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HomeTRAFEED MediaH20 / H200 / MI308 China Export Status Explained: The 15% Fee Scheme and Regulatory Changes from 2022–2026
TRAFEED Media

H20 / H200 / MI308 China Export Status Explained: The 15% Fee Scheme and Regulatory Changes from 2022–2026

Published2026-05-20Updated2026-11-22Ryuta Hamamoto
export controlNVIDIA H20NVIDIA H200AMD MI30815% feeChina semiconductor controlsTRAFEED

Tracks China-export status for NVIDIA H20/H200 and AMD MI308/MI325X from the 2022 October 7 rules through the January 2026 final rule.

H20 / H200 / MI308 China Export Status Explained: The 15% Fee Scheme and Regulatory Changes from 2022–2026
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Hello, this is Ryuta Hamamoto from TIMEWELL. As of May 2026, the U.S.–China AI semiconductor control picture looks very different from six months earlier. NVIDIA’s H20 swung from ban to restart to production pause discussions. Higher-performance H200 and AMD’s MI325X became conditionally shippable to China. The condition: pay 15% of China sales to the U.S. government. That scheme is unprecedented.

(November 22, 2026) We had cited "EAR Part 740.29" as the basis for the case-by-case thresholds (TPP below 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth below 6,500 GB/s). We have corrected this to the license review policy in EAR §742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A): paragraph (A)(1) as of May 20, and (A)(2) after the November 19 rule. §740.29 is License Exception LPP, which the November 19 rule removed.

The body of this article reflects the position as of May 20, 2026. The interim final rule effective November 19, 2026 (91 FR 74970) changed the following:

  • Exports, reexports and in-country transfers of 3A090 (except 3A090.c), 4A090 and related items to or within Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil now also need a license (§742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), reviewed case by case). The requirement does not apply where the ultimate consignee or end user is headquartered in the United States, or its ultimate parent is, provided the §743.10 reports are filed.
  • The case-by-case policy for end users in China or Macau (TPP below 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth below 6,500 GB/s) keeps the same wording and now sits in §742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(2). All other applications to or within Country Group D:5 and Macau, or for entities headquartered (or with an ultimate parent headquartered) there, remain under a presumption of denial.
  • With the rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule, License Exceptions AIA (§740.27) and LPP (§740.29) were removed.
  • The presumptions that front-end fabricators and chip packagers face when exporting advanced-node logic ICs (Note 1 to ECCN 3A090) were also amended.

For practice after the November 19 rule, see Reported TSMC and Samsung China Shipment Pause: What the New BIS Foundry Rule Changed.

“What is the difference between H20 and H200?” “Is the 15% fee a tariff?” “Should we freeze GPU procurement for our China sites?” I get those three questions constantly. Below I answer them at a beginner-friendly level: chip specs, regulatory posture, timeline, the fee scheme, Chinese-side moves, and Japanese company practice. Information is current as of 20 May 2026. Always re-check BIS, METI, CISTEC, and other primary sources.

Three terms first

  • TPP (Total Processing Performance): BIS metric for advanced computing chip controls. It aggregates dense compute performance weighted by precision bit-width.
  • Performance Density: TPP divided by die area. High density can bring an item into control even if raw TPP looks moderate.
  • 15% fee scheme: Trump Administration arrangement requiring NVIDIA and AMD to pay 15% of covered China H20/MI308 sales to the U.S. federal government as a license condition (in operational use from August 2025).

Specs and regulatory posture by chip

NVIDIA Hopper family (H100 / H20 / H200)

Item H100 (global) H20 (China SKU) H200 (global)
Memory 80 GB HBM3 96 GB HBM3 141 GB HBM3e
Memory bandwidth 3.35 TB/s 4.0 TB/s 4.8 TB/s
FP16 performance ~1,979 TFLOPS ~296 TFLOPS ~1,979 TFLOPS
TDP 700W 350W 700W
Primary use Training + inference Mainly LLM inference Training + inference, large LLMs

H20 intentionally cuts compute to roughly 15% of H100 while keeping higher memory capacity and bandwidth. For memory-bound LLM inference it can even beat H100 by 20%+ in some workloads.

H200 is not a China-only chip. It is the global product that became conditionally China-exportable from January 2026, at about 6× H20 compute. AMD mirrors the pattern: MI308 as a downgraded MI300X, MI325X as flagship. The design idea is “keep compute under the line, maximize memory.”

Main BIS thresholds in force as of May 20, 2026 (the ECCN 3A090.a performance criteria and the license review policy in EAR §742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(1)):

  • AI accelerators with TPP ≥ 4,800, or (TPP ≥ 1,600 and Performance Density ≥ 5.92) need a China license
  • For end users in China or Macau, chips with TPP < 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth < 6,500 GB/s fall under case-by-case review, provided the applicant supplies the additional information in paragraph (dd) of Supplement No. 2 to Part 748 (H200 / MI325X class)
  • All other applications to China, Macau and Country Group D:5 (for example TPP ≥ 21,000, B200 / Blackwell class) remain under presumption of denial

After the November 19, 2026 rule (91 FR 74970), this China and Macau policy keeps the same wording and sits in §742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(2) (see the note at the top).

H20 was designed under the original thresholds (license-exception territory) yet was forced into individual licensing in April 2025. Political dynamics enter there.

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Timeline of China exportability (2022–2026)

Period Event
Oct 2022 Biden Administration 10/7 rules; A100/H100 effectively banned
Oct 2023 Tightening (10/17); A800/H800-class derivatives blocked; NVIDIA H20 and AMD MI308 launched
Jan 2025 Biden Administration publishes AI Diffusion Rule near end of term
Apr 2025 Trump Administration requires individual licenses for H20/MI308 to China (de facto ban)
Jul 2025 NVIDIA announces H20 China sales restart (after CEO–President meeting)
Aug 2025 Reports of “15% of China sales to U.S. government” deal; CAC guides major tech firms to refrain from H20 purchases
Dec 2025 President Trump signals H200/MI325X China export permission (fee reported at 25%)
15 Jan 2026 BIS final rule (FR 2026-00789) moves H200/MI325X from presumption of denial to case-by-case
Jan–Feb 2026 ~10 firms including Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance obtain purchase approvals (up to 75,000 units each reported)
2026 Q1 NVIDIA discloses zero H20 China customer revenue; AMD records ~$440M MI308-related inventory write-down
From Jan 2026 Reports that Chinese customs effectively blocked H200 clearance (Nikkei, Reuters)

H200 moved from “could not sell” toward “can sell conditionally.” H20 moved from “was selling” toward “China revenue near zero.” Do not reverse those vectors. I still see teams mix them up in internal briefings.

Five steps Japanese export-control teams should take now

Step 1: Inventory AI chip procurement and holdings

List H20/H100/H200/MI308/MI300X/MI325X by site. For China-subsidiary plans, run classification and EAR applicability. Cloud indirect use is common even when teams believe they “do not use advanced AI chips.”

Step 2: Confirm ECCN and current China status

ECCN is the five-character BIS classification that starts license analysis. Check current China posture (license required / case-by-case / presumption of denial) using Federal Register, law-firm alerts, and JETRO notes.

Step 3: Run de minimis analysis

For Japanese products incorporating U.S. chips destined for China, compute U.S.-origin value share against de minimis thresholds (generally 25% for China, but advanced AI semiconductors are structured so capture is common).

Step 4: Screen recipients against restricted lists

Check China subsidiaries and counterparties against the Entity List, Unverified List, and METI Foreign End User List. List placement is a regulatory designation, not a moral judgment on the company. Officer and shareholder changes can flip status, so monitor periodically.

Step 5: Build internal escalation and monitoring

Route new China-export cases to export control at intake. Monitor BIS rules, CAC guidance, and customs practice as a process, not as individual heroics.

Structure and constitutionality of the 15% fee

The scheme conditions licenses on paying 15% of covered China chip sales to the U.S. federal government (domestic R&D support). Washington Post reporting described an initial 20% ask settling at 15%; H200/MI325X were reported at 25%, but the final rule text does not codify the fee.

It is unusual because it is a direct commercial payment to the federal government, neither ordinary export duty nor a standard license fee. Accounting and receiving-agency practice remain opaque.

Constitutionality is contested. Article I, Section 9 (Export Clause) bars federal taxes on exports; ECRA 50 USC 4815(c) expressly limits fees related to export licenses. Lawfare analyses and Carnegie Endowment’s Peter Harrell, among others, call it effectively an export tax of dubious constitutionality. The government frames it as consideration for a license, not a tax. Standing is hard to establish (NVIDIA and AMD have weak incentives to sue while China market access continues), and as of May 2026 no formal challenge had been filed. Practically, treat litigation as medium-term uncertainty and comply with current rules short-term.

Supporters argue controlled exports with monitoring beat bans and fund domestic semiconductor R&D. Vendors prefer sharing revenue to losing China entirely. Critics fear executive-branch deal-making over discretionary export permissions. The compliance problem is predictability. Frameworks that change after CEO–President meetings shrink planning horizons.

Chinese-side moves and spillover to Japanese companies

CAC guidance and domestic acceleration

On 12 August 2025, reporting said China’s Cyberspace Administration (CAC) convened ByteDance, Alibaba, Tencent, and others and administratively guided restraint on H20 purchases for security reasons, including concern that NVIDIA might have to provide customer-related materials to the U.S. government. Domestic AI chip vendors surged (Cambricon 1H 2025 revenue reported up 40×+ YoY). Huawei Ascend became a major alternative product line in that market shift. From January 2026, customs blocking of H200 was reported even after roughly 10 firms secured approvals for up to 75,000 units. U.S. approval is not Chinese delivery.

Three Japanese-company scenarios

U.S. EAR applies to re-exports of U.S. items/technology via third countries (including Japan):

  1. Japan HQ buys U.S. AI chips and transfers them to a China subsidiary → BIS license; FEFTA catch-all may also apply
  2. Japanese products embedding U.S. chips exported to China → de minimis analysis
  3. U.S. persons involved in China-side chip use → person-based controls (EAR 744.6) can apply

Using H20/H200-class cloud compute as an end user is not automatically a controlled “export,” but vendor selection criteria still need risk assessment.

Japanese FEFTA / economic security context

METI continues comprehensive and specific bulk licenses and updates security trade control guidance; CISTEC runs EAR briefings. Combined with the Economic Security Promotion Act, AI-chip rules will keep fragmenting. FEFTA catch-all can require licenses for unlisted items when military end-use diversion risk exists under Japanese rules. Dual EAR and FEFTA compliance is normal.

Also readWhat the AI Chip Diversion Reports Teach Us About Thin Counterparties and Insider ApproachesHow can counterparty checks help prevent AI chip diversion?

FAQ

Q1. How do H20 and H200 differ under the rules?
H20 is a reduced-performance China SKU; H200 is the global flagship. H20 was designed under thresholds then forced into individual licensing (April 2025). H200 sat above thresholds (presumption of denial) then moved to case-by-case (January 2026)—opposite directions.

Q2. Is the 15% fee like a Japanese tariff?
Formally no—it is a license-condition payment of a revenue share. Whether it is a “tax” is the U.S. legal dispute. Japan’s export trade control order and customs law have no close analogue.

Q3. Checklist when sending U.S. GPUs to a China subsidiary?
(a) ECCN and current China control level, (b) re-export under de minimis, (c) BIS license need, (d) FEFTA service-transaction / bulk license need, (e) Entity List status of the recipient.

Q4. How severe are penalties?
EAR criminal: up to $1 million or 20 years; civil: up to ~$308,000 per violation (inflation-adjusted) or twice transaction value, plus denial of export privileges (Denied Person List)—business-ending risk.

July 2026: the Japan–India summit

China-related AI chip controls center on U.S. EAR, but Japan’s economic-security frame is also moving. At the Japan–India summit in Delhi on 2 July 2026, the two governments issued the Japan–India Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation, committing to project-based cooperation in five priority areas: semiconductors, critical minerals, information and communications technology, clean energy and pharmaceuticals. The two leaders also welcomed that about ¥2 trillion of investment had already been decided toward the ¥10 trillion private investment target set in 2025 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-India Summit Meeting and Luncheon," July 2, 2026, in Japanese). At the joint press announcement, Prime Minister Takaichi said both countries regard strengthening supply chains for critical goods as an urgent task (Visit to India (2), joint press announcement, Prime Minister's Office of Japan, 2 July 2026, in Japanese). Diversifying supply of critical goods, semiconductors included, among partners can help manage AI-chip geopolitics. Export-control teams should plan procurement on U.S.–China dual axes plus trusted-partner supply redesign. See Japan–India summit and economic security.

Summary

From the 2022 10/7 rules to 2026, China-related AI semiconductor controls changed almost completely. The Trump Administration partly unwound Biden-era bans into a 15% revenue-share model. China accelerated localization and used customs to constrain delivery. Front-line teams must track U.S. EAR, FEFTA catch-all, and Chinese import practice together.

Japanese companies need structures that survive multiple scenarios (procurement plans, site layout, and intra-group transfers) rather than firefighting each rule change. AI infrastructure lead times are long. Misreading the rules costs years. Discretionary schemes like the 15% fee are hard to forecast, but understanding the structure leaves room for calm decisions instead of overreaction.

If I had to start Monday morning with one action, it would be inventorying which H20, H200, MI308, and MI325X units you hold or plan to buy by site, then checking current China license posture for each ECCN.

Practical five steps again:

  • Step 1: Inventory AI chip procurement and holdings
  • Step 2: Confirm ECCN and current regulatory status
  • Step 3: Run de minimis analysis
  • Step 4: Screen recipients against Entity List and related lists
  • Step 5: Build internal rules and monitoring

Related reading: AI export regulation 2026, China export risk 2026, EAR affiliate rule risk, Dual-use technology diversion risk.

If you want Entity List and end-user list screening, along with classification records, for AI chip transactions to run as a routine process, you can contact us about TRAFEED. An overview of its features is in the TRAFEED service catalog (PDF).

References

  • BIS Press Release: Department of Commerce Revises License Review Policy for Semiconductors Exported to China — https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-revises-license-review-policy-semiconductors-exported-china
  • Federal Register: Revision to License Review Policy for Advanced Computing Commodities (FR 2026-00789, effective 15 Jan 2026) — https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/15/2026-00789/revision-to-license-review-policy-for-advanced-computing-commodities
  • 15 CFR §742.6 Regional stability (license review policy in (b)(10)(iii)(A): (A)(1) as of May 20, 2026, and (A)(2) from November 19, 2026; checked against eCFR versions) — https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-742/section-742.6
  • Federal Register: Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors (91 FR 74970, effective November 19, 2026; amends §742.6 and removes §740.27 and §740.29) — https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/11/19/2026-23529/addressing-remote-access-to-advanced-semiconductors
  • CRS R48642 Advanced Semiconductors and U.S.-China Strategic Competition — https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48642
  • Morgan Lewis: BIS Revises Export Review Policy for Advanced AI Chips — https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2026/01/bis-revises-export-review-policy-for-advanced-ai-chips-destined-for-china-and-macau
  • Covington & Burling: U.S. Commerce Department Revises License Review Policy — https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2026/01/us-commerce-department-revises-license-review-policy-for-exports-of-certain-advanced-computing-commodities-to-china-and-macau
  • Lawfare: Trump's Illegal AI Chip Export Controls and Who Can Challenge Them — https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-s-illegal-ai-chip-export-controls--and-who-can-challenge-them
  • Washington Post: Nvidia, AMD strike deal to share 15% of China chip revenue (10 Aug 2025) — https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/08/10/nvidia-amd-china-chips-deal-trump/
  • CNBC: Trump approves Nvidia H200 China AI chips with 25% deal (14 Jan 2026) — https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/14/trump-nvidia-h200-china-ai-chips.html
  • Al Jazeera: China raises concerns over Nvidia's H20 chips with local firms — https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/8/12/china-raises-concerns-over-nvidias-h20-chips-with-local-firms-report
  • Nikkei: China customs reportedly holds Nvidia H200 imports — https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOGN1508E0V10C26A1000000/
  • JETRO Security Trade Control Quick Guide (Jan 2024) — https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/world/security_trade_control/pdf/guide/202401_v2.pdf
  • CISTEC EAR overview — https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/keizai_anzenhosho/us/ear.html
  • AMD 10-K / earnings materials (MI308 inventory) — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000002488/000000248826000014/amdq425earningsslidesfin.htm
  • NVIDIA 8-K (April 2025 H20 license notice) — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581025000082/nvda-20250409.htm

This article was produced with the help of AI. A human verified the primary sources and edited the text before publication.

Read next

Articles that answer the question you are likely to have next.

  1. 1ECCN 3A090 Classification in Practice: Calculating TPP, Performance Density and Transistor CountsHow do you determine a chip's ECCN from its performance figures?
  2. 2What the AI Chip Diversion Reports Teach Us About Thin Counterparties and Insider ApproachesHow can counterparty checks help prevent AI chip diversion?
  3. 3US-China AI Semiconductor Regulation Calendar 2024-2026: Reading the Symmetric Interlock on One PageHow do you follow US and Chinese chip rules on a single timeline?

This article is part of TRAFEED Media, our practical media on export controls and economic security

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