." Checked by us on 22 November 2026 against a copy of the GPO edition. ↩






