TIMEWELL
Solutions
Free ConsultationContact Us
TIMEWELL

Unleashing organizational potential with AI

ISO/IEC 27001 (ISMS) certification mark (SGS / ISMS-AC)

ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certified Certificate No. JP26/00000255 Scope: Planning, development and operation of SaaS products utilizing AI technology

Services

  • ZEROCK
  • TRAFEED
  • TIMEWELL BASE
  • WARP
  • WARP 1Day
  • WARP NEXT Corporate
  • WARP BASIC
  • WARP ENTRE
  • Alumni Salon
  • WARP for Schools
  • Alumni Ventures
  • FDE
  • AI Consulting
  • EMC GLOBAL

Company

  • About Us
  • Team
  • Why TIMEWELL
  • News
  • Contact
  • Free Consultation

Content

  • Insights
  • Knowledge Base
  • Case Studies
  • Whitepapers
  • Events
  • Solutions
  • AI Readiness Check
  • ROI Calculator

Legal

  • Privacy Policy
  • Manual Creator Extension
  • WARP Terms of Service
  • WARP NEXT School Rules
  • Legal Notice
  • Security
  • Anti-Social Policy
  • ZEROCK Terms of Service
  • TIMEWELL BASE Terms of Service

Newsletter

Get the latest AI and DX insights delivered weekly

Your email will only be used for newsletter delivery.

© 2026 株式会社TIMEWELL All rights reserved.

Contact Us
HomeTRAFEED MediaDual-Use Technology and Export Control: The Complete Guide (Updated November 2026)
TRAFEED Media

Dual-Use Technology and Export Control: The Complete Guide (Updated November 2026)

Published2026-01-23Updated2026-11-22Checked against sources2026-11-22Ryuta Hamamoto
export controlTRAFEEDAIeconomic securityglobal

China's export restrictions against Japan expanded in two waves — February 24, 2026 (MOFCOM Notices No. 11 and No. 12) and June 29, 2026 (Notices No. 27 and No.

Dual-Use Technology and Export Control: The Complete Guide (Updated November 2026)
Share

(22 November 2026) We corrected the following points to match the primary sources: the breakdown of the entities listed in MOFCOM Notice No. 27 of 2026; the content of METI's Security Trade Control Guidance (Introductory Edition) v3.0; the list changes made at the 2025 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary; who amended the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer (the National Security Council and the Cabinet); the case in which exports to parties on the Foreign End User List need no license (where it is clear the items will not be used for weapons development); the document retention periods (seven and five years); and what the 52% in METI's violation analysis covers.

Dual-Use Technology and Export Control: The Complete Guide [Updated November 2026] — China's 80-Entity Measures Against Japan (Two Waves in February and June), the U.S. Affiliate Rule (50%), and METI Security Trade Control Guidance v3.0

This is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL.

For most companies, "dual-use" has long been close to a textbook concept. It comes up in export-control training, it sits in a corner of the internal manual just in case, and it almost never becomes a real problem in day-to-day deals. That describes a great many firms.

That premise broke in 2026 — and not as a one-off event. China's export restrictions against Japan have accumulated in stages across January, February, and June.

The trigger was January 6. China's Ministry of Commerce announced in Notice 2026 No. 1 that it would generally tighten export controls on dual-use items bound for Japan1. In substance, it prohibits exports of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for military uses, and to any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability (the text says "prohibit" and lists no items). Then on February 24, MOFCOM placed 40 Japanese companies and organizations on the "Export Control List (管控名単)" and the "Watch List (関注名単)" through Notices No. 11 and No. 122. And on June 29, Notices No. 27 and No. 28 added another 40 entities, swelling the total to a cumulative ~803.

From 40 to 80 in half a year. The doubling itself tells you this is not a one-shot retaliation but a policy that will be operated on an ongoing basis.

This article walks through the definition of dual-use (civil-military) technology, the two-stage expansion of China's measures against Japan in 2026, the simultaneous easing of defense-equipment transfers on the Japanese side, the U.S. Affiliate Rule (50%), and what companies should actually do in practice.


[Self-Check] Are any of your handled items classified as dual-use?

Semiconductors, integrated circuits and electronic components, precision machinery (medical and optical equipment), lithium compounds and rare earths tied to EV batteries (gallium, germanium, rare-earth elements), telecommunications equipment, and PCs are fields that tend to include dual-use items. MOFCOM Notice 2026 No. 1 of January 6, 2026 lists no items and covers all dual-use items, so trade in these fields is especially exposed1 (whether a given item is dual-use has to be checked against China's dual-use import and export license catalog). On top of that, 40 entities were listed on February 24 (Notices No. 11 and No. 12)2 and another 40 on June 29 (Notices No. 27 and No. 28)3 on the Export Control List and Watch List, reaching a cumulative ~80.


Summary

  • The definition of dual-use (civil-military), and why its stakes rose a notch in 2026
  • How China's measures against Japan expanded in three stages — January 6 → February 24 → June 29 — and the structure of the cumulative ~80 entities
  • The concrete faces added to the export-ban list on June 29, including research institutes such as the National Institute for Defense Studies and companies whose names include Mitsubishi Electric or Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI)
  • The legal basis for China's measures (the Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items)
  • The asymmetric structure — "tightening and easing at once" — revealed by the April 21 amendment to the operational guidelines for the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer
  • What the U.S. Affiliate Rule (50%, stayed; the stay was extended on November 9, 2026 through January 10, 2027) demands of Japanese supply-chain management
  • Updated practitioner points from METI's "Security Trade Control Guidance, Introductory Edition v3.0" (March, Reiwa 8)
  • How the Wassenaar, NSG, AG, and MTCR regimes relate to Japan's catch-all controls
  • The practical workflow for HS-code-based classification, end-user criteria, and end-use criteria

Table of Contents

  1. What Is Dual-Use (Civil-Military) Technology?
  2. What Happened in 2026: China's Measures Against Japan Expanded in Two Waves
  3. The U.S. Affiliate Rule (50%) and METI Security Trade Control Guidance v3.0
  4. International Export Control Regimes and Japan's Position
  5. The Operational Workflow for Handling Dual-Use Items

Replace siloed classification work with AI.

METI's FY2024 data shows 52% of foreign exchange law violations stem from classification errors. Download the TRAFEED product catalog covering features and rollout.

Download Product CatalogContact About TRAFEED

What Is Dual-Use (Civil-Military) Technology?

Definition

Dual-use refers to technologies, products, or software that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Under Japan's Export Trade Control Order and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act these are called "dual-use items," organized under Item 2 and beyond of the list controls, separately from weapons themselves (Item 1 of the list controls).

A related term is "military-civilian fusion." That phrase refers to the policy itself of integrating military and civilian technology, talent, and capital as one — something China has strengthened as a national strategy since 2017. Dual-use describes a property of a technology or item; military-civilian fusion describes the national framework for exploiting it. They are often conflated, but keeping them distinct also makes China's later measures easier to understand.

Historical Context

During the Cold War, COCOM (the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) governed Western exports to the Eastern bloc. The 1987 Toshiba Machine COCOM violation — in which high-precision machine tools were allegedly used to machine submarine propellers, said to have improved the quieting performance of the Soviet navy — cast a serious shadow over U.S.-Japan relations. It was the first major incident that made Japanese firms feel viscerally how directly export control ties to management risk.

After the Cold War, COCOM was dissolved and succeeded by the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), which began operating in 1996. The WA is a multilateral framework for bringing transparency to exports of conventional weapons and dual-use items, and Japan has participated as an original member4.

The Reversal from Spin-Off to Spin-On

Historically, the mainstream of technical progress was "spin-off" — military technology flowing down into civilian use (the internet, GPS, microwave ovens). Since the 2010s, however, fields where civilian technology exceeds military technology have surged.

Field Situation Representative examples
Semiconductors Commercial leads the frontier TSMC, Samsung advanced logic
AI / machine learning Private sector leads research Large language models, image recognition
Drones Consumer-grade reaches military-divertible levels Industrial multicopter makers
Communications Private-sector-led standardization 5G, satellite broadband

In this "spin-on" era, an utterly unremarkable civilian product can become a core component of a military system depending on how it is combined. The difficulty of export control is, I would say, almost entirely concentrated here. The era in which you could comfortably draw a line and say "it's a civilian product" is over.


What Happened in 2026: China's Measures Against Japan Expanded in Two Waves

First, get the terms right: not the Unreliable Entity List, but the Export Control List and the Watch List

When discussing the measures against Japan, mistaking the name of the list throws off your practical judgment too. What Japanese companies were placed on in this series of measures is not China's "Unreliable Entity List (不可靠実体清単)." It is two lists that China's Ministry of Commerce operates under the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items: the "Export Control List (管控名単)" and the "Watch List (関注名単)"2. The names are similar, but the weight of the measures imposed is entirely different.

List Nature Practical meaning
Export Control List (管控名単) Exports of dual-use items are, in principle, prohibited A de facto embargo. Transactions in progress are also halted immediately
Watch List (関注名単) Subject to strict review General licenses become unavailable; individual licenses, risk assessment reports, and written pledges are required

Put roughly, the Export Control List says "do not ship," and the Watch List says "if you ship, take on considerable effort and accountability." Which list your counterparty is on completely changes the response required.

The three-stage timeline (January 6, February 24, June 29)

Tracking MOFCOM's measures by notice number makes the structure clear.

Notice Publication / effective date Content
Notice 2026 No. 1 January 6 Strengthened export controls on dual-use items bound for Japan. Exports of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for military uses, and to any other end users or end uses that help raise Japan's military capability are prohibited (no item list)1
Notices No. 11 and No. 12 February 24 Listed 40 Japanese companies and organizations. 20 on the Export Control List plus 20 on the Watch List2
Notices No. 27 and No. 28 June 29 Added another 40 entities. 20 on the Export Control List plus 20 on the Watch List. Cumulative total to ~803

The point to hold onto here is that the January 6 Notice No. 1 is not the date 40 companies were listed. Notice No. 1 was strictly a "general tightening"; the first time specific entity names were put on a list was February 24. News summaries sometimes wrongly write "40 companies in January," but if you follow the primary sources, both the date and the substance are different.

The faces in the second wave (June 29): defense research institutes and defense subsidiaries of the heavy-industry and electronics groups

What I most want to convey in this article is the second wave of June 29. Nearly all leading law firms and news outlets now include this June round, but plenty of internal manuals stop at February.

The 20 entities added to the Export Control List (export ban) under Notice No. 27 include a lineup of the Ministry of Defense's research organizations: the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ground Systems Research Center, the Naval Systems Research Center, and the Aerospace Systems Research Center — four institutes in all. The remaining 16 are companies: NIKKO TOKKI and NIKKO-YPK SHOJI; three companies whose names include Mitsubishi Electric, such as Mitsubishi Electric Defense and Space Technologies; Mitsubishi Precision; five companies whose English names include MHI, such as MHI Oceanics; NIPPI Corporation; and others35. The notice gives "involvement in enhancing Japan's military capabilities" as the reason for listing. That is China's regulatory classification, not a judgment on the merits of any company.

The 20 companies added to the Watch List (strict review) under Notice No. 28 sit in fields China has designated as potentially involving dual-use items — unmanned aircraft, nuclear fuel, pyrotechnics. The stated reason for listing was that these are Japanese entities whose end user and end use of dual-use items cannot be confirmed; it is not a finding that any of them acted improperly3. The companies named are legitimate Japanese manufacturers whose products are primarily for civilian use, caught within a broadly drawn category.

The substance of the measures does not end at being listed, either. For the 20 entities on the Export Control List, it is not only that exports of dual-use items are prohibited: organizations and individuals outside China are also barred from transferring or supplying Chinese-origin dual-use items to those entities, and activities in progress must be halted immediately. For the 20 companies on the Watch List, every transaction now requires submission of a risk assessment report and a written pledge that the dual-use items will not be used for any purpose that contributes to enhancing Japan's military capabilities3.

The full official names of all ~80 entities are compiled in the companion article. For matching against your counterparties, you need the entire roster rather than representative examples, so use that alongside this piece.

  • Which Japanese Companies Are on China's Export Control Lists? The Full List of ~80 Entities and Organizations

The legal basis for China's measures

This series of measures is not issued on a whim; it rests on clear domestic law. The bases are the Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items, which took effect on December 1, 20246. The export ban of the Export Control List is tied to Articles 28 and 29 of those Regulations, and the strict review of the Watch List to Article 26. China is stacking up its targets methodically, in line with its own legal system — this is not the kind of thing that is easily withdrawn through diplomatic negotiation. Reading it that way sharpens the resolution of your response.

Political escalation and economic impact

Japan's government reacted the day the first wave landed. According to press reports, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kei Sato said at a February 24, 2026 briefing that the measure was "utterly unacceptable and deeply regrettable," lodging a strong protest with China and demanding withdrawal2. That a second wave nonetheless came in June shows this is not a phase where protest alone stops the momentum. Reports have framed the June measures as a scene of deepening confrontation between the Takaichi administration and China.

The economic impact swings widely depending on how "dual-use items" are interpreted. Takahide Kiuchi, Executive Economist at Nomura Research Institute, estimates that if China interprets "dual-use items" broadly, the items potentially affected could reach roughly 42% of Japan's total imports from China in 2024 (approximately ¥25.3 trillion)7. If the interpretation widens to include rare earths and semiconductor materials, even companies whose names are not on any list cannot stay unaffected on the procurement side.

Practical supply-chain impact

Companies not listed among the 40, and then the 80, are not unaffected either. There are three reasons.

The first is spillover through counterparties. Suppliers and subcontractors of listed entities may find it hard to continue the transactions themselves. The second is difficulty sourcing critical materials. If China restricts exports of gallium, germanium, and rare earths, the effects reach the entire population of Japanese firms handling semiconductors, batteries, and motors. The third is scrutiny of third-country transactions. China is also watching for circumvention exports, so transactions routed through Hong Kong, Singapore, or Malaysia come under monitoring.

The asymmetry of the April 21 amendment to the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer

While China was tightening controls, the Japanese side was moving in the opposite direction. On April 21, 2026, the National Security Council and the Cabinet partially amended the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer and their Implementation Guidelines8. METI describes the review as a foothold for promoting defense equipment transfers. From the perspective of civilian companies handling dual-use items, the important points are the following.

Amendment item Implication for civilian companies
Eased conditions for third-country transfer of jointly developed products More business opportunities for civilian suppliers that make components of defense equipment
Clearer scope for components and services Clearer criteria for when your product is exported as part of "equipment"
Expanded list of recipient countries for finished equipment Potentially more flow of civilian-derived products

Here lies the structural twist. China tightens controls, while Japan eases transfers. On the same "dual-use items" playing field, tightening and easing are running at the same time. Companies handling dual-use items now have to manage, within a single workflow, a combination of controls in which opposite forces act depending on the export destination. The details are organized in a separate article.

  • The Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer: What Changed in the April 21, 2026 Amendment?

The U.S. Affiliate Rule (50%) and METI Security Trade Control Guidance v3.0

2026 was not a year in which only China moved. U.S. export control regulations and Japan's operational guidance were also substantially updated at almost the same time. As an export control officer, three points need to be on your dashboard.

The U.S. Affiliate Rule (50%) — stay extended through January 10, 2027

On September 30, 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) promulgated the interim final rule commonly called the "Affiliate Rule" in the Federal Register (90 FR 47201), with an effective date of September 29, 2025. Under it, affiliates and subsidiaries in which an Entity List company holds, directly or indirectly, 50% or more equity are automatically subject to the same EAR restrictions as the parent listing.

The U.S. government subsequently stayed the application of the main provisions for one year from November 10, 20259. The stay period is a grace period for companies to build out their compliance frameworks. The stay was originally set to end November 9, 2026, but on that day BIS published a rule extending it through January 10, 2027 (91 FR 70789; updated November 20, 2026). It is not a repeal, and the extension pushes the date back by only two months. Do not read this as "it's stayed, so it's irrelevant for now"; treat January 10, 2027 as the deadline on paper and watch what BIS publishes next. Details are in our BIS 50% rule guide.

The cases where this bites in practice look like the following.

Case Risk
A 50%+ subsidiary of an Entity List company is a key component supplier to you Exports and re-exports of products incorporating U.S.-origin technology or parts effectively halt
Your distributor or reseller sells into China via an affiliate of an Entity List company Potential re-export control violation and exposure to U.S. sanctions
Somewhere in a China- or third-country-routed transaction chain there is an affiliate of an Entity List company Even without a direct contractual relationship, you can be caught indirectly by the EAR

In other words, looking only at your direct counterparty is not enough. You need to trace the chain of ownership on a 50% basis and keep your entire supply chain visible.


[Stay now runs to Jan 10, 2027] Impact-assessment checklist for the U.S. Affiliate Rule (50%)

The U.S. Affiliate Rule — under which a 50%+ subsidiary of an Entity List company is automatically in scope — has been stayed since November 10, 2025, and on November 9, 2026 BIS extended the stay through January 10, 2027 (91 FR 70789)9.

  • Is any of your key component suppliers 50%+ owned by an Entity List company?
  • Could your customers or distributors indirectly deliver to an Entity List company?
  • Are EAR-controlled items used anywhere in your China- or third-country-routed schemes?
  • Is your capital-relationship map of parents, subsidiaries, and group companies up to date?
  • Has your internal Compliance Program (CP) been updated to cover the Affiliate Rule?

METI "Security Trade Control Guidance, Introductory Edition v3.0" (March, Reiwa 8)

The cover of METI's Security Trade Control Guidance (Introductory Edition) reads "Version 3.0, March Reiwa 8 (2026)"10. The guidance itself says it was revised in January 2026 to reflect the amendments to the conventional-weapons catch-all and the public-private dialogue scheme for technology management promulgated on April 9, 2025, and the amendment to the Export Trade Control Order of November 14, 2025. The main points you can confirm in v3.0 are these.

Item What v3.0 says
Catch-all controls Chapter 2, III, "3. Catch-all controls," explains the WMD catch-all and the conventional-weapons catch-all by destination group: Group A, UN arms-embargoed countries and regions, and general countries
Foreign End User List A table of listed entities by country or region as amended on October 9, 2025 (835 in total). Exporting to a listed party requires a license unless it is clear the items will not be used for WMD development or for conventional-weapons development (the latter limited to items in item 16(1) of Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order)
Deemed exports (specified categories) The internal review documents to be retained include records of the specified-category check; records such as pledges obtained at hiring should be kept for as long as provision of controlled technology to the employee is expected
Document retention At least seven years for items in rows 1 to 4 of Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and the Appended Table of the Foreign Exchange Order (arms and WMD-related), and at least five years for rows 5 to 16

It is content you can use as a baseline both for onboarding new export control staff and for revising your internal CP.

The catch-all amendment (effective October 9, 2025) and the 835-entity Foreign End User List

The amendment to catch-all controls that took effect on October 9, 2025 broadened the scope in which a license application is required when a certain concerning end use applies, regardless of the destination country. In parallel, METI amended the Foreign End User List as of September 29, 2025, expanding the number of listed entities to 83511.

The practical meaning is simple: there is more "cross-referencing work against listed parties, affiliates, and group companies." According to METI's "Analysis of FEFTA Violation Cases (FY2024)," released in December 2025, 52% of violation cases related to classification (including 32% where no classification was done or the item was wrongly assumed to be uncontrolled) and 36% to the management framework12. From what I see in the field, the more a company depends on its staff's manual work, the more its violation risk piles up with every regulatory revision.


International Export Control Regimes and Japan's Position

The four major regimes

Controls on dual-use items are not decided piecemeal by each country. The structure is that content agreed among several international regimes is transposed into each country's domestic law.

Regime Scope Members (2026)
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Conventional weapons and dual-use items 42
NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) Nuclear-related items and technology 48
AG (Australia Group) Chemical and biological weapons-related 43
MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) Missile-related technology 35

Japan is a member of all four, and the agreed control targets are reflected in Appendix 1 (list controls) of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act and the Export Trade Control Order. Unlike China's measures against Japan, these are frameworks that go through international agreement, so movement is relatively gradual. That said, the lists are reviewed every year, including at the regimes' plenaries, and the changes flow into each country's law in turn (see below).

The relationship with catch-all controls

Even goods or technology that do not fall under list controls require a license application if military diversion can be objectively judged, or if the end-user or end-use criteria apply. This is the "catch-all control."

Category Basis Trigger for the judgment
List control Appendix 1 (Items 1–15) Specifications and performance thresholds
Catch-all (end-use criterion) METI notification The use falls under weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons
Catch-all (end-user criterion) Foreign End User List The buyer is a party of concern
Catch-all (inform criterion) Notice from METI A case-specific government notification exists

The latest developments in regime revisions

The WA held its 29th Plenary in Vienna on 3–4 December 2025, chaired by Japan's ambassador. According to the Plenary Chair's statement, in 2025 it updated and clarified entries covering lasers (including those frequently used in the automotive, shipbuilding and aerospace industries), imaging sensors and cameras, seabed surveying equipment, parachutes and paragliders, and ceramic composite materials, and removed entries for certain temperature sensors and underwater vision and light systems now deemed to have no military significance13. These changes flow into each country's domestic law in turn.

The NSG is discussing high-performance carbon fiber for uranium enrichment, the AG is examining synthetic-biology-related equipment, and the MTCR is reviewing solid propellants for small-satellite launch vehicles. Details can be tracked on METI's security trade control page14.


The Operational Workflow for Handling Dual-Use Items

From here, we organize the workflow a company actually runs on an export deal, in five steps.

Step 1: Preliminary applicability check (HS code and item classification)

Start from the HS code (tariff classification code) and screen which item of Appendix 1 your product might fall under. Because HS codes are a classification for tariffs, they do not map one-to-one to export-control items. Even so, they are an effective entry point for a first pass.

To do classification in earnest, cross-reference the item-by-item matrix tables (published by METI and CISTEC) against your product's specification sheets. The judgment criteria are centered on numerical specifications (accuracy, temperature range, resolution, and so on).

Step 2: List-control classification

Prepare a classification document (parameter sheet) and check it against the judgment criteria for each item of Appendix 1.

Item Scope Representative judgment indicators
Item 5 Advanced materials Tensile strength, fiber orientation, purity
Item 6 Materials processing Positioning accuracy, number of axes, temperature range
Item 7 Electronics Operating temperature, radiation hardness, computing speed
Item 8 Computers Compute performance (TOPS/FLOPS)
Item 9 Communications Frequency band, encryption strength
Item 10 Sensors Sensitivity, detection wavelength, resolution

If it falls within a list control, an export license application to METI is required. Even when the conclusion is "non-applicable," record the rationale as a classification document.

Step 3: End-user check (matching the Foreign End User List and China's lists)

Cross-reference the buyer, the end user, and the final end user against METI's Foreign End User List. Exporting to a listed party requires METI's license unless it is clear that the items will not be used for WMD development or for conventional-weapons development (the latter limited to items in item 16(1) of Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order)10.

From 2026, matching against China's lists has been added to this. The process of confirming whether your counterparty is on China's Export Control List or Watch List (a cumulative ~80 entities), or is a company with a capital relationship to them, has become a permanent part of practice.

Step 4: End-use check

Confirm the following about the end user and the end use.

  • The use is not connected to development, manufacture, use, or stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological, missile).
  • It is not connected to development, manufacture, use, or stockpiling of conventional weapons.
  • The stated use is not unnatural (e.g., a bulk order for what is a general-purpose product, no need for technical support, cash and immediate settlement).

The end-use criterion is triggered "when it can be objectively known" and "when there is a notice (inform) from METI." When the judgment is difficult, advance consultation with METI or CISTEC is the realistic move.

Step 5: Issuing the non-applicable certificate and keeping records

For cases judged non-applicable, issue the "non-applicable certificate (parameter sheet)" that buyers often request, and keep the rationale for the judgment on file internally. METI's introductory guidance sets retention periods of at least seven years for arms- and WMD-related items (rows 1 to 4 of Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and of the Appended Table of the Foreign Exchange Order) and at least five years for conventional-weapons-related items and others (rows 5 to 16)10. Considering traceability across the supply chain, a longer retention is desirable in many cases, as I see it.

Details are explained in the Non-Applicable Certificate Writing Guide. For discussions of an espionage-prevention law and a security clearance system, see also The Spy Prevention Law and Business.


Also readWhat Are Catch-All Controls? A Plain Guide to Japan's Supplementary Export Controls for BeginnersWhen do you need a license even for items not on the control list?

2026, the Year Regulations Moved in Two Waves: Making Dual-Use Management a Rapid-Response Capability

China's measures against Japan (the general tightening of January 6, the 40-entity listing of February 24, and the second wave of June 29 reaching a cumulative ~80), the April 21 amendment to the operational guidelines for the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer, the U.S. Affiliate Rule (50%, stayed; the stay was extended on November 9, 2026 through January 10, 2027)9, METI's Security Trade Control Guidance v3.0 (March, Reiwa 8)10, the catch-all amendment effective October 9, 2025, and the 835-entity Foreign End User List11. 2026 was a year in which the regulatory environment moved in quick succession, and the workload of export control officers at companies handling dual-use technology has clearly increased. On top of that, opposite forces are acting at once — China tightening, Japan easing transfers. You have to handle this asymmetry within a single workflow.


Conclusion

  • In 2026, dual-use (civil-military) shifted from a textbook definition to a real regulatory risk.
  • China's measures against Japan expanded in three stages — the general tightening of January 6 (Notice No. 1), the 40-entity listing of February 24 (Notices No. 11 and No. 12), and the second wave of June 29 (Notices No. 27 and No. 28) — reaching a cumulative ~80 entities.
  • Those listed are not on the "Unreliable Entity List" but on the export-banning Export Control List and the strict-review Watch List. The basis is the Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items (effective December 2024).
  • China's tightening and Japan's easing of defense-equipment transfers (April 21) are proceeding at the same time, so companies must manage opposite dynamics within a single workflow.
  • The U.S. Affiliate Rule (50%) is stayed; BIS extended the stay on November 9, 2026 through January 10, 2027 (91 FR 70789). Prepare your ownership-chain checks for that date while watching for the next BIS rule.
  • Because the lists to reference and the revision information keep growing, AI-driven automation has become a realistic option.

The fact that targets doubled in half a year implicitly suggests a third wave is possible. Rather than stopping at confirming whether a company name is on a list, I recommend building a framework now that can see through both the flow of Chinese-origin items and the layers beyond your counterparties.

If you want classification of your handled items, and matching against lists that include ownership chains, to run as a routine process, you can contact us about TRAFEED. An overview of its features is in the TRAFEED product catalog (PDF).


References

  1. CISTEC flash report, "China's Tightening of Export Controls on Dual-Use Items Bound for Japan (Flash)" (January 6, 2026, MOFCOM Notice No. 1) — https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260106-2.pdf
  2. JETRO, "China Tightens Export Controls on Dual-Use Items Toward Japan" (January 2026) — https://www.jetro.go.jp/biznews/2026/01/daa0760fd28a2226.html
  3. CISTEC flash report, "Chinese Authorities Place Japanese Companies, Universities, etc. on the Export Control List (20 in total) and the Watch List (20 in total) (Flash)" (February 25, 2026, Notices No. 11 and No. 12) — https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260225.pdf
  4. JETRO, "China Places 40 Japanese Companies and Organizations on the Export Control List and Watch List, Banning Exports of Dual-Use Items and Tightening Review" (February 2026) — https://www.jetro.go.jp/biznews/2026/02/e4f19a798abdc080.html
  5. CISTEC flash report, "Chinese Authorities Add Japanese Companies, etc. to the Export Control List (20 in total) and the Watch List (20 in total) (Flash)" (June 29, 2026, Notices No. 27 and No. 28) — https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260629.pdf
  6. Xinhua (Japanese), "China Places 20 Japanese Entities, Including the National Institute for Defense Studies, on Its Export Control List" (June 29, 2026) — https://jp.news.cn/20260629/b17450419a1548679f8a6b1058933062/c.html
  7. People's Daily (Japanese edition), "China's Ministry of Commerce Adds 20 Japanese Companies and Organizations to Its Export Control List" (June 29, 2026) — https://j.people.com.cn/n3/2026/0629/c94476-20472207.html
  8. Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China / Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items (effective December 1, 2024)
  9. METI, "On the Partial Amendment of the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer, etc." (April 21, 2026) — https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2026/04/20260421003/20260421003.html
  10. METI, "Security Trade Control Guidance, Introductory Edition v3.0" (March, Reiwa 8) — https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/
  11. METI, "Amendment to the Foreign End User List" (September 29, 2025) — https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/
  12. METI, "Analysis of FEFTA Violation Cases (Security Trade Control) (FY2024)" (December 2025) — https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/gaitameho_document/ihanjireigaitamehou6.pdf
  13. Federal Register, "One Year Suspension of Expansion of End-User Controls for Affiliates of Certain Listed Entities" (November 12, 2025; one-year stay and re-application of the Affiliate Rule) — https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/12/2025-19846/one-year-suspension-of-expansion-of-end-user-controls-for-affiliates-of-certain-listed-entities
  14. Nomura Research Institute, Takahide Kiuchi, "Economic Impact of China's Export Restrictions on Japan (Estimate)"
  15. Wassenaar Arrangement — https://www.wassenaar.org/

Related Articles

  • Which Japanese Companies Are on China's Export Control Lists? The Full List of ~80 Entities and Organizations
  • The Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer: What Changed in the April 21, 2026 Amendment?
  • Non-Applicable Certificate: How to Write Parameter Sheets and Run Classification
  • 52% of FY2024 FEFTA Violations Were Classification-Driven — The Top 5 Fatal Mistakes Hidden in METI's Statistics

Footnotes

  1. CISTEC, "China's Tightening of Export Controls on Dual-Use Items Bound for Japan (Flash)" (January 6, 2026, MOFCOM Notice 2026 No. 1) https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260106-2.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  2. CISTEC, "Chinese Authorities Place Japanese Companies, Universities, etc. on the Export Control List (20 in total) and the Watch List (20 in total) (Flash)" (February 25, 2026, Notices No. 11 and No. 12) https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260225.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  3. CISTEC, "Chinese Authorities Add Japanese Companies, etc. to the Export Control List (20 in total) and the Watch List (20 in total) (Flash)" (June 29, 2026, Notices No. 27 and No. 28) https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/china/data/20260629.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  4. Wassenaar Arrangement https://www.wassenaar.org/ ↩

  5. MOFCOM, "Announcement No. 27 of 2026 listing 20 Japanese entities on the export control list" (29 June 2026), annex "Export Control List" (names and addresses of the 20 entities). ↩

  6. The Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items (effective December 1, 2024). The Export Control List rests on Articles 28 and 29 of the Regulations, and the Watch List on Article 26. ↩

  7. Estimate by Takahide Kiuchi, Executive Economist at Nomura Research Institute. If China interprets "dual-use items" broadly, the items potentially affected could reach roughly 42% of Japan's total imports from China in 2024 (approximately ¥25.3 trillion). ↩

  8. METI, "On the Partial Amendment of the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer, etc." (April 21, 2026) https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2026/04/20260421003/20260421003.html ↩

  9. Federal Register, "One Year Suspension of Expansion of End-User Controls for Affiliates of Certain Listed Entities" (November 12, 2025). The interim final rule was promulgated on September 30, 2025 (90 FR 47201, effective September 29, 2025), stayed from November 10, 2025 (originally through November 9, 2026), and the stay was extended through January 10, 2027 by a rule published November 9, 2026 (91 FR 70789). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/12/2025-19846/one-year-suspension-of-expansion-of-end-user-controls-for-affiliates-of-certain-listed-entities ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  10. METI, "Security Trade Control Guidance, Introductory Edition," v3.0 (March, Reiwa 8). The revision history is in "Purpose of this guidance," the Foreign End User List in the reference box in Chapter 2, III, and the retention periods in the table of documents to be kept. https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/guidance/guidance.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. METI, "Amendment to the Foreign End User List" (September 29, 2025, 835 entities) https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/ ↩ ↩2

  12. METI, "Analysis of FEFTA Violation Cases (Security Trade Control) (FY2024)" (December 2025) https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/gaitameho_document/ihanjireigaitamehou6.pdf ↩

  13. Wassenaar Arrangement, "Statement Issued by the Plenary Chair on 2025 Outcomes of the Wassenaar Arrangement" (Vienna, 4 December 2025). https://www.wassenaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/chair_statement.pdf ↩

  14. METI, Security Trade Control https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/ ↩

This article was produced with the help of AI. A human verified the primary sources and edited the text before publication.

Read next

Articles that answer the question you are likely to have next.

  1. 1Japan Export Classification (Gaihi Hantei): The 5 Steps and What Is Current in October 2026What steps do you follow to classify your own items?
  2. 2What Are Catch-All Controls? A Plain Guide to Japan's Supplementary Export Controls for BeginnersWhen do you need a license even for items not on the control list?
  3. 3China's Dual-Use Export Control List and Watch List on Japan - How They Work and What to CheckHow does China's Japan-focused control list work, and what should you verify?

This article is part of TRAFEED Media, our practical media on export controls and economic security

Back to TRAFEED MediaThis week's regulatory updates

52% of FY2024 export-control violations stem from classification errors. Is your team covered?

METI FY2024 data shows over half of violations stem from classification. Start with a free 5-question light check (~2 min, no email), then continue to the full 10-question report.

Contact About TRAFEED
Contact About TRAFEEDContact form (about 3 min)TRAFEED product briefFeatures & rollout in PDF

Share this article if you found it useful

Share

Newsletter

Get the latest AI and DX insights delivered weekly

Your email will only be used for newsletter delivery.

Free download

Recommended materials

China MOFCOM Lists (Control & Watch): 80-Entity Reference Sheet (through the 29 Jun 2026 wave)

All 80 entities on China MOFCOM's Control List and Watch List, in official / Chinese / English names. Being listed is a regulatory designation, not a judgment of the company — useful both for counterparty screening and for listed companies to understand where they stand. Based on primary sources (Announcements No. 11/12/27/28); as of 20 November 2026 there had been no additions or removals (checked through No. 56).

The BIS Affiliates Rule (50 Percent Rule) Readiness Checklist (2026)

A fill-in working checklist for trade compliance teams preparing for the BIS Affiliates Rule. Covers what the rule actually does (aggregation across owners and across lists, cascade/carry-forward, the rule of most restrictiveness, and why exactly 50% is in while below 50% is not automatically out), what is stayed and what is in effect now, where ownership data typically breaks, and a six-phase preparation list from scoping through governance. The stay was due to end on 9 November 2026; on that day BIS published a rule extending it to 10 January 2027 (91 FR 70789). The sheet is built to work whether the rule then returns, is stayed again, or is modified (as of 21 November 2026). Based on primary sources (90 FR 47201, 90 FR 50857, 91 FR 70789, 15 CFR, and China's Ministry of Commerce). Designation is a regulatory classification, not a judgement about a company; final determinations rest with your export-control officer and the authorities' current guidance.

EAR Classification Flow & EAR99 Practical Checklist (for exporters from Japan, 2026)

A fill-in working sheet covering "subject to the EAR? → ECCN on the CCL? → EAR99?", the crucial "when EAR99 still needs a license" (embargoes, end-use, end-user), de minimis / FDP, counterparty screening, and the two-track cross-check with Japan's classification (FEFTA / Appended Table 1). Based on primary sources (15 CFR, the Federal Register, BIS, METI); the EAR changes frequently, so treat the authorities' latest guidance and your export-control officer as authoritative.

See all materials

Related Knowledge Base

Export Control GuideEnterprise AI Guide

Solutions

Strengthen Export ComplianceStreamline compliance with complex export regulations
Solve Knowledge Management ChallengesCentralize internal information and quickly access the knowledge you need

Talk with us about export-control operations

Share your screening, classification, or compliance workflow. We will map where TRAFEED can help—via our contact form (no cold booking).

Contact UsDownload Catalog

Related Articles

Reading the Middle East Crisis from a Corporate Lens [2026-May Update]: Supply Chain Response under $126 Brent, 5% Transit, and 40x War-Risk Premiums

Reading the Middle East Crisis from a Corporate Lens [2026-May Update]: Supply Chain Response under $126 Brent, 5% Transit, and 40x War-Risk Premiums

Reading the Middle East Crisis from a Corporate Lens [2026-May Update]: Supply Chain Response under $126 Brent, 5% Transit, and 40x War-Risk Premiums.

2026-01-21
What Is the National Intelligence Agency? Japan's New Intelligence Command Center After the National Intelligence Council Act

What Is the National Intelligence Agency? Japan's New Intelligence Command Center After the National Intelligence Council Act

On May 27, 2026, Japan's National Intelligence Council Establishment Act was enacted, and the National Intelligence Agency launched in July.

2026-02-25
[2026 Edition] Customer Due Diligence (End-User Screening) in Practice — How to Cross-Reference the Foreign User List and Entity List

[2026 Edition] Customer Due Diligence (End-User Screening) in Practice — How to Cross-Reference the Foreign User List and Entity List

How to conduct customer due diligence (end-user screening) in export control. Covers practical use of Japan's Foreign User List, the U.S.

2026-01-23
Why Export Control Officers Should Move to AI-Driven Export Control: Lifting Classification and Partner Screening

Why Export Control Officers Should Move to AI-Driven Export Control: Lifting Classification and Partner Screening

The research grind of export classification, keeping up with rule changes, the manual work of partner screening, and the way it all gets locked inside one person.

2026-07-25
Japan's Certificate of Non-Applicability Explained — What Foreign Suppliers Must Provide Japanese Buyers [Feb 14, 2026 Update]

Japan's Certificate of Non-Applicability Explained — What Foreign Suppliers Must Provide Japanese Buyers [Feb 14, 2026 Update]

Japan's certificate of non-applicability is not an ECCN letter. What foreign suppliers must provide Japanese buyers after the February 2026 list update.

2026-01-23
Export Control Compliance in 2026: Automate the Risk with TRAFEED

Export Control Compliance in 2026: Automate the Risk with TRAFEED

Export Control Compliance in 2026: Automate the Risk with TRAFEED. "Export control doesn't apply to us" is a statement that gets companies into serious trouble.

2026-01-21